HASELTON, C.J.

Defendant appeals, challenging, inter alia, his conviction for first-degree kidnapping, ORS 163.235, assigning error to the trial court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal (MJOA) and entry of conviction on that charge.1 Defendant contends that the state did not adduce sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to find either of the conjunctive, requisite elements of ORS 163.225 beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons amplified below, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find that defendant moved the victim "from one place to another." ORS 163.225(1)(a). Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the MJOA. We reverse defendant's conviction for first-degree kidnapping, remand for resentencing, and otherwise affirm.2

In reviewing the denial of an MJOA, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact could find each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cervantes, 319 Or. 121, 125, 873 P.2d 316 (1994).

Stated consistently with that standard, the facts material to the kidnapping charge are as follows. Defendant and the victim met in early 2008, and, in the spring of 2008, they became romantically involved. Shortly thereafter, defendant moved into the victim's one-bedroom apartment in Woodburn, where he intermittently resided until the summer of 2009. That apartment consisted of a living room, a combined kitchen and dining area, one bathroom, and a hallway leading to a bedroom.

In October 2008, before the events leading to this case, defendant was convicted of fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence for his conduct related to the victim. In the summer of 2009, defendant spent three months in jail. During that period, the victim obtained a restraining order against him. In early September 2009, shortly after defendant was released, he and the victim resumed their relationship, and the victim allowed defendant to stay at her apartment. At about 9:00 p.m. on the evening of September 10, 2009, defendant came to the apartment. Although the victim thought that defendant "seemed agitated," she allowed him into the apartment.

Shortly after defendant arrived, and as defendant and the victim were in the living room, defendant "worked himself up" about the fact that he had spent time in jail, for which he blamed the victim. Defendant's agitation escalated, and he began slapping and punching the victim as she lay on the couch. He then threw her onto the floor, dragged her to the kitchen by her arm, and threw her against a wall and a bookshelf while "bitching about [the victim] putting him in jail." At that point, the victim was bleeding. Defendant pulled her by her hair into the bathroom and threw her headfirst into the shower; consequently, the victim's face smashed into a metal bar in the shower, fracturing the orbital bone around her left eye. Defendant turned cold water onto the victim to rinse off the blood.

Defendant then took the victim to the living room, where she lay on the floor. At that point, defendant had obtained a syringe. Defendant placed his knee on the victim's chest and began stabbing her in the arm, neck, and face with the syringe while telling her that he was injecting her with air and that "[t]he air will kill you, you'll be dead in a few minutes." Defendant then moved the victim to the bedroom, threw her onto the bed, would not let her get up, and continued hitting her until both defendant and the victim eventually fell asleep on the bed at approximately 3:00 a.m. on September 11.

During the night of September 10 to 11, the victim told defendant that she needed medical attention because she felt that "something [was] wrong because there [was] squishy stuff going on in [her] stomach." She asked defendant to leave her apartment and told him that, if he would leave, she would not tell anyone that he had injured her. However, for the next two days, defendant refused to leave the apartment; he would not allow the victim to get close to the door or windows or leave to seek medical attention for her injuries. The victim did not attempt to escape because she was so badly injured that she did not believe that she could physically outrun or outmaneuver defendant and she was afraid that, if she tried to escape, defendant would "hurt [her] some more."

At some point after the assault, defendant instructed the victim to write a note to her adult daughter, falsely stating that she had gone to the coast with defendant and his son.3 The victim complied, but she wrote the note in sloppy handwriting (her handwriting was usually "clear and smooth") and signed the note "Mom" (she usually signed her first name), because she wanted to signal to her daughter that something was wrong. Defendant placed the note on the apartment door, while remaining in the apartment with the victim.

On the third day, September 12, the victim's daughter found the note. Suspicious that something was wrong, the daughter requested that the police perform a welfare check. When the police arrived at the victim's apartment, defendant had fled after telling the victim that he would kill her if she answered the door or went outside before her wounds had healed. The police took the victim to the hospital, where she received medical treatment for her substantial injuries.

Defendant was subsequently apprehended and charged with attempted murder, ORS 163.115; ORS 161.405 (Count 1); first-degree kidnapping, ORS 163.235 (Count 2); second-degree assault constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.175 (Count 3); first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225 (Count 4); and fourth-degree assault constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.160 (Count 5). As pertinent to our consideration of the first-degree kidnapping charge, the state alleged in the amended indictment that "defendant, on or about September 10, 2009, in Marion County, Oregon, did unlawfully and knowingly, without consent or legal authority, take [the victim] from one place to another, with intent to interfere substantially with [the victim's] personal liberty, and with the purpose of causing physical injury to [the victim]."

Defendant waived jury trial, and the case was tried to the court. After the close of the state's evidence, defendant made an MJOA on, inter alia, the first-degree kidnapping charge. Defendant argued:

Defendant also argued that the victim's testimony that defendant had prevented her from approaching the door or windows in her apartment related only to events that had occurred after the assault and that "in order for it to be kidnapping in the first degree, the interference with personal liberty had to be for the purpose of causing physical injury to [the victim]," and, because there was no evidence that defendant intended to further physically harm the victim, the evidence that he intended to keep the victim away from the door and windows was not sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement for first-degree kidnapping.

The state responded:

The state additionally argued that defendant's movement of the victim was "not incidental to the assault." The state explicitly disclaimed any reliance on confinement as an alternative means of proving the act element. See ORS 163.225(1)(b) ("A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the second degree if, with intent to interfere substantially with another's personal liberty, and without consent or legal authority, the person * * * [s]ecretly confines the person in a place where the person is not likely to be found."). Nonetheless, relying on State v. Mejia, 348 Or. 1, 227 P.3d 1139 (2010), the state contended that the "two days of confinement" demonstrated defendant's intent to substantially interfere with the victim's liberty. See Mejia, 348 Or. at 12, 227 P.3d 1139 (concluding that, in the situation and context of that case, the evidence of the defendant's moving and restraining the victim in her own apartment for an hour and half "would be sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that, apart from his various assaultive and menacing acts, defendant intended to interfere substantially with the victim's personal liberty").

The trial court summarily denied defendant's MJOA.

During closing arguments, defendant renewed his MJOA, relying on his previous arguments. The state remonstrated:

On appeal, defendant correctly observes that, because "[t]he state charged defendant with the asportation theory of kidnapping in the first degree, ORS 163.235(1)(c)," the state was required "to establish that [defendant] moved the victim from one place to another with the intent to interfere substantially with her personal liberty and with the purpose of causing her physical injury." Defendant contends that the state failed to adduce legally sufficient evidence that defendant "qualitatively change[d] the victim's location," and, further, the state failed to establish that any movement was not "incidental to the assaults." According to defendant, it follows that "the evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant took the victim from one place to another." Defendant further, and alternatively, argues that the state's evidence was insufficient to prove the requisite culpable mental state — that is, that defendant intended to "interfere substantially with [the victim's] personal liberty," ORS 163.225(1) — because the evidence did not establish that defendant "intended to confine the victim for a substantial period of time or intended to move the victim a substantial distance."

The state first remonstrates that defendant's argument regarding the asportation element is unpreserved:

In any event, the state argues, the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to demonstrate that defendant had moved the victim "from one place to another" because, in the state's view, each room in the victim's apartment "was, in context, a `qualitatively different' place." Specifically, the state contends that

For the reasons amplified below, we determine that defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the state's proof of asportation is preserved. We further conclude, on the merits, that the state failed to adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant moved the victim "from one place to another" within the meaning of ORS 163.225. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant's MJOA, and we reverse without addressing defendant's alternative contention as to the purported insufficiency of the state's proof of intent. Accord State v. Sierra, 349 Or. 506, 518 n. 9, 254 P.3d 149 (2010), adh'd to as modified on recons., 349 Or. 604, 247 P.3d 759 (2011) ("Because we reverse defendant's second-degree kidnapping convictions on the ground that the state presented insufficient evidence as to the act element, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence as to the intent element.").

We begin with the threshold issue of preservation. See ORAP 5.45(1) ("No matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claim of error was preserved in the lower court."). We agree with the state that defendant's argument before the trial court in support of his MJOA pertained primarily to the intent element of kidnapping. See 256 Or.App. at 525-27, 301 P.3d at 948-49. Nevertheless, the state's responses — and the court's reasoning — set out above demonstrate that the parties and the court both understood that defendant's motion challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to both the act and intent elements. See State v. Wyatt, 331 Or. 335, 343, 15 P.3d 22 (2000) (explaining that, in addition to preventing unfair surprise to the parties, the purpose of the preservation requirement is to permit the trial court to "to consider and correct the error immediately, if correction is warranted"). We conclude that defendant adequately raised and preserved his argument that the state's evidence was insufficient for the court to find that his actions constituted asportation.

We proceed to the merits. The Supreme Court most recently articulated what is required to demonstrate the act element of kidnapping by asportation in Sierra, 349 Or. 506, 254 P.3d 149, which issued after the notice of appeal was filed in this case, but before briefing. Sierra is not only instructive but, ultimately, dispositive.4

In Sierra, as pertinent to our analysis here, two victims were patrons at a truck stop restaurant. 349 Or. at 509, 254 P.3d 149. Those two victims "heard a commotion" in the adjoining convenience store and entered through a door near the front of the store to investigate. Id. They found the defendant pointing a loaded crossbow at a store clerk, who was on his knees behind a counter near the back of the store. Id. at 509-10, 254 P.3d 149. Hoping to assist the clerk, one victim "attempted to divert [the] defendant's attention so that [the other victim] would be able to restrain" the defendant. Id. The defendant yelled at the victims to leave. Id. When they refused to leave, the defendant pointed the crossbow at them and directed them to move to the back of the store and kneel beside the clerk. Id. The victims did as they were instructed. Id. In relation to those acts, and with respect to those two victims, the defendant was convicted of second-degree kidnapping. We affirmed without opinion. State v. Sierra, 228 Or.App. 149, 206 P.3d 1153 (2009).

On review, the parties' dispute centered on "the meaning of the act element of kidnapping by asportation." Sierra, 349 Or. at 512, 254 P.3d 149. In resolving the issue, the Supreme Court examined State v. Murray, 340 Or. 599, 136 P.3d 10 (2006), and State v. Walch, 346 Or. 463, 213 P.3d 1201 (2009).

In Murray, the victim was sitting in the driver's seat of her car in a grocery store parking lot when the defendant opened the driver's side door, entered the car, pushed the victim into the passenger seat, and instructed her to get out. 340 Or. at 601-02, 136 P.3d 10. The victim exited through the passenger side door and the defendant drove away in her car. Id. The defendant was convicted of second-degree kidnapping, and we affirmed. State v. Murray, 200 Or.App. 732, 117 P.3d 297 (2005). On review, the Supreme Court reversed. Murray, 340 Or. 599, 136 P.3d 10. In so holding, the court determined that "[the] defendant's movement of the victim was insufficient to satisfy the act element of kidnapping by asportation because, even assuming that the movement of the victim from driver's seat to passenger's seat was place-to-place movement, that movement was incidental to defendant's substantive crime" of car theft. Sierra, 349 Or. at 514, 254 P.3d 149 (citing Murray, 340 Or. at 606, 136 P.3d 10).

In contrast, Walch "involved nonincidental movement `from one place to another.'" Sierra, 349 Or. at 515, 254 P.3d 149. There, in attempting to rob the victim, the defendant attacked her in a driveway, dragged her to a parked car, and lifted her into the open trunk of the car. Walch, 346 Or. at 466, 213 P.3d 1201. The Supreme Court, in affirming the defendant's conviction for first-degree kidnapping, concluded that the defendant had "moved the victim from one place (the open driveway) to a qualitatively different, more mobile and isolated place (the trunk of a car)." Id. at 476, 213 P.3d 1201 (emphasis added). The court thus concluded that "the asportation element of the kidnapping statute ha[d] been satisfied." Id.

Against that precedential backdrop, the defendant in Sierra argued that, "as a general rule, movement within a single structure (such as a home, building, or car), including room-to-room movement, will not be movement to a qualitatively different place in terms of interference with a victim's liberty." 349 Or. at 512, 254 P.3d 149. The state agreed "that the beginning place and ending place must be qualitatively different, but argue[d] that place-to-place movement requires only proof that the defendant moved the victim" to a more restrictive or isolated place. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Both parties recognized that "the state is not required to prove that defendant took the victim a substantial distance." Id. (citing Walch, 346 Or. at 473, 213 P.3d 1201).

After observing that "pinpointing the legislature's intended meaning of the word `place' with precision has proved * * * vexing," id. at 513, 254 P.3d 149, the Supreme Court explained that

Id. at 513-14, 254 P.3d 149 (emphasis added). The court observed that, under that standard, "Murray and Walch are consistent." Id. at 515, 254 P.3d 149.

Before applying that construct to the facts, the court in Sierra sought to

Id. at 516, 213 P.3d 1201.

Consistently with the foregoing construction, the Supreme Court in Sierra rejected the defendant's proposition that "movement of a victim within a single structure will never be place-to-place movement." Id. at 517, 254 P.3d 149 (emphasis in original). Instead, the court concluded that, in the particular "situation and context" of Sierra, the facts were insufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant moved the two victims "from one place to another." Id. That was so, the court explained, because "[t]he beginning location (inside a convenience store, near the front door) and the ending location (inside the same room, behind a * * * counter near the back of the room) of [the] defendant's contact with [the victims] are not `qualitatively different' locations." Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that "the state introduced insufficient evidence to prove the two charges of kidnapping in the second degree." Id. at 518, 254 P.3d 149.

We return to this case. For purposes of our review, the issue reduces to whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, "as a matter of situation and context, the victim's ending place [was] qualitatively different from the victim's starting place." Id. at 513-14, 254 P.3d 149 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the victim's "starting place" was the living room of her apartment. Defendant moved her from the living room to the kitchen, from the kitchen to the bathroom, back to living room, and ultimately down the hallway to the bedroom. 256 Or.App. at 524-25, 301 P.3d at 948. To be sure, each of those rooms was — as the state emphasizes — functionally distinct, but Sierra, Murray, and Walch instruct us that generic functional distinctions do not establish the requisite "qualitative difference" vis-a-vis the commission of the crime of kidnapping. The hallmark of "qualitative difference" is whether the difference between the starting and ending places promotes or effectuates a substantial interference "with another's personal liberty." ORS 163.225(1). In the "situation and context" of this case, the functional differences among the rooms in the victim's apartment had no effect on the extent to which defendant interfered with the victim's personal liberty. Accord State v. Gerlach, 255 Or.App. 614, 619-20, 300 P.3d 193 (2013) (analyzing ORS 163.225, for merger of conviction purposes, and observing that the gravamen of the crime of kidnapping is a defendant's substantial interference with another's personal liberty).

In that respect, we also note that the state adduced no evidence that, in moving the victim between rooms of her apartment, defendant intended or accomplished transporting the victim to a place where he could exert greater control over the victim or increase her isolation. See Sierra, 349 Or. at 516, 254 P.3d 149 ("[T]he degree by which the movement in question increases defendant's control over the victim, or isolates the victim from the view of others, is relevant to the determination whether a defendant has moved a victim `from one place to another' only to the extent that those considerations tend to demonstrate the qualitative difference between where the victim started (`from one place') and where the victim was as a result of the defendant's conduct (`another [place]').").

The state posits, nevertheless, that, "[b]ecause the bathroom had a bathtub and shower, and consequently was able to serve a different and additional function than other rooms in the residence, it was `qualitatively different' from other rooms in the residence." Specifically, the state points to the fact that the bathroom "served as a location — distinct from any other room in the residence — where defendant could clean the blood from the victim's body and clothing." With respect, that is a non sequitur because, with respect to any restraint of the victim's personal liberty, the degree of restraint was no different in the bathroom than at the "starting place," that is, in the living room.

Finally, the evidence here demonstrates that, during the course of the nearly seven-hour assault, defendant moved the victim in the course and in furtherance of the ongoing assault. The movement, thus, was "only incidental" to the assault. The assault ended when defendant and the victim fell asleep in the bedroom. See 256 Or.App. at 524-25, 301 P.3d at 948. The state adduced no evidence that defendant moved the victim during the two days that defendant remained in the victim's apartment following the assault.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the state introduced insufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to determine that defendant moved the victim "from one place to another." ORS 163.225. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant's MJOA on the kidnapping charge.

Conviction for first-degree kidnapping reversed; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.