Filed: Jul. 01, 2014
Latest Update: Jul. 01, 2014
Summary: ORDER ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge. AND NOW, this 30 TH day of June, 2014, upon careful and independent consideration of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the parties' briefs, United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey's Report and Recommendation ("R & R"), and Petitioner William Johnson's objections to the R & R, it is ORDERED that: (1) The R & R is APPROVED and ADOPTED as to the outcome and analysis of each claim. Therefore, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is
Summary: ORDER ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge. AND NOW, this 30 TH day of June, 2014, upon careful and independent consideration of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the parties' briefs, United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey's Report and Recommendation ("R & R"), and Petitioner William Johnson's objections to the R & R, it is ORDERED that: (1) The R & R is APPROVED and ADOPTED as to the outcome and analysis of each claim. Therefore, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is ..
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ORDER
ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.
AND NOW, this 30TH day of June, 2014, upon careful and independent consideration of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the parties' briefs, United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth T. Hey's Report and Recommendation ("R & R"), and Petitioner William Johnson's objections to the R & R, it is ORDERED that:
(1) The R & R is APPROVED and ADOPTED as to the outcome and analysis of each claim. Therefore, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED without an evidentiary hearing.
(2) Further, as to the certificate of appealability, the certificate SHALL ISSUE on Claim Two: Denial of Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation.
Both the R & R and the Pennsylvania Superior Court's Opinion correctly recognize that a confrontation error occurred during Johnson's trial when the inculpatory out-of-court statement of Mumin Slaughter—Johnson's co-defendant—was read to the jury after Slaughter refused to testify. Slaughter refused to answer questions posed by defense counsel and this refusal effectively denied Johnson his constitutional right to cross-examine and confront Slaughter in violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The outcome of this petition thus hinges on whether this constitutional error was harmless or whether it resulted in actual prejudice to Johnson.
"`[A]n error is harmless unless it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Adamson v. Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007)). The Third Circuit instructs that
if we have grave doubt about whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, we must conclude that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court has cautioned that [t]he uncertain judge should treat the error, not as if it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict . . . .
Adamson, 633 F.3d at 260 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). I agree with the R & R that Johnson was not prejudiced by the admission of Slaughter's statement. However, although I do not have "grave doubt" that Slaughter's statement had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury verdict, there may be some doubt that this statement did so, given the significant impeachment of the Commonwealth's two key eyewitnesses1 and the lack of physical evidence connecting Johnson to the murder. This question thus merits review by the Third Circuit, because reasonable jurists may disagree on whether Johnson was actually prejudiced by the admission of Slaughter's statement and because Johnson has made "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Therefore, a certificate of appealability SHALL ISSUE for Claim Two.
