MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BERNARD M. JONES, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Lori Anne Coleman, seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits (DIB). The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction over this matter by a United States Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The Commissioner has filed the Administrative Record (AR) [Doc. No. 12], and both parties have briefed their positions.1 For the reasons stated below, the Court reverses the Commissioner's decision and remands the matter for further proceedings.

I. Procedural Background

On June 17, 2016, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff is not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to DIB. AR 11-19. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Id. at 1-5. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision constitutes the Commissioner's final decision. See Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff timely commenced this action for judicial review.

II. The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ followed the multi-step sequential evaluation process required by agency regulations. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining process); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Following this process, the ALJ first determined that Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements for DIB through December 31, 2018 and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since November 2, 2013, her alleged onset date. AR 13.

At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from severe degenerative disease, but that, at step three, her impairment does not meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id. at 13, 16.

The ALJ next determined Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), concluding that she can perform sedentary work with exertional limitations. Id. at 16. Finally, at step four, relying on a vocational expert's (VE) testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work. Id. at 19. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act. Id.

III. Claims Presented for Judicial Review

Plaintiff presents two claims for review. First, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in rejecting the consultative examiner's opinion that she can only sit for three hours total in an eight-hour workday. See Pl.'s Br. at 12-17. Second, Plaintiff claims the ALJ also erred in rejecting the medical expert's opinion that her medications limit her ability to "function[] coherently or drive[] safely." Id. at 17-20 (citing AR 39). Because the Court finds reversal necessary on Plaintiff's second argument, it does not address her first.2

IV. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that the court only reviews an ALJ's decision "to determine whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied" and in that review, "we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

V. Analysis

Orthopedist Dr. Henry S. Urbank, Jr., M.D.,3 reviewed Plaintiff's medical file and offered his expert testimony, at the SSA's request. AR 33-41. Dr. Urbank expressed two opinions. First, he stated that he did not believe that Plaintiff's severe impairment meets or equals Listing 1.04A. Id. at 38. Second, he opined that Plaintiff "takes way too much medicine" and noted that he "wouldn't have her drive [his] children around taking all those pills." Id. at 37. He then explained:

Id. at 39. When asked, the expert clarified that he did not believe Plaintiff was abusing her medications, and was instead taking her medications as prescribed, for her "well defined" severe impairment, which was "a big deal." Id. at 40. After the expert's testimony, Plaintiff's attorney stated that he wished they had asked Dr. Urbank how much he believed Plaintiff would be "off task" based on her medication. Id. at 42.4 The ALJ indicated further questioning on that front was unnecessary because "we can assume that was part of his answer" and "that's fine." Id.

Ultimately, the ALJ gave Dr. Urbank's opinion "great weight" but did not incorporate any functional limitations into Plaintiff's RFC related to her medication side-effects. Id. at 16, 18. The ALJ noted that: (1) Plaintiff's pain medications were reduced in 2015, (2) Plaintiff was able to adjust her medications in order to drive, and (3) other treatment notes showed Plaintiff's medications "allowed her to perform her activities of daily living" and reduce her pain "to a 4/10" which "allows her to work and do everything she needs to do." Id. at 17-18.

Even though he was a non-examining consultant, the ALJ was required to properly consider Dr. Urbank's opinion5 and provide legitimate reasons for discounting it. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Plaintiff claims the ALJ committed legal error because the reasons she gave to reject Dr. Urbank's opinion were not legitimate. See Pl.'s Br. at 17-20. The Court agrees.

First, the ALJ implied that he was rejecting Dr. Urbank's opinion regarding Plaintiff's medication side effects because the record "shows that in mid-2015, [Plaintiff] changed pain management physicians" and her "narcotic pain medications were reduced." AR 17-18. But Dr. Urbank considered those very records and nevertheless opined that Plaintiff was taking too many medications to "function coherently" and drive safely.6 Id. at 33 (indicating Dr. Urbank had reviewed Exhibits 1F through 6F, which include Plaintiff's 2015 pain management records), 37, 39. Indeed, the record reflects that after mid-2015, Plaintiff was still taking multiple narcotic medications at a time. Id. at 798, 799, 801, 813, 816, 824, 828, 832, 836, 840, 844, 847.

Second, the ALJ seemed to reject the expert's opinion because Plaintiff "took her pain medications so as not to prevent her ability to drive." Id. at 18. However, the ALJ did not explain how this is related to Dr. Urbank's opinion that someone taking that much medication could not function coherently, i.e., maintain concentration and pace, and it is also not completely accurate. That is, Plaintiff explained in her hearing that before 2015, she could manipulate her medication dosages so that she could drive to work, but said that the manipulation caused her additional limitations towards the end of the workday. Id. at 36. Moreover, Plaintiff testified that after 2015, she was unable to control the side effects (for purposes of driving) because of the unique nature of the medication. Id. at 62.

Third and finally, the ALJ appears to have rejected Dr. Urbank's opinion based on notations in the record that Plaintiff's pain medications reduced her pain to a "4/10" and "allows her to work and do everything she needs to do." Id. at 18. Notably, it is not entirely clear from this language whether the physician meant Plaintiff could work and perform daily activities because of a pain reduction, or despite her pain medication. The ALJ obviously interpreted it as the latter, but in doing so, seemingly relied on boilerplate language while ignoring conflicting medical evidence. For example, Plaintiff's pain management physician from 2012 to mid-2015, made the identical "functional status" assessment in every single treatment note, finding: "With the pain medications, [Plaintiff's] pain is reduced to a 4/10. This allows her to work and do everything she needs to do." Id. at 294, 305, 321, 332, 342, 352, 364, 375, 386, 398, 409, 421, 433, 444, 454, 465, 476, 487, 498, 512, 524, 535, 547, 560, 572, 585, 597, 609, 627, 640, 653, 665, 675, 690, 703, 716, 728, 740, 753. The ALJ relied on this never-changing language despite the fact that many of these records pre-date Plaintiff's alleged onset date, see id. at 294, 305, 321, 332, 342, 352, 364, 375, 386, 398, 409, 421, and, more importantly, the "functional status" language frequently conflicted with the same physician's notations about Plaintiff's pain complaints, ability to remain working, and reporting of much higher pain assessments. See id. at 433, 444, 454, 465, 487, 498, 512, 524, 535, 547, 560, 572, 585, 597, 609, 627, 640, 653, 665, 675, 690, 728, 753. An ALJ must "consider all evidence" in the record when making a decision and may not pick-and-choose among medical reports. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012).7

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to offer any legitimate reason for rejecting the relevant portion of Dr. Urbank's opinion.8 Further, the Court further finds that the error is not harmless. Although Dr. Urbank was not asked to articulate how much Plaintiff was likely to be "off task" based on her medications, the ALJ conceded that "we can assume" the physician was expressing an opinion that she would be off task. AR 42. And, the VE testified that Plaintiff's past relevant work can likely not be performed with even a twenty percent reduction in concentration or pace. Id. at 66. Under such circumstances, the Court cannot know whether Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work and must therefore remand the Commissioner's decision.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth, the Commissioner's decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.