OPINION BY Judge LEAVITT.

Jon J. Keller appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County (trial court) granting the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's petition for forfeiture of Keller's 2009 Ford Mustang, which was seized in the course of a drug transaction with an undercover police officer. The trial court held that because the vehicle was used as collateral in the transaction, its forfeiture was authorized by the statute commonly known as the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act (Forfeiture Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6801-6802. Keller challenges the forfeiture on the grounds that he used his vehicle as collateral only at the suggestion of the undercover officer, a defense Keller refers to as "forfeiture entrapment." We affirm.

The facts of this case are undisputed. Police Officers Adam Bruckhart and Travis Shearer are assigned to the York County Drug Task Force. A confidential informant advised Shearer that Keller was selling prescription drugs. The two arranged to have Bruckhart go undercover to buy drugs from Keller while Shearer conducted surveillance.

On August 5, 2013, Bruckhart met the confidential informant in a parking lot in Penn Township, in York County. Keller arrived a few minutes later in his 2009 Ford Mustang. The confidential informant introduced Officer Bruckhart to Keller, who sold Bruckhart several knives and 59 prescription pills for $80. Some of the pills were in Keller's pocket and others were in the vehicle's passenger compartment.1 Keller advised Bruckhart that he had cocaine available for sale, and the two exchanged telephone numbers. Keller drove away.

An hour later, Bruckhart called Keller about the cocaine. Keller instructed Bruckhart to meet him at another parking lot in Hanover Borough. Prior to Bruckhart's arrival, Shearer observed Keller sitting inside his Mustang in the parking lot. When Bruckhart arrived, Keller got into Bruckhart's vehicle. Keller asked Bruckhart if he was a police officer and searched both Bruckhart and his vehicle. Satisfied, Keller agreed to sell Bruckhart two "eight balls" of cocaine for a total of $400.2 Keller told Bruckhart to give him $400 and wait there for the cocaine delivery. Bruckhart objected lest Keller take the cash and not return with the cocaine. Keller agreed to take $200 in cash and give Bruckhart the keys to his Mustang to secure his promise to return.

Keller got into a silver SUV and left.3 Bruckhart waited in the parking lot. After some time passed, Bruckhart called Keller and threatened to take the Mustang if Keller did not return soon. Shortly thereafter, Keller returned to the parking lot on foot and was arrested. Keller no longer had the $200. He did have a small amount of cocaine, but not the two eight balls he had promised to secure. Police searched the Mustang and found various small knives and undescribed drug paraphernalia, but no drugs. Keller told police that he was supposed to report to jail later that day and that he was selling knives, pills and cocaine to tide him over while in jail.4

On December 5, 2013, the York County District Attorney's Office filed a petition for forfeiture of Keller's 2009 Ford Mustang.5 On October 20, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing at which the Commonwealth and Keller appeared. The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officers Bruckhart and Shearer, who testified to the above recited events.6 Keller did not testify.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered the forfeiture of the Mustang. The trial court reasoned that Keller's use of the vehicle to travel to the site of the drug transaction, by itself, did not make the vehicle forfeitable. Rather, it was the use of the Mustang as collateral that facilitated the cocaine drug transaction. The trial court explained its reasoning as follows:

Notes of Testimony, October 20, 2014, at 27-28 (N.T. ____).

Keller appealed to this Court, raising three issues in his Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) statement: (1) the evidence did not show a substantial nexus between the use of the vehicle and the crime committed; (2) the vehicle was used as collateral at the insistence of the police, not Keller; and (3) giving the vehicle's keys to the undercover officer did not make the vehicle itself collateral. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion rejecting Keller's arguments. The matter is now before this Court for our consideration.7

On appeal, Keller raises one issue for this Court's consideration, explaining that he is "proceed[ing] only on Issue # 2 of the 1925(b) Statement." Keller's Brief at 4 n.1. Specifically, Keller argues that the trial court erred in granting the forfeiture of his 2009 Ford Mustang that was used as collateral only at the insistence of law enforcement.8

The Forfeiture Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6801-6802, abolishes any property right in any property used to purchase or sell contraband drugs. Forfeitable property includes motor vehicles. The Forfeiture Act states, in relevant part, as follows:

42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a) (emphasis added). In sum, a vehicle can be forfeited if it has been used "in any manner to facilitate" the sale of illegal drugs. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(4). In Commonwealth v. Wingait Farms, 547 Pa. 332, 690 A.2d 222 (1997), our Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of thoroughbred horses that had been used as collateral in a large-scale marijuana operation.

Where the Commonwealth proves that a seized vehicle is forfeitable under Section 6801(a)(4), the burden shifts to the owner of the vehicle to establish an innocent owner defense, i.e., that the vehicle's unlawful use was "without his knowledge or consent." 42 Pa.C.S. § 6801(a)(4)(ii). If he cannot, the vehicle will be forfeited.

Keller argues that his use of his vehicle as collateral to facilitate the proposed drug deal should not result in a forfeiture because it was done at the insistence of Officer Bruckhart. It was not Keller's idea. Keller argues that by inducing him to use the vehicle as collateral, the police engaged in what amounts to "forfeiture entrapment," akin to criminal entrapment where police use methods of persuasion that would ensnare an otherwise honest, law abiding citizen. Commonwealth v. McGuire, 339 Pa.Super. 320, 488 A.2d 1144, 1148-49 (1985).

The Commonwealth responds that there was no entrapment. Nothing that Officer Bruckhart did or said created a risk that Keller, otherwise innocently disposed, was ensnared. Bruckhart's demand for collateral is what Keller could have expected of any purchaser of cocaine.10

Entrapment is a statutory defense to a criminal charge in Pennsylvania. Section 313 of the Crimes Code provides for the defense of entrapment. It states, in relevant part, as follows:

18 Pa.C.S. § 313(a), (b) (emphasis added).

Keller pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. He did not raise an entrapment defense to his criminal charge. Keller's brief concedes that "the facts make it pretty apparent that Keller was ready to perform a drug transaction with Officer Bruckhart." Keller's Brief at 10. Rather, Keller asserts that it was not his choice to use his Mustang as collateral. Bruckhart forced the Mustang's bailment, which Keller considers a form of entrapment. But for Bruckhart's demand, the vehicle would not have been involved in the transaction.

A proceeding under the Forfeiture Act is a civil, in rem proceeding. Strand v. Chester Police Department, 687 A.2d 872, 873 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). The Forfeiture Act provides an innocent owner defense, not an entrapment defense. The Forfeiture Act nowhere states that the idea to use a vehicle to facilitate an illegal drug sale must originate with the drug dealer in order for the vehicle to be forfeitable.

The Commonwealth points out that even if entrapment were a defense under the Forfeiture Act, it would not help Keller in this particular case. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has explained the purpose behind an entrapment defense as follows:

Commonwealth v. Lucci, 443 Pa.Super. 431, 662 A.2d 1, 3 (1995) (emphasis added). If there is no dispute as to the operative facts relating to the defense, the court should determine the question of entrapment as a matter of law. Id. at 3. Where police conduct "rises to the level of outrageousness, the conduct will support a finding of entrapment as a matter of law." Commonwealth v. Zingarelli, 839 A.2d 1064, 1073 (Pa.Super.2003) (citing Lucci, 662 A.2d at 7).11 Simply providing an opportunity to commit a crime that the defendant seizes is not entrapment; the police behavior must be "outrageous and egregious." Zingarelli, 839 A.2d at 1075.

Officer Bruckhart testified about using the Ford Mustang for collateral as follows:

N.T. 6-7. In addition, Officer Bruckhart was examined as follows:

N.T. 13-15. Officer Bruckhart's conduct was neither outrageous nor egregious.

After closing the first drug sale, Keller proposed an upsale of cocaine. Keller chose the meeting place and chose to drive his Mustang there. Keller requested $400 in cash in exchange for a promise to deliver cocaine. Even assuming that entrapment can be a defense in any civil proceeding, it fails here because nothing Officer Bruckhart did was outrageous. The problem was one of Keller's doing. Instead of leaving his keys with Bruckhart, Keller could have decided not to go forward with his proposed illegal drug transaction.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 14th day of October, 2015, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County dated October 20, 2014, in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.