SAVAGE, District Judge.
This action brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")
Plaintiff, Rachel Wegelin, contends that defendant, the Reading Hospital and Medical Center ("Reading Hospital"), violated the FMLA by refusing to grant her leave to find alternative daycare arrangements for her daughter, who suffers from pervasive developmental disorder ("PDD") and congenital blindness in one eye. Wegelin argues that due to a change in her job conditions, she needed time off work to arrange for a transfer of her daughter, who cannot be left unsupervised, to a different daycare that could accommodate the change in her work schedule.
Reading Hospital moved for summary judgment. It contends that Wegelin was not entitled to FMLA leave because her daughter did not suffer from a "serious health condition" and Wegelin was not "needed to care for" her daughter.
We denied summary judgment because there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether Wegelin's daughter, Carolyn, had a "serious health condition," as defined in the FMLA and regulations promulgated under it, and whether Wegelin "needed to care for" her daughter when she had to make arrangements to transfer her to another daycare. We now explain our rationale.
Wegelin was employed at the Reading Hospital as a technician assistant since 1997. She was terminated on January 25, 2010, after she failed to report for duty.
In 2003, Wegelin gave birth to Carolyn, who suffers from PDD and congenital blindness in one eye. PDD is an autism spectrum disorder, "characterized by impaired social interaction and communication, repetitive stereotyped patterns of behavior, and uneven intellectual development often with mental retardation."
Reading Hospital provides each employee a parking space in one of its garages or parking lots based on various criteria, including seniority, department location, and shift.
On January 18, 2010, Wegelin had a scheduled day off. She did not report to work the rest of the week because she was looking for a daycare center that could take care of Carolyn with her special needs. It is undisputed that she notified her supervisor that she needed time off to find a new daycare. On January 21, 2010, Wegelin was told that she would be allowed to utilize her paid time off for the week of January 18 through 22, 2010, but she was expected to return to work on January 25, 2010. When Wegelin did not report to work on January 25, Reading Hospital terminated her employment.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Judgment will be entered against a party who fails to sufficiently establish any element essential to that party's case and who bears the ultimate burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In examining the motion, we must draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 159-60 (3d Cir.2003).
The initial burden of demonstrating there are no genuine issues of material fact falls on the moving party. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(a). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must counter with "`specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation and emphasis omitted). Thus, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (citation omitted).
The FMLA is intended to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of employees to take reasonable leave for eligible medical conditions and compelling family reasons. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) and (2); Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 146 (3d Cir.2004). Congress enacted the FMLA in recognition of the growth of "single-parent households and two-parent households in which the single parent or both parents work," the importance of parental participation "in early childrearing" and "care of family members who have serious health conditions," the lack of "employment policies to accommodate working parents," and the inadequacy of "job security for employees who have serious health conditions." 29 U.S.C. § 2601; Churchill v. Star Enters., 183 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir.1999).
Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to a total of twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve month period "[i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). After returning from an FMLA leave, the employee must be reinstated to his or her former position, or an equivalent one. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1).
An employer may not interfere with an employee's exercise of an FMLA right, nor may an employer discriminate against an employee for exercising or attempting to exercise this right. 29 U.S.C. § 2615. "Interference" includes refusing
To prevail on an FMLA interference claim, Wegelin must prove that she was entitled to benefits under the FMLA, and that Reading Hospital denied her those benefits. Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d 398, 401 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir.2005)). To prove entitlement, Wegelin must prove the following elements: (1) Carolyn's health condition was a "serious health condition," as defined in the statute and the regulations promulgated under it; (2) Wegelin gave appropriate notice of her need to be absent from work; and (3) Reading Hospital interfered with her right to unpaid leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303; Sarnowski, 510 F.3d at 401-02. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of an FMLA-eligible condition. Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 598 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 2010).
An employee is entitled to FMLA leave to care for a child who has a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). A "serious health condition" is defined in the FMLA as an "illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition" that involves "inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility" or "continuing treatment by a health care provider." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). This case does not concern inpatient care. Rather, it presents a case where the parent of a child who is unable to perform regular life activities as a result of an impairment is entitled to FMLA leave in order to make appropriate arrangements for care of her special needs child.
The FMLA does not define what constitutes "continuing treatment" by a health care provider. The statutory language narrowly defines "serious health condition." But, the regulations amplify the definition, expanding it beyond the literal reading of the term. The FMLA regulations describe conditions that constitute a qualifying "serious health condition." 29 C.F.R. § 825.115. The definition includes "any period of incapacity" due to a "chronic serious health condition" or "a period of incapacity" which is "permanent or longterm due to a condition for which treatment may not be effective." 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(c) and (d). "Incapacity" is defined as an "inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefore or recovery therefrom." 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(b). A "chronic serious health condition" is "[a]ny period of incapacity" that (a) "[r]equires periodic visits ... for treatment by a health care provider, or by a nurse under direct supervision of a health care provider;" (b) "[c]ontinues over an extended period of time;" and (c) may "cause episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.)." 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(c).
In this case, Carolyn was born with pervasive developmental disorder, which is manifested by delays in social and emotional functioning, sensory integration difficulties, and attention deficit.
It is undisputed that Carolyn is never left unattended.
As Dr. Pamela Jordan, a licensed psychologist, found, Carolyn is extremely disruptive at school, and exhibits anxiety and "affective dysregulation when demands [a]re placed on her."
Significantly in the context of this case, she becomes extremely anxious around people. She has poor environmental and safety awareness. Thus, a reasonable jury could find that she cannot be left alone.
As a result of her behavioral issues, Carolyn has not adjusted to the school
Considering Carolyn's mental and emotional conditions, and her developmental history, a jury could find that she has a chronic serious health condition that causes an impairment. It would then have to determine whether the impairment caused incapacity.
The statute defines incapacity as the inability to attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition. The FMLA and the regulations do not define "other daily activities." The ADA definition of "major life activities," although not controlling, is informative. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 97 (1st Cir. 2001). Under the ADA, major life activities include, but are not limited to:
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
Due to her condition, Carolyn is unable to perform many of these life activities. Although she attends school, she requires constant supervision and her behavior is unpredictable and disruptive. She is blind in her left eye. This condition causes her head to "abnormally turn or tilt to compensate for the eye muscle weakness."
As a working parent, Wegelin was able to arrange for proper care of her daughter by enrolling her in the Bowmansville Church Before and After School daycare.
Although Wegelin's employment conditions changed, the Bowmansville daycare operating hours did not. The program started at 8:00 a.m. and ended "promptly at 5:30 p.m. and children not picked up by then [were] charged a late fee."
In short, because Wegelin's new parking assignment delayed her departure from her work site, she was unable to get to Carolyn's daycare on time. The daycare could not accommodate the time change. As a result, Wegelin had to find a new daycare center that had hours that could meet her new work schedule.
Wegelin started to look for a new daycare center promptly after learning of the new parking arrangement. She testified that she attempted to find one that both could take care of a child with special needs and was open until at least 6:00 p.m.
Wegelin did not have time to find a suitable daycare while she was at work. She testified that her work schedule was Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. She received a thirty-minute lunch and a short break in the morning and afternoon. The breaks "were allowed if [employees] obviously had to use the restroom or to get a drink."
Wegelin unsuccessfully attempted to visit a daycare on the afternoon of January 18, her scheduled day off work.
According to Wegelin, she called about six locations to find an alternative arrangement for Carolyn's daycare. She was waiting to hear back from some of them because they had to check with others "who would be able to provide the care."
Wegelin needed time to find a daycare center that could handle her child's impairments and would accept the responsibility.
Reading Hospital contends that Wegelin's attempts to find alternative daycare arrangements do not constitute a "need to care for" Carolyn due to her medical condition. As the language of the statute and the regulations make clear, FMLA does not provide qualified leave to cover every family emergency. FMLA leave is only available when an employee is "needed to care for" a family member. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Although the FMLA does not define the phrase, the regulations describe it as follows:
29 C.F.R. § 825.124 (emphasis added).
Reading Hospital argues that Wegelin's sole criterion for a change in daycare was finding a daycare that would be open after 5:30 p.m. It contends she has failed to demonstrate a nexus between Carolyn's health condition and the need to find an alternative daycare. However, Wegelin testified that she was trying to find a daycare that would be qualified to care for Carolyn and her special needs as well as one that could meet her work schedule.
Making arrangements for "changes in care" is expressly covered by the regulations. Significantly, the regulations are silent on whether the facility needs to be one that provides medical treatment. The fact that Carolyn's daycare is not a specialized facility is not dispositive. What is relevant is that Carolyn has a chronic serious health condition resulting in an inability to perform regular daily activities and Wegelin had to make arrangements to find a suitable daycare that could care for her. Bowmansville daycare center was suitable, but no longer available. Therefore, when Reading Hospital changed Wegelin's parking assignment, she had to make arrangements for a change in Carolyn's care, entitling Wegelin to FMLA leave.
Based on Wegelin's testimony and the medical evidence documenting Carolyn's symptoms, there are genuine issues of fact relating to Carolyn's incapacity and Wegelin's need to care for her by finding a suitable daycare provider that preclude summary judgment. See, e.g., Rankin v. Seagate Techs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1145, 1148-1149 (8th Cir.2001) (plaintiff's affidavit testimony that she was "too sick to work" combined with medical records showing she suffered from the same symptoms were sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's incapacity); Marchisheck v. San Mateo Cnty., 199 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that a plaintiff's declaration that "I just did not and could not do anything for four or five days" creates "a disputed issued of fact and precludes summary judgment on the issue of `incapacity.'"), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1214, 120 S.Ct. 2217, 147 L.Ed.2d 250 (2000). Therefore, Reading Hospital's motion for summary judgment was denied.
