EDWARD G. SMITH, District Judge.
This is a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations arising from an incident in November 2012 in which multiple inmates assaulted the inmate-plaintiff while they were inside of a county jail. After the pleadings were closed, the defendants raised a claim that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies at the jail prior to commencing this litigation. As the issue of exhaustion is a question of law for the court to determine, the court allowed the parties to engage in limited discovery on this issue. After completing discovery, the defendants have moved for summary judgment, claiming that the evidence in the record shows that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The plaintiff opposes the motion and argues that he did not have to exhaust any administrative remedies prior to filing suit because of the nature of his claim or, alternatively, he exhausted his administrative remedies because he filed an informal grievance and the jail policy did not provide for a procedure requiring him to file a formal grievance once he received a response to his informal grievance.
After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, the court finds that (1) the plaintiff was aware of the jail's grievance procedure, (2) he needed to exhaust his administrative remedies by grieving any issues concerning any improper conduct by jail staff because such action constituted grievable "staff action" under the jail's grievance policy, (3) the plaintiff did not file an informal grievance relating to the acts at issue, (4) even if he did file an informal grievance, the jail's grievance policy required inmates to file a formal grievance and proceed through any appeal from a denial of that grievance before the inmate's remedies are considered to be exhausted, and (5) the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he admits that he never timely filed a formal grievance relating to the November 2012 incident at issue. Accordingly, the court will grant the motion for summary judgment because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff exhausted his available administrative remedies at the jail and, as such, the defendants are entitled to have the court enter summary judgment in their favor.
The plaintiff, Charles Shumanis, commenced this action by filing a complaint against the defendants, Lehigh County Jail (the "Jail"), Warden Dale Meisel ("Meisel"), Warden Janine Donate ("Donate"), Sergeant Eric Saborsky ("Saborsky"), Correction Officer Ronald March ("March"), and Correction Officer Eric Nowicki ("Nowicki"), on November 14, 2014. Complaint, Doc. No. 1. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on November 16, 2012, he was an inmate at the Jail. Id. at ¶ 10. While the plaintiff was in the Jail, there was a ten-year-old "no contact" order preventing him from having contact with another inmate named Roberto Diaz ("Diaz"). Id. at ¶ 11. The no-contact order was in effect to protect the plaintiff because he had previously served as a witness against Diaz. Id.
Jail personnel had brought the plaintiff into the administration and discharge room so he could complete paperwork to transfer him to state prison. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 12. While in this area, the plaintiff saw Diaz, but before he could react, Diaz and two other individuals brutally attacked him. Id. at ¶ 12. Despite being in the plaintiff's presence at the time of the attack, Saborsky, March, and Nowicki did not attempt to stop the assault because none of them had handcuffs.
Based on the aforementioned allegations, the plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Id. at 6, 8, 9. In his requests for relief, the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 7, 10.
The defendants filed an answer to the complaint along with affirmative defenses on January 13, 2015. Doc. No. 3. For their fourth affirmative defense, the defendants assert that "Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedy [sic]. Specifically, Plaintiff failed to take those steps required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.[] § 1997e and he is therefore barred from suit." Answer with Affirmative Defenses to Pl.'s Compl. at 6.
The court held an initial pretrial conference with counsel on March 13, 2015. During the conference, the defendants indicated that they had significant evidence that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit in this case. As such, the court entered a scheduling order on March 16, 2015, allowing the parties engage in limited discovery on the exhaustion of administrative remedies and then potentially move for summary judgment thereafter.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum of law on May 19, 2015. Doc. No. 9. The plaintiff filed a reply to the motion with a supporting memorandum of law on June 11, 2015. Doc. No. 10. The court heard oral argument on the motion on July 23, 2015. The motion is ripe for disposition.
A district court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Additionally, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id.
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden "of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must counter with "`specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that "[a] party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or . . . [by] showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute"). The non-movant must show more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" for elements on which the non-movant bears the burden of production. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (indicating that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not "rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions"); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that "speculation and conclusory allegations" do not satisfy non-moving party's duty to "set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor"). Additionally, the non-moving party "cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, arguments made in briefs "are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985).
"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). The court must decide "not whether . . . the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial'" and the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).
Edward Sweeney ("Sweeney") has served as the Director of Corrections for the Jail since 1999.
With regard to the inmate grievance policy, the Jail "provide[d] inmates with an administrative means for the expression of, and for the prompt review and resolution of, inmate problems and concerns." Id. at Ex. A, Inmate Grievance Policy Effective May 1, 2009 ("IGP") at 1.
The GPP defines a "Grievance" as "[a] complaint by a present or former inmate and consisting of one claim, issue or problem affecting that inmate and which is addressable under [the] policy." Id. Inmates can file informal or formal grievances under the GPP. Id. at 1-2. A "Formal Grievance" is "[a] grievance written on [the Jail's] multi-part `Inmate Formal Grievance, Part I' form." Id. at 1. An "Informal Grievance" is "[a] grievance for which resolution is attempted with facility staff either verbally, or in writing via an `Inmate Request to Staff.'" Id. at 2.
The following "issues are grievable, either informally or formally," under the GPP: "Classification[;] Food Service[;] Housing Unit operations[;] Inmate accounts[;] Library access[;] Medical access[;] Program access[;] Property (secured)[;] Staff actions[;] Telephones (non-collect)[; and] Visitation." Id. The following issues are not grievable under the GPP: "Collect phone system (separate process)[;] Informal Resolution Reports[;] Housing unit or cell assignment[;] Judicial decisions[;] Mail/books (separate process)[;] Misconducts/appeals (separate process)[;] Probation/parole issues[;] Property, issued (separate process)[; and] State and federal laws." Id. According to Sweeney, "[a]n alleged failure to keep identified and reported enemies separated constitutes a grievable issue under the GPP as it pertains to `staff actions.'" Sweeney Aff. at ¶ 14.
The GPP provides that an inmate must attempt to first resolve a grievable issue through an informal grievance.
All formal grievances are forwarded to the Grievance Coordinator.
The GPP provides that "[a]n inmate shall exhaust all administrative remedies contained in this policy before filing a civil suit over the grievance." Id. at 3. The GPP also defines the "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies" as
Id. at 1.
According to Sweeney, "[i]n 2012, inmates entering [the Jail] would be given a handbook which included, among other things, an explanation of the GPP." Sweeney Aff. at ¶ 12. The inmates also would have had inmate grievance forms available on every residential block in the Jail. Id. at ¶ 13.
The plaintiff has been incarcerated at the Jail on multiple previous occasions. Defs.' MSJ at Ex. A, Requests for Admission of Defs. Addressed to Pl., Charles Shumanis ("RFA") at ¶ 5, Doc. No. 9-3; Defs.' MSJ at Ex. B, Pl.'s Answers to Request for Admissions ("RFA Answers") at ¶ 5, Doc. No. 9-4.
On October 4, 2012, the plaintiff filed an inmate formal grievance regarding the processing of a sick call request.
The plaintiff filed an informal grievance to "Deputy Warden of Treatment (Donate)" on or about November 30, 2012.
It appears that Deputy Warden Donate responded to the informal grievance on November 27, 2012. Id. In the response, she indicated that she "was not aware [he was] being restricted & not using the phone etc." Id. She further stated that she would "have [his] status updated [and she did not] know anything about internal affairs." Id.
The plaintiff filed a formal grievance on December 13, 2012.
The plaintiff filed another formal grievance on December 28, 2012.
On January 11, 2013, the plaintiff received a response to his December 28, 2012 grievance. Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. D, Grievance Response, Doc. No. 10-6. The response indicated that the Grievance Coordinator rejected the grievance because "misconducts are not grievable." Id. The plaintiff then appealed from the Grievance Coordinator's denial to the Warden on January 19, 2013. Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. E, Grievance Appeal, Doc. No. 10-7. The Warden denied the appeal on February 1, 2013. Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. F, Grievance Appeal Denial, Doc. No. 10-8. In denying the appeal, the warden noted (1) the Grievance Coordinator properly rejected the grievance, (2) he had reviewed the available evidence and could not find support for the plaintiff's claims, and (3) the plaintiff did not suffer an injury because he was transferred out of the Jail before the misconduct was heard. Id.
The plaintiff denies being in possession of a grievance procedure handbook or written rules and regulations. RFA at ¶ 14; RFA Answers at ¶ 14. Nonetheless,
RFA Answers at ¶ 14.
The plaintiff claims in the complaint that the incident at issue in this case occurred on November 16, 2012. Sweeney Aff. at ¶ 16; RFA at ¶ 2; RFA Answers at ¶ 2. The 21-day period for filing a formal grievance relating to the incident would have expired on December 7, 2012. Sweeney Aff. at ¶¶ 16-17. The plaintiff never filed a formal written grievance concerning the issues raised in his complaint prior to commencing this action.
In his response to the defendants' requests for admissions, the plaintiff denies having never filed any grievance for the following reasons:
With regard to the notice under 42 Pa. C.S. § 5522, the plaintiff attached the notice to his answers to the requests for admissions. RFA Answers at Ex. H. The notice is dated on December 19, 2012, and states as follows:
Please be advised that I have been asked to represent Charles Shumanis in an injury claim against Lehigh County Prison and/or employees of Lehigh County arising out of an injury on November 16, 2012. Mr. Shumanis was severely beaten by fellow inmates in Lehigh County Prison. Mr. Shumanis was allowed to suffer this beating notwithstanding a separation order being in place that required him to not be allowed to come into contact with Robert Diaz, one of the perpetrators in the beating. It is my understanding that Mr. Diaz and two other inmates attacked Mr. Shumanis on November 16, 2012 and inflicted severe injuries causing him neurological, orthopaedic and dental injuries which required hospitalization and that he is still suffering form [sic] these injuries. The medical information is within the control of the Lehigh County Prison but it is my understanding that Mr. Shumanis was initially taken to St. Luke's Hospital in Allentown and then transferred to St. Luke's Hospital in Bethlehem. It is also my understanding that Dr. Wilson, who is employed by the prison system, also saw him in prison. My understanding is that the beating was recorded on videotape and I am requesting that the videotape be preserved as well as any other documentation or physical evidence for later review.
Please have your Solicitor and/or representative contact me to discuss this matter.
Id.
Jail personnel completed misconduct reports charging each of the three individuals involved in assaulting the plaintiff on November 16, 2012 with misconducts.
The plaintiff has produced three e-mail messages individuals exchanged that appear to be related to the incident on November 16, 2012. In the first message, Cliff Knappenberger ("Knappenberger"), identified in the body of the e-mail as the Internal Affairs Investigator for the Lehigh County Department of Corrections, sent an e-mail on November 16, 2012, to three individuals looking for a copy of the video relating to "the code red that took place at the booking counter on 11/16/2012 at 0530 between Inmates Eric Rosario, . . . Rodolfo Hernandez, . . . Roberto Diaz, . . . and Chuck Shumanis, . . . for investigation." Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. J, E-mails, Doc. No. 10-12. In the second message, Knappenberger appears to have sent an e-mail on December 10, 2012, to Sweeney and Meisel, in which he states: "Ed Ressler is conducting an investigation concerning the Shumanis assault. Usually, they wait until the inmate files a private criminal complaint form, but this time they begun the investigation after we sent them the reports." Id. In the third message, Knappenberger sent a message dated December 13, 2012, to Edward Ressler related to the "Shumanis Investigation," in which he appears to ask Mr. Ressler to "give us a `heads-up' when you make an arrest(s) in the Shumanis investigation to allow Director Sweeney to be prepared for any press inquiries." Id.
In the motion for summary judgment, the defendants generally argue that the court should grant summary judgment in their favor because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action. The defendants argue that the GPP requires an inmate to file a formal grievance (and proceed through the necessary steps thereafter) to fully exhaust administrative remedies. Memorandum of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. of Defs., Lehigh Cnty. Jail, Dale Meisel, Janine Donate, Eric Saborsky, Ronald March, and Erick Nowicki ("Defs.' Mem.") at 8-9. They assert that, contrary to the plaintiff's assertions in his responses to their requests for admissions, his issues with respect to the conduct of Jail staff on November 16, 2012, were grievable under the GPP because they related to "staff actions." Id. at 8. Despite being aware of the grievance procedure — as evidenced by the plaintiff's response to the defendants' requests for admissions and his grievances filed before and after the November 16, 2012 incident — the plaintiff failed to file a formal grievance within 21 days of the assault as required by the GPP. Id. at 5-8. The defendants contend that this failure to file a formal grievance unequivocally demonstrates that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Id.
In response to the motion, the plaintiff contends that he did not need to exhaust any remedies with respect to the assault on November 16, 2012, or, alternatively, he exhausted his administrative remedies through his participation in the GPP's informal grievance procedure. Pl.'s Mem. at 3-13. With respect to the first contention, the plaintiff asserts that he did not need to grieve any issues pertaining to the assault because those issues involve "state and federal laws," which are not grievable under the GPP. Id. at 3-4. He also states that although the defendants are now asserting that "staff actions" are grievable under the GPP, he attempted to grieve a "staff action" about a month after the incident, but was repeatedly told it was not grievable.
Concerning the plaintiff's arguments that he exhausted his administrative remedies, he claims that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing an informal grievance within 14 days of the incident and Donate responded to the informal grievance. Id. at 5-6. He asserts that he exhausted his administrative remedies because the GPP essentially provides two avenues for resolutions of grievances: the informal grievance avenue and the formal grievance avenue. Id. at 6-11. The plaintiff argues that because GPP does not provide a procedure when an inmate receives a decision on an informal grievance and states that an inmate "may" (instead of "shall") file a formal grievance if the informal grievance is unresolved, he exhausted the administrative remedies available to him.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The phrase "with respect to prison conditions" refers to "all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Exhaustion under the PLRA is mandatory. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). Section 1997e(a)'s mandatory exhaustion requirement promotes numerous and significant public policies, including:
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover,
Id. at 76-77 (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted).
There is no "futility" exception to the PLRA's administrative exhaustion requirement. Id. at 71. Thus, prisoners "must . . . exhaust administrative remedies even where the relief sought— monetary damages—cannot be granted by the administrative process." Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 734).
In addition, "the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion." Id. at 83. Requiring proper exhaustion "eliminate[s] unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons, and thus seeks to `affor[d] corrections officers time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.'" Id. at 93 (quoting Porter, 534 U.S. at 525). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted). If a prisoner does not properly exhaust his or her administrative remedies, the prisoner cannot file a lawsuit challenging prison conditions in federal court because he or she is procedurally defaulted from doing so. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-29 (3d Cir. 2004); see Small v. Camden Cnty., 728 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2013) ("Under the PLRA, exhaustion is a precondition for bringing suit under § 1983.").
A prisoner cannot properly exhaust administrative remedies "by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal." Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83. The prisoner also "may not satisfy the exhaustion requirement after the filing of his complaint." Wallace v. Miller, 544 F. App'x 40, 42 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 & n.9 (3d Cir. 2002) and Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 2003)).
If prison officials interfere with or impact the prisoner's filing of a grievance, this interference may serve as an exception to the requirement calling for full and proper exhaustion because it prohibits (or prevents) the availability of the grievance procedure to the inmate. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003) ("A grievance procedure is not available even if one exists on paper if the defendant prison officials somehow prevent a prisoner from using it."); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that "[s]ection 1997e(a) only requires that prisoners exhaust such administrative remedies as are available" and, therefore, if the prisoner-plaintiff was correct that prison officials told him that he needed to wait until the termination of an investigation before he could file a formal claim yet never told him that they had completed the investigation, "the formal grievance proceeding . . . was never available to" the plaintiff (internal quotation marks omitted)). This exception applies to excuse a failure to exhaust "under certain limited circumstances." Harris v. Armstrong, 149 F. App'x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005). The prisoner would have to show that he or she "was misled or that there was some extraordinary reason he [or she] was prevented with complying with the statutory mandate." Davis v. Warman, 49 F. App'x 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2005); see Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the plaintiff satisfied section 1997e(a)'s exhaustion requirement where the evidence showed that the Office of Professional Responsibility reviewed the plaintiff's excessive force claim
Nonetheless,
Smith v. Lindsey, No. 1:13-cv-2914, 2015 WL 1651115, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2015).
The "exhaustion of administrative remedies under the PLRA is a question of law to be determined by the judge." See Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (agreeing with Pavey v. Convey, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2008)). The court must resolve this issue "even if that determination requires the resolution of disputed facts." Small, 728 F.3d at 269 (citing Drippe, 604 F.3d at 781). Also, as the defendants are asserting the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, they bear the burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Brown, 312 F.3d at 111 ("Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be pled and proven by the defendant.").
As indicated above, the plaintiff contends that the court should conclude that he did not have to exhaust any administrative remedies with respect to his claims in this case. His first argument in support of his contention that he did not need to exhaust any administrative remedies before filing suit is that his actual complaints relate to "state laws" and, as such, are specifically identified as non-grievable issues under the GPP.
Secondly, the plaintiff's purported interpretation of this language, namely that a prisoner would not have to grieve any issues that could constitute a violation of federal or state law, is untenable and unreasonable. The interpretation of a prison's grievance policy is a question of law for the court to resolve. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Stokes v. District Attorney, 247 F.3d 539, 540-41 (3d Cir. 2001)).
After reviewing the entirety of the GPP, the court finds that the language "state and federal laws" when included as non-grievable issues, indicates that the Jail is precluding inmates from raising challenges to state and federal laws through the prison grievance process. If the court interpreted the phrase "state and federal laws" in the GPP in accordance with the plaintiff's interpretation and its logical extension, it would necessarily mean that any time that a prisoner wanted to grieve about an alleged unconstitutional violation (as such a violation would seemingly violate "federal law"), the prisoner would not have to file a grievance and could directly proceed to bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court. Therefore, Lehigh County would be permitting its inmates to file all of the associated claims that inmates often file in section 1983 actions, such as claims for excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, without ever having exhausted their administrative remedies and providing the Jail with the opportunity to investigate the claims and resolve issues before the claims are filed in federal court. This result would be inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the PLRA. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (explaining that a purpose of the PLRA's exhaustion requirement is to give prison officials the first opportunity to correct constitutional violations). Accordingly, even if the phrase "state and federal laws" was ambiguous, the court will not adopt the plaintiff's interpretation of this language in the GPP because it would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that is inconsistent with the purpose of the PLRA. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that a court should avoid interpreting a statute that would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1114 (1994).
For his second argument in support of his claim that he did not need to exhaust any remedies prior to bringing suit, the plaintiff appears to assert that contrary to Sweeney's statement in his affidavit, the Jail staff members' conduct at issue would not have fallen under "staff actions" grievable under the GPP. Pl.'s Mem. at 4-5. The plaintiff claims that the Jail's treatment of his grievance relating to the actions by Schraer on December 22, 2012, demonstrates that staff actions were not grievable. Id. He claims that the Jail should have reviewed the grievance and not mislabeled it as a non-grievable misconduct. Id. at 5. This argument is also unavailing because (1) the Jail personnel did not "mislabel" the grievance as relating to a misconduct, and (2) the result of that investigation does not excuse the plaintiff of exhausting his remedies with respect to his claims against the defendants or result in a conclusion that "staff actions" were not grievable.
While the court recognizes that this is a tangential issue, the Jail personnel did not mislabel the plaintiff's grievance against Schraer as a misconduct when it was actually a grievable "staff action" issue. Instead, as properly determined by the Grievance Coordinator and the Warden, the plaintiff's allegations against Schraer were not grievable under the GPP because they pertain to a "misconduct" imposed against him. The essence of the plaintiff's grievance was that Schraer lied about the circumstances giving rise to the imposition of the misconduct and, as such, he should not have received the misconduct. The GPP provides that any issues relating to "[m]isconducts/appeals" are not grievable because there is a separate process for addressing those issues. See IGP at 2. Although the record in this case does not include the Jail's process for resolving those issues, such a process would seemingly have to include resolving allegations of misconduct on their merits if they are disputed by the inmate. Thus, the issue of whether the plaintiff or Schraer were telling the truth as it relates to the facts underlying the misconduct charge would have to be resolved as part of that process. Although technically Schraer's act of allegedly lying would constitute "staff action" because Schraer is a member of the Jail's "staff" and lying about something is an "action," this entire grievance relates to the plaintiff's misconduct and does not constitute "staff action" under the GPP. It would be nonsensical to allow inmates to get around the Jail's process for resolving misconducts by collaterally attacking the allegations in a misconduct charge (including allegations based on observations of Jail personnel) through filing grievances based on "staff action." In addition, simply because the plaintiff claimed that he was not attacking the merits of the misconduct charge, which is an arguable interpretation of his statements, did not (1) mean he was not actually doing so, or (2) prohibit the Jail staff from interpreting his grievance as complaining about his misconduct charge. The Jail appears to have properly classified the grievance as a grievance pertaining to misconduct and not staff action. Accordingly, the Jail staff appears to have properly addressed this particular formal grievance.
In addition, the Jail staff's handling of the Schraer grievance does not somehow correlate as an excuse for the plaintiff to not file a formal grievance in this case. The plaintiff asserts that "[i]t could certainly be inferred based upon [the decision denying the grievance] that conduct of prison employees was not considered grievable because the underlying action in that matter was alleged misconduct by the Plaintiff." Pl.'s Mem. at 5. As already indicated, the Jail personnel's resolution of the Schraer grievance does not support a conclusion, inference, or even a suggestion that "staff actions" were not grievable at the Jail. Instead, the only reasonable conclusion (even viewing it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff) is that the plaintiff was attempting to grieve a non-grievable issue.
The GPP provides inmates at the Jail with a grievance procedure and it expressly provides that "staff actions" are grievable issues (either informally or formally). As indicated by Sweeney, allegations that correctional staff failed to follow a no-contact order or have handcuffs on their persons relate to grievable "staff actions" under the GPP. Those allegations do not relate to "state and federal law." Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims fall under the PLRA and under the GPP's grievance policy and the plaintiff was required to follow the GPP to exhaust any administrative remedies.
For purpose of addressing the plaintiff's arguments on whether he exhausted his administrative remedies, the court will first analyze the GPP as a whole because the plaintiff argues that it essentially provides two avenues for grievances and completion of the informal grievance procedure constitutes completion of administrative remedies under the GPP because there is nothing else for the plaintiff to do at that point. As explained below, the plaintiff's interpretation of the GPP is illogical and lacks merit.
As noted by the plaintiff, the GPP provides for informal and formal grievances. See IGP at 1-3; Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. K, Handbook, Inmate Guidelines at § 42 (referencing informal and formal grievances). The GPP states that "[a]n inmate shall attempt to resolve a grievance informally" and if the inmate does not do so, this failure "to resolve an issue informally is grounds for rejecting a formal grievance." IGP at 3. The inmate can attempt to informally grieve verbally or in writing, but if the inmate grieves in writing, the inmate must use an "Inmate Request to Staff" form. Id.
Although the GPP provides that Jail staff shall "answer written informal grievances within 14 calendar days of receipt[,]" it also states that "[i]f the inmate does not hear back from the staff member, any formal grievance submitted must still meet the submission deadline spelled out below." Id. Regarding this submission deadline for formal grievances, the GPP states that the inmate must file the formal grievance "so the Grievance Coordinator receives the form no later than 21 calendar days from the event that triggered the grievance." Id. Thus, the GPP expressly informs inmates that although staff is expected to respond within 14 days of receipt of the written informal grievance, if the inmate were to not receive a response, the inmate must file a formal grievance within 21 days of the date of the incident triggering the grievance.
Regarding the interplay between informal and formal grievances, the plaintiff contends that "there is absolutely NOTHING that deals with the denial of an Informal Grievance." Pl.'s Mem. at 8. The plaintiff notes that the GPP's provision on grievance appeals deals only with formal grievances or grievance restrictions. Id. The plaintiff also points out that the GPP mentions that an inmate "may" file a formal grievance, "but there is NO requirement that he file a formal grievance following a response from an informal grievance." Id. Because he argues that the GPP does not provide for remedies after a response to an informal grievance, he claims that the GPP did not reasonably communicate to him what his remedies were. Id. at 8-10.
The court does not find the plaintiff's interpretation of the GPP to be persuasive. In particular, the court does not interpret the GPP's use of the word "may" in accordance with the plaintiff's interpretation. Per the plaintiff's interpretation, an inmate dissatisfied with the result of the resolution of an informal grievance could exhaust remedies because the use of the word "may" means that filing a formal grievance is permissive and not mandatory. This interpretation would render other language in the GPP meaningless.
If an inmate is dissatisfied with the resolution of an informal grievance, the inmate does not need to do anything in a literal sense. There is no requirement that an inmate file a formal grievance if the inmate does not wish to pursue the issue further. The Jail cannot force an inmate to pursue a grievance that the inmate does not want to pursue. It would be illogical for the Jail to state, "[s]hould the inmate be unable to resolve the grievance informally, he [
Most importantly, the GPP informs the inmates of the requirements for exhaustion. It indicates that an inmate "shall exhaust all administrative remedies contained in this policy before filing a civil suit over the grievance." Id. In its totality, the GPP provides that if the inmate files a formal grievance, which the Grievance Coordinator denies, and the inmate then files an appeal to the warden, the decision by the warden concludes the appeal and "administrative remedies will have been exhausted." Id. at 3-4. The GPP does not state that an inmate exhausts any administrative remedies through an unsatisfactory result at the informal grievance level.
The court notes that the plaintiff "agrees that had there been no response by Defendant Prison, then he would have had to file a formal grievance." Pl.'s Mem. at 8. So, through the plaintiff's interpretation, if Jail personnel do not respond to an informal grievance the inmate "would have had to," i.e. "must" file a formal grievance, yet he would have the court interpret the GPP so if the Jail responds, then the inmate would not have to pursue a formal grievance to complete exhaustion. Once again, if the Jail personnel respond and give the inmate exactly what he or she wants, there would be no reason to grieve and it is unlikely that a federal court ever gets involved in the case. If, however, the inmate does not get the relief requested in the informal grievance, there is no practical difference between that scenario and one where the inmate did not receive a response because the result is the same, namely, the inmate is not getting the requested relief. The GPP's language does not produce such a result and there is simply no rational reason to interpret it as such.
Moreover, the plaintiff's argument that his remedies were not reasonably communicated to him because the GPP "did not provide any remedies for those filing an Informal Grievance to which a response was sent to the [p]risoner" is meritless. Pl.'s Mem. at 8-10. Instead, the Jail reasonably communicated a remedy for an inmate that receives a response to an informal grievance to which the inmate does not agree, namely, the inmate may file a formal grievance to further pursue the issue with Jail personnel.
As referenced by the defendants, the court's decision in Scheeler v. Lehigh County Prison, No. 13-5739, 2015 WL 573702 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2015) supports their and this court's interpretation of the GPP with respect to exhaustion of administrative remedies, namely that the GPP requires the filing and prosecution (through an appeal) of a formal grievance for full exhaustion.
In rejecting the plaintiff's argument, Judge Robreno explained that the plaintiff "misapprehends the clear meaning of the provisions relating to exhaustion." Id. In particular, Judge Robreno pointed out that "the language of Defendant's grievance policy makes clear that a formal written grievance is necessary to the extent an inmate seeks to continue the grievance process (after an informal grievance) and fulfill the exhaustion requirements." Id. at *5. Judge Robreno also stated as follows:
Id. at *5-6.
The plaintiff attempts to distinguish Scheeler because he asserts that the plaintiff in Scheeler never filed a formal or informal grievance to assert his complaints about his block officer whereas here the plaintiff submitted an informal grievance to which Donate responded. Pl.'s Mem. at 9-10. The plaintiff incorrectly claims that the plaintiff in Scheeler did not pursue informal grievances. While it is unclear if that plaintiff submitted written informal grievances, he had indicated that he was able to resolve his grievances informally. Scheeler, 2015 WL 573702 at *6. The plaintiff also must have received responses to those informal grievances as he had "his Bible returned to him, his water/toilet restored by moving him from cell 2 to cell 7, soap and toilet paper provided, and finally [by his] transfer [] back to general population." Id. (citation omitted) (alterations in original). So, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the Scheeler plaintiff was similarly-situated to the plaintiff here insofar as he had informally grieved and received a response from prison officials. Also similarly, neither plaintiff ever filed a timely formal grievance.
Based on this court's review of the entirety of the GPP and the decisions in Scheeler and Ayala, the plaintiff needed to file a formal grievance and pursue that grievance through an appeal before he exhausted his administrative remedies and commenced this litigation. His argument in an attempt to distinguish this situation insofar as he filed an informal grievance and received a response from Donate (which the court will discuss below) is unpersuasive and ultimately, unavailing.
While the court's interpretation of the GPP regarding the proper exhaustion of administrative remedies moots the need to discuss the plaintiff's contention that he filed an informal grievance addressing the issues that he raises in this case, for sake of completeness, the court addresses that argument here. As indicated above, in support of his assertion that he exhausted his administrative remedies, the plaintiff claims that he satisfied the GPP's informal grievance procedure when he filed an informal grievance to which Donate responded.
The issue that is readily apparent from the face of the grievance is whether it would reasonably place the Jail officials on notice of any claims and, if so, the identity of the claims. With regard to the specificity of a grievance, the PLRA does not provide any requirements. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 516 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Section 1997e(a) does not say how specific a prisoner's administrative grievances must be[.]"). Instead, "[t]he level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion." Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). "The primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison officials to a problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that he may be sued; the grievance is not a summons and complaint that initiates adversarial litigation." Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 522 (5th Cir. 2004).
The court recognizes that the GPP does not provide any guidance in itself, to the necessary requirements or specifics of an informal grievance. In this regard, the definition of an "informal grievance" does not provide any specifics other than to indicate that the inmate must use an "Inmate Request to Staff" form if the inmate chooses to complete a written informal grievance. IGP at 2. The GPP section on "Informal Grievance Submission Procedure" also does not provide any specifics of the necessary contents of a written informal grievance. Id. at 3. As for the "Inmate's Request to Staff" form, it requires the inmate to identify the recipient, the grieving party, and the "quarters assignment" of the grieving party. Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. I, Informal Grievance. It then provides numerous lines for the inmate to "[s]tate completely but briefly the problem on which you desire assistance. Give details." Id.
Here, even viewing the plaintiff's informal grievance to Donate in the light most favorable to him and giving him every "reasonable" inference therefrom, the court simply cannot find that that document would have placed prison officials (in this case, Donate) on notice that he was raising claims against any correctional officers (or the Jail) relating to what happened to him on November 16, 2012. Instead, his specific claims relate to his desire to be removed from "A/S" and be permitted to contact individuals outside of the Jail. He also asks a specific question about whether anyone from internal affairs will be speaking to him, but he does not state why he should be speaking to internal affairs. While purely speculative, any conversation with internal affairs could be about the incident in general or it could focus on the assault itself. There is simply nothing about that document that would notify prison officials that he was claiming that the correctional officers acted improperly with regard to failing to follow prison policy (as it relates to the no-contact order or the handcuffs issue) or that they otherwise violated his constitutional rights (if he was even aware of such a claim at the time).
In addition, while unclear if he is attempting to do so, the plaintiff may not group the entirety of the Jail's investigation of the November 16, 2012 incident to buttress the lack of reference to the incident in the informal grievance. Even if he could argue that the court should consider the investigation along with the grievance, the investigative reports do not specifically reference any claims of identified misconduct by the Jail staff. The plaintiff attached copies of the misconduct reports filed against the assaulting inmates and none of those reports contain any identified misconduct or wrongful acts by the correctional officers. Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. G. Instead, they describe what happened and what the correctional officers did to attempt to stop the assault. Id. Even the incident report by Saborsky, which also contains a recitation of what happened once he arrived at the scene of the assault, does not contain any references to improper conduct by the correctional officers other than his passing reference that the plaintiff told him that the Diaz "was listed as his enemy which led to the assault." Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. H, Incident Report. Further, although the plaintiff attaches copies of e-mails exchanged by Knappenberger, who is identified as an "Internal Affairs Investigator," it is purely speculative that any such investigation pertained to claims by the plaintiff that the correctional officers acted improperly under the Jail's rules and regulations or violated his rights. In fact, the reasonable inference from these e-mails is that the investigation was related to criminal charges against the other inmates, and this is evidenced by his (1) reference to an investigation into the plaintiff's assault, but with a notation that the investigation usually does not commence until the inmate files a private criminal complaint, and (2) request to Edward Ressler to "give [them] a `heads up' when [he] make[s] an arrest(s) in the Shumanis investigation to allow Director Sweeney to be prepared for any press inquiries." Pl.'s Mem. at Ex. J, Incident Report. The fact that Knappenberger was seeking to view a video of the incident also does not support a reasonable inference that he was investigating the conduct of the correctional officers involved. Even viewing these documents in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court cannot reasonably infer from these documents that the Jail was on notice as to claims by the plaintiff against the correctional officers present during the assault. Moreover, even if the plaintiff could combine all of these documents relating to an investigation into the informal grievance, he still did not file a formal grievance after receiving a response from Donate and Donate's response did not provide him with any relief at least as it pertains to the claims in this case.
Although the court recognizes that the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party, and give him the benefit of reasonable inferences, the court cannot even reasonably infer that this informal grievance related to allegations of improper conduct by correctional officers or the Jail. Therefore, the plaintiff did not submit an informal grievance as contemplated by the GPP at least insofar as he has claimed that correctional officers and the Jail failed to comply with the no-contact order and the correctional officers lacked handcuffs to prevent the assault. Even if somehow the court were to conclude that this constituted a proper informal grievance (or the totality of the investigation with this grievance constituted a proper informal grievance under the GPP), the bottom line is that the plaintiff never filed a formal grievance after receiving Donate's response and Donate's response did not provide him with any relief at least as it pertains to the allegations in this case.
The court recognizes that it appears to be undisputed that on November 16, 2012, the plaintiff was the victim of a horrible assault by three other inmates in the Jail and he was injured as a result of the assault. The plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by these inmates even though the Jail had a no-contact order in place to prevent him and one of those other inmates from being in the same location. He also alleges that the correctional officers lacked handcuffs on their persons resulting in their inability to restrain the other inmates as they were assaulting him. While the record has not been developed to determine whether the plaintiff could ultimately prove any constitutional violations by the defendants, if the plaintiff's allegations are true, he had a valid reason to commence this litigation.
Nonetheless, the plaintiff admits he was aware of the grievance policy at the Jail and this is further evidenced by him filing at least one informal grievance (even though he was in "A/S") and three formal grievances in the month prior to the assault and the month after the assault. For one of those formal grievances that he filed in the month after the assault, he appears to have prosecuted it through an appeal to the warden (although he was ultimately unsuccessful). Even if the plaintiff did not have a copy of the GPP, a fact that he does not argue about in his opposition memorandum, these grievances evidence his knowledge of the grievance procedure at the Jail and the remedies available to him.
The GPP, taken as a whole, provides that for an inmate to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to a particular issue, the inmate must proceed from an informal grievance (verbal or written), to filing a formal grievance and, presuming that the Grievance Coordinator denies the formal grievance, to filing an appeal to the Warden. Contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, the GPP provides an available remedy for inmates receiving an unfavorable resolution of an informal grievance; namely, they may file a formal grievance with the Grievance Coordinator if they desire to further pursue the issue.
Although the plaintiff claims that he filed an informal grievance with respect to his claims in this case, the record, despite the court giving the plaintiff the benefit of any and every reasonable inference, simply does not reflect that he filed any such informal grievance that would have placed the defendants on notice of his claims in this case. Even if the court could possibly interpret his informal grievance to Donate as relating to his claims against the defendants in this case, at best he received no response with respect to these claims or her response possibly constituted a denial insofar as Donate indicated that she did not know anything about internal affairs. For either of these outcomes, the GPP provided that the plaintiff needed to file a formal grievance within 21 days of the incident if he intended to pursue his claim. The plaintiff admits that he failed to do so.
Accordingly, the defendants have satisfied their burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies at the GPP prior to commencing this litigation and the court will grant their motion and enter summary judgment in their favor and against the plaintiff.
A separate order follows. EDWARD G. SMITH
Ayala, No. 10-7571 at 1 & n.1. Judge Joyner then noted that despite being aware of the formal grievance procedure (as evidenced by his submission of three formal grievances in the preceding months on an unrelated incident) the plaintiff never submitted a formal grievance after he received responses to his informal grievances. Id. As such, Judge Joyner concluded that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Johnson, 385 F.3d at 516-17 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
