OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH.
H. Edwin Rodrock (Appellant) appeals from the June 26, 2017 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County (trial court) sustaining the preliminary objections of the Public Utility Commission (PUC) and dismissing Appellant's complaint with prejudice.
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Appellant has been employed with the PUC since December 17, 1973. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 61a.) Appellant was first employed as an Accountant II. Id. In 2002, Appellant became employed as a fixed utility financial analyst supervisor. (R.R. at 62a.) In 2005, the PUC advertised an available position as a fixed utility manager. Id. Appellant applied for this position but learned that he was rejected in May 2006. Id. Appellant was 59 years old at the time of this rejection. Id. Paul Diskin, a 51-year-old male, was hired for this position. Id.
On November 6, 2006, Appellant filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (Commission) alleging that he was denied the aforementioned fixed utility manager position due to unlawful age discrimination. (R.R. at 61a.) By letter dated July 21, 2008, the Commission advised Appellant that the matter was "closed administratively" for reasons which "[y]ou have been informed by your investigator." (R.R. at 73a.) This letter stated that both the complainant (Appellant) and respondent (PUC) had the opportunity to provide comments regarding the investigation of the complaint after "final disposition" of the same. Id. This letter also
(R.R. at 57a.)
Appellant requested a preliminary hearing. By letter dated March 27, 2009, the Commission notified Appellant that his case would be reopened and would be "forwarded to the Commission's Regional Office for further investigation." (R.R. at
However, by letter dated July 27, 2011, the Commission notified Appellant that his request was denied. (R.R. at 68a.) This letter also advised Appellant that his case was "closed" and that he had "no further appeal rights with the Commission." Id. Further, the letter reminded Appellant of his right to file a complaint with the common pleas court under section 12(c) of the Act, stating that,
Id.
On July 26, 2013, Appellant filed a complaint with the trial court reiterating his claim that he was not hired for the fixed utility manager position due to unlawful age discrimination. (R.R. at 61a-64a.) Appellant alleged in this complaint that he was more qualified for that position than Diskin, the 51-year-old male who was eventually hired, and had more experience performing many of the duties of that position. (R.R. at 62a.) The PUC filed preliminary objections asserting that Appellant did not aver that a complaint had been first filed with the Commission, after which Appellant filed an amended complaint on July 22, 2014, addressing this error. The PUC filed preliminary objections to the amended complaint alleging that Appellant failed to state a claim because his original complaint filed on July 26, 2013, was untimely. The PUC noted that Appellant had two years to initiate a claim in the trial court in accordance with section 12(c)(2) of the Act. The PUC stated that the two-year period began to run with the June 3, 2011 right-to-sue letter/notice provided to Appellant, and not with its July 27, 2011 letter, which merely denied Appellant's request for a preliminary hearing due to a lack of new evidence.
In the interim, Appellant filed another complaint with the Commission, alleging that he was denied a second newly-advertised fixed utility manager position due to unlawful age discrimination. (Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 6b.) Appellant was 65 years of age at the time this position was advertised and it was eventually filled by Darren Gill, a 44-year-old male. Id. Appellant's second complaint was dismissed and closed on December 17, 2012. Less than two years later, on December 12, 2014, Appellant filed a second complaint with the trial court, again alleging that he was not hired for the fixed utility manager position due to unlawful age discrimination. Appellant also alleged that he was more qualified than Gill because he had more supervisory experience and training in the area of emergency preparedness. (S.R.R. at 3b-8b.) By order dated February 22, 2017, the trial court consolidated Appellant's cases. (R.R. at 17a.)
By order dated June 26, 2017, the trial court sustained the PUC's preliminary objections and dismissed Appellant's amended
The trial court also relied on sections 42.61 and 42.63 of the Commission's regulations in support of its opinion. Section 42.61 addresses the dismissal and closing of complaints when the Commission finds that no probable cause exists to credit the allegations of a complaint, as well as the procedure for notifying parties of such decisions, including written notification. 16 Pa. Code § 42.61.
Appellant thereafter filed a notice of appeal with the trial court, as well as a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. (R.R. at 5a-9a.) Specifically, Appellant alleged that the trial court erred in concluding that the Commission's June 3, 2011 letter/notice, rather than its July 27, 2011 letter, constituted notice of the closing of his case and, hence, that his complaint was untimely filed. (R.R. at 5a.) Appellant also alleged that the trial court erred in finding that notice of dismissal of a complaint and notice of closing the case are the same action. (R.R. at 6a.) The trial court did not issue a supplemental opinion in support of its June 26, 2017 order but instead found that the issues raised by Appellant were adequately addressed in the opinion accompanying that order.
On appeal,
Section 12(c) of the Act provides as follows:
43 P.S. § 962(c)(1)-(4) (emphasis added).
Appellant alleges that the trial court's interpretation of the terms "closed" and "dismissed" as related to section 12(c)(2) of the Act, and its reliance upon the Commission's regulations for support, violates the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory Construction Act), 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. Appellant avers, contrary to the rules of statutory construction, that the trial court's interpretation "fails to give full effect to the provisions of the [Act] enacted by the General Assembly, usurps the legislative prerogative, impermissibly alters the framework set in the statute, and treats the General Assembly's language regarding the statute of limitations as mere surplusage." (Appellant's brief at 7-8) (emphasis in original). Appellant further describes section 42.61 of the Commission's regulations as "confused, defective, and fatally flawed." (Appellant's brief at 12.) We agree with Appellant.
Certainly, the focus of any statutory construction analysis is the legislative intent behind the enactment. Indeed, section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), (b).
In the present case, the words of the statute are clear. Section 12(c)(2) of the Act states that the two-year time period within which a complainant must initiate an action in the common pleas court begins to run from "the date of notice from the Commission
The Commission's June 3, 2011 letter/notice states as follows:
(R.R. at 43a) (emphasis added). Nowhere in this letter/notice does the Commission advise Appellant that his case was closed. Rather than simply indicating that Appellant's complaint is dismissed, the Commission opts to inform Appellant that his complaint "should be dismissed." Id. At the very least, the Commission's use of the words "should be" renders the letter itself somewhat ambiguous. Further, this language, coupled with the language of the second paragraph of the letter, i.e., "after the final disposition of the complaint," seemingly implies that the matter was not in fact closed. The second paragraph notes the opportunity of a complainant and respondent to provide comments after final disposition of the complaint, which comments will be provided to the members of the Commission. Such language suggests that the Commission members could take further action in response to the comments.
Moreover, although the "NOTICE OF RIGHTS OF COMPLAINANTS AFTER DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT" that was attached to the June 3, 2011 letter advised Appellant of his right to file a complaint with the common pleas court "upon the dismissal of your case," this notice goes on to state that such complaint "must be filed within two (2) years after the date of the notice from the commission
Importantly, we note that Appellant's complaint was originally closed by the Commission by letter/notice dated July 21, 2008. The 2008 letter specifically advised Appellant that his complaint was "closed administratively." (R.R. at 73a.) However, following Appellant's request for a preliminary hearing, the Commission reopened the case and noted that further investigation would follow. Upon completion of that investigation, the Commission issued the June 3, 2011 letter/notice to Appellant. Nevertheless, the Notice of Rights that was included with this letter, which was identical to the one attached to
(R.R. at 68a) (emphasis added). The July 27, 2011 letter from the Commission, for the first time, advises Appellant in clear and definitive language that his case was closed. According to section 12(c)(2) of the Act, it is the closing of the complaint that initiates the two-year statute of limitations for filing a complaint with the common pleas court. Given the express language of the statute, it was not unreasonable for Appellant to believe that the two-year period for filing a complaint with the trial court began as of the date of this letter.
Based upon the clear language of section 12(c)(2) of the Act, along with the language used by the Commission in its July 27, 2011 letter, the trial court erred in sustaining the PUC's preliminary objections and dismissing Appellant's amended complaint, originally filed on July 26, 2013, as untimely.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings relative to Appellant's amended complaint.
Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in this decision.
AND NOW, this 9
Jurisdiction relinquished.
16 Pa. Code § 42.62(a)-(d).
16 Pa. Code § 42.61(a)-(c).
16 Pa. Code § 42.63(a)-(f).