ERIC L. FRANK, CHIEF U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.
Portnoff Law Associates, Ltd. ("Portnoff") is a law firm that represents various municipalities and municipal authorities in Pennsylvania. In the course of that representation, Portnoff regularly files written motions in state court "continuing" or "postponing" sheriff's sales of real property that have been stayed by the property owner's bankruptcy filing under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Debtors Michael Billings and Kathleen Billings ("the Debtors") have filed a class action lawsuit against Portnoff asserting that Portnoff's practice of filing multiple motions to postpone sheriff's sales, without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), violates the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
Presently before the court is Portnoff's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("the Motion"), filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (incorporated in this adversary proceeding by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012).
The Motion will be granted.
The Debtors filed a voluntary chapter 13 petition on April 11, 2014. On October 22, 2015, the Debtors instituted this adversary proceeding against Portnoff by filing a class action complaint ("the Complaint"). The Complaint consists of two (2) counts.
Count I is a claim for violation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The Debtors seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 362(a)(1), (k). More specifically, the Debtors request that the bankruptcy court: (1) declare that the filing of state court continuation motions is a violation of the automatic stay, (2) enjoin Portnoff from filing any further such motions, and (3) sanction Portnoff for a knowing violation of the stay.
In Count II, the Debtors request that this action be certified as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). They define the putative plaintiff class as chapter 13 debtors who:
Portnoff moved to dismiss the Complaint on November 18, 2015. (Doc. # 5). The Debtors filed a response to the Motion on December 7, 2014. (Doc. # 7).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) allows a party to raise as a defense that the complaint "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Last year, I described the legal standard under Rule 12(b)(6) as follows:
In re Bennett, 531 B.R. 68, 71-72 (Bankr. E.D.Pa.2015).
In deciding the Motion, I accept the following facts as true based on the allegations in the Complaint and the documents attached to the Complaint.
The Debtors own and reside at the real property located at 600 Jolene Drive, West Chester, Pennsylvania ("the Property").
On March 11, 2013, Portnoff, acting as counsel to West Bradford Township ("the Township"), filed a municipal lien action (2013-02220-LN) in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Chester County ("the CP Court") against the Debtors for unpaid sewer, trash, and hydrant fees, totaling $4,452.78. (Compl. ¶ 12; Ex. B). The Township obtained a default judgment on July 10, 2013 in the amount of $5,259.61 ("the Judgment"). (Id. ¶ 13; Ex. B).
The Township filed a praecipe for a writ of execution to allow the Township to schedule a sheriff's sale of the Debtors' Property to satisfy the Judgment. (Compl. ¶ 14). The CP Court granted the writ and the Property was listed for a sheriff's sale in April 2014. Prior to the sale date, the Debtor filed this chapter 13 bankruptcy case, whereupon Portnoff orally postponed the scheduled sheriff's sale to August 2014. (Id. ¶ 15).
On August 20, 2014, Portnoff filed a written motion with the CP Court to postpone the sheriff's sale until October 16, 2014. (Id. ¶ 18).
Again on October 15, 2014, January 14, 2015, April 14, 2015, September 16, 2015, Portnoff filed written motions with the CP Court to postpone the sheriff's sale. The CP Court granted the motions to postpone the sheriff's sale. Portnoff did not seek relief from the stay before filing these subsequent written motions in the CP Court. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20, 23-24).
The Debtors allege that Portnoff has a history of routinely filing the same type of motions in state court to postpone scheduled sheriff's sales against chapter 13 bankruptcy debtors in this bankruptcy district without first seeking relief from stay. (Id. ¶ 32).
The issue before the court is a question of law. Simply put, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals' decision in Taylor v. Slick, 178 F.3d 698 (3d Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1079, 120 S.Ct. 797, 145 L.Ed.2d 672 (2000), controls.
The Taylor decision is based on the interplay between a provision of the Bankruptcy Code and the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 362(a)(1) of the Code provides that a bankruptcy filing stays "the
Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.2 provides that prior to the execution upon a judgment by a sheriff's sale of real property, notice must be given by posting and publication. Rule 3129.3(a) provides, as a general rule, that if a sheriff's sale is "stayed, continued, postponed or adjourned," new notice of the sale must be given. Of course, new notice (especially the publication requirement) compels the creditor to incur additional expenses (which, by agreement or by statute, frequently is passed on to the judgment debtor/homeowner).
There are, however, exceptions to the general rule that stayed, continued, postponed or adjourned sheriff's sales must be re-noticed.
The first exception is found in subsection Rule 3129.3(b), which allows a sale to be postponed without the service and publication of a new sale notice if the creditor or sheriff makes an oral announcement at the sale of the new sale date and that new sale date is within one hundred thirty (130) days of the postponed sale date. Under subsection (b), a sale may be postponed twice within the 130 day period without re-noticing.
The second exception is by special order of the court. Thus, a party seeking more than two (2) postponements within 130 days of the original sale date or a postponement beyond the 130 day period, must file a motion in the state court. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.3(a).
In Taylor, the creditor instituted foreclosure proceedings, obtained a default judgment against the debtor and, upon a writ of execution, scheduled the property for sheriff's sale. The debtor filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition a few days prior to the sale. The creditor "postponed" the sale by oral announcement at the scheduled sale pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. 3129.3(b). Shortly after continuing the sale, the creditor obtained relief from the stay. The postponed sale took place on the later sale date announced on the initial sale date.
In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed the primary purposes of the automatic stay: "to effectively stop all creditor collection efforts, stop all harassment of a debtor seeking relief, and to maintain the status quo between the debtor and [his] creditors." 178 F.3d at 702 (quoting Zeoli v. RIHT Mortg. Corp., 148 B.R. 698 (D.N.H.1993)) (emphasis in original). The Taylor court observed that "continuation" under § 362(a) means the "carrying forward" of a judicial proceeding. The court reasoned that the postponement at issue in Taylor did not allow the sale to go forward and that "no act had occurred that prejudiced [the debtor] or otherwise altered his position with respect to the property." Taylor, 178 F.3d at 702. The court concluded that the oral notice postponing the sheriff's sale merely preserved the status quo and avoided duplicative foreclosure costs that eventually would be charged to the debtor. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that Rule 3129.3(b) comports with the underlying policy of § 362(a)(1).
The Debtors acknowledge Taylor, but attempt to distinguish the precedent in two (2) ways. First, they assert that because no written motion was filed with the state court in Taylor, and therefore, no state court judicial intervention was required to effect the continuance, Taylor is not applicable. They also contend that the practice of filing multiple Rule 3129.3(b)(1) motions effectively alters the status quo because it subjects debtors to considerable additional expenses in the form of legal fees.
The Debtors seek support for their arguments in In re Townsville, 268 B.R. 95 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2001).
The issue in Townsville was confirmation of the debtor's chapter 13 plan. The debtor sought to provide for what it categorized as the secured claim of a "creditor," even though the putative "creditor" purchased the debtor's property at a sheriff's sale prior to the bankruptcy filing. That party objected to the plan's treatment of it as the "holder of a secured claim,"
To determine whether the debtor's chapter 13 plan should be confirmed, the Townsville court considered whether the debtor was likely to succeed in setting aside the sheriff's sale, relief that the debtor requested in a pending adversary proceeding.
Ultimately, the Townsville court held that even if there had been a violation of the automatic stay, the debtor was not likely to prevail in establishing that the sheriff's sale could be set aside as void ab initio. However, in dictum, the Townsville court made two (2) statements which warrant consideration here.
First, the court observed that Taylor was distinguishable because the creditor in Townsville took further action than the creditor in Taylor. The Townsville creditor re-noticed the property for sheriff's sale, an action that the Townsville court perceived as moving the proceeding forward, not simply maintaining the status quo. Here, the Debtors characterize the filing of multiple written motions in state court as the equivalent of re-noticing the property for sale. They suggest that the filing of a written motion is even worse, in some sense, because it requires state court judicial action.
Second, the Townsville court observed the re-noticing of the sheriff's sale increased the judgment costs and, consequently, the claim against the debtor, causing the court to opine that the debtor's stay violation claim "may be successful." Townsville, 268 B.R. at 125. The Debtors here argue that the multiple state court motions filed by Portnoff alter the status quo by imposing expenses on them in two (2) distinct ways: (1) increasing the amount of their Judgment on the Township's secured claim
The Debtors' attempt to distinguish Taylor is unpersuasive.
Another judge in this district rejected the argument that the Taylor holding is limited to cases involving oral postponements of a sheriff's sale and the corollary argument that a postponement obtained by written motion violates the automatic stay. See In re Angulo, 2010 WL 1727999 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Apr. 26, 2010) (per Fox, J.).
Angulo involved the same set of facts as the present adversary proceeding: the postponement of a sheriff's sale via state court motion without obtaining relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy court. The court dismissed the debtor's claim for violation the automatic stay, reasoning that the proper test under Taylor is whether the creditor's action altered the
Here, as in Angulo, Portnoff's actions in filing written motions simply maintained the status quo in the foreclosure action, just like the oral postponement in Taylor. Portnoff's client gained no substantive advantage over the Debtors by postponing the sale. A different result is not warranted simply because the state court procedural rules require the filing of a motion in some circumstances. I find Angulo persuasive and I will follow it.
The Debtors' second argument, that Portnoff's filing of multiple motions prejudices them because of the expected imposition of legal expenses, also fails under Taylor.
The potential for a creditor to incur legal expenses (potentially chargeable to the debtor) exists any time the creditor follows the state court rules that authorize the postponement of a sheriff's sale, regardless whether the procedure involves an oral announcement or the filing of a written motion. After all, the creditor's counsel likely incurs billable time in attending the sale or otherwise communicating with the sheriff to arrange for announcement of the sale postponement or in preparing and prosecuting a motion. The Taylor court was not concerned with this collateral issue, i.e., whether expenses chargeable to the debtor will be incurred in the process of complying with the state court rules. Instead, Taylor instructs that violation of the stay turns exclusively on the nature of the action taken by the creditor, and specifically, whether that action advanced the creditor's position in the state court proceeding.
The Debtors' argument that it is unfair to require a debtor to retain counsel to defend or contest such motions is equally unavailing. It is in the debtor's interest to have the sheriff's sale postponed. No real reason exists for the debtor to contest the postponement motion. Certainly, a debtor would prefer the sheriff's sale to be stayed or canceled, but it is very difficult to imagine the circumstances that would cause a debtor to contest a postponement motion. Indeed, the Debtors here make no allegation that they incurred any such legal expenses.
It may appear counterintuitive to hold that the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), permits a creditor to file a motion seeking some sort of judicial relief in a pending lawsuit against the debtor. Certainly, such action presumptively fall within the broad reach of the automatic stay. However, Taylor carves out a limited circumstance in which it is permissible — where the creditor seeks only to maintain
Accordingly, the Debtors cannot obtain any of the relief they seek from Portnoff in this adversary proceeding.
It is hereby
1. The Motion is
2. Complaint is
The rule uses four (4) different terms to describe the deferral of a sheriff's sale: "stay," "continue," "postpone" and "adjourn."
In my experience, Pennsylvania attorneys, at least in this judicial district, tend to use the terms "continue" and "postpone" to refer to deferred sales for which no new notice is required and the term "stayed" or "canceled" for sales whose rescheduling will require re-noticing. I recognize that these linguistic distinctions have no foundation in Rule 3129.3.
