FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

PAUL PAPAK, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Dakota Derry ("Derry") seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying her applications for social security insurance ("SSI") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). I have considered all of the paiiies' briefs and all of the evidence in the administrative record. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's final decision should be reversed and remanded for the immediate payment of benefits.

DISABILITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

To establish disability within the meaning of the Act, a claimant must demonstrate an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected . . . to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential process for determining whether a claimant has made the requisite demonstration. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At the first four steps of the process, the burden of proof is on the claimant; only at the fifth and final step does the burden of proof shift to the Commissioner. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999).

At the first step, the Administrative Law Judge considers the claimant's work activity, if any. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 404.1520(b), 416.920(a)(4)(i), 416.920(b). Otherwise, the evaluation will proceed to the second step.

At the second step, the ALJ considers the medical severity of the claimant's impairments. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 140-141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). An impairment is "severe" if it significantly limits the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities and is expected to persist for a period of twelve months or longer. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). The ability to perform basic work activities is defined as "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141. If the ALJ finds that the claimant's impairments are not severe or do not meet the duration requirement, the claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 404.1520(c), 416.920(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(c).

If the claimant's impairments are severe, the evaluation will proceed to the third step, at which the ALJ determines whether the claimant's impairments meet or equal "one of a number of listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d). If the claimant's impairments are equivalent to one of the impairments enumerated in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P, app. 1, the claimant will conclusively be found disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d).

If the claimant's impairments are not equivalent to one of the enumerated impairments, the ALJ is required to assess the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), based on all the relevant medical and other evidence in the claimant's case record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The RFC is an estimate of the claimant's capacity to perform sustained, work-related, physical and mental activities on a regular and continuing basis, despite the limitations imposed by the claimant's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a); see also SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184.

At the fourth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ considers the RFC in relation to the claimant's past relevant work. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If, in light of the claimant's RFC, the ALJ determines that the claimant can still perform his or her past relevant work, the claimant will be found not disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1520(±), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(±). In the event the claimant is no longer capable of performing her past relevant work, the evaluation will proceed to the fifth and final step, at which the burden of proof is, for the first time, on the Commissioner.

At the fifth step of the evaluation process, the ALJ considers the RFC in relation to the claimant's age, education, and work experience to determine whether the claimant can perform any jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c), 404.1566, 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 416.960(c), 416.966. If the Commissioner meets its burden to demonstrate that the claimant is capable of performing jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, the claimant is conclusively found not to be disabled. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c), 404.1566, 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g), 416.960(c), 416.966. A claimant will be found entitled to benefits if the Commissioner fails to meet its burden at the fifth step. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 142; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404. 1520(g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), 416.920(g).

LEGAL STANDARD

A reviewing Comt must affirm an Administrative Law Judge's decision if the ALJ applied the proper legal standards and his findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Batson v. Comm'r, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). "`Substantial evidence' means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007), citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006).

The Court must review the record as a whole, "weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion." Id. The Comi may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See id., citing Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882; see also Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). If the ALJ's interpretation of the evidence is rational, it is immaterial that the evidence may be "susceptible [of] more than one rational interpretation." Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989).

BACKGROUND

Born in August 1961, Derry was 50 years old on her alleged onset date. Tr. 25, 41. 1She protectively filed for SSI and DIB on May 16, 2008, alleging disability as of May 1, 2005 due to stroke, sciatica, and stress disorder. Tr. 161-62, 187. Derry completed the ninth grade and two years of college. Tr. 52-53. She has past work experience as a stock clerk. Tr. 53.

After her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration, Derry requested a hearing before an ALJ. Tr. 125. She appeared and testified before ALJ John Michaelsen on April 10, 2014. Tr. 33-58. Derry was represented by an attorney at the hearing. Id The ALJ also heard testimony from vocational expert ("VE") Mark McGowan. Tr. 50-56. On May 22, 2014, ALJ Michaelsen issued a decision finding Derry not disabled. Tr. 14-32. The Appeals Council denied Derry's subsequent request for review. Tr. 1-6. This appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ALJ FINDINGS

At the first step of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Derry had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of February 1, 2012. Tr. 19. At the second step, the ALJ found that Derry had the following severe impairments: lumbar degenerative disc disease, multiple sclerosis with chronic pain syndrome, and status post cerebral vascular accident. Id. Because Derry's impairments were deemed severe, the ALJ properly proceeded to the third step of the analysis. Tr. 19-22.

At the third step, the ALJ found that Derry's impairments did not meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt P, app. 1. Tr. 22. The ALJ therefore conducted an assessment of Derry's RFC. Id.

The ALJ found Derry retained the RFC to perform work with the following limitations: she could lift and/or carry no more than 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for a total of four hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit up to six hours in an eighthour workday; she can never climb scaffolds, ropes or ladders, and would be limited to no more than occasional balancing, stooping, crawling, crouching, kneeling, and climbing of ramps and stairs; and she must avoid working around unprotected heights, moving machinery, and similar hazards. Tr. 22.

At step four, the ALJ found that Derry was unable to perform any of her past relevant work. Tr. 25. At step five, the ALJ determined that Derry could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy including office helper, ticket seller, and photocopy machine operator. Tr. 25-26. The ALJ therefore concluded that Derry was not disabled. Tr. 26.

ANALYSIS

Derry argues that the Commissioner erred because he (1) rejected her subjective symptom testimony; and (2) rejected the opinion of her treating physician. Because the ALJ's conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence, the court should reverse his decision and this case should be remanded for the immediate payment of benefits.

Plaintiff's Testimony

Derry first argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting her subjective symptom testimony. The Ninth Circuit established two requirements for a claimant to present credible symptom testimony: the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of an impairment or impairments; and must show the impairment or combination of impaitments could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of symptom. Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1986). The claimant, however, need not produce objective medical evidence of the actual symptoms or their severity. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996).

If the claimant satisfies the above test and there is not any affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony only if the ALJ provides clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2007). General assertions that the claimant's testimony is not credible are insufficient. Id. The ALJ must identify "what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant's complaints." Id. (quoting Lester v. Chafer, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Derry testified that she was unable to work because of fatigue in her legs and arms that drains her energy. Tr. 42. It was difficult for her to read or watch television. Id She had difficulty concentrating on multiple tasks at once, and suffers from back pain. Id On bad days, Derry cannot get out of bed and suffers fatigue and eye strain. Tr. 46. She testified that she has bad days about half of the time in a given month. Tr. 47.

The ALJ rejected Derry's testimony. Tr. 23. First, the ALJ found that the medical evidence did not suppott Derry's allegations of severe symptoms and limitations. Lack of objective support from the medical record can undermine a claimant's credibility when other clear and convincing reasons are present. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1040 (valid factors for doubting credibility include "whether the alleged symptoms are consistent with the medical evidence"). Here, the ALJ found that Derry had no more than mild limitations in her range of motion, sensation, and muscle strength, and that her symptoms improved with medication. Tr. 23. On examination of the entire record, however, the court finds that the medical evidence does not undermine Derry's testimony. For example, treating neurologist Robert Choi, M.D., observed clumsiness, ataxia, and unsteady gait, consistent with Derry's testimony. Tr. 522, 546, 575. Further, while Derry's conditions improved somewhat with medication, she continued to suffer ataxia and fatigue from multiple sclerosis after over a year of treatment. Tr. 719, 766-67, 784. On this record, there is no shortage of objective medical evidence to suppott Derry's complaints of severe fatigue and other limitations.

As a second reason for rejecting Derry's testimony, the ALJ found that her activities of daily living were not limited to an extent consistent with her allegations of disability. Tr. 23. Activities of daily living that conflict with a claimant's testimony can provide a clear and convincing reason for rejecting the claimant's credibility. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, the ALJ noted that Derry retained the ability to perform household chores, prepare simple meals, shop for groceries, and maintain her finances. Tr. 23. The ALJ also noted that Dell'y enjoys hiking and visits with others three to four times a week. Id.

The court should reject these findings. The ALJ based his observations regarding Derry's activities on a function repott completed on August 5, 2012, two weeks before Derry's condition deteriorated and a month before she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. Tr. 522. The Disability Report filed on September 21, 2012 noted that Derry was no longer able to cook or clean and received help from her family in performing basic daily activities. Tr. 265-70. Further, while Dell'y rep01ted that she enjoyed hiking, she testified at the administrative hearing that she was no longer able to hike alone due to her conditions. Tr. 46. On this record, Dell'y's daily activities do not constitute a clear and convincing reason for rejecting her testimony. Because the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Detl'y's testimony, his credibility finding should be reversed.

Treating Physician Gary Brandt, M.D.

Derry also argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of Gary Brandt, M.D. Dr. Brandt found that Derry retains the ability to perform only pait-time, sedentary work, and would require unscheduled breaks every hour. Tr. 740-41. He opined that Derry's impairments were so severe that she would be unable to maintain a regular work schedule over four days per month. Tr. 742. After the hearing, Dr. Brandt reported that Derry's multiple sclerosis could cause fatigue that waxes and wanes in intensity, occurs unexpectedly, and may require significant recovery time. Tr. 789. Dr. Brandt concluded that Derry would be unable to work for at least four days out of every month. The Commissioner concedes that the ALJ ell'oneously rejected Dr. Brandt's opinion, and asks the court to remand the case for further proceedings.

Remand

Within the Court's discretion under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is the "decision whether to remand for further proceedings or for an award of benefits." Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1210 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Although a comt should generally remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation, a court has discretion to remand for immediate payment of benefits. Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2014). The issue turns on the utility offmther proceedings. A remand for an award of benefits is appropriate when no useful purpose would be served by fmther administrative proceedings or when the record has been fully developed and the evidence is insufficient to support the Commissioner's decision. Id. at 1100. A comt may not award benefits punitively and must conduct a "credit-as-true" analysis on evidence that has been improperly rejected by the ALJ to determine if a claimant is disabled under the Act. Strauss v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011).

In the Ninth Circuit, the "credit-as-true" doctrine is "settled" and binding on this Court. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2014). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aiticulates the rule as follows:

Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407-08 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, fu1ther administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose. As discussed above, the ALJ erroneously rejected the medical opinion of Dr. Brandt as well as Derry's subjective symptom testimony. Dr. Brandt opined that Derry would miss at least four days of work per month due to her symptoms and limitations. At the administrative hearing, the VE testified that a claimant who missed work over one day per month on a regular basis would not be able to sustain substantial gainful activity. Tr. 55-56. Thus, when Dr. Brandt's opinion and the erroneously rejected testimony is credited as true, no umesolved issues remain before a finding of disability can be reached. Because no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, this case should be remanded for the immediate payment of benefits.

RECOMMENDATION

The Commissioner's decision is not supp01ted by substantial evidence in the record and should therefore be REVERSED and REMANDED for the immediate payment of benefits.

This Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 4(a)(1) should not be filed until entty of the district court's judgment or appealable order. The Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a district judge.

Objections to this Findings and Recommendation, if any, are due no later than foutteen (14) days from today's date. If objections are filed, any response is due fourteen (14) days from the date of the objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6. Patties are advised that the failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951F.2d1153 (9th Cir. 1991).