Filed: Mar. 19, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2015
Summary: ORDER MARCO A. HERNANDEZ , District Judge . On January 13, 2015, Magistrate Judge Papak issued an Order (#41) in which he granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses. On January 27, 2015, Bhupendra Patel, Nila Patel, Heetan Patel, and Heetal Patel-Manani filed objections to the Order. The matter is now before me pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). In accordance with Rule 72(a), "[w]hen a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's cl
Summary: ORDER MARCO A. HERNANDEZ , District Judge . On January 13, 2015, Magistrate Judge Papak issued an Order (#41) in which he granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses. On January 27, 2015, Bhupendra Patel, Nila Patel, Heetan Patel, and Heetal Patel-Manani filed objections to the Order. The matter is now before me pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). In accordance with Rule 72(a), "[w]hen a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's cla..
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ORDER
MARCO A. HERNANDEZ, District Judge.
On January 13, 2015, Magistrate Judge Papak issued an Order (#41) in which he granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses. On January 27, 2015, Bhupendra Patel, Nila Patel, Heetan Patel, and Heetal Patel-Manani filed objections to the Order. The matter is now before me pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).
In accordance with Rule 72(a), "[w]hen a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim or defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge must promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a written order stating the decision." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The standard of review for an order with objections is "clearly erroneous" or "contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (applying the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard of review for nondispositive motions). If a ruling on a motion is not determinative of "a party's claim or defense," it is not dispositive and, therefore, is not subject to de novo review as are proposed findings and recommendations for dispositive motions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).1
I have carefully considered Defendants' objections and conclude they do not provide a basis to modify the Magistrate Judge's Order.
CONCLUSION
The Court AFFIRMS Magistrate Judge Papak's Order [41].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
FootNotes
1. In their Objections, Defendants suggest that my review should be de novo, the standard used when the matter before the Magistrate Judge disposes of a claim or defense. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). The case law, none of it controlling on this Court, is conflicting. E.g., Int'l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Southgate, No. 2:11-CV-14719, 2012 WL 2367160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 2012) (motion to strike affirmative defenses is dispositive), adopted, 2012 WL 2367170 (E.D. Mich. June 21, 2012); Gagan v. United Consumers Club, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-026 JD, 2012 WL 729943, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2012) (court characterized motion to strike affirmative defenses as non-dispositive and reviewed magistrate judge's decision under a clearly erroneous/contrary to law standard).
I need not revolve the conflict because even construing Judge Papak's Opinion & Order as a Findings & Recommendation and reviewing it under the de novo standard used for dispositive issues, I reach the same conclusion and adopt his recommendation to grant in part and deny in part the motion to strike affirmative defenses.
