SHON T. ERWIN, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying Plaintiff's application for benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner has answered and filed a transcript of the administrative record (hereinafter TR. ____). The parties have consented to jurisdiction over this matter by a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
The parties have briefed their positions, and the matter is now at issue. Based on the Court's review of the record and the issues presented, the Court
Initially and on reconsideration, the Social Security Administration (SSA) denied Plaintiff's application for benefits. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a partially unfavorable decision. (TR. 21-35). Subsequently, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review,
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process required by agency regulations. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 23, 2015, his amended alleged onset date. (TR. 24). At step two, the ALJ determined that Mr. Weaver had the severe impairment of disorder of the spine. (TR. 24). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairment did not meet or medically equal any of the presumptively disabling impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (TR. 26).
At step four, the ALJ concluded that between the amended alleged onset date of disability of October 23, 2015 through March 26, 2017, Mr. Weaver retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a), except he could only occasionally stoop. (TR. 26).
This Court reviews the Commissioner's final decision "to determin[e] whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied." Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010). Under the "substantial evidence" standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains "sufficien[t] evidence" to support the agency's factual determinations. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). "Substantial evidence ... is more than a mere scintilla ... and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
While the court considers whether the ALJ followed the applicable rules of law in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, the court will "neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency." Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Mr. Weaver alleges the ALJ erred in his treatment of findings from two medical providers. (ECF No. 12:3-12).
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly considered opinions from Dr. Stephen Wilson and Dr. R.D. Schubert. (ECF No. 12:3-12). The Court disagrees.
On April 7, 2016, Dr. Wilson examined Plaintiff in connection with a worker's compensation claim which involved injuries to Plaintiff's cervical and lumbar spines and his right shoulder and arm. (TR. 606-612). Ultimately, Dr. Wilson rendered several opinions regarding:
(TR. 611-612).
On September 7, 2016, Dr. Schubert authored an "Electrodiagnostic Report" which showed "moderate" findings on Plaintiff's left peroneal nerve
The ALJ noted Dr. Wilson's examination and Dr. Schubert's report and stated:
(TR. 30). Mr. Weaver takes issue with the ALJ's treatment of both physicians' findings, arguing "the ALJ erred when he gave less than controlling weight or great weight to two objectively determined opinions that told him, by objective testing, that Mr. Weaver was not neurologically intact, had weakness in the legs, and he would be extremely limited in walking and standing secondary to severe neurologic loss of function—he cannot feel his feet and he has weakness." (ECF No. 12:9). According to Mr. Weaver, the ALJ "played doctor", minimizing the physicians' findings in lieu of his own subjective opinion. (ECF No. 12:9).
The Court begins by noting that the ALJ has a duty to consider all medical opinions in the record and discuss the weight he assigns to such opinions. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012). A "medical opinion," in turn, is a regulatory term reserved for "judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment(s), including his symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what he can still do despite impairment(s), and his physical and mental restrictions." Lackey v. Barnhart, 127 F. App'x 455, 457 (10th Cir. 2005) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(1).
Dr. Schubert's report does not qualify as a "medical opinion" which the ALJ was required to weigh, as it merely reported findings regarding particular nerves tested and suggested that further studies were warranted which "may be diagnostic." (TR. 651). Dr. Schubert neither diagnosed Plaintiff nor made any statement about Mr. Weaver's symptoms or specific work-related abilities or limitations. Dr. Wilson's report, on the other hand, is considered a "medical opinion" which the ALJ was required to weigh. The ALJ's failure to expressly weigh the opinion constitutes error, but the error is harmless.
Mr. Weaver contends that he ALJ "failed to recite all of Dr. Wilson's findings,"
The Court has reviewed the medical evidence of record, the transcript of the administrative hearing, the decision of the ALJ, and the pleadings and briefs of the parties. For the reasons explained, the Court