Justice TODD.
In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether the Superior Court, in vacating the sentence imposed upon Appellee Shawney Perry for carrying a loaded firearm without a license in violation of the Uniform Firearms Act ("UFA"), specifically, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a),
The relevant facts were previously summarized by this Court
Commonwealth v. Perry, 568 Pa. 499, 500-01, 798 A.2d 697, 697-98 (2002) (editorial omissions original).
A few minutes after the broadcast alert, police officers observed Perry and Stewart in the white Lexus, pursued them, and stopped the vehicle. Jones was taken by police to the location of the stop, at which time he identified Perry and Stewart as the two men with whom he and Mahalati had engaged in a confrontation. During a search of the vehicle, police officers uncovered a 9mm Helwan handgun containing six bullets under the driver-side floor mat, and a .22 Beretta under the passenger-side floor mat.
Ultimately, Perry and Stewart were arrested and charged with two counts of attempted murder,
On November 18, 2004, Perry was sentenced to 10 to 20 years for his aggravated assault conviction and a consecutive term of 2½ to 5 years for his UFA conviction; both sentences represented the maximum term of imprisonment for those
N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 11/18/04, at 52-54. The sentencing court denied Perry's subsequent motion for reconsideration of sentence.
Thereafter, Perry appealed to the Superior Court, alleging, inter alia, that the sentencing court erred in sentencing him "outside of the guidelines solely on the basis of the serious injury to the [victim] and in disregard of all of the defense evidence regarding defendant's excellent character, reputation, work history, prior victimization and lack of criminal record and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant."
The Commonwealth filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and, on May 4, 2010, this Court granted review, limited to the issue of whether the Superior Court, in vacating Perry's sentence for his UFA conviction, failed to apply the proper standard of review as set forth in Walls.
It is well settled that "the proper standard of review when considering whether to affirm the sentencing court's determination is an abuse of discretion." Walls, 592 Pa. at 564, 926 A.2d at 961. An abuse of discretion "is more than a mere error of judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless `the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.'" Id. (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion. Id. Indeed, as we explained in Walls, there are significant policy reasons underpinning this deferential standard of review:
Id. at 565, 926 A.2d at 961-62 (citations and footnote omitted).
Further, Section 9781 of the Sentencing Code sets forth an appellate court's statutory obligations in reviewing a sentence. Subsection (c) provides:
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c) (emphasis added). Thus, the appellate court must specifically review a sentence outside the guidelines for reasonableness.
Subsection (d) sets forth the factors to be considered in determining whether a sentence outside of the guidelines is unreasonable:
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).
As noted above, the Superior Court affirmed Perry's judgment of sentence for his aggravated assault conviction. In doing so, the court reasoned that, because "there is a wide spectrum of conduct that can satisfy the elements of aggravated assault, some far more serious than others,. . . the [sentencing] court was certainly justified in considering the individual facts of the present case to determine where on that spectrum the present case fell when imposing sentence." Perry, 228 EDA 2005, at 23. Specifically, the Superior Court noted the assault inflicted life threatening injuries, and that "but for fortuity, the victim could have suffered a mortal wound and [Perry] could have . . . been facing a conviction for third-degree murder. In terms of [Perry's] actions, there is no real difference except for the outcome." Id. at 24.
However, with regard to the judgment of sentence for Perry's UFA conviction, the Superior Court held "the same rationale does not analytically support a maximum sentence." Id. at 25. The court opined:
Id. at 25-26.
The Superior Court reasoned that, "even if intent in carrying the weapon was a legitimate factor, there is no evidence that [Perry] carried a weapon with the intent to shoot someone on that night or to employ the weapon criminally," stating:
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27-28.
The Commonwealth first argues the Superior Court erred in granting relief based on its analysis of the elements of Section 6106 because Perry did not argue on appeal that the sentencing court should have confined itself "to a mechanical review of the elements of [UFA]." Commonwealth's Brief at 14. Rather, the Commonwealth asserts Perry complained that his overall sentence was unduly harsh and that the sentencing court should have focused more on his rehabilitative needs and excellent character, instead of the severity of the victim's injuries. Id. The Commonwealth additionally contends the Superior Court's decision conflicts not only with this Court's holding in Walls, but with "decades of binding precedent" which requires that an appellate court have due regard for, inter alia, the "protection of the public" and the "gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim and the community." Id. at 11, 15-16 (emphasis omitted). In this respect, the Commonwealth emphasizes Perry
Id. at 16 (emphasis original).
Finally, the Commonwealth reiterates that a sentencing court is not bound by the sentencing guidelines, and that the trial court was permitted to impose its sentences consecutively. According to the Commonwealth, in vacating the sentence imposed by the sentencing court for Perry's UFA conviction, the Superior Court "impermissibly substituted its view for that of the trial judge concerning what constituted [a] suitable punishment." Id. at 19.
In response to the Commonwealth's arguments, Perry asserts the Commonwealth "impermissibly seeks to interpret Walls so as to provide `near limitless discretion' for sentencing courts." Appellee's Brief at 13. Perry maintains the Superior Court's decision in the instant case did not conflict with this Court's decision in Walls; Perry points out that, unlike in Walls, the Superior Court in this case gave proper deference to the sentencing court's judgment and discretion, as evidenced by its affirmance of Perry's sentence on his conviction for aggravated assault. Id. at 22. Perry further avers the Superior Court properly considered the factors listed in Section 9781(d), and that "a careful review of the [Superior Court's] opinion reveals that the [Court] . . . did not negate either intent or result as relevant [UFA] sentencing factors," but simply found there was "no evidence that [Perry] carried a weapon with the intent to shoot someone on that night or to employ the weapon criminally." Id. at 25-26 (emphasis omitted).
Perry further contends that, while not dispositive, the trial court's failure to specifically acknowledge on the record or in its written opinion the applicable sentencing guidelines for his UFA conviction militates against a finding that the sentence was reasonable. Id. at 15. Finally, Perry echoes the Superior Court's suggestion that his sentence was an attempt by the sentencing court to "rectify" the jury's failure to return a verdict of attempted murder, and Perry alleges that, in imposing a sentence in excess of the sentencing guidelines, the sentencing court essentially "nullified" the jury's decision to acquit him of attempted murder. Id. at 17.
After careful consideration, we find that, in vacating the sentencing court's judgment of sentence for Perry's UFA conviction, the Superior Court failed to adhere to the dictates of this Court's decision in Walls. In Walls, the defendant sexually molested his seven-year-old granddaughter on several occasions when the child spent the night at her grandparents' house. Walls pled guilty to one count of rape of a victim under the age of thirteen; one count of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse ("IDSI") with a victim under the age of thirteen; and one count of incest. Walls was sentenced to consecutive terms of 10 to 20 years each for the rape and IDSI offenses, and a consecutive term of one to ten years on the incest offense. The mandatory minimum sentence for the rape and IDSI offenses was 5 years each, and the standard range sentence for each offense was 60 to 66 months, with an aggravated range sentence of 66 to 78 months; thus, Walls' sentences of 10 to 20 years for these offenses, which constituted the statutory maximum, was well outside the sentencing guidelines.
Walls appealed his judgment of sentence. In its opinion written pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the sentencing court offered the following reasons for its sentence: (1) Walls was in a position of trust
The Superior Court vacated Walls' judgment of sentence. In doing so, the court first opined that a sentence should be based on the minimum length of confinement consistent with the gravity of the offense, the need for public protection, and the defendant's need for rehabilitation. Commonwealth v. Walls, 846 A.2d 152, 157-58 (Pa.Super.2004). The court further reasoned that, because the sentencing guidelines "were implemented to create greater consistency and rationality in sentencing," the creation of a "norm"—that is, a standard range of punishment—by which to measure the gravity of an offense "strongly implies that deviation from the norm should be correlated with facts about the crime that also deviate from the norm for the offense, or facts relating to the offender's character or criminal history that [deviate] from the norm and must be regarded as not within the guidelines contemplation." Id. at 158. Applying its reasoning to the facts of the case, the Superior Court opined that the sentencing court in Walls "focused to an extreme end upon. . . retribution/vengeance and protecting the public." Id. at 160. The court further posited that the fact that Walls held a position of trust and was responsible for caring for the victim was not uncommon in cases involving the sexual assault of children, and noted that the tender age of the victim was a factor contemplated in the crimes themselves. Id. at 161. Thus, the Superior Court concluded none of the factors cited by the sentencing court justified the imposition of the statutory maximum sentence. Id.
This Court granted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal, and ultimately reversed the Superior Court's decision, concluding the Superior Court exceeded its applicable standard of review. In so doing, we first emphasized the deferential standard of review an appellate court should employ when reviewing a judgment of sentence—abuse of discretion. Furthermore, and related thereto, we reiterated "the guidelines have no binding effect, create no presumption in sentencing, and do not predominate over other sentencing factors—they are advisory guideposts that are valuable, may provide an essential starting point, and that must be respected and considered; they recommend, however, rather than require a particular sentence." Walls, 592 Pa. at 570, 926 A.2d at 964-65. Additionally, to the extent the Superior Court in Walls suggested that a defendant must be sentenced to the minimum amount of confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, gravity of the offense, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant, we rejected that position, noting that the phrase "minimum amount of confinement" had been deleted from the Sentencing Code in 1978. Id. at 571, 926 A.2d at 965.
Next, we reviewed the four factors set forth in Section 9781(d), and determined that the sentencing court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, as well as the history and characteristics of the defendant. Id. at 573, 926 A.2d at 967. Specifically, we noted the sentencing court properly relied on a number of additional findings in support of its upward departure from the sentencing guidelines, including the victim's age, Wall's position of trust and responsibility, the relationship between Walls and the victim, and Walls' characterization of the assaults as "accidents," and stated:
Id. at 574, 926 A.2d at 967.
Finally, we pointed out that the sentencing court in Walls took into account the general standards for sentencing, in that it "clearly considered the protection of the public as well as the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and the community. Furthermore, it is apparent that the sentencing court factored into its decision the rehabilitative needs or prospects of rehabilitation for Walls." Id. at 575, 926 A.2d at 967-68.
We conclude the Superior Court likewise exceeded its standard of review in the instant case. Initially, we note that, at the time of Perry's sentencing, the sentencing court indicated that it was aware of the guideline range for the offenses of which Perry was convicted. In addition, the sentencing court stated at its hearing on Perry's post-trial motion that, prior to imposing Perry's sentence, it read and considered the pre-sentence report, which included Perry's employment history and evidence of his age and lack of a criminal record. N.T. Hearing, 1/4/05, at 10. The sentencing court also indicated that it took into account Perry's own testimony, and the testimony of his family and friends as character witnesses. Id. at 43. The sentencing court also considered the gravity of the offense, the fact that Perry was in possession of two firearms, the protection of the public, and Perry's need for rehabilitation, and refused to modify his sentence:
Id. at 40-41. Based on the above, it is clear that the sentencing court properly considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, including the gravity of the offense and the impact on the life of the victim; the protection of the public; and the history, characteristics, and rehabilitative needs of Perry, in imposing its sentence.
Nevertheless, the Superior Court concluded the sentence imposed for Perry's UFA conviction was unreasonable because, in imposing its sentence, the sentencing court improperly considered (1) Perry's intent in carrying the weapons; and (2) the severity of the injuries to the victim. First, the Superior Court failed to provide any legal support for its conclusion that, because Section 6106 of the Crimes Code prohibits the "relatively limited range of conduct" of carrying a firearm without a license, the purpose for which the weapon was carried and the result of the crime, neither of which is an element of the offense, are irrelevant to determining the appropriate sentence. Indeed, such a conclusion is inconsistent with our holding in Walls, wherein we held that factors that are not specific elements of an offense may be considered by the sentencing court in imposing its sentence.
Further, to the extent the Superior Court suggested that the sentencing court imposed the maximum sentence for Perry's UFA offense as a way of increasing the punishment for his aggravated assault conviction, or for the criminal episode as a whole, this is mere conjecture by the Superior Court, unsupported by any reference to the record.
For all of these reasons, we find the Superior Court failed to give proper deference to the sentencing court when it determined that the sentencing court's imposition of a sentence, although outside of the sentencing guidelines, was unreasonable. Accordingly, we vacate the Superior Court's order and remand the matter to the Superior Court for a reexamination of Perry's judgment of sentence consistent with this opinion and with our decision in Walls, supra.
Chief Justice CASTILLE, Justices EAKIN, BAER, McCAFFERY, and ORIE MELVIN join the opinion.
Justice SAYLOR files a dissenting opinion.
Justice SAYLOR, dissenting.
The General Assembly has tasked our Superior Court colleagues with finally reviewing the discretionary aspects of sentences and, in doing so, has sharply limited
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a) (1995). Section 6106 was last amended on April 22, 1997.
