MEMORANDUM

STENGEL, District Judge.

Plaintiff Valerie Beahm brought the present § 1983 action alleging violations of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by defendants Todd Buskirk, Roger Bulava, James Kleinman, and Bonita Crowe. The defendants filed this motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, I will grant their motion and dismiss this case.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is a resident of Allentown, Pennsylvania. The defendants are employed in some capacity with the Northampton County Prison.1 On June 6, 2009, the plaintiff was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI).2 On June 18, 2010, the plaintiff was sentenced as part of a negotiated plea to 6 to 54 months with 6 months of house arrest to start immediately for her misdemeanor DUI.3 The plaintiff's minimum release date was December 18, 2010, while her maximum release date was December 18, 2014.4 She was then put under state parole supervision while she participated in the Northampton County Department of Corrections Community Corrections Program.5 As a condition of that program, the plaintiff was not permitted to possess or consume any alcoholic beverages.6

On March 4, 2011, the plaintiff was arrested following a visit from state parole at which she tested positive for alcohol. As a result, she was incarcerated in Northampton County Prison (NCP) from March 8, 2011 until June 1, 2011-87 days total. On June 1, 2011, Judge Kimberly McFadden entered an order releasing plaintiff from her incarceration at NCP.

At that time, the plaintiff's attorney filed a motion to clarify the sentence.7 In response, on June 1, 2011, Judge McFadden ordered and directed that

On March 12, 2012, the plaintiff filed this complaint against the defendants for violations of her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For an issue to be "genuine," a reasonable fact-finder must be able to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

A party moving for summary judgment always bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: 1) citing relevant portions of the record, including depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations; 2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute; 3) or showing that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is therefore appropriate when the non-moving party fails to rebut the moving party's argument that there is no genuine issue of fact by pointing to evidence that is "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Harter v. GAF Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir.1992).

Under Rule 56, the court must draw "all justifiable inferences" in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court must decide "not whether ... the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-moving party cannot avert summary judgment with speculation or conclusory allegations, such as those found in the pleadings, but rather must present clear evidence from which a jury can reasonably find in its favor. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir.1999). Finally, in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court does not make credibility determinations and must view facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Siegel Transfer v. Carrier Express, 54 F.3d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir.1995).9

III. DISCUSSION

The plaintiff argues the defendants violated her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the plaintiff "was placed under the jurisdiction of the State Parole Board instead of the local County Probation Office, even though she was sentenced under an Alternate Sentencing Guideline." Doc. No. 16.10 She argues that "[a]s a matter of law, the County Intermediate Punishment must be served in a County institution." Id. The plaintiff claims that "o[n]ce the court sentenced Plaintiff to House Arrest under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763, it was outside the jurisdiction of the State Parole Board." Id. She alleges that she was three months past her release date and, but for being mistakenly placed on state supervision, her sentence would have been completed and she would not have been tested after her minimum six month sentence was complete.

A private party may bring a civil cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any person who deprives the party of his or her constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. Section 1983 provides pertinent part:

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to succeed on a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the violation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal statute; and 2) that a person acting under color of state law committed or caused the alleged deprivation. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.1994). Section 1983 does not itself confer any substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of federally — protected rights. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). Therefore, I will address each of plaintiff's constitutional claims separately, to determine if there is a violation warranting relief.

A. Fourth Amendment Claim

The defendants argue that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable as a matter of law because the plaintiff was a prisoner and Fourth Amendment protections did not apply to her. The plaintiff concedes that the Fourth Amendment does not normally apply to "prison cells." However, the plaintiff further argues that the Fourth Amendment applies because the system "was transferring the body of the Plaintiff from County Probation to the State Parole Board ... in violation of the Alternative Sentence Procedure under State Law." Doc. No. 16.

Though the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment argument is not entirely clear, the plaintiff asserts no injury against which the Fourth Amendment would protect. The Fourth Amendment secures the right of citizens to be free of an unreasonable seizure of person or property. However, the United State Supreme Court has held that this right does not apply to those incarcerated. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). The Third Circuit has reiterated that "a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is inconsistent with incarceration." Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing Hudson); see also Bosold v. Warden, SCI-Somerset, No. 11-4292, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148774, at *14-15 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 28, 2011).

Although house arrest is not a prison sentence per se, the parties agree that it is a form of "confinement." Since plaintiff was already confined as part of her sentence, plaintiff's allegation that her inappropriate transfer between county and state parole was an unreasonable seizure of her person has no basis. See Granberry v. Chairman of Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, Civ. A. No. 07-272, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124667, 2010 WL 486593, at *4 (W.D.Pa. Feb. 05, 2010) (dismissing Granberry's claim that "`that being imprisoned well past the maximum sentence imposed ... constituted an illegal seizure of [his] person under the 4th amendment to the United States Constitution'" (omission in original)) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) and citing Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir.2001)), aff'd, 396 Fed. Appx. 877 (3d Cir.2010)). As such, plaintiff is unable to assert a constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment, and this claim under § 1983 has no legal merit.

B. Fifth Amendment Claim

The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment "only protects against federal governmental action and does not limit the actions of state officials." Caldwell v. Beard, 324 Fed.Appx. 186, 189 (3d Cir.2011) (citing Riley v. Camp, 130 F.3d 958, 972 n. 19 (11th Cir.1997)); see also Nguyen v. United States Catholic Conference, 719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir.1983) ("The limitations of the fifth amendment restrict only federal governmental action....") (citing Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461, 72 S.Ct. 813, 96 L.Ed. 1068 (1952))). The defendants argue that Fifth Amendment protections do not apply because they are county and not federal officials.11 Given that there is no dispute as to the defendants' status as non-federal officials, I agree with the defendants and find the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim without merit as well.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim

The complaint further alleges that the Fourteenth Amendment protects her from illegal arrest or incarceration.12 The plaintiff argues that the defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights related to her liberty interest in "making prison officials follow the sentence." Doc. No. 16. She contends that by improperly classifying her as being under state parole, rather than county probation, prison officials changed her court-imposed sentence creating a new and different sentence of incarceration with significantly less advantages.13 The defendants contend that the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims of procedural due process fail because plaintiff has not alleged a constitutionally-protected injury.

In order to establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, plaintiff must demonstrate that she has been deprived of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 339, 106 S.Ct. 677, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). The plaintiff offers no legal basis for her asserted constitutional right, and I find none as well.

Though no case law directly addresses whether a change in community supervision invokes the protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no due process liberty interest is infringed when a person serving a criminal sentence is transferred from one place of confinement to another. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (holding that "any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved" does not invoke due process protections); see also Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 244, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 49 L.Ed.2d 466 (1976). A criminal defendant may be confined and subject to the rules of a prison system, so long as those conditions in themselves do not violate the Constitution. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532.14 Plaintiff has not alleged that the conditions of her sentence, in themselves, have violated the Constitution. Furthermore, while state statutes may also create a liberty interest, plaintiff does not point to any specific Pennsylvania statute that requires supervision by county probation for those serving community sentences over two years. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (discussing how state statute can create a liberty interest).

Additionally, the plaintiff has no legal right to a release from custody at her minimum sentence date. In order for a protectable property interest to exist, a person "must have more than an abstract need or desire for it" or have "a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Board of Reg. of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). It is well established under Pennsylvania law that a prisoner has no absolute right to be released upon the expiration of the prisoner's minimum term. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9756(b).15 Therefore, I can find no basis for a violation of plaintiff's constitutional due process rights, and her § 1983 claim related to these "rights" has no merit.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim

With regard to her substantive due process claim, the defendants assert that because of the "more specific provision rule," the plaintiff can only make out a claim under the Eighth Amendment for the assertion that the plaintiff was released past her scheduled release date.16 See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)).17 "Under this rule, `if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997)). I agree with the defendants that we are bound by the "more specific provision rule" and must analyze the plaintiff's claim under the Eighth Amendment, not the substantive due process rubric.

"The Eighth Amendment protects convicted individuals from `cruel and unusual punishments,' and the Third Circuit has recognized a cause of action under this provision for prisoners detained past their scheduled release date." Davis v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, Civ. A. No. 05-330J, 2006 WL 3308440, at *7 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 13, 2006) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110 (3d Cir.1989), and Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993)). Even when a prisoner has been detained past his maximum release date, his continued detention may only be cruel and unusual if it is "totally without penological justification."18 Sample, 885 F.2d at 1108 (allowing relief for a prisoner held in error for nine months and eight days past his five year maximum). Furthermore, in order to obtain relief for continued detention under § 1983, a prisoner must show that a prison official was aware of his overstay and was deliberately indifferent in rectifying the problem.19 Id. at 1110. For these reasons, cases or this type are "extremely rare." Moore, 986 F.2d at 686.

Again, while house arrest is not a prison sentence per se, it is considered a "confinement." Like a prison sentence, the plaintiff could have been "confined" for a maximum of fifty-four months, after which point her detention could have been considered cruel and unusual. But this did not happen. The plaintiff was released just over her minimum date and was released from her sentence three and a have years before her maximum date. The plaintiff would have suffered this same maximum sentence regardless of her supervising parole officer's jurisdiction. Someone, either from the county or the state, would have supervised her parole. Consequently, the plaintiff asserts no cognizable injury under the Eighth Amendment and her § 1983 claim lacks merit.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, I will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment. An appropriate Order follows.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of November 2013, upon consideration of defendants' motion for summary judgment and their brief in support thereof (Doc. No. 14), as well as responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff.

The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE the above-captioned case.