REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GARY M. PURCELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner denying his application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-34. Defendant has answered the Complaint and filed the administrative record (hereinafter AR ____), and the parties have briefed the issues. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, it is recommended the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.

I. Administrative History and Agency Decision

On October 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed his application for DIB. AR 12. The Social Security Administration denied his application initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") then held a hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. AR 31-51. The ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. AR 12-25.

Following the agency's well-established sequential evaluation procedure, the ALJ found at the first step that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from the alleged onset date through his date last insured. At the second step, the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of degenerative disc disease status post-surgical repair, chronic pain syndrome, and hypertension. At the third step, the ALJ found these impairments were not per se disabling as Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the requirements of a listed impairment. AR 14, 17.

At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work with the following limitations:

AR 17-18. Based on this RFC finding and VE testimony regarding the requirements of Plaintiff's previous work, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work.

At step five, the ALJ again relied on the VE's testimony and concluded Plaintiff's RFC would allow him to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy including self-service store attendant, cashier II, and merchandise marker. AR 23-24. As a result, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined by the Social Security Act, from June 3, 2011 through December 31, 2016, the date last insured. AR 25.

The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, and therefore the ALJ's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009).

II. Issue Raised

Plaintiff alleges the sit/stand option contained in the RFC is impermissibly vague. Plaintiff's Opening Brief (Doc. No. 15) at 3-7. The Court disagrees.1

III. General Legal Standards Guiding Judicial Review

The Court must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1153 (2019); Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence "means—and means only— such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (quotations omitted). The "determination of whether the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Consequently, [the Court must] remain mindful that evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record." Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052 (citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).

The Social Security Act authorizes payment of benefits to an individual with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. A disability is an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see 20 C.F.R. §404.1509 (duration requirement). Both the "impairment" and the "inability" must be expected to last not less than twelve months. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).

The agency follows a five-step sequential evaluation procedure in resolving the claims of disability applicants. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), (b)-(g). "If the claimant is not considered disabled at step three, but has satisfied his burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability under steps one, two, and four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant has the [RFC] to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience." Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005). "The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he is not able to perform other work." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 142 (1987).

IV. Analysis

A. The Sit/Stand Was Sufficiently Specific

The RFC contains a limitation such that Plaintiff "would require a sit/stand option every thirty minutes." AR 18. Plaintiff asserts the limitation is flawed because it is impermissibly vague. Pl.'s Br. at 3-7. He contends the ALJ "failed to specify the parameters and frequency of the sit/stand option." Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff also argues "the ALJ failed to specify the amount of time that [Plaintiff] would need to spend in each position after alternating every thirty (30) minutes in his RFC." Pl.'s Br. at 6. The specificity of the sit/stand option, however, complies with relevant regulations and decisional authority.

Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-9p provides: "The RFC assessment must be specific as to the frequency of the individual's need to alternate sitting and standing." 1996 WL 374185, at *7; see also Jimison v. Colvin, 513 F. App'x 789, 792 (10th Cir. 2013) ("We agree with [the claimant] that an ALJ must be specific as to the frequency of the individual's need to alternate sitting and standing." (quotation omitted)).2 But here the ALJ specifically addressed the frequency of the individual's need to alternate sitting and standing. He stated that Plaintiff "would require a sit/stand option every thirty minutes." AR 18. Given the plain text of the RFC, the Court finds Plaintiff's argument—that the ALJ "failed to specify the parameters and frequency of the stand/sit option"—is without merit.

B. The Sit/Stand Option is Not Inconsistent with Light Work

In addition to an allowance for a sit/stand option, the RFC also restricted Plaintiff to sitting for about six hours and standing or walking for about six hours during an eight-hour workday. AR 17. Plaintiff asserts that if the sit/stand option meant that Plaintiff could stand for thirty minutes and then sit for thirty minutes, he was limited to standing for four hours during an eight-hour workday, "which is less than the six . . . hours of standing required for light work." Pl.'s Br. at 6-7.

Presuming, without deciding, that the sit/stand option is interpreted to require Plaintiff to change positions exactly every thirty minutes as he suggests,3 such terms are not inconsistent with light work. While SSR 83-10 notes that a full range of light work requires standing or walking for approximately six hours of an eight-hour workday, it also states that a job also qualifies as light work "when it involves sitting most of the time but with some pushing and pulling of arm-hand or leg-foot controls." 1983 WL 31251, at *5-6; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (noting a job can be in the light work category "when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls").

Further, for a plaintiff "limited to four hours of standing and walking in an eight-hour workday . . . it is not apparent that [the] walking and standing limitation is inconsistent with the [Dictionary of Occupational Titles'] specified requirements" for jobs requiring light work. Denning v. Saul, No. CIV-18-813-G, 2019 WL 4534023, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2019) (noting the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") entry for each job the claimant could perform stated that "a job should be rated for Light Work: (1) when it requires walking or standing to a significant degree; or (2) when it requires sitting most of the time but entails pushing and/or pulling of arm or leg controls; and/or (3) when the job requires working at a production rate pace entailing the constant pushing and/or pulling of materials even though the weight of those materials is negligible." (quotations omitted)). The DOT entries for the jobs identified by the ALJ in this matter include the same language as those in Denning. See DOT 299.677-010, 1991 WL 672643 (self-service store attendant); DOT 211.462-010, 1991 WL 671840 (cashier II); DOT 209.587-034, 1991 WL 671802 (merchandise marker). Thus, presuming the sit/stand option limited Plaintiff to four hours of standing and walking per day, he could still perform light work. Accordingly, the undersigned finds there is no conflict between the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff could perform light work and Plaintiff's interpretation of the sit/stand option. Therefore, Defendant's decision should be affirmed.

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the foregoing findings, it is recommended that judgment enter AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner to deny Plaintiff's application for benefits. The parties are advised of their respective right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court on or before February 19th, 2020, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Report and Recommendation will waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.").

This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addressed herein is denied.