HASELTON, C.J.

Petitioner, who pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner argues, inter alia, that the post-conviction court erred in denying his allegation that criminal trial counsel were constitutionally inadequate in advising him to plead guilty to aggravated murder without securing, in return, a guarantee that the state would not seek the death penalty. We reject without extended discussion all of petitioner's challenges to the denial of post-conviction relief except those which pertain to that issue.1 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in concluding that petitioner failed to establish that counsel were constitutionally inadequate with respect to the guilty plea. Accordingly, we affirm.

We begin with an overview of the facts and the protracted procedural history of the underlying criminal proceedings, as recounted by the Oregon Supreme Court's final opinion on direct review:

State v. Simonsen, 329 Or. 288, 290-91, 986 P.2d 566 (1999), cert. den., 528 U.S. 1090, 120 S.Ct. 822, 145 L.Ed.2d 692 (2000) (Simonsen III) (some internal citations omitted). On remand, a jury sentenced petitioner to death for a third time. That sentence was affirmed by the Oregon Supreme Court. Id. at 290, 986 P.2d 566.2

Having exhausted his direct appeals, petitioner initiated this action in 2000. The post-conviction court denied relief, carefully analyzing and rejecting each of petitioner's claims in a comprehensive (indeed exhaustive) letter opinion, followed by a formal judgment and 37 pages of factual findings and legal conclusions distilled from the original letter opinion. Petitioner appeals, alleging, in part, that he received inadequate assistance of counsel with respect to his guilty plea.

We now turn to those allegations pertaining to the guilty plea. Petitioner alleged that he received inadequate and ineffective assistance during the original criminal proceedings, because trial counsel Earl R. Woods and William D. Dials improperly

Petitioner's opening and supplemental trial memoranda amplified that allegation, alleging that it was per se ineffective assistance of counsel "to permit [petitioner] to plead guilty to two counts of Aggravated Murder without the District Attorney taking the penalty of death off the table." Petitioner also argued that that advice was constitutionally deficient given the timing of the plea agreement and trial counsel's alleged failure to conduct a forensic investigation, to further explore petitioner's competency, and to litigate the admissibility of the inculpatory statements. In addition, petitioner alleged that counsel failed to explain the consequences of pleading guilty to him and either omitted or misrepresented the content of the plea agreement:

As pertinent to our review, the post-conviction court rendered the following findings concerning those allegations:3

(Internal citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.)

Based on those and other findings, the post-conviction court determined that trial counsel had developed a reasonable trial strategy, noting that petitioner's allegation "can be read two ways: either trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective as a matter of law when they advised petitioner to plead guilty to crimes that still left him eligible for a death sentence, or that trial counsel were unreasonable under the particular facts of petitioner's case in advising petitioner to plead guilty." (Emphasis in original.) Under either approach, the court explained, "petitioner has failed to prove this allegation to be true." More specifically, the post-conviction court reached the following conclusions:

(Internal citations omitted; emphasis in original.)

On appeal, petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's rejection of his claim that he received inadequate assistance in connection with the advice to plead guilty without a death penalty waiver. That challenge implicates three separate, but related, theories of purported inadequacy. First, advice to plead guilty to a capital crime without the prosecution agreeing to waive the death penalty constitutes inadequate assistance of counsel as a matter of law (the "categorical" theory). Second, under the circumstances here, trial counsel's plea strategy rendered their performance constitutionally inadequate (the "as-applied" theory). Third, in all events, trial counsel failed to adequately inform petitioner of the details of the plea deal and the consequences of pleading guilty.

In reviewing the post-conviction court's resolution of those matters, we are bound by its factual findings that are supported by evidence in the record. Stroup v. Hill, 196 Or.App. 565, 568, 103 P.3d 1157 (2004), rev. den., 338 Or. 432, 110 P.3d 1105 (2005). To obtain postconviction relief on a state constitutional claim of inadequate assistance of counsel, petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts demonstrating that trial counsel failed to exercise the professional skill and judgment necessary to "diligently and conscientiously advance the defense" and that he was prejudiced as a result of that failure. Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or. 867, 874, 883, 627 P.2d 458 (1981). To be entitled to relief under the federal constitution, petitioner must show that trial counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness * * * under prevailing professional norms" and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).4

We begin with the first, categorical proposition: Does advising a defendant to plead guilty to aggravated murder without securing a guarantee that the state will not seek the death penalty necessarily violate the constitutional standard of competent representation? Petitioner contends "that it was per se ineffective assistance of counsel to permit [him] to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated murder while the possibility of a death sentence remained," an approach considered "ill-advised" by "experienced capital practitioners." The state remonstrates that petitioner's categorical challenge is unavailing as a matter of law — and invokes authority from other jurisdictions that have recognized that, depending on the particular circumstances of a case, trial counsel can provide adequate representation despite advising a client to plead guilty without a plea bargain waiving the death penalty.

As explained below, we conclude that advising a capital client to plead guilty notwithstanding the possibility that the penalty phase may result in a death sentence does not render legal representation categorically inadequate. Although no Oregon appellate court has confronted this issue, other jurisdictions are in agreement, and no legal authority that we are aware of suggests otherwise.

Under federal law, Strickland establishes the contours of a defendant's right, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to effective counsel in the trial setting, including the plea-bargaining process. See Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1384, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012). In general, under Strickland — and subject only to narrow exceptions for cases partaking of structural error,5 or something akin to structural error6 — the propriety of post-conviction relief is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. As nearly as we can determine, no jurisdiction has held that advising a client to plead guilty notwithstanding the possibility of a death sentence is categorically unreasonable under Strickland. Rather, the consensus of authority is that the reasonableness of such advice and representation is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.7

Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), albeit arising in a different procedural posture, corroborates such an approach. In that case, the petitioner, who had been sentenced to death, sought and obtained postconviction relief from the Florida Supreme Court on the ground that trial counsel had conceded his guilt without his express consent. The United State Supreme Court reversed.

In the predicate criminal case in Nixon, there was overwhelming evidence — including a detailed confession — that the petitioner had kidnapped and brutally murdered a woman who gave him a ride after his car broke down, and prosecutors were unwilling to recommend a sentence other than death. Rather than contest the state's case, trial counsel decided to concede the petitioner's guilt in order to preserve credibility with the jury for the penalty phase. Id. at 179-81, 125 S.Ct. 551. Although trial counsel explained that decision to the petitioner several times, the petitioner neither verbally approved nor protested that decision. On post-conviction review, the Florida Supreme Court set aside the plea due to the lack of express consent to the concession strategy, reasoning that a concession of guilt requires the same level of consent as a formal guilty plea and that such an error is presumed to be prejudicial.

The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petitioner's challenge was properly evaluated under Strickland and that an alleged failure by counsel to obtain a client's express consent to a strategy to concede guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial does not automatically render that performance deficient. Id. at 189-93, 125 S.Ct. 551. In so holding, the Court discussed at length the strategic reasons for admitting guilt to a capital crime when the prosecution will not accept any plea bargain that removes the death penalty from the picture:

Id. at 190-91, 125 S.Ct. 551 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

Noting that a strategy challenging the prosecution's case in the guilt phase can have dire implications for the sentencing phase, the Supreme Court concluded:

Id. at 191-92, 125 S.Ct. 551 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)).8

Thus, depending on the totality of circumstances, acknowledging guilt can be a tenable capital defense strategy, especially where "the evidence is overwhelming and the crime heinous." Nixon, 543 U.S. at 191, 125 S.Ct. 551. In such circumstances, advising a capital client to plead guilty where the state has not waived the death penalty may be a "tactically advantageous" choice that falls within Strickland's wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 187, 125 S.Ct. 551.9

It is also true, however, that, as the Nixon court noted, "pleading guilty without a guarantee that the prosecution will recommend a life sentence holds little if any benefit for the defendant" because it "relinquishes trial rights" and "increases the likelihood" that aggressive evidence of guilt will be introduced during the sentencing phase, "so that the gruesome details of the crime are fresh in the jurors' minds as they deliberate on the sentence." 543 U.S. at 191 n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 551. Those considerations inform and circumscribe, rather than categorically proscribe, the propriety of an unconditional plea.

Our conclusion that the plea strategy in this case is not per se unreasonable is also informed by the American Bar Association (ABA) standards, which the United States Supreme Court recognizes "are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). The contemporaneous ABA Guidelines at the time of petitioner's plea provided, in relevant part:

ABA, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, commentary to 11.6.3 (1989).10 The gravamen of that guideline was, again, that, although an unconditional plea is exceptional in capital cases — that is, a tactic that counsel should be "extremely reluctant" to advise and participate in — there can be circumstances in which it is reasonable as being in the client's best interests.11

Having rejected petitioner's "categorical" theory, we proceed to the "as applied" approach: In the circumstances of this case, was it beyond the range of reasonable tactical choices to advise petitioner to plead guilty without the state's agreement not to seek the death penalty? Petitioner argues that trial counsel's strategy was ill-advised, that the process was rushed, and that he received no meaningful benefit in exchange for pleading guilty. The state counters that trial counsel provided reasonable justification for their advice and that the post-conviction court's findings and conclusions are supported by the record.

We conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in rejecting petitioner's "as applied" challenge. The post-conviction court's extensive factual findings — which petitioner does not contest — are well-supported by the record, and its conclusions are well-reasoned and legally sound.12 Petitioner's appellate argument rests primarily upon selective excerpts of deposition testimony and, as we will explain, the inferences that he urges from that testimony are inconsistent with the record, as well as the post-conviction court's factual findings — particularly its credibility findings. Before addressing petitioner's specific arguments, however, we summarize the salient circumstances, as found by the post-conviction court, which underlay trial counsel's advice that petitioner plead guilty.

First, trial counsel, Woods and Dials, knew that the case against petitioner was overwhelming. Before he was arrested, petitioner not only confessed his guilt to friends on two separate occasions but also, once in custody, he gave police a detailed statement confessing to the murders. In his statement to the police, petitioner acknowledged that

That confession was corroborated by the medical examiner's report, details from the crime scene, and evidence recovered from Williams's truck — and, based on petitioner's statements, the police were able to locate the murder weapon. In addition, petitioner made inculpatory statements to his attorneys, his girlfriend, and others. At no time during the original proceedings did petitioner ever give his attorneys any reason to doubt his confessions.

Given that overwhelming and irrefutable evidence that petitioner had murdered two victims after sadistically raping one of the women, and lacking a viable defense, counsel concluded that the chances of an acquittal were extremely low and that their efforts were better focused on avoiding the death penalty.13 As Woods testified: "This was not a whodunit * * * every bit of evidence that I remember was consistent with [petitioner's confessions]. * * * [O]ur strategy shifted fairly early on to `We've got to save this guy from the death penalty.'"

Second, there was no prospect of the state agreeing not to seek the death penalty. In 1988, there was no "true life" sentencing option; rather, at the time, the only possible sentences for aggravated murder were life imprisonment with a possibility of parole or a death sentence. Woods — a former Coos County district attorney who was very familiar with the prosecutors, the trial judge, and the tendencies of Coos County juries — knew that the state would seek the death penalty and would not bargain for a life sentence. Those circumstances led him to decide that "litigating petitioner's guilt would only serve to emphasize the brutality of the murders to the jury" and that pleading guilty was the best way to demonstrate remorse to the jury and attempt to shift the focus from the details of the crime to petitioner's story.14

Third, consistently with those goals, the plea agreement included a number of concessions, which trial counsel believed "increased the possibility that the jury would not impose the death sentence." The prosecution dismissed all charges except the two counts of aggravated murder, withdrew the state's motion for a jury view of the crime scene, and stipulated that petitioner gave a detailed, truthful confession to the police and that the murders "may well have remained unsolved" if not for petitioner's cooperation. The parties also agreed to allow two officers to give hearsay testimony in place of the live testimony of numerous witnesses, including two witnesses who saw petitioner with the victims just before the murders, a forensic expert, the victims' family members, and eight burglary victims.15

Petitioner's arguments challenging the reasonableness of the plea advice are based largely upon certain of Dials's statements during the post-conviction proceedings. However, the post-conviction court specifically discredited Dials's statements to the extent that they conflicted with Woods's testimony. For example, although petitioner highlights Dials's testimony that Dials disagreed with the decision to plead guilty and skipped the plea hearing "in protest" as evidence that the advice was unreasonable, that assertion is inconsistent not only with Woods's testimony, but also with Dials's own testimony. Woods testified that he was not aware of any disagreement over the plea agreement. When asked whether he agreed with Woods's assessment that the plea deal was a good idea, Dials responded that, although he had concerns with the strategy, he did not disagree with Woods — and, in fact, repeatedly defended the decision to plead petitioner guilty as the only way to make the jury realize that defendant had taken responsibility and deserved to be spared from death.16

Petitioner also invokes Woods's statement, from a 2009 affidavit, that he "thought [at the time of the plea] that entering the plea would persuade * * * [the state] into offering life imprisonment." Based on that statement, petitioner posits that "[f]orgoing a guilt phase trial on the vague hope that the state would drop the death penalty is not the actions of adequate or effective counsel." Whatever the validity, or accuracy, of Woods's recollection, 20 years after the operative events, it does not alter the contemporaneous circumstances, as found by the post-conviction court, that objectively justified counsel's advice, including the "enormous amount of evidence" of petitioner's guilt, the fact that the state was going to pursue the death penalty in all events, and the inclusion in the plea agreement of several concessions that the post-conviction court found "increased the possibility that the jury would not impose the death sentence."

In sum, given the horrific nature of the murders, the damning evidence of petitioner's guilt, the prosecution's refusal to bargain over the death penalty, and the inclusion of certain, potentially useful, concessions in the plea agreement, trial counsel's advice to plead guilty without a death penalty waiver did not amount to constitutionally inadequate assistance.

Finally, we briefly address petitioner's third challenge — viz., that trial counsel provided inadequate assistance by failing to inform him of the details of the plea agreement and the possible consequences of pleading guilty. See Purdy v. U.S., 208 F.3d 41, 44-45 (2d Cir.2000) (counsel should inform the defendant of the terms of the plea offer, the strengths and weakness of the case against him, and the alternative sentences to which he will most likely be exposed); Gonzalez v. State of Oregon, 340 Or. 452, 457-58, 134 P.3d 955 (2006) (counsel must inform client of the risks and consequences of a criminal plea, including the maximum and minimum possible sentences). That contention fails because it is premised entirely upon petitioner's own testimony during the post-conviction proceedings — testimony that the post-conviction court found to be wholly incredible.17

The post-conviction court properly denied post-conviction relief.

Affirmed.