ORDER

DAVID L. RUSSELL, District Judge.

Before this Court is the Motion for Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) filed by Plaintiff's attorney, Miles L. Mitzner. Doc. 35. On January 13, 2017, the Court entered Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and remanded this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings on Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits. See Docs. 24-25. Upon remand, the Commissioner concluded Plaintiff was disabled and entitled to past-due benefits. Plaintiff's counsel now moves for an Order approving an award of $32,826.00— equaling twenty-five percent of the back benefits awarded to Plaintiff by the Social Security Administration ("SSA")—pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Although the Commissioner does not object to the proposed award, this Court must perform an independent review to ensure that the award is reasonable. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Having considered counsel's request, the Court finds as follows.

When "a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Counsel requesting the fee bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the requested fee. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. The attorney fee award is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not responsible for payment. Id. at 802. "[Section] 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases." Id. at 807. Factors include: (1) the character of the representation and results achieved; (2) whether any dilatory conduct might allow attorneys to "profit from the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in court"; and (3) whether "the benefits are [so] large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case" that a windfall results. Id. at 808.

As prescribed in Gisbrecht, the Court begins its analysis by reviewing the contingency fee agreement executed by Plaintiff and his counsel. See Doc. 35-1. Plaintiff agreed to pay attorney's fees not to exceed twenty-five percent of the back benefits awarded.1 Here, the requested fee award equals both the contingency fee and the statutory maximum. The Court next considers the appropriate factors to determine whether a downward adjustment is necessary in this case, finding that such an adjustment is warranted. Plaintiff's counsel presents records indicating that his firm expended 31.45 total hours performing legal work before this Court to obtain remand and EAJA fees, broken into 23.65 hours of attorney work and 7.8 hours of paralegal work. See Doc. 35-3. But while the legal work performed by Plaintiff's counsel was of a professional quality and resulted in a remand to the SSA, without which Plaintiff would not have received past benefits, the Court finds that the award requested here is not reasonable. An award of $32,826.00 would equate to an hourly rate of $1,043.75, far exceeding the $190 noncontingent, hourly attorney rates reflected in counsel's motion.2

Counsel cites an unpublished case from this Court, Gracey v. Astrue, No. CIV-05-0823-HE, ECF No. 38 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2008), in support of his fee request. But Gracey, if anything, reveals how exorbitant counsel's request is. In Gracey, plaintiff was awarded past-due disability benefits totaling $75,499.00; Plaintiff's counsel requested $16,000.00 in attorney's fees, less than twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits. Gracey, No. CIV-05-0823-HE, at 1.3 In order to assess the reasonableness of the requested fee, the court instructed counsel to submit her non-contingent hourly billing charge. Id. at 2; see also Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 ("[T]he court may require the claimant's attorney to submit, . . . as an aid to the court's assessment of the reasonableness of the fee yielded by the fee agreement, a record of the hours spent representing the claimant and a statement of the lawyer's normal hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases."). Counsel was unable to comply, though, as her practice was primarily conducted on a contingency fee basis. Id. at 2-3. Accordingly, the court set as a "reasonable baseline" $275 per hour in light of its "familiarity with hourly rates for comparable appellate work." Id. at 3. To this baseline the court applied a multiplier of 2.5, which "t[ook] into account the various contingencies involved and the somewhat unique factors impacting a reasonableness determination in [the § 406(b)] context." Id. (citing Ellick v. Barnhart, 445 F.Supp.2d 1166, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2006)). The resulting reasonable fee amount was $13,008.75 (2.5 times an hourly rate of $275 for attorney work and $85 for paralegal work)—less than counsel's requested fee of $16,000, which was already below the twenty-five percent ceiling.

The Court finds Gracey's logic persuasive. But applying Gracey's methodology to counsel's records yields a reasonable fee amount far less than the amount he requested.4 To begin, counsel—unlike the attorney in Gracey—has provided hourly, non-contingent billing rates for his firm's work: $192/hour for attorney work, $110/hour for paralegal work. See Doc. 35-3. Consequently, the Court, unlike in Gracey, need not construct a "reasonable baseline" because it has the data needed. The Court will apply a 2.5 multiplier to the rates provided by counsel, in recognition of the "various contingencies" and "unique factors" salient to the § 406(b) context and contingency fee contracts generally. Applying this multiplier to the rates provided, however, does not yield a fee of $32,826.00. Rather, the reasonable fee for Plaintiff's counsel in this case is $13,497.00, which represents 23.65 hours of attorney work billed at $480/hour (or $192/hour times 2.5) plus 7.8 hours of paralegal work billed at $275/hour (or $110/hour times 2.5).5

Plaintiff's counsel is not simply entitled to twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits, either because it is the statutory ceiling or because the underlying contingency contract included this amount as a potential fee. Under the statute, counsel is entitled to a reasonable fee, taking into account both the underlying contingency contract and the factors outlined above designed to ensure that counsel does not enjoy a windfall. Thus, counsel's reasonable fee is $13,497.00, which represents an upward departure from the lodestar amount, but evades the windfall Plaintiff's counsel would enjoy from a $32,826.00 fee.

Accordingly, counsel's motion, as modified above, is GRANTED. The court approves an award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $13,497.00. The Commissioner shall pay the fees directly to Plaintiff's counsel Miles L. Mitzner of the Mitzner Law Firm, PLLC. Counsel shall refund to the plaintiff the previously-awarded EAJA fee of $5,398.90 (Order, Doc. 29). See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.

IT IS SO ORDERED.