EGAN, J.
Plaintiff brought a personal injury action and obtained a jury award for her economic damages. After judgment was entered, defendant filed a motion for partial satisfaction pursuant to ORS 31.555 in which he sought to reduce the amount of the judgment by the amount that defendant's insurance carrier had previously provided to plaintiff in personal-injury-protection (PIP) benefits. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court's order directing the court clerk to enter that partial satisfaction; she contends that the trial court erred under ORS 31.555(2). Plaintiff also seeks attorney fees. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff was riding in a vehicle driven by defendant when it struck another vehicle. Defendant's insurer, State Farm, paid plaintiff $25,000 in PIP benefits. Those benefits, which were the maximum amount available under defendant's policy, were paid solely to cover plaintiff's medical expenses. Defendant also had liability protection under that same policy.
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against defendant, in which she prayed for $225,000 in noneconomic damages, $50,000 for future medical expenses, $45,382.57 in medical bills that she had previously incurred, and $30,000 for past and future loss of earning capacity. At trial, plaintiff proposed the use of a segregated jury verdict form, which would have specified the categories of damages as follows:
"Economic Damages: "Past Medical Expenses (may not exceed $45,382.57) $ __________ "Future Medical Expenses (may not exceed $50,000) $ __________ "Past Loss of Earnings (may not exceed $20,000) $ __________ "Future Loss of Earnings (may not exceed $10,000) $ __________"Noneconomic Damages $ __________"
Defense counsel objected to the proposed verdict form. Although conceding that using plaintiff's proposed form would not be in error, defense counsel urged that the trial court use a nonsegregated verdict form, i.e., one that asked the jury to distinguish only between economic and noneconomic damages. After the trial court opted for defendant's nonsegregated verdict form, the jury returned a verdict specifying $45,382.57 in "[e]conomic" damages — the exact amount that plaintiff sought for past medical expenses — and no noneconomic damages.
After a general judgment was entered on the verdict, defendant moved under ORS 31.555 for a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of $25,000 — the amount that State Farm had previously paid to plaintiff in PIP benefits. In support of that motion, defendant provided a declaration of the claims representative in charge of the liability claim against defendant, which stated that "State Farm acknowledges its obligation to make reimbursements for such PIP payments made for the medical expenses encompassed in the jury's verdict in the amount of $25,000.00." The trial court then issued an order directing the court clerk to enter a partial satisfaction of judgment in that amount. Plaintiff timely appeals from that
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred under ORS 31.555 by ordering entry of the partial satisfaction. Plaintiff's assignment of error presents questions of law, and we therefore review for errors of law. Wade v. Mahler, 167 Or.App. 350, 352, 1 P.3d 485, rev. den., 331 Or. 334, 23 P.3d 986 (2000). As relevant to this appeal, ORS 31.555(2) provides:
"[T]he legislative purpose of [ORS 31.555] is to `prevent the injured party from receiving payments from the PIP insurer and the negligent party's insurer that together would be greater than the injured party's proven damages.'" Wade, 167 Or.App. at 356, 1 P.3d 485 (brackets omitted) (quoting Dougherty, 79 Or.App. at 495, 719 P.2d 906).
We have previously addressed the application of that statute on several occasions. In Dougherty, a jury awarded the plaintiff $20,000 in general damages and $7,068.05 in special damages.
Id. at 495-96, 719 P.2d 906. Thus, when a plaintiff pleads and proves damages subject to PIP benefits, and the plaintiff "submits a verdict form from which the jury cannot tell whether the damages award includes losses subject to PIP benefits," the court must reduce the damage award under ORS 31.555. Wade, 167 Or.App. at 356, 1 P.3d 485.
In Brus v. Goodell, 119 Or.App. 74, 849 P.2d 552 (1993), on the other hand, we determined that the record showed that there was no overlap in the damages awarded by the jury and the previously paid PIP amounts.
Brus, 119 Or.App. at 78, 849 P.2d 552 (internal citation omitted; emphasis in original).
Finally, in Wade, as here, the plaintiff proposed a segregated verdict form that would have required the jury to categorize the type of economic damages awarded; as here, the defendant proposed a verdict form that only distinguished between economic and noneconomic damages. 167 Or.App. at 353, 1 P.3d 485. The trial court opted to use the defendant's form, and after the jury returned a plaintiff's verdict for $5,300 in economic damages, but before judgment was entered, the defendant sought the entry of a partial satisfaction under ORS 31.555(2) for PIP benefits that the plaintiff had previously obtained. The plaintiff argued that the use of the defendant's nonsegregated verdict form made it impossible to determine if the jury had awarded economic damages previously compensated for by PIP benefit payments; therefore, he reasoned, the defendant was not entitled to the entry of a partial satisfaction. In assessing that argument, we observed that in Mitchell v. Harris, 123 Or.App. 424, 430-31, 859 P.2d 1196 (1993),
Wade, 167 Or.App. at 356, 1 P.3d 485.
Although the plaintiff in Wade acknowledged that the trial court would be required to speculate about whether the jury's award included losses subject to PIP benefits, she argued, as plaintiff here does, that such speculation was attributable to the defendant's successful objection to her proposed verdict form. We rejected that argument on the ground that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that her verdict form would have obviated the need for such speculation:
Wade, 167 Or.App. at 356-57, 1 P.3d 485 (internal citation omitted).
In light of the foregoing, the first question that we must answer is whether the jury's award of $45,382.57 overlapped with those past medical PIP benefits that plaintiff had previously received. That is because defendant was entitled to a partial satisfaction to the extent that there was an overlap. ORS 31.555(2); Dougherty, 79 Or.App. at 495-96, 719 P.2d 906. If there was no overlap, defendant is not entitled to a partial satisfaction. Brus, 119 Or.App. at 78, 849 P.2d 552. If, as a third possibility, it is impossible to tell whether there was an overlap, defendant is ordinarily entitled to entry of a partial satisfaction under the Dougherty rule.
Defendant urges that there was an overlap in the damages and the PIP benefits because the amount of the damage award — $45,382.57 — precisely reflects the amount plaintiff sought for past medical expenses. Plaintiff responds that she sought $125,382.57 in economic damages and that, although it is possible that the jury merely awarded plaintiff damages for her past medical bills, it is also possible that some portion of the jury award was comprised of plaintiff's lost wages, future medical bills, or both. Thus, reasons plaintiff, it was necessarily "mere speculation to draw any conclusions about how the jury actually calculated the plaintiff's damages." Wade, 167 Or.App. at 356, 1 P.3d 485.
We disagree with defendant's assertion that the $45,382.57 jury award was unambiguously awarded for past medical expenses. As shown by defendant's concession at trial that it would not be error to use plaintiff's proposed verdict form, plaintiff put forth sufficient evidence for the jury to consider four distinct categories of damages: past and future medical expenses and past and future wage loss. Accordingly, the award could have been comprised of some combination of the aforementioned four categories. As plaintiff correctly points out, Oregon courts have long declined, in such circumstances, to attempt to divine a jury's intentions from the face value of an unspecified damage award.
In Mullins v. Rowe et ux., 222 Or. 519, 353 P.2d 861 (1960), the plaintiff requested $35,000 in noneconomic and $2,582 in economic damages on a cause of action arising from an automobile accident. There was evidence presented at trial showing that the plaintiff had spent $332 on medical services, which were appropriately classified as economic damages. The jury returned a plaintiff's verdict for $332 in noneconomic damages and no economic damages. When the verdict was returned, the plaintiff argued that a mistrial was required under the rule that an award of economic damages cannot
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial. It reasoned that it was impermissible, under the Oregon Constitution, for courts to "speculate concerning the mental processes of juries." Mullins, 222 Or. at 522, 353 P.2d 861. The court also stated that
Id. at 523-24, 353 P.2d 861; see also Sedillo v. City of Portland, 234 Or. 28, 380 P.2d 115 (1963) ("Because the amount of the verdict was the amount of the claimed specials, we could speculate that the verdict was one only for special damages. We could also speculate with as much certainty that the jury did not find that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the entire amount of his claimed special damages but that it was unable to determine just how much of the specials he was entitled to recover."); DeMaris v. Whittier, 280 Or. 25, 30-31, 569 P.2d 605 (1977) (declining to speculate on why jury reached damage award that it did). On this record, the trial court was necessarily required — because of the nonsegregated verdict form — to speculate about the mental process the jury employed in reaching the damage figure that it did.
Given that the jury award is ambiguous in the respect that plaintiff urges, we must next determine whether defendant is entitled to a satisfaction of judgment for the $25,000 in PIP benefits by application of the Dougherty rule to the facts of this case. In Dougherty, as noted, we effectively placed the burden on the plaintiff to show that an ambiguous jury award was not intended to compensate the plaintiff for that which PIP benefits had already been provided. We agree with plaintiff, however, that this case differs from Dougherty in a crucial respect. In Dougherty, neither party requested a segregated verdict form. 79 Or.App. at 494, 719 P.2d 906. Here, plaintiff requested a segregated verdict form, but defendant — while acknowledging that use of plaintiff's form would not be in error — requested the use of a nonsegregated form. It was the use of defendant's nonsegregated form that created the ambiguity in this case; plaintiff's form would have demonstrated whether and to what extent the jury awarded plaintiff compensation for her past medical benefits — viz., the losses for which she had received PIP benefits.
It is in that crucial respect that this case also differs from Wade. In that case, as noted, we concluded that the plaintiff's proposed verdict form would not have cured the ambiguity in the judgment as to what category the jury awarded damages for. That is not so here; the record reveals both that State Farm had paid $25,000 in medical PIP benefits and that $25,000 was the maximum amount of benefits that plaintiff could obtain. That is, the only category of PIP benefits at issue in this case were past medical expenses; there was no possibility that State Farm would pay more PIP benefits to cover things like future lost wages. See ORS 742.524(1)(b); Wade, 167 Or.App. at 356-57, 1 P.3d 485 (stating that PIP benefits may, "[u]nder limited circumstances," consist of payments for future wage losses). Whatever amount of past medical expenses the jury chose to award would be subject to a partial satisfaction under ORS 31.555(2), up to $25,000. Thus, we agree with plaintiff that the use of her proposed verdict form would have cured any ambiguity as to what the jury awarded damages for.
That being the case, we conclude that defendant is not entitled to rely on the ambiguity to obtain a partial satisfaction of his judgment debt. It is consistent with the legislative purpose behind ORS 31.555(2) —
Were the rule otherwise, a plaintiff who wished to avoid having a judgment reduced would, pursuant to Dougherty, be placed in the position of having to show that a damage award did not overlap with PIP benefits. See Koberstein v. Sierra Glass Co., 65 Or.App. 409, 671 P.2d 1190 (1983), modified on recons., 66 Or.App. 883, 675 P.2d 1126, rev. den., 297 Or. 83, 679 P.2d 1367 (1984) (stating that "a plaintiff may plead and prove all of his [economic] damages, even if he has received PIP benefits"). A defendant, however, could effectively thwart a plaintiff's ability to make that showing by successfully objecting to the use of a segregated verdict form that would reveal whether there was such an overlap. We conclude that the trial court erred under ORS 31.555(2) by ordering the entry of a partial satisfaction of the judgment debt after defendant objected to the use of a verdict form that would have eliminated any ambiguity about whether the awarded damages overlapped with PIP benefits.
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in not awarding her attorney fees incurred in contesting defendant's motion for a partial satisfaction. For that proposition, plaintiff cites ORS 18.352, ORS 742.031, and ORS 742.061. See Swett v. Bradbury, 335 Or. 378, 381, 67 P.3d 391 (2003) ("Ordinarily, a court awards attorney fees to a litigant only if a statute or contract authorizes such an award."). In rejecting plaintiff's argument, it is enough to note that ORS 18.352 addresses garnishment in insurance disputes; ORS 742.031 pertains to bankruptcy provisions in insurance contracts and actions to recover judgment amounts against insurers; and ORS 742.061 addresses an "action [that] is brought in any court of this state upon any policy of insurance of any kind or nature." Defendant's motion for a partial satisfaction of judgment does not implicate any of those statutes.
Reversed and remanded.