ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.
Plaintiff Carolyn Freidrich ("Freidrich") alleges that Defendant Thomas Davis ("Davis") fell on and broke her arm during a December 29, 2010 flight from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to Munich, Germany. Freidrich brings suit against Davis in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Davis moves to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Freidrich fails to establish diversity of citizenship
The party invoking diversity jurisdiction bears the burden of proof. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir.2004). A party meets this burden by proving diversity of citizenship between the parties by a preponderance of the evidence. McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 290 (3d Cir.2006).
In my July 11, 2013 order, I granted Davis's motion to dismiss to the extent that if either party is domiciled in Germany, I lack subject matter jurisdiction. I directed the parties to take jurisdictional discovery into the domicile of Freidrich and Davis. After reviewing the evidence submitted at the November 20, 2013 hearing, I now make the following findings of fact:
Freidrich alleges that diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because she and Davis are "citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Specifically, she alleges that she is citizen of Ohio and Davis is a citizen of Pennsylvania. Davis argues that both he and Freidrich are American citizens domiciled in Germany and thus not citizens of any state for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Natural persons can be sued in federal court under the diversity jurisdiction statute if they are either "citizens of a State," see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), or "citizens or subjects of a foreign state," see id. § 1332(a)(2). "In order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute, a natural person must be both a citizen of the United States and be domiciled within the State." Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989).
Domicile is established by one's physical presence in a state — e.g., residence — and intent to remain there indefinitely. Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir.2011). When determining a person's domicile, courts consider declarations;
An individual can change his domicile instantly if "he takes up residence at the new domicile and intends to remain there." Washington, 652 F.3d at 345 (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted). "Proof of intent to remain permanently is not the test. If the new state is to be one's home for an indefinite period of time, he has acquired a new domicile." Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300-01 (3d Cir. 1972) (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted). But "domicile once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed." Korn v. Korn, 398 F.2d 689, 691 n. 4 (3d Cir.1968) (citation omitted). "This principle gives rise to a presumption favoring an established domicile over a new one." McCann, 458 F.3d at 286-87 (citation omitted). Given such a presumption, "[t]he party claiming a new domicile bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the established domicile." Id. at 288.
With respect to the present case, I find that Davis has met the burden of production required to rebut the presumption that he continues to be domiciled in Pennsylvania. Davis has not worked or resided in Pennsylvania since 1996, and he has not owned property in the state since 1999. To the contrary, Davis has worked and resided in Germany for more than fifteen years, and the center of his business, domestic, social and civil life is in Germany. Davis and his wife own a home there, and Davis owns his own business there. Davis has a German driver's license and residency permit. Davis' declaration on his Registration and Ballot Request form that he intends to return to the United States is not dispositive and is contradicted by Davis's declared intention to spend the rest of his life in Germany. That he cannot definitively rule out the possibility of his return to the United States does not change the fact that he has acquired a new domicile in Germany. See Krasnov, 465 F.2d at 1300-01. I find that Davis is an American citizen domiciled in Germany.
In summary, I find that Davis is an American citizen domiciled in Germany. As a result, Davis is "stateless" for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, and he cannot sue or be sued under the diversity jurisdiction statute. Thus, I lack subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and I will grant Davis's motion to dismiss without prejudice.