OPINION BY President Judge LEAVITT.
Thomas L. Barker and Julia Barker (Taxpayers) appeal an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court) denying their petition to set aside the December 9, 2013, upset tax sale of two properties to CJD Group, LLC. Taxpayers assert that the upset sale was invalid because it did not conform to the requirements of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law.
Taxpayers own a parcel located at 356 Church Street and another at 153 East Morgan Street in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. The parcels are identified, respectively, as Parcel Nos. 1509_03610000 and 1509_07510000. The Tax Claim Bureau listed both properties for upset sale on September 9, 2013, because of delinquent taxes.
On September 5, 2013, Thomas Barker executed an installment agreement (2013 Agreement) with the Tax Claim Bureau to resolve Taxpayers' overdue real estate taxes on eight properties they own, including the two scheduled for sale on September 9, 2013. The other six properties had not been scheduled for an upset sale when the agreement with the Tax Claim Bureau was made.
The terms of the 2013 Agreement were straightforward. Taxpayers agreed to make an immediate payment of $15,000, to be apportioned among the eight properties as follows:
Parcel ID Total Owed 2011 Owed 1505_03950000 $10,138.85 $5,256.48 ($2,100 paid) 1509_03610000 $ 6,498.06 $3,394.02 ($1,400 paid) 1509_03670000 $ 8,959.85 $4,580.11 ($1,900 paid) 1509_07520000 $ 2,943.25 $1,575.57 ($700 paid) 1509_07510000 $ 8,934.49 $4,640.37 ($1,900 paid) 1512_01900000 $ 8,201.19 $4,265.25 ($1,700 paid) 1512_01900100 $ 8,058.20 $4,192.02 ($1,700 paid) 2706G00900000 $15,330.61 $7,990.34 ($3,600 paid)
R.R. 116a.
On November 1, 2013, the Tax Claim Bureau sent a letter to Taxpayers reminding them of the upcoming installment payment of the 2011 taxes scheduled for December 6, 2013. Its letter advised:
R.R. 117a. On December 11, 2013, Taxpayers learned that the Church Street and East Morgan Street properties had been sold at the December 9, 2013, upset tax sale.
Taxpayers filed objections, and the trial court conducted a hearing. Jonathan Schuck, Director, testified on behalf of the Tax Claim Bureau. Both Taxpayers also testified.
Schuck first testified about Taxpayers' Morgan Street property, parcel 1509_03610000. On August 30, 2010, Mrs. Barker entered into an installment agreement (2010 Agreement) to stay the sale of the Morgan Street property scheduled for upset sale in September 2010.
Schuck testified that Mrs. Barker contacted him in September 2013 to request an installment agreement on eight properties, for which their taxes were past due. Schuck agreed. However, he testified that this installment agreement was not governed by Section 603 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, which gives taxpayers one year to get current on their delinquent taxes once they make a payment of 25% of the amount of delinquent taxes.
Schuck testified that he discussed the 90-day extension with Mrs. Barker in a series of e-mails. It was Mr. Barker who came to the Tax Claim Bureau to sign the 2013 Agreement, at which time Schuck went over its terms. When Taxpayers missed the December 6, 2013, payment of the 2011 taxes on all eight properties, the Church Street and East Morgan Street properties proceeded to an upset sale on December 9, 2013.
Schuck testified about the Tax Claim Bureau's notifications to Taxpayers. He confirmed that it did not inform Taxpayers, who paid the entire balance owed under the 2010 Agreement before the stated deadline, that they had defaulted on that agreement. He also confirmed that he did not inform Mr. Barker that if full payment of the 2011 taxes on eight properties were not fully paid by December 6, 2013, that two of the properties covered by the 2013 Agreement would be sold on December 9, 2013. Finally, he confirmed that when Taxpayers missed the December 6, 2013, payment, the Tax Claim Bureau did not notify them of their default or that two of the properties would be sold three days later.
Mr. Barker testified. He stated that he arrived at the Tax Claim Bureau on September 5, 2013, with a check for $15,000. He was given the 2013 Agreement and time to read it. Mr. Barker assumed the 2013 Agreement was the same as the 2010 Agreement. Mr. Barker was not advised that the two properties scheduled for sale in September would be sold in December if the 2011 taxes owed on all eight properties were not paid by December 6, 2013.
The trial court concluded that the 2013 Agreement was not governed by Section 603 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law and that Taxpayers should have known that the 2013 Agreement, with a 90-day duration, was different from the 2010 Agreement. The trial court noted that the 2010 Agreement was captioned "Agreement to Stay Tax Sale" and referred to Section 603. By contrast, the 2013 Agreement was captioned "Installment Agreement" and did not refer to Section 603.
On appeal to this Court,
We begin with a review of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law. We have explained that the statute was not enacted to deprive citizens of their property or to create investment opportunities for those who attend tax sales but, rather, to assist the collection of taxes. Stanford-Gale v. Tax Claim Bureau of Susquehanna County, 816 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). The United States Supreme Court has held that due process is implicated in any taking of property for the collection of taxes, stating that
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234, 126 S.Ct. 1708, 164 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006). Because of these due process concerns, this Court has explained that
Smith v. Tax Claim Bureau of Pike County, 834 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). A failure by a tax claim bureau to comply with each and every statutory requirement will nullify a sale. Id. at 1252.
In their first issue, Taxpayers assert that they were wrongly denied a payment plan that conformed to Section 603 of
The Tax Claim Bureau contends that Taxpayers' admitted failure to make interim payments between October 1, 2010, and March 25, 2011, constituted a default. As such, Taxpayers were not entitled to a Section 603 agreement in 2013 and, thus, Schuck properly offered them, instead, a 90-day "extension" agreement.
Section 603 provides that a taxpayer who pays 25% of the tax due may have a pending property sale stayed by agreeing to pay "in not more than three (3) installments all within one (1) year of the date of said agreement," the balance owed. 72 P.S. § 5860.603. Section 603 further states that
Id. (emphasis added).
Here, the Tax Claim Bureau did not prove that Taxpayers defaulted on the 2010 Agreement.
Our conclusion that the Tax Claim Bureau did not prove a default of the 2010
The Tax Claim Bureau responds that assuming, arguendo, that a default did not occur in 2010, Taxpayers were not entitled to a Section 603 agreement because they did not pay 25% of the outstanding taxes owed on their eight properties. The $15,000 covered 22% of the outstanding taxes. We reject this argument.
The correspondence between Schuck and Mrs. Barker began with an e-mail from Mrs. Barker with a subject line "agreement for stay of tax sale." R.R. 115a. Mrs. Barker's email then stated that Taxpayers needed agreements for eight properties, which were listed by number. She then explained:
Id. Schuck responded that he was "[w]illing to set-up a 90-day extension agreement on the below eight parcels for down payment of 15K." Id.
In In Re Consolidated Return of the Tax Claim Bureau of the County of Beaver from the August 16, 2011 Upset Sale for Delinquent Taxes, 105 A.3d 76 (Pa. Cmwlth.2014), petition for allowance of appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 121 A.3d 497 (2015), this Court recognized that an upset sale must be stayed where a taxpayer pays 25% of the taxes due and agrees to an installment plan for the remainder. Further, where a taxpayer makes a payment of 25% or more, "the tax claim bureau must advise the taxpayer of the Section 603 option because its failure to do so `would deprive the owner of his or her property without due process of law.'" Id. at 82 (emphasis added) (quoting Darden, 629 A.2d at 323).
Mrs. Barker specifically requested a stay of the tax sale of the two properties scheduled for the upcoming tax sale. At that time, the total due on the Church Street property was $6,498.06 and the total due on the Morgan Street property was $8,934.19. The $15,000 far exceeded 25% of what was owed on those two properties. At that point, the Tax Claim Bureau was obligated to offer her a Section 603 agreement and to stay the tax sale for the two properties listed for sale. It did not do so.
The Tax Claim Bureau argues, in the alternative, that it is not limited by the terms of Section 603 when it negotiates with delinquent taxpayers. It points to Section 601(a) of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law, which authorized it to continue a scheduled upset sale for any reason. The Tax Claim Bureau asserts that it complied with Section 601(a), which states, in relevant part, as follows:
72 P.S. § 5860.601(a).
Section 601(a) permits a tax claim bureau to continue any scheduled sale to the end of the calendar year. There are many reasons why a tax claim bureau may wish to continue a sale, such as the failure of an upset sale to produce a bid equal to the amount of the delinquent taxes. When a sale is continued, the tax claim bureau need not repeat all the notice requirements undertaken for the first scheduled upset sale. However, Section 601(a)(1) also provides as follows:
72 P.S. § 5860.601(a)(1) (emphasis added). Section 601(a) did not authorize the Tax Claim Bureau's actions here.
A sale pursuant to Section 601(a) cannot take place where a property's sale is not governed by Section 603 of the Tax Sale Law. 72 P.S. § 5860.601(a)(1)(ii). Here, the Tax Claim Bureau was obligated to offer Taxpayers a Section 603 installment plan option when they tendered $15,000. Likewise, the Tax Claim Bureau was not permitted to sell their two properties under authority of Section 601(a)(1)(ii) because Taxpayers met the requirements for having their properties "removed from sale under Section 603." 72 P.S. § 5860.601(a)(1)(ii).
For the above-stated reasons, we reverse the order of the trial court.
AND NOW, this 27th day of July, 2016, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, dated June 30, 2015, is hereby REVERSED.
72 P.S. § 5860.603 (emphasis added).