MACRO A. HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge.
Plaintiff Kaylene Dickmeier brings this action under the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), for judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Act. Dickmeier challenges the Commissioner's denial of her application on three separate grounds, but none of them are a sufficient reason for reversal and therefore, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
Dickmeier applied for DIB on June 18, 2010, alleging an onset date of March 1, 2010. (Tr. 153-54.) The Commissioner denied her application initially and after reconsideration. (Tr. 114-17, 121-23.) After a hearing in July of 2012, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") James W. Sherry found Dickmeier was not disabled. (Tr. 14-28.) Dickmeier appealed, but the Appeals Council denied her request for review, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision that Dickmeier now challenges in this Court. (Tr. 1-7.)
A claimant is disabled if she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Disability claims are evaluated according to a five-step procedure.
The burden to show disability rests with the claimant at steps one through four, but if the analysis reaches step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant could perform. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & (f), 416.920(e) & (f);
The ALJ found that Dickmeier met the insured status requirement for DIB through June 1, 2015. (Tr. 16.) At step one, the ALJ found Dickmeier had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 1, 2010, her alleged onset date. (Tr. 16.) At step two, the ALJ found Dickmeier had the "following severe impairments: cervical degenerative disc disease; cervicalgia; sacroiliitis; left knee patella chondromalacia; chronic myalgia and arthralgia/fibromyalgia; left carpal tunnel syndrome; left tarsal tunnel syndrome; asthma; hearing loss; pain disorder association with a general medical condition; and posttraumatic stress disorder[.]" (Tr. 16.) At step three, the ALJ found Dickmeier's impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or equal the severity of any listed impairments. (Tr. 16-17.) The ALJ next found that Dickmeier had the following RFC:
(Tr. 20.) At step four, the ALJ found that Dickmeier was not able to perform any of her past relevant work. (Tr. 26.) At step five, the ALJ found that Dickmeier was not disabled because jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform, including mail clerk, lab sample carrier, deliverer (outside), charge account clerk, surveillance system monitor, and escort vehicle driver. (Tr. 26-27.)
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Dickmeier challenges the ALJ's decision on three separate grounds: 1) that the ALJ improperly discounted the credibility of Dickmeier's testimony about the severity and limiting effects of her symptoms; 2) that the ALJ improperly relied on testimony from a vocational expert that conflicted with information in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles; and 3) that the ALJ erred by not providing the narrative explanation required by SSR 96-8p as to the ALJ's formulation of Dickmeier's RFC or how the RFC finding accommodated her tarsal tunnel syndrome. Each contention is addressed below.
Dickmeier argues that the ALJ improperly relied on her application for and receipt of unemployment benefits as a reason for rejecting her subjective testimony as not entirely credible. Pl. Brief at 12-16. An ALJ analyzes the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding her subjective pain and other symptoms in two steps.
The ALJ's credibility findings must be "sufficiently specific to permit the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit the claimant's testimony."
The ALJ provided a lengthy summary of Dickmeier's testimony that included a description of her daily activities, her various physical ailments, including shoulder pain, hearing loss, wrist problems, knee pain, ankle pain, back pain, eczema on her hands, back and feet, asthma, and mental impairments including depression and mood swings. (Tr. 19-21.) The ALJ found that Dickmeier's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms," but found that her "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible." Tr. 20-21. There is no evidence of malingering in the record. Therefore, the ALJ's reasons for discounting Dickmeier's credibility must be clear and convincing.
The ALJ explained that "the record reveal[ed] that [Dickmeier's] allegedly disabling impairments were present at approximately the same level of severity prior to the alleged onset date," and the "fact that the impairments did not prevent [her] from working at that time suggests that it would not currently prevent work." (Tr. 21.) The ALJ then gave a lengthy summary of the medical evidence of Dickmeier's various symptoms over time and concluded that "current treatment notes show [her] signs and symptoms related to her severe impairments have not worsened since the alleged onset date." (Tr. 22.) A conflict between a claimant's ability to work while suffering from impairments that she now claims render her disabled is a valid reason for discounting the claimant's credibility.
The ALJ also noted that "[a]lthough there is a referral in the treatment notes for physical therapy, there is no evidence of record indicating the claimant followed up on the referral, which suggests that the symptoms may not have been as serious as has been alleged in connection with this application and appeal. (Tr. 23.) This too is a legally sufficient reason for discounting the credibility of her testimony.
The ALJ stated that "[t]he claimant has asthma but there is very little in the current treatment notes," and also that "[t]he claimant alleged she has constant outbreaks of eczema on her hands and outbreaks over her body; however, the record since the alleged onset date shows only one reported outbreak." (Tr. 23.) Again, that is a legally sufficient reason for discounting Dickmeier's credibility. Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-7p,
The ALJ also discounted her testimony about the limiting effects of her symptoms because it was inconsistent with evidence in the record about her daily activities, including a report from her mother that contradicted Dickmeier's claims. (Tr. 24.) Inconsistencies such as these are yet another legitimate basis for the ALJ to find a claimant less than credible.
Dickmeier, however, does not challenge the ALJ's analysis of her credibility on any of those grounds. Instead, Dickmeier argues that the ALJ improperly relied "primarily and most importantly" on the fact that she previously applied for and received unemployment benefits as a reason for finding her less than credible. Pl. Brief at 15. First, the Court disagrees with Dickmeier's characterization of the ALJ's reasoning. The ALJ did not "primarily and most importantly" rely on the unemployment issue at all—the ALJ briefly mentioned her application for and receipt of unemployment benefits in merely two sentences at the end of a nearly fivepage long discussion of the other issues with Dickmeier's credibility that the Court analyzed above. Tr. 21-25. More importantly, even if the Court were to find the ALJ erred in relying the unemployment benefits issue as a reason to discount her credibility, that error is harmless because the ALJ gave numerous, legally sufficient reasons for discounting Dickmeier's credibility.
Dickmeier also argues that the ALJ erred by relying on testimony from a vocational expert ("VE") about the jobs she could perform with her RFC because information about those jobs contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") seemed to conflict with the limitations in her RFC. Pl. Brief at 6-8.
At step five, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that the claimant can perform other work in the national economy, given the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Here, the ALJ asked the VE to identify jobs that Dickmeier could perform with a limitation to, among others, occasional overhead reaching bilaterally. (Tr. 77-79.) The VE identified mail clerk, lab sample carrier, deliverer (outside), charge account clerk, surveillance system monitor, and escort vehicle driver. (Tr. 78-80.) The VE then testified that the information she gave the ALJ was consistent with the DOT unless she specifically stated otherwise. (Tr. 81-82.)
Dickmeier claims that the DOT descriptions of five of the six identified jobs are inconsistent with the limitations in her RFC because the jobs "require frequent reaching, and no distinction is made by the DOT regarding overhead reaching and other forms of reaching." Pl. Brief at 7.
The Court does not find a conflict between the VE's testimony and the DOT descriptions of the identified jobs. First, the VE testified she chose the mail clerk, lab sample carrier, and deliverer (outside) jobs specifically because those positions were compatible with the ALJ's restriction to only occasional bilateral overhead reaching. (Tr. 78.) Second, the ALJ did not restrict Dickmeier to all forms of reaching, but only to occasional overhead reaching bilaterally. The DOT descriptions of the various positions only indicate that the jobs require unspecified reaching; none of the descriptions include any mention of any overhead work.
Dickmeier also claims there is a conflict between the VE's testimony that she could perform the job of surveillance system monitor, which according to the DOT would require her to engage in "frequent" talking and hearing, and her RFC, which limits her to only occasional public contact. But the Court again finds no conflict. The DOT does not specify what kind of "talking" or "hearing" is required to perform the job, and the DOT narrative description does not indicate any kind of public contact:
Surveillance System Monitor, DOT § 379.367-010,
Finally, Dickmeier contends that the ALJ erred by failing to provide an adequate narrative explanation, as required by SSR 96-8p, regarding "1) what medical opinion evidence he relied [on] when formulating the physical RFC regarding the tarsal tunnel impairment; or 2) how the medical evidence or opinions supported those limitations included in the RFC." Pl. Brief at 11-12.
An ALJ's RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion. SSR 96-8p at *7. However, an ALJ is not required to "discuss every piece of evidence" in the record.
Notably, Dickmeier does not identify any medical evidence in the record about her tarsal tunnel syndrome that the ALJ should have included in his narrative. The only evidence the Court can find of her tarsal tunnel syndrome is her own subjective complaints, which the ALJ properly found were not entirely credible. In making his RFC determination, the ALJ was not required to "prepar[e] a function-by-function analysis for medical conditions or impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the record[.]"
Finally, Dickmeier claims that the ALJ "reached his own conclusion regarding Dickmeier's physical RFC, which is a medical judgment the ALJ is not qualified to make." Pl. Brief at 11. But that misunderstands the nature of the RFC analysis and the ALJ's role. "The term `residual functional capacity assessment' describes an adjudicator's finding about the ability of an individual to perform work-related activities." SSR 96-55p,
Accordingly, the Court finds no error.
For the reasons stated, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.