DAVID W. HERCHER, Bankruptcy Judge.
Subject: In re Antoinette Michelle Maxwell Case No. 17-32084-dwh7 State of Oregon v. Antoinette Michelle Maxwell Adversary Proceeding No. 17-03113-dwh
Greetings:
I will enter judgment in this action for plaintiff, the State of Oregon, Department of Human Services, determining that the state's claim against defendant, Antoinette Michelle Maxwell, is nondischargeable. This letter constitutes my findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Maxwell filed her chapter 7 petition on June 1, 2017. The state filed this action on August 30, 2017.
The state alleges that she obtained food stamps and public-assistance benefits through the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Employment Related Day Care programs by making false representations. Specifically, it alleges that (1) she had a duty to report her earnings and her receipt of child-support payments; (2) she failed to report her earnings from employment with Martin Meaux; (3) she failed to report that she received child support; (4) the representations were material; (5) she made the representations with the intent to deceive the state in order to receive benefits; (6) the state provided her with $8,813 of food stamps to which she wasn't entitled, of which it has recovered $4,173, $2,741.82 in TANF benefits, none of which has been recovered, and $8,834.60 in ERDC benefits, none of which has been recovered; (7) the state provided these benefits in reliance on her representations; and (8) the balance owing is $16,288.42.
On June 11, 2018, the Monday before the trial held on Thursday, June 14, the state filed its Motion to Amend Witness List,
At the beginning of the trial, Maxwell's lawyer objected to the motion on the ground that he had done research on Silberman "last night" (Wednesday, June 13) and thus would be prejudiced by the substitution.
Because this action arises under title 11 of the U.S. Code, the district court of this district has original jurisdiction over this action.
The state has expressly consented to this court's entry of final orders or judgments. Although Maxwell's answer failed to address that issue,
Section 523(a)(2) of title 11 excepts from discharge two kinds of debts for money, property, services, or an extension or renewal of credit: (1) those where the money or property was obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud (under section 523(a)(2)(A)) and (2) for which the money or property was obtained by use of a materially false written statement respecting the debtor's financial condition, on which the creditor reasonably relied (under section 523(a)(2)(B)). In the complaint, the state invokes section 523(a)(2), but the state doesn't specify whether it relies on subparagraph (A) or (B). In the state's posttrial brief, it relies on both subparagraphs.
There are two differences between these categories that are significant when a creditor seeks to prove an exception to discharge based on misrepresentations. First, section 523(a)(2)(A) expressly excludes statements respecting the debtor's financial condition. So, if a creditor is relying on a statement respecting the debtor's financial condition, the statement must be in writing to support an exception to discharge.
Second, the level of required reliance varies between the categories. Section 523(a)(2)(A) (statements unrelated to financial condition) requires only justifiable reliance.
Because the misrepresentations on which the state relies—nondisclosure of some of Maxwell's sources of income—have a direct relation to and thus "respect" her overall financial status, the applicable subsection is section 523(a)(2)(B), and not section 523(a)(2)(A).
That the state alleges omissions, rather than affirmative misrepresentations, raises a possible, but surmountable, interpretive difficulty. In the state's argument that section 523(a)(2)(A) applies to omissions and thus is an independent basis for nondischargeability, it fails to distinguish between two distinct types of potentially nondischargeable omissions. The first type of omission, addressed by section 523(a)(2)(A), is a debtor's failure to disclose a fact when under a legal obligation to do so
Here, Maxwell's alleged omissions were of the second type. The applications were in writing and respecting her financial condition, and she allegedly omitted reportable earned wage income and child support. Thus, the nondischargeability of the state's claim against her—even though based on omissions—can be based only on section 523(a)(2)(B).
I needn't decide the more challenging question whether a debtor's total silence, when under a legal obligation to disclose facts respecting the debtor's financial condition, could create a nondischargeable debt despite the absence of any writing.
Having concluded that the alleged statements at issue were respecting Maxwell's financial condition, I conclude that the state must prove the following elements to except the debt from discharge: (1) by making the benefits applications at issue, she made a written statement respecting her financial condition; (2) the statement was materially false; (3) she then knew that the representation was false; (4) she intended to deceive the state; (5) the state relied on the representations; (6) the state's reliance was reasonable; and (7) damages proximately resulted from the representations.
The applications constituted written statements respecting Maxwell's financial condition.
Her representations were made in 10 benefits applications. In six of the applications dated January 13,
In two interim change reports for SNAP and ERDC benefits dated June 30, 2010,
In an ERDC re-application dated December 29, 2011, paragraph 5 on page 2 required Maxwell to list each employer.
Maxwell testified that she didn't recall whether she received child-support payments in 2009 and 2010, but she recalled receiving none in 2011 through 2013.
I was not persuaded by Maxwell's testimony that she forgot her Meaux income each of the ten times she omitted it from an application;
I was also not persuaded by her argument, implicit in her statement that the Meaux payments were "small,"
Finally, I wasn't persuaded by her testimony that she "didn't really read the applications."
I find that she knew that she was receiving or had previously received income that she was required to, but didn't, disclose on each of the applications.
Even if a defendant in a section 523(a)(2)(B) action denies intent to deceive the plaintiff, the debtor's intent may be established by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor's false written statement was either knowingly false or made so recklessly as to warrant a finding that the debtor acted fraudulently.
Here, Maxwell made a series of materially affirmative false statements to the state in applications for public assistance. Each application included the statement above the signature line that "by signing below I agree that I have given DHS true, correct, and complete information." I find that she either knew that she had omitted material information from the applications or acted so recklessly as to warrant a finding that she acted fraudulently. I thus find that she intended to deceive the state.
As a result of the false applications, the state provided financial benefits to Maxwell. I heard testimony, albeit somewhat general, that the state relied on the applications in providing benefits to her.
The types of governmental-benefit payments at issue in this action are intended for people whose other resources are insufficient to support them or their dependents. I heard testimony that the application forms, systems, and policies the state uses to accept and process benefits applications and to seek to recover overpayments are designed to comply with laws, including federal regulations, regulating eligibility for the benefits. Although Maxwell questioned the state's actual reliance on the applications, she didn't offer any evidence or argument that the state's reliance wasn't reasonable. I find that the reliance was at least reasonable.
The amounts of the debt due from Maxwell to the state were subjects of testimony by Carter and are set forth in the state's Exhibits 4 through 6. According to Exhibit 4, the amount of the SNAP benefits due is $8,813, less the state's recovery of $4,173, leaving a net of $4,650. According to Exhibits 5 and 6, the amounts of the TANF and ERDC benefits due, for which the state has had no recovery, are $2,741.82 and $8,834.60, respectively. Those figures also appear in paragraph 11 of the complaint.
The state's Exhibit 7 is its distraint warrant dated December 22, 2106, which includes a $72 fee in addition to the benefits overpayment amounts.
I thus find that the state's debt resulted from her application misrepresentations.
I received posttrial briefs from both the state
I will prepare and enter a judgment in the state's favor consistent with this letter.