MEMORANDUM

LAWRENCE F. STENGEL, District Judge.

Joseph Curry claims he was falsely arrested for and convicted of a retail theft he did not commit. He brings this § 1983 action with related state law claims against the retail store, its employees, and the officers involved in his arrest. The defendants have moved to dismiss his claims. As explained below, I will grant the defendants' motions.

I. BACKGROUND1

Mr. Curry's complaint offers a disconcerting set of facts. In Fall 2012, Mr. Curry discovered a newspaper article stating he had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The warrant was related to a theft at a WalMart located at 1901 Mill Creek Road in Lower Macungie Township, Pennsylvania. Curry had allegedly never been to that WalMart location. WalMart security personnel Kerrie Fitcher had allegedly identified the plaintiff as the perpetrator.

Curry called the Lower Macungie WalMart and spoke with security personnel, John Doe. He explained that he had not committed the theft. He asked John Doe to review the store surveillance video. John Doe refused.

Curry then allegedly called the Pennsylvania State Police. He spoke with Brianne Yachera, a state trooper. Curry explained that he was innocent and had never been to the Lower Macungie WalMart. He asked Yachera to investigate further. She allegedly responded that it was "up to the courts to figure it out." She told Curry, "[Y]ou're going to jail—that's how it is."

On October 29, 2012, Curry was arrested and charged with theft by deception— false impression and conspiracy. Unable to afford bail, Curry was imprisoned in Lehigh County. On November 14, 2012, Curry was also charged with theft by deception—false imprisonment by Exeter Township Police Department Detective Richard McClure. McClure claimed Curry was a part of a larger theft ring. McClure allegedly conducted no meaningful investigation prior to charging Curry. McClure also allegedly called Curry's then fiancée accusing him of theft and threatening further consequences if he failed to cooperate.

Two months later, McClure met with Curry in prison. McClure admitted that Curry was actually innocent, apologized profusely, and said he would do whatever he could to help. In or around February 2013, the charges brought by McClure were dismissed. Curry still remained in jail on the charges brought by Yachera. He was told he would need to wait until September 2013 for his case to proceed.

During his imprisonment, Curry missed the birth of his only child and lost his job. He and his family were also in jeopardy of losing their home and car. Curry decided to plead nolo contendere to theft by deception—false impression and conspiracy so that he could return home to his family.

Curry alleges that WalMart and its employees "clothed themselves with color of state authority through the use of Defendant, Pennsylvania State Police and Exeter Township Police Department." He claims that WalMart coordinated with the police entities to arrest the plaintiff without probable cause.

According to the complaint, the person responsible for the WalMart theft was a man named Christopher Heller, who looks nothing like the plaintiff. Heller had little to no hair and was heavy-set. Curry is skinny with long hair and tattooed sleeves on his arms. Curry contends there is surveillance video to show Heller was the perpetrator. Curry continues to claim he is "actually innocent."

On September 12, 2014, Curry filed this action against State Trooper Yachera, Detective McClure, Exeter Township (d/b/a Exeter Township Police Department), Kerrie Fitcher, John Does, and both "WalMart Stores, a.k.a WalMart" and "WalMart Stores East, L.P. a.k.a. WalMart."2 Yachera is being sued in his individual, not official, capacity. McClure and Fitcher are being sued in both their individual and official capacities. Curry alleges claims of malicious prosecution/false arrest/false imprisonment under state and federal law against all defendants. These claims are made pursuant to § 1983, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff also makes an implicit Monell claim against all defendants. Against WalMart and Fitcher only, Curry asserts a claim of negligence/negligent supervision.

The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint.3 All defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).4 The plaintiff conceded that the Monell claim and the claims against Exeter Township should be dismissed. I agree that these claims are deficient. They will be dismissed. I will address the defendants' motions together in this memorandum since some of their arguments overlap.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted examines the legal sufficiency of the complaint.5 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The factual allegations must be sufficient to make the claim for relief more than just speculative. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, a federal court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id.; see also D.P. Enters. v. Bucks County Cmty. Coll., 725 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1984).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a plaintiff to plead in detail all of the facts upon which she bases her claim. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Rather, the Rules require a "short and plain statement" of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id. The "complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564. Neither "bald assertions" nor "vague and conclusory allegations" are accepted as true. See Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997); Sterling v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 897 F.Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The claim must contain enough factual matters to suggest the required elements of the claim or to "raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" those elements. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A court "may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 456 (3d Cir. 2006)(quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)).

III. DISCUSSION6

A. The Heck Bar to Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims

The defendants argue that Heck v. Humphrey, et al. bars the plaintiff's § 1983 claims attacking his conviction.7 In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not recover damages under § 1983 for "allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid." 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The Supreme Court was concerned that a plaintiff's §1983 case could implicitly invalidate the plaintiff's conviction without utilizing the appropriate processes.8 Id. at 484-87. Without a showing that his "conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254," a plaintiff cannot recover damages related to an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment.9 Id. at 487.

1. Charges Brought by Yachera10

The plaintiff entered a plea of nolo contendere for the charges brought by Yachera. Though nolo contendere is a "no contest" plea, it is "equivalent to a plea of guilty" in Pennsylvania. U.S. v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562, 568 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting Eisenberg v. Commonwealth, 516 A.2d 333, 335 (Pa. 1986)).11 The only difference between a guilty plea and a plea of nolo contendere is that the nolo plea "cannot be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit for the same act."12 Id. In the Third Circuit, a plea of nolo contendere is considered a conviction under Heck. See Marable v. West Pottsgrove Twp., No. 05-3080, 176 Fed.Appx. 275, 280-81 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2006); Marable v. West Pottsgrove Twp., No. Civ.A.03-CV-3738, 2005 WL 1625055, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 8, 2005)(finding that malicious prosecution and false arrest claims fail because nolo contendere plea barred claim under Heck); Jackson v. City of Phila., et al., 08-4494, 328 Fed.Appx. 762, 763 (3d Cir. May 27, 2009)(finding that plaintiff's nolo contendere plea precluded relief for false arrest/false conviction claim under Heck).

The plaintiff has failed to show evidence that his conviction for the charges brought by Yachera were reversed, expunged, or invalidated. The plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim requires a showing of a favorable termination. See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007)(citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).The plaintiff's false arrest and false imprisonment claims address the validity of the conviction itself—not the level of force used in his arrest or the conditions of his imprisonment.13 See Sharif v. Picone, 740 F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2014)("[W]e held in Nelson v. Jashurek, that Heck does not bar an excessive force claim because the claim can stand without challenging any element of the conviction." (citing Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1997)); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 2002)("[T]he favorable termination rule does not apply to claims that implicate only the conditions, and not the fact or duration, of a prisoner's incarceration.").14 Without evidence that his plea was invalidated, the plaintiff's success in this case would implicitly invalidate his arrest, imprisonment, and conviction without having used the proper state court process to challenge his conviction.15 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. The plaintiff's § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment are legally barred by Heck.16

The § 1983 claims against Yachera must be dismissed for this reason. These charges relate to the theft at the Lower Macungie WalMart. If they are barred by Heck, the § 1983 claims against WalMart and Fitcher should also be dismissed.

2. Charges brought by McClure

The plaintiff was also charged by Detective McClure with theft by deception when he was already incarcerated on Yachera's charges. From what is alleged in the complaint, these charges appear to be distinct from Yachera's charges. While Curry was still incarcerated, McClure recognized that the plaintiff was innocent of the charges he had brought. The charges were dropped. Unlike Yachera's charges, Curry was not convicted of McClure's charges. Heck does not bar the § 1983 claims against McClure.

B. § 1983 Claims Against McClure

1. Malicious Prosecution Unviable Because No Seizure

To state a prima facie case for malicious prosecution under § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff must establish that:

Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007)(citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).

The complaint alleges that McClure initiated a criminal proceeding by filing criminal charges against the defendant without probable cause. McClure allegedly conducted no investigation and later admitted the Curry was actually innocent. These allegations are enough to satisfy the first and third elements of the claim.

The dismissal of the charges brought by McClure would be considered a termination in his favor, satisfying the second element. A dismissal of charges based on insufficient evidence of guilt is considered a favorable termination. Taylor v. Winters, No. 04-1201, 115 Fed. Appx. 549, 552 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2004)("[I]f the defendant is discharged after abandonment of the charges by the prosecutor, this is sufficient to satisfy the requisite element of prior favorable termination of the criminal action." (quoting Haefner v. Burkey, 626 A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1993)(quotation marks omitted)).18

McClure argues that Curry's nolo plea to Yachera's charges should also bar his liability for bringing similar charges. It is not alleged that the charges brought by Yachera and McClure involved the same theft at the Lower Macungie WalMart. Instead, McClure's charges appear to implicate Curry in presumably another theft or thefts committed by a larger theft ring in Exeter Township. Curry's plea to Yachera's charges would not necessarily serve as a plea to his already dismissed Exeter charges.

McClure argues that the fourth element cannot be met. The allegations that McClure "profusely apologized" would lead one to infer that McClure did not act with malice. Even drawing all inferences in favor of the plaintiff, I cannot say that McClure's actions were carried out with "malicious" intent given the remorse he expressed later. However, it is plausible that McClure's initially charging the plaintiff could have been for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice.

The defendant argues that the final element of the plaintiff's § 1983 claim is not met because McClure did not "seize" the plaintiff. The plaintiff was already incarcerated when McClure brought charges against him. He remained incarcerated after the charges were dropped. Under these facts, the plaintiff cannot claim to have suffered a deprivation of liberty from McClure's charges. Without this final element, the plaintiff cannot establish a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.

2. False Arrest/False Imprisonment Claims Also Fail

False arrest and false imprisonment claims under § 1983 serve to remedy unreasonable seizures under the Fourth Amendment. See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995).19 Both are dependent upon a showing that the plaintiff was seized without probable cause.20 See Garcia v. County of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001)(citing Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir.1988)); Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1994); Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1995).

Under the facts presented, it is not clear whether there was probable cause for McClure bringing his charges. Regardless, Curry technically was not seized nor detained by McClure. McClure imposed charges after Curry was arrested and detained by Yachera. He remained in jail on Yachera's charges after McClure's charges were dismissed. Without a "seizure" to trigger a Fourth Amendment violation, Curry's false arrest and false imprisonment claims against McClure fail. The § 1983 false arrest and false imprisonment charges against McClure will be dismissed.

C. Remaining State Law Claims

The claims that remain against the defendants are premised on state law. Section (c)(3) of 28 U.S.C. §1367 provides that a district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction once the federal claims have been dismissed. "[W]hen federal claims are dismissed at an early stage, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction should be declined . . ." City of Pittsburgh Com'n. on Human Relations v. Key Bank USA, 163 Fed.Appx. 163, 166 (3d Cir. Jan. 24, 2006)(citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726). See also Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 386 (3d Cir. 2006)(citations omitted). I will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

D. Amendment Would be Futile

The plaintiff has asked for leave to file a second amended complaint if his first amended complaint is dismissed. "Dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility." Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004). The defendants argue that leave to amend is futile. I agree.

"[A] § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated." Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90. See also Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2006)("In Heck, the Supreme Court held that where success in a § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence."). Unfortunately, the plaintiff's time for appealing his conviction has long past. He would be unable to assert a § 1983 cause of action related to his conviction. The Heck bar would remain in place.21 Amendment would be futile.22

IV. CONCLUSION

From the facts alleged, the charges brought against Mr. Curry and their subsequent consequences do raise a specter of injustice. Given his circumstances, one can understand why he chose to plead nolo contendere to the charges against him, even if he was innocent of those crimes. Unfortunately, § 1983 does not provide him with a legal remedy under Heck and its interpretations in the Third Circuit. While I am sympathetic to his predicament, I am also bound to follow the precedent set forth in this Circuit.

For the foregoing reasons, I will grant the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice, and I will decline to retain jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.23 I will deny the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint.

An appropriate Order follows.