MARK A. KEARNEY, District Judge.
An employee seeking damages for hostile work environment and retaliation for filing a discrimination complaint must provide evidence of discrimination adversely affecting her employment and retaliation beyond one possible insult of her lawyer's success rate and a sporadic comment about others "watching her". After discovery, she cannot rely on her complaint's allegations alone to defeat her employer's summary judgment motion. We understand she may wish to represent other union workers in filing one of several similar federal lawsuits brought by her counsel against her employer, but she cannot show hostile work environment by only alleging, even in a verified complaint, a panoply of harms unrelated to four instances of minor discipline over a five year period with only one since 2010. Alleging racial slurs and disparate treatment allegedly suffered by unknown persons at unknown times also does not create a private right of action unless she can show severe or pervasive discrimination. As the corrections officer cannot adduce facts of severe or pervasive discrimination adversely affecting her continued employment nor of any adverse employment action in retaliation other than two sporadic and ambiguous comments, we grant her employer's motion for summary judgment in the accompanying Order.
Defendant Community Education Centers, Inc. ("CEC") operates George W. Hill Correctional Facility (the "Prison") in Delaware County, Pennsylvania.
Officer Simmons claims CEC discriminates against her through disparate discipline in four incidents.
On February 17, 2009, CEC disciplined Officer Simmons for reporting late to work.
On June 18, 2009, CEC disciplined Officer Simmons for leaving her post.
On February 3, 2010, CEC disciplined Officer Simmons for failing to check attorneys' bags as they passed through the security checkpoint.
Over four years later, on February 19, 2014, CEC issued a Disciplinary Action Form because Officer Simons reported late to work.
Officer Simmons claims CEC subjected her to a hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA").
Officer Simmons claims she is subject to a hostile work environment at the Prison on account of her race. To demonstrate a Title VII hostile work environment claim, Simmons must establish: 1) she suffered intentional discrimination because of her race, 2) of a severe or pervasive nature, 3) which detrimentally affected her, 4) and would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.
CEC argues Officer Simmons cannot adduce sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of a hostile work environment as she cannot show: she suffered intentional discrimination; of a severe or pervasive nature detrimentally affecting her; nor, respondeat superior liability as there is no evidence CEC knew of her racial discrimination complaints and failed to take immediate remedial steps.
Officer Simmons' Opposition curiously seems to agree she never experienced intentional discrimination, "defendant's motion for summary judgment attempts to shift the Court's attention away from Officer Simmons' allegations of wrongdoing and focus instead on Officer Simmons' own personal history of disciplines (notwithstanding the fact that Officer Simmons' lawsuit did not implicate unlawful conduct with respect to her own discipline)."
Officer Simmons recounts various instances she claims show the Prison's racially charged atmosphere. For example, Officer Simmons alleges discriminatory hiring and firing; a member of the union board being told her hair was "too afrocentric and not European enough;" union board member reporting Assistant Warden Colluci referred to African American members of the board as Malcom X, Martin Luther King, Jr., Rosa Parks, and Bethany Shabbazz. (ECF Doc. No. 43, at 5-7.) These allegations are not constrained by time as almost none of them are accompanied by date. Those that are accompanied by date occurred in 2009 and 2010. Officer Simmons cannot defeat summary judgment by pointing solely to derogatory and discriminatory comments and actions directed to others. This is especially true where some of the events happened five years ago and the others cannot be placed in the timeline at all.
Even considering the incidents cited by CEC, which it hypothesized were Officer Simmons' most likely arguments of intentional discrimination towards her, we cannot find Officer Simmons suffered intentional discrimination based on her race. CEC discusses four incidents where Officer Simmons received discipline. On February 17, 2009, CEC disciplined her for reporting late to work.
Then, on February 3, 2010, CEC disciplined Officer Simmons for failing to check attorneys' bags as they passed through the security checkpoint.
Four years later, on February 19, 2014, CEC disciplined Officer Simmons for reporting late to work. CEC issued a Disciplinary Action Form.
Officer Simmons' remaining claim is for retaliation under the PHRA. Officer Simmons alleges CEC retaliated against her after she engaged in protected activity, including her filing a PHRC complaint. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Officer Simmons must show (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) CEC took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal connection between her participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
CEC contends Officer Simmons cannot show an adverse employment action coupled with a causal connection relying on her testimony:
According to CEC, this admission closes the door on Officer Simmons' retaliation claim. The legal standard for adverse employment action "speaks in general terms rather than specific prohibited acts" because "an act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others."
Even with this enhanced scope, Officer Simmons fails to adduce evidence of an adverse employment action against her in retaliation for her protected activity aside from her own Complaint's allegations. While Officer Simmons urges us to consider the allegations of the Complaint sufficient to overcome summary judgment, we cannot do so.
Officer Simmons alleges one month after she filed her PHRC charge, a "prison investigation investigator" approached Officer Simmons and stated "we are watching you ... the camera is on you." Then, three months later, the assistant warden walked back and forth while Simmons counseled a fellow corrections officer. Additionally, the assistant warden allegedly directed the comment "0-4" at Officer Simmons referring to Officer Simmons' counsel and his alleged record "in PHRC filings."
We cannot find these allegations, individually or in the aggregate, sufficient to support a retaliation claim. While excessive scrutiny in the workplace may be unpleasant, it does not rise to the level needed to overcome summary judgment.
Simmons fails to support her PHRA retaliation claim with evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with regard to any adverse employment action taken against her for her protected activity. Her hostile work environment claim fails because she cannot establish and no reasonable juror could conclude she suffered intentional discrimination. Officer Simmons almost solely relies on the allegations averred in her state court complaint along with factually unsupported assertions from a plaintiff in a separate case against the Prison. While those allegations may have been sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss on these claims, after discovery a plaintiff must come forward with something more. Officer Simmons has failed to do so. Summary judgment is granted in the accompanying Order.
Simmons cites a motion to remand at ECF Doc. No. 8, yet there has been no remand motion filed in this case. Given the relative interchangeable nature of Simmons' allegations with those of other complaints filed by Simmons' counsel, we attribute this to an oversight on counsel's part. It does not make a difference. The "nerve center" of CEC's operation is Caldwell, New Jersey, thus making it a citizen of New Jersey, as well as Delaware where it is incorporated. We may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.