ORDER

GARY M. PURCELL, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Kromer brings this action for judicial review of defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration's final decision that she is not disabled under the Social Security Act. The matter was referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Gary M. Purcell for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (b)(3), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Judge Purcell recommends the Acting Commissioner's decision be affirmed. The parties were advised of their right to file an objection to the Report and Recommendation by June 14, 2018. No objections have been filed. The parties therefore waive any right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues raised in the Report and Recommendation. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059-60 (10th Cir. 1996); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation [Doc. #24], a copy of which is attached to this order. The Acting Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner denying his applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434. Defendant has answered the Complaint and filed the administrative record (hereinafter "AR___"), and the parties have briefed the issues. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.

I. Administrative History and Agency Decision

In his applications, Plaintiff alleged that he was disabled beginning on October 29, 2012. (AR 17, 275, 279, 332, 376, 378). Plaintiff alleged that he was disabled due to asthma, degenerative disc disease of the back, sciatica, anxiety, panic attacks, major depression, bipolar disorder, restless leg syndrome, insomnia, and attention deficit disorder. (AR 335). Plaintiff has a 12th grade education and previously worked as a supply room clerk, inventory control clerk, and a laborer. (AR 26, 70, 343-350). Plaintiff's medical record reveals that he has received treatment for musculoskeletal impairments and underwent surgery for an ankle injury. (AR 430-459, 478-479, 488-537, 560-563).

At a consultative examination in June 2016, Plaintiff stated that he has never received counseling services or inpatient treatment for his mental health impairments. (AR 578). However, Plaintiff was involuntarily hospitalized in January 2014 after threatening his doctor. (AR 23, 472, 474, 482). Plaintiff also testified during the hearing that he had been hospitalized on four or five occasions "years ago" due to mental health problems. (AR 48-49).

Plaintiff appeared at an administrative hearing conducted on April 26, 2016 before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Jodi B. Levine.1 (AR 34-76). At this hearing, Plaintiff testified concerning his usual daily activities, symptoms, functional abilities, medications, and medical treatment. A vocational expert ("VE") also testified. On August 25, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff's applications for benefits. (AR 28).

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process, required by agency regulations, to determine whether Plaintiff had been disabled at any time during the relevant period. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining process); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since his alleged onset date. (AR 19). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the severe impairments of degenerative joint and disc disease, asthma, and depression. (AR 20).

At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. (AR 20-21).

At the next step, the ALJ considered the medical and nonmedical evidence in the record and determined Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform work at the light exertional level; however, the ALJ found Plaintiff could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; could stand and/or walk up to one hour continuously or sit up to one hour continuously with the change of position occurring at the workstation without the need for a break; could understand, remember and carry out simple and detailed instructions with only occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors and no interaction with the general public. (AR 22).

At step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ relied on the hearing testimony of the VE, who, in turn, relied on the description of Plaintiff's past relevant work contained in the U.S. Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"). Taking into account Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC for work, the ALJ found at step four that Plaintiff was not capable of performing his past relevant work as a laborer, inventory control clerk, and a supply room clerk. (AR 26).

At step five, however, the ALJ relied on the testimony from the VE and found Plaintiff could perform other light, unskilled jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy including small parts assembler, hand packer, and mail sorter. (AR 26-27).

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the ALJ's decision on July 7, 2017. (AR 1-6). Therefore, the ALJ's decision constitutes the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; 416.1481, Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009).

II. Plaintiff's Arguments

Plaintiff raises several claims in support of reversing the Commissioner's decision. Pl.'s Br. (Doc. No. 19) at 2-12. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ (1) improperly evaluated the opinion of consultative examiner Taimur Paracha, MD, and (2) improperly analyzed the evidence concerning Plaintiff's mental impairments. Id.

III. General Legal Standards Guiding Judicial Review

The Court must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010); Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). The "determination of whether the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Consequently, [the Court must] remain mindful that evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record." Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

The Social Security Act authorizes payment of benefits to an individual with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. A disability is an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); accord, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 416.909 (duration requirement). Both the "impairment" and the "inability" must be expected to last not less than twelve months. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).

The agency follows a five-step sequential evaluation procedure in resolving the claims of disability applicants. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (b)-(g), 416.920(a)(4), (b)-(g). "If the claimant is not considered disabled at step three, but has satisfied her burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability under steps one, two, and four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform other work in the national economy in view of her age, education, and work experience." Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005). "The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he [or she] is not able to perform other work." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 142 (1987).

IV. Analysis

A. Opinion of Dr. Paracha

Plaintiff argues there is a contradiction in the ALJ simultaneously characterizing Dr. Paracha's examination of Plaintiff as "thorough" and also noting that some of the functional limitations assessed by Dr. Paracha were "unsupported by the physical findings of the examination itself." Doc. No. 19 at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Paracha's opinion "cannot be both" and that the ALJ's findings are therefore "inconsistent and incongruent." Id.

Plaintiff's semantic argument is without merit. As a matter of simple logic, it is entirely possible for a consultative examiner to conduct a thorough physical examination, and also for the ALJ to find that the functional limitations assessed by the examiner in connection with that examination were inconsistent with the results of the examination itself. There is no inherent inconsistency whatsoever in such a finding.

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate many of the exertional, postural, and manipulative limitations assessed by Dr. Paracha into the RFC without providing good reasons for omitting them. Doc. No. 19 at 3-4. When assessing a medical opinion, the ALJ must consider the factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) and 416.927 and give good reasons for the weight he or she assigns to the opinion. See Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir.2003).

In evaluating Dr. Paracha's opinion, the ALJ discussed Dr. Paracha's physical examination findings at length. (AR 23-24). In comparing the functional limitations assessed by Dr. Paracha to the results of his physical examination of Plaintiff, the ALJ found that "while [Dr. Paracha's] lifting and carrying assessments are more reasonable given the overall findings, the limits to sitting, standing and walking are not congruous with unassisted ambulation and excellent musculoskeletal strength." (AR 24).

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ excluded several "postural" limitations assessed by Dr. Paracha from the RFC. Doc. No. 19 at 4. As the Commissioner correctly notes, many of the excluded limitations cited by Plaintiff relate to Plaintiff's exertional and manipulative abilities. Id.; Comm.'s Br. (Doc. No. 23) at 5. With respect to postural activities, Dr. Paracha assessed Plaintiff as never being able to climb ramps or stairs, never climb ladders or scaffolds, occasionally balance, stoop, and crawl, and frequently kneel and crouch. (AR 569). In formulating the RFC, the ALJ did include postural limitations, adopting Dr. Paracha's opinion that Plaintiff is unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (AR 22). As discussed above, the ALJ was clear about her reasons for rejecting some of the exertional limitations contained in Dr. Paracha's opinion. (AR 24). In evaluating the rest of the evidentiary record, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff did not exhibit a loss of gait or station. (AR 20).

With respect to the remaining postural limitations assessed by Dr. Paracha, the Commissioner, citing Social Security regulations, correctly notes that kneeling and crawling are relatively rare even in arduous work. Doc. No. 23 at 6, citing SSR 85-15, 1985 WL, 56857, at *7 ("Crawling on hands and knees and feet is a relatively rare activity even in arduous work, and limitations on the ability to crawl would be of little significance in the broad world of work.").

The Commissioner's argument is supported by descriptions of the jobs cited by the VE at step five, which are contained in the Selected Characteristics of Occupations2 ("SCO"). The detailed SCO descriptions of the three jobs cited by the VE — small parts assembler, hand packager, and mail sorter — establish that even if the ALJ had adopted all the postural limitations assessed by Dr. Paracha, Plaintiff would remain capable of performing the jobs cited by the VE.3

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred by not including any manipulative limitations in the RFC. Specifically, Plaintiff notes the ALJ found on examination that Plaintiff had reduced grip strength and numbness in his left hand. Doc. No. 19 at 4. Citing SSR 96-9p, Plaintiff argues the ALJ "never properly considered the rulings," and "any significant manipulative limitation of an individual's ability to handle and work with small objects with both hands will result in a significant erosion of the unskilled sedentary occupational base." Id. at 5-6 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff is correct about the contents of SSR 96-9p, but is incorrect about its applicability to this case. The provisions of SSR 96-9p detail how certain physical limitations will erode the base of unskilled sedentary work. In this case, the ALJ clearly restricted Plaintiff to light, rather than sedentary work. (AR 22). The SSR applicable to this case is SSR 83-14, which provides that unlike unskilled sedentary work "many unskilled light jobs do not entail fine use of the fingers" but instead require only "gross use of the hands to grasp, hold, and turn objects." SSR 83-14, 1983 WL 31254, at *4.

With respect to manipulative limitations, Dr. Paracha assessed Plaintiff as being capable of occasionally handling, fingering, feeling, and pushing/pulling with both hands, and noted that Plaintiff had a somewhat reduced range of motion in his left palmar and dorsal wrist hinges. (AR 568, 575). However, Dr. Paracha further assessed Plaintiff as being able to effectively oppose the thumb to the fingertip, being able to manipulate small objects, and being able to effectively grasp tools such as a hammer. (AR 575).

The record does not contain, and Plaintiff does not allege, any physical impairment that would cause the manipulative limitations Dr. Paracha found during his examination. In his function report, Plaintiff stated that he had no problems using his hands. (AR 357). In evaluating the record, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff did not exhibit a lack of gross and fine manipulation, displayed no evidence of joint dysfunction or malformation, and that there was no consistent evidence of reflex loss, motor loss, sensory loss, or muscle atrophy. (AR 20). Other physical examinations conducted since Plaintiff's alleged onset date revealed no problems with Plaintiff's extremities. (AR 475, 490, 498, 501, 505, 515, 524, 527, 530, 533).

While the ALJ could have provided a more precise connection between her evaluation of the record and her findings concerning Plaintiff's manipulative limitations, Tenth Circuit case law clearly establishes that courts do not "insist on technical perfection" in an ALJ's decision and discussion of his or her reasoning. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Davis v. Erdmann, 607 F.2d 917, 919 n.1 (10th Cir. 1979) ("[W]e will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." (citations omitted)).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ never properly assigned weight to Dr. Paracha's opinion, and that "to a reasonable person" it would appear that the ALJ assigned Dr. Paracha's opinion both "some and no weight." Doc. No. 19 at 7. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ "did not specify what weight, if any" was given to Dr. Paracha's opinion. Id. at 8. Plaintiff's argument has a degree of merit. In weighing Dr. Paracha's opinion, the ALJ did not specify the precise weight she was giving Dr. Paracha's opinion, by using terms such as "great weight," "some weight," or "little weight," as is typical in Social Security hearing decisions. (AR 23-24). However, in this case, the text of the ALJ's decision is clear about which portions of Dr. Paracha's opinion the ALJ adopted, and Tenth Circuit case law is also clear that an oversight of this kind is not grounds for reversal if the ALJ has otherwise provided an explanation for the weight assigned to an opinion. See Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 761 (10th Cir. 2003) (although ALJ did not use phrase "I find" in connection with conclusion, form of words should not obscure the substance of what ALJ actually did); see also Keyes-Zachary at 1156 (in reviewing an ALJ's decision, the court "should, indeed must, exercise common sense.").

Plaintiff further argues that as a consultative examiner, Dr. Paracha's opinion is subject to the same inquiry as an opinion from a treating source physician and must be given "controlling weight" if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques" and is not "inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." Doc. No. 19 at 7 (citing Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003); SSR 96-2p, at *2).

For claims filed before March 27, 2017, SSR 96-2p governs the evaluation of treating source opinions.4 Social Security regulations establish when a physician can be considered a treating source. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2).5 Here, Plaintiff does not actually argue that Dr. Paracha, who appears to have only examined Plaintiff once in the context of a consultative examination, qualifies as a treating physician. Instead, Plaintiff appears to argue that opinions from consultative examiners are subject to the same two-step inquiry as treating source opinions.6

Plaintiff is incorrect. Social Security regulations establish that generally the agency will give "more weight to opinions from your treating sources. . ." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). These regulations explain that treating source opinions are evaluated differently than opinions from consultative examiners because

Id. Tenth Circuit case law further establishes the sequential, two-step inquiry discussed above relates exclusively to the evaluation of treating source opinions. Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1339 (10th Cir. 2011).

B. ALJ's Evaluation of Mental Health Impairments

With respect to Plaintiff's mental impairments, Plaintiff argues that "just because" Plaintiff can "supposedly" carry out work-related mental activities consistent with the RFC does not mean that "mental health symptomology will not also be in evidence when performing" the "simple and complex"7 instructions indicated by the RFC. Doc. No. 19 at 9. Plaintiff urges the Court to "think of it . . . as if the ALJ's job is a prescription for removal of mental health symptoms. The mental health symptoms might be not as evident in simple work, but they will not be eliminated." Id.

Plaintiff argues that despite assigning "great weight" to the opinion of consultative examiner Robert Danaher, Psy.D, the ALJ did not adopt all the functional limitations assessed by Dr. Danaher into the RFC. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff specifically notes that Dr. Danaher assessed Plaintiff as having "moderate" limitations in interacting appropriately with the public and responding appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting, and as having "mild" limitations in interacting appropriately with supervisors and co-workers. Id. Plaintiff further argues that the RFC should include additional restrictions related to Plaintiff's depression, such as an off-task limitation, "perhaps a 20% reduction" in the ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace or a restriction involving responding appropriately to others in a work situation. Id. at 10.

In evaluating Plaintiff's mental impairments, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's activities of daily living, testimony, the evidentiary record, and the relevant opinion evidence. (AR 21, 23-25). The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff's January 2014 psychiatric admission, noted that Plaintiff had not sought "significant or appropriate" treatment for his mental health problems, discussed Plaintiff's symptom improvement when taking medication, and discussed in detail the conclusions of Dr. Danaher and the state agency physicians. (AR 24-25).

Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not adopt every functional limitation assessed by Dr. Danaher into the RFC, notably a moderate restriction involving responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting. (AR 586). However, as Plaintiff himself acknowledges, the ALJ "was not required to formulate an RFC that adopted a medical opinion present in the record wholesale." Doc. No. 19 at 11 (citing McDonald v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-00871-CMA, 2011 WL 1398928, at *5 (D. Colo. April 13, 2011) ("There is no requirement in the social security regulations that an ALJ must come to the same conclusion as at least one medical source opinion.")).

Plaintiff's argument that there is "no accounting" for Plaintiff's depression-related symptomology in the RFC is factually inaccurate. Doc. No. 19 at 10. In assessing the RFC, the ALJ found that because of his severe impairment of depression, Plaintiff can understand, remember and carry out simple and detailed instructions with only occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors and no interaction with the general public. (AR 22). Plaintiff does not cite any opinion evidence from an acceptable medical source, or anything else in the medical record, to support his suggestion that the ALJ should have assessed an off-task limitation, or "perhaps a 20% reduction" in the ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace. Doc. No. 19 at 10.

With respect to the moderate restriction assessed by Dr. Danaher involving responding appropriately to usual work situations and changes in a routine work setting, even if this limitation had been included in the RFC, Plaintiff would still have been able to perform the unskilled work cited by the VE at step five of the sequential evaluation. See SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *9 (Unskilled work generally requires only the following: (1) "[u]nderstanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions"; (2) "[m]aking judgments that are commensurate with the functions of unskilled work—i.e., simple work-related decisions"; (3) "[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations"; and (4) "[d]ealing with changes in a routine work setting."); see also Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2015) (a limitation to unskilled work was sufficient to account for a moderate limitation in work-related mental areas such as concentration, persistence, and pace).

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the foregoing findings, it is recommended that judgment enter AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner to deny Plaintiff's applications for benefits. The parties are advised of their respective right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before June 14th, 2018, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.").

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addressed herein is denied.