OPINION BY Judge LEADBETTER.
Before the court are the cross-appeals of Rebecca Harden and Albert Gallatin School District from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County disposing of post-trial motions following a jury verdict in favor of Harden and against the School District. Harden's action was based on a teacher-student sexual harassment claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 — 1688 (Title IX).
For all intents and purposes, it is undisputed that in 2006, Harden was a sixteen
In October 2006, Harden, through her mother, commenced the underlying civil action against Rosie and the School District, proceeding to trial against the District on the theory that its actions violated Title IX, causing Harden harm and entitling her to monetary damages. As noted, although the "jury found in favor of Harden against both defendants, common pleas granted the District's motion for a new trial. Before addressing the issues and arguments raised on appeal to this court, it is helpful to set forth the relevant statutory scheme and the elements of a Title IX claim.
Title IX provides in pertinent part that: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]" Section 1681(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Title IX is designed to prevent recipients of federal funds from using such funds in a discriminatory manner. It is now well settled that this statutory prohibition against discrimination based upon gender encompasses a teacher's sexual harassment or abuse of a student and provides the student with a private cause of action for damages against the school district.
In discussing the private cause of action under Title IX, the United States
Id. at 170-01.
Regarding the specificity of knowledge required to impose liability on a school district, the federal courts have held that mere knowledge of the possibility of harassment or potential for abuse is insufficient to impose liability under Title IX. See Bostic, 418 F.3d at 360-61; Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 237-38 (4th Cir. 2001) [discussing standard of actual notice required by Gebser and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629,
Significantly, after construing Title IX to require school officials to possess actual notice of known acts of discrimination, the Supreme Court held in Gebser that complaints by parents to a high school principal regarding a teacher's improper sexually suggestive comments to students in the classroom were insufficient to demonstrate that school officials had the requisite notice that the teacher was possibly involved in a sexual relationship with a student. 524 U.S. at 291, 118 S.Ct. 1989.
Similarly, in Escue v. Northern Oklahoma College, 450 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2006), the Tenth Circuit held that prior allegations of misconduct against the defendant university professor failed to establish actual notice for purposes of the student-plaintiff's Title IX claim against the university. There, the plaintiff averred in her complaint that in 2002, the professor touched her inappropriately and made inappropriate sexual remarks about her and to her. The evidence pertaining to prior notice involved reports that the professor had dated two older, non-traditional students (one was his student and the other was not) in the past (one of the relationships purportedly occurred in the early 1990s), in addition to two harassment complaints, which were made against the professor nine years earlier. One of the complaints alleged that the professor had
On the other hand, in Warren, the Third Circuit held that evidence demonstrating that two or three years before the student-plaintiff was sexually abused by a teacher, a complaint made to the school principal by a concerned parent that the same teacher was taking his son to the teacher's house and paying him to "[lift the teacher] up and down," was sufficient to demonstrate that the school district had actual notice of the teacher's discriminatory conduct. 278 F.3d at 173.
Similarly, in Doe v. School Board of Broward County, 604 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010), the Eleventh Circuit held that evidence of recent complaints to the principal (within nine months of the violent sexual assault on the plaintiff) by two students, who reported that the subject teacher propositioned them, lifted their shirts to see their stomachs or asked them to show him their stomachs, attempted to blackmail one of the students into having sex and made sexually-suggestive comments about the girls' bodies, were sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden regarding actual notice for summary judgment purposes.
In addition, a plaintiff must show that the school reacted to the established notice with deliberate indifference. The Supreme Court characterized "deliberate indifference" in Gebser as "an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation." 524 U.S. at 290, 118 S.Ct. 1989. See also Chancellor, 501 F.Supp.2d at 708 (characterizing deliberate indifference as a clearly unreasonable response, and stating that if a school official took timely and reasonable measures to end the harassment, such response would not constitute deliberate indifference even if the efforts were unsuccessful) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, while deliberate indifference is certainly a factually driven issue, when the facts are largely undisputed, it can be determined as a matter of law. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 649, 119 S.Ct. 1661 (stating: "[Deliberate indifference] is not a mere reasonableness standard.... In an appropriate case, there is no reason why courts, on a motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not identify a response as not clearly unreasonable as a matter of law.") (internal quotations omitted).
As the Supreme Court stated:
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292-93, 118 S.Ct. 1989.
Turning to the present case, we emphasize that the issue before us is not whether Rosie sexually harassed students, nor whether he is responsible for the consequences of serious acts of moral turpitude. Rather, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether, as a matter of law, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to demonstrate (1) that the District had actual notice that Rosie was sexually harassing Harden (or, alternatively, whether, based upon the known facts, the District had actual notice that Rosie posed a substantial danger to students), and (2) that the District was deliberately indifferent to known acts of discrimination.
We begin by noting that no evidence was offered that the School District possessed actual notice that Rosie was involved in a sexual relationship with Harden or any other student before the State Police contacted Superintendent Vicinelly.
One such incident involved another teacher, George James Hamilla, III, who saw Harden at Rosie's home. Hamilla stated that he drove to Rosie's house one day when Rosie was on sabbatical to see if he wanted to join him for lunch. He observed a girl (whom Harden later identified as herself) standing in Rosie's open garage while Rosie washed her car. There was no suggestion of any activity of a sexual nature. Moreover, this incident could not constitute actual notice of the relationship to the District because there was no trial evidence that Hamilla had authority to take corrective measures to end the discrimination, nor that he reported what he saw to anyone else. See Warren,
We draw a similar conclusion regarding the testimony of Norma Griffith, the mother of seventeen year-old Anna Griffith, who was taught by Rosie in sixth grade. Mrs. Griffith testified regarding Rosie's inappropriate physical contact with her daughter (touching her hair, putting his chin on her head, etc.) and that she told Anna's special education teacher or case-worker about Rosie's behavior, noting to her that she wanted to keep the matter confidential. Such evidence cannot constitute actual notice to the District because there was no evidence that the teacher/case-manager had the requisite authority to address the alleged harassment.
Former student Lisa Keffer, who was born in 1984, testified to an incident involving Rosie that occurred when she was in sixth grade.
Lisa's mother, Betty Rafail Sanders, testified that after she spoke to the principal about what had happened, he called her approximately one week later to indicate that he had investigated the incident and couldn't confirm whether it had happened or not. According to Mrs. Sanders, she trusted the principal and did not think that he would lie. Superintendent Vicinelly testified that the above-described incident occurred during Spring of the 1996-97 school year. Vicinelly, who was the principal at the time, echoed Lisa's description of events to the extent that Rosie was on duty and a commotion occurred while Lisa was emptying her tray and preparing to leave the cafeteria. When he arrived at the scene, Lisa was crying and reported to him that Rosie had touched her breast. He also noted that Rosie appeared to be upset and reported to him that Lisa would not do as he instructed. After talking to Lisa, Vicinelly interviewed Rosie, who stated that he directed Lisa to pick up a piece of trash from the floor and she refused to do so. He indicated that he only reached for her tray or arm and if there was any contact with her breast, it was unintentional or accidental. Vicinelly also spoke to the custodian, who confirmed that Lisa and Rosie had an argument and that Rosie
Assuming that Rosie did indeed grab Lisa's breast as described, the incident, which occurred nearly 10 years before the harassment at issue, is simply too remote to constitute actual notice to the District that Rosie would engage in a sexual relationship with a student in 2006 or that Rosie posed a substantial risk of danger to the students, particularly given the inconclusive results of Vicinelly's investigation. In addition, Vicinelly was not deliberately indifferent to the allegation: he investigated the matter quickly, Rosie denied any intentional touching, and the custodian's observations confirmed Rosie's version of events. Moreover, Vicinelly documented his investigation and created a file to permanently document the incident.
Similarly, the testimony of former student Tami Patterson was not sufficient to provide actual notice to the School District relative to Harden's Title IX claim. According to Tami, she was Rosie's student in approximately 1972-74, and she told Assistant Superintendent Mario Tiberi at a restaurant in 2005 that when she was a student in the seventies, Rosie touched her face and hair and commented on her rear-end. Tami admitted on cross-examination that she testified during an earlier deposition that she had this conversation closer to when Rosie was caught with Harden. She also equivocated on cross-examination regarding the amount of detail she actually gave the Assistant Superintendent when she spoke to him.
We reach the same conclusion regarding the testimony of Alexandria Walls, who was a student of Rosie's in the late eighties or early nineties.
During trial, multiple witnesses testified regarding Rosie's inappropriate conduct as a Softball coach. These incidents were closer in time to the Harden/Rosie relationship, but not all of the described conduct was brought to the attention of school officials. Celeste Tiberi, parent of softball player Monica Tiberi, testified that she met with Superintendent Vicinelly and Principal Tina Burns in the Spring of 2005 to report that, according to her daughter, Rosie stated to some of the players in the outfield that the field was "wet and mushy like sex." N.T. at 446 (February 14, 2012). She also reported that her daughter told her that a player walked into a room when Rosie was changing, and Rosie stated: "You know you like what you see," and invited the girl to stay. Id. at 452. Mrs. Tiberi noted that the school officials "documented everything," and she was given forms to be filled-out by the players; she explained to the officials that the players would probably decline to fill-out the forms because they feared repercussions. She stated, however, that Vicinelly told her that there would be no repercussions. Mrs. Tiberi believed that the forms needed to be completed for the matter to proceed further. Although Mrs. Tiberi did not hear anything further after that meeting, she later called Assistant Superintendent Mario Tiberi, her cousin by marriage, to report to him what she told Vicinelly and to report that after she talked to Vicinelly, the other softball coach, Head Coach Brooks, reprimanded the girls and accused them of lying about Rosie. She also testified that Rosie was not at practice the day after she talked to Vicinelly.
During her testimony, Monica described inappropriate conduct by Rosie, to wit: he placed softballs in the pockets of his jacket and shook them "like referring to his testicles," N.T. at 414 (February 14, 2012); he made a comment after a rain about "the ground being wet and mushy like feeling like sex," id.; he made a comment about another player, "[s]omething about when she ran that she needed to put those away, referring to her breasts, because the boys were watching, looking," id. at 415; and he gave some players backrubs. She indicated, though, that she never told anyone about it other than the other coach, Coach Brooks, and her mother. She further testified that her mother was given forms for the players to fill-out regarding Rosie but none of the girls would fill them out. She noted that no one ever told her that she could report Rosie's conduct to the police or Children and Youth Services but admitted that she knew that she could have gone to the police if she felt strongly enough about it.
Similarly, Shirley Korsh,
Crystal Chesslo, who played softball on Rosie's team in 2005, testified that Rosie told her that her eyes were beautiful and that they were very blue. She further testified that she never heard Rosie direct any inappropriate comments to other players, or act inappropriately towards the players. However, according to Crystal, the team would meet in a particular classroom every day after changing in the girls' locker room; the classroom contained an athletic room where their equipment was kept. Crystal related that on one occasion, she was the first person to reach the classroom and when she walked in, she saw Rosie in the equipment room wearing only "boxer, biker shorts" and when he saw her, he said, "you don't have to leave." N.T. at 655 (February 15, 2012). According to Crystal, she did not tell anyone other than a few girls, including Mrs. Korsh's daughter and Monica Tiberi; she did not tell her parents until after Rosie quit or was fired. She also noted that she mentioned the incident to Mr. Bonni, a board member, at one of the softball games; Rosie was still a coach at the time. She also testified that she told Mr. Bonni that, "they needed to have a teacher and to have them there to watch him." Id. at 658.
According to Superintendent Vicinelly's testimony, Mrs. Tiberi met with him to pass along parental concerns conveyed to her about Rosie's inappropriate comments to the softball team. At that meeting, Mrs. Tiberi reported that Rosie purportedly said: (1) "this field looks like sex;" (2) "you better cover those things up [referring to breasts][;] [t]here [are] horny boys around here;" and (3) to a softball player who walked in while he was changing, "What? You never saw anything like this before?" N.T. at 1319 (February 21, 2012). Mrs. Tiberi also described the following conduct by Rosie: he stated during stretching exercises that he "felt vulnerable in [that] position;" he talked about balls, and on one occasion put a softball in his pants and asked if anyone wanted it; and hit the girls on the rear-end. Mrs. Tiberi indicated that the girls were afraid to be around Rosie. Vicinelly gave Mrs. Tiberi the Sexual Harassment Complaint forms and while she took them, she indicated that the girls wanted to remain anonymous and would probably decline to fill-out the forms. He assured Mrs. Tiberi that he would honor their anonymity as far as was possible in the process. Vicinelly then spoke to Mrs. Korsh that same day or the next day about similar concerns regarding Rosie.
While the exact timing is not altogether clear, Vicinelly, along with Administrative Assistant Tokish, promptly investigated the matter by talking to both Head Coach Brooks and Rosie. Coach Brooks told Vicinelly that he never observed any behavior similar to that which was described and discounted the reports of harassing behavior.
Finally, Harden adduced the expert testimony of William L. Bainbridge, Ph.D., a school standards evaluator. In his testimony, Dr. Bainbridge, based upon his review of Vicinelly's deposition, which was presumably taken during discovery, summarily stated that Vicinelly, as Superintendent, should have brought in a third person to conduct sexual abuse and harassment training in the District rather than conduct the training himself. In Dr. Bainbridge's opinion, the District's abuse/harassment training was lacking. He also referenced an "unbelievable paucity of documentation ... [he] did not see the [S]uperintendent or the Principal writing things down, putting them in the perpetrator's file.... [he] didn't see ... anything in that file to indicate parents had complaints ... every single parent complaint should go in the file." N.T. at 851 (February 16, 2012). According to Dr. Bainbridge, the parents' complaints about Rosie's behavior as a coach should have been reported to the police, who in most instances, will call Children and Youth Services. Accordingly, Dr. Bainbridge criticized Vicinelly's failure to report Rosie to the police. Dr. Bainbridge also criticized the District generally, taking issue with its "substandard" performance reviews of Rosie, noting that they lacked "very thorough goals and objectives, avenues for improvement, specific kinds of information about his teaching and coaching and what he could do better...." Id. at 873. Moreover, Dr. Bainbridge opined that the fact that Rosie was unaware that one of his students had an Individual Education Plan demonstrated that the District was not following Pennsylvania and federal standards. Dr. Bainbridge ultimately opined that Superintendent Vicinelly was grossly negligent regarding his standard of care with mandatory reporting, staff training, documentation of complaints and evaluation of his staff, and most importantly, "he failed to contact the appropriate authorities who could have been available to help this child." Id. at 877. He further opined that the leadership of the school was more than deficient and a gross violation of children's rights had occurred. On cross-examination, Dr. Bainbridge admitted that while he believes that investigations of sexual harassment often lead to discovery of sexual abuse, in this case, any investigation of Rosie as a result of his conduct towards the softball players would not have revealed his relationship with Harden because that sexual relationship did not begin until almost one year later. Dr. Bainbridge also admitted on cross-examination that Vicinelly responded promptly to the parents' complaints about Rosie's behavior as a coach.
After a review of the evidence regarding Rosie's reported behavior toward his softball players, we conclude that while the conduct was completely inappropriate, crude, and unprofessional, the conduct itself
Even if we were to find sufficient notice, Harden's Title IX claim would fail because the District's response to the reported behavior was not deliberately indifferent.
The fact that Dr. Bainbridge was highly critical of the District in general, including its training methods and failure to report Rosie's coaching conduct to the police or Children and Youth Services, does not command a different conclusion.
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's grant of a new trial and remand for the entry of jnov for the School District.
AND NOW, this 11th day of September, 2014, we REVERSE the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County granting a new trial in the above-captioned matter and REMAND for the entry of judgment in favor of Albert Gallatin School District (School District).
And further, Rebecca Harden's motion to strike the School District's Counterstatement of the Case is DENIED.
CONCURRING OPINION BY Judge BROBSON.
Upon review of the record in this matter, I am compelled to agree with the majority that the School District was entitled to a judgment in its favor notwithstanding the jury verdict, or JNOV. Although I believe the issue of whether the School District had sufficient notice to trigger Title IX liability is a close question, there is no record evidence upon which a jury could conclude that the School District acted with deliberate indifference in the face of the incidents involving Donald James Rosie (Rosie) and students outlined by the majority in its opinion. Perhaps the responses to each of those incidents, separately and collectively, fell short of what, in hindsight, would have been more appropriate or even would have prevented Rosie from later harming Rebecca Harden (Harden). But under prevailing law, like the majority, I cannot conclude that there is evidence in the record of deliberate indifference, such that Harden can prevail on her Title IX claim.
Rosie and those like him have taken so much more from us than can be compensated by jury verdicts. The days of allowing our children to roam their neighborhoods, to walk to school, or to play on a playground are gone, replaced with concern that a stranger's single kind word to a child may be the opening salvo to a heinous act. "Grooming" is a word that we no longer think of as involving personal hygiene. Although we are all importantly
Judge LEADBETTER joins in this concurring opinion.
Phillips v. A-Best Prods. Co., 542 Pa. 124, 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1995) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Regarding the latter ground for the entry of jnov, "the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure." Reott v. Asia Trend, Inc., 7 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa.Super.2010) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
524 U.S. at 289, 118 S.Ct. 1989.