WILLIAM H. YOHN, Jr., District Judge.
Wal-Mart Stores East, LP has moved for summary judgment on Betty Ann Gilchrist's negligence claim that arose when she slipped on a wet floor and fell while exiting its store in Boothwyn, Pennsylvania.
On February 29, 2012, a rainy day, Betty Ann and John Gilchrist went shopping at a Wal-Mart in Boothwyn, Pennsylvania. Gilchrist Dep. 16:25-17:4, 18:9-12. After they finished shopping, they walked toward a vestibule that provided an exit from the store. Id. at 26:13-27:12, 34:2-25. Some Wal-Marts have two such exits, one from the general merchandise area and one from the grocery area, but this Wal-Mart had only one exit from both areas. Gilchrist Wal-Mart Interview 10:6-19. The only other possible exit was through the store's lawn and garden department, but that exit may have been closed at that time. Burke Dep. 37:14-38:13.
Just before Gilchrist entered the vestibule, she noticed that it was still raining outside. Gilchrist Dep. 28:2-10. She also saw puddles all over the vestibule's floor, covering most of it. Id. at 36:11-14. She even warned her husband, who was walking ahead of her, to tread carefully because the floor looked slippery. Gilchrist Wal-Mart Interview 7:25-8:2. As Gilchrist stepped onto the vestibule's floor, she launched into the air and then landed on the floor, hitting her back, head, and shoulder. Gilchrist Dep. 20:12-17, 39:14-40:3. She lay there until an ambulance arrived and took her to the hospital. Id. at 41:6-11. As the result of her fall, she sprained her arm and hurt her head. Gilchrist Wal-Mart Interview 8:4-9.
On November 6, 2013, the Gilchrists sued Wal-Mart in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Gilchrist brought one count of negligence, and John brought one count of loss of consortium. On April 14, 2014, Wal-Mart removed the lawsuit to this court and filed a motion for summary judgment on September 22, 2014. The Gilchrists responded on October 14, 2014, and Wal-Mart replied to their response on January 19, 2015.
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Material facts are those that could affect the outcome of the proceeding, and a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Roth v. Norfalco, LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish the existence or absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact, a party must "cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record" or "show[] that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).
"In evaluating the motion, `the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.'" Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, LLC, 716 F.3d 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Wal-Mart argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Gilchrist's negligence claim because the record proves that it did not owe her a duty to protect her from the wet floor. It contends that "the record is clear that [Gilchrist] knew it was raining outside, knew of the rain water on the floor in the vestibule and its attendant risks, and voluntarily proceeded through the vestibule, absolving Wal-Mart from any duty to protect her." Wal-Mart's Mot. Summ. J. 3. I reject this argument because, based on the record, a reasonable juror could find that Gilchrist did not "voluntarily" walk through the vestibule, as she had no reasonable alternative. Thus, the danger was not "avoidable."
As a possessor of land, Wal-Mart owed a duty to Gilchrist, a business invitee,
In Kaplan, for example, the Third Circuit applied Pennsylvania law and held that the plaintiff did not voluntarily encounter a risk because she had "no reasonable alternative." Id. at 227. Kaplan tried to board a bus from a sidewalk by walking across a snow mound that stood between her and the bus. Id. at 223. Another passenger warned Kaplan that the mound was icy, but she tried to cross it anyway and fell. Id. She could have taken another route to the bus that was longer and required her to walk in the street. Id. She sued Exxon, the sidewalk owner, for negligence. Id. Considering whether Exxon owed Kaplan a duty, the Third Circuit first established that "the snow mound was a known and obvious risk." Id. at 226. But it found that reasonable minds could disagree on whether Kaplan crossed it voluntarily, asserting that "[t]he plaintiff does not make a real choice when there is no safe alternative to encountering the risk." Id. It concluded that a jury could find that the other route was not a reasonable alternative, as it would have required Kaplan to walk in an icy street with traffic and to time her "round-about traverse to the bus with some precision." Id. As a result, it reversed the district court and remanded the case for a jury to decide whether Kaplan had a reasonable alternative route.
Here, as in Kaplan, a reasonable juror could find that Gilchrist did not voluntarily cross the treacherous area because it was not avoidable. To be sure, Wal-Mart has established that Gilchrist, like Kaplan, proceeded in the face of a known and obvious danger. As Gilchrist herself admits, she saw that the vestibule floor was covered with water; she even warned her husband that it looked slippery. But the record suggests that she did not voluntarily confront this known and obvious danger.
For the forgoing reasons, I deny Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment. An appropriate order follows.