LEGROME D. DAVIS, District Judge.
AND NOW, this ___ day of ____, 2016, upon consideration of Defendant Wilson's Amended Motion to Dismiss Indictment, and the government's response, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED. Defendant's indictment is hereby dismissed. A new scheduling ordered shall be issued.
Marquis Wilson, by way of Pro Se motion, respectfully requests that the court permit Mr Wilson's Indictment to be Dismissed with prejudice entered on April 24, 2014. For the reasons set forth in the included Memorandum of Law in Support of the Amended motion to Dismiss Indictment as well as the reasons set forth in Mr Wilson's previously filed Pro Se Motion to Dismiss Indictment (dkt#126 &127). Mr Wilson also submits exhibit attachments one being a letter written to the court by USA Astolfi, another being a letter from Wilson written to the court, and lastly a transcript of the June 16, 2015 hearing and court orders. Mr Wilson respectfully request that the court grants this motion.
No person shall be held to answer to a capitol, or otherwise in-famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Right Of The Accused
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
Prior to the Speedy Trial Act of 1979, the act required that a defendant's arraignment occur within 10 days of the filings of an information or indictment, and that trial commence within sixty days of arraignment. The section was amended for the purpose of "(merging) the 10-day indictment-to-arraignment and the 60-day arraignment-to-trial time limits. . . . into a single 70-day indictment to-trial period." H.R.REP.NO 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 reprinted in (1979) U.S Code.Cong § Ad News 805; see S.Rep. No. 212, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1979). Our interpretation of the act coincides with the "overall" "100 day time-frame" envisioned by Congress, See H.R. REP. NO 390, supra at 5 (quoting from a General Accounting Office Study), (1979) U.S Code. Cong. § Ad News 809. Under section 3161(b), an indictment or information must be filed within thirty days from the date of arrest or summons, and a "100-day time frame" results if indictment triggers the seventy-day period. See S.Rep (indictment to trial) into the third interval (arraignment to trial). Thus instead of 30-10-60 day intervals, the act would operate on a 30-70 day (Arrest to Indictment to trial basis.)"
Dismissal of an indictment is mandatory if the section 3161(c) time limits as extended by section 3161(h), are not met. see 18 U.S.C § 3162(a)(2)(1976). Subsection{h) permits certain periods of delay to be excluded when computing the time within which a trial must be commenced. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 provides that dismissal may be with or without prejudice, depending on facts such as the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances leading to dismissal, and the impact reprosecution would have on The Administration Of The Act and on the administration of justice see 18 U.S.C § 3162(a) (2).
On or about April 24, 2014, Mr Wilson along with three co-defendants were charge in a five-count indictment with one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (count one); two counts of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 2113(d)(counts two and four) two counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C 924(c) (counts three and five). Attorney Russell Soloway was appointed to represent Mr Wilson under the criminal justice act and on May 28, 2014 Mr Wilson entered a plea of not guilty to all charges against him. (see dkt 41, 45, & 52). The docket indicates that Mr Wilson was interested in challenging the government's case. On February 27, 2015, Mr Wilson filed a pro se motion to suppress physical evidence. (dkt #81) Mr Wilson was given a scheduled trial date for July 28, 2014 which was intervened by a motion to continue trial pursuant to The Speedy Trial Act 18 U.S.C § 3161(h)(8) following the first motion to file pretrial motions in which defense attorney Coley Reynolds never did so. (see dkt history). Shortly after the same motion was filed by defense attorney Russell Soloway and both motions were granted by the court without oral and written explanation stating why the court finds that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.(see dkt 56, 57, 58, 59, 72, 73). These continuance motions along with Wilson's pro se motions to withdraw guilty plea submitted June 22, 2015 and Suppress physical evidence submitted February 27, 2015 has been under the courts advisement for more than a year while defendants remained incarcerated feeling uncertainty which is 23 months now. Though the court has been made aware of the delay resulted from this misconduct all from forced illegal pleas, to purposely stalling by defense counsels in which is a Due Process violation defendants remained incarcerated with no set trial instead the docket reads and always has "THE FUTURE."
Subsection(h)(8)(A) states that any period of delay is excluded if the judge grants a continuance because the ends of (982 f.2d 877) justice serve to outweigh the speedy trial interest of the public and the defendant. see 18 U.S.C § 3161(h)(8)(A), This statue also provides that the court must justify its continuances by an oral or written statement setting forth on the record it's reason for granting them. Id. If such a statement is not provided, the delay occasioned by a continuance cannot be excluded from the time within which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. Rivera, 863 f.2d at 296; Brooks, 697 f.2d at 520. Moveover, a district court cannot provide an after-the-fact justification for unauthorized delays by granting an ends-of-justice continuance non pro tune. see United States v. Carasquillo, 667, f.2d 382, 386 (3rd cir 1981). Placing the reasons for an "ends of justice" continuance on the record serves two purposes: First Congress wanted to ensure that a district judge would give careful consideration when balancing the need for delay against "the interest of the defendant and of society in achieving a speedy trial." Second the requirement provides a record so that an appellate court may review that decision. Rivera 863 f.2d at 296 (quoting Brooks, 697, f.2d at 520). Also in Rivera, the court indicated that we would strongly disfavor any apparent after-the-fact justification. Id at 297.
In Carasquillo, The district court granted a retroactive ends of justice continuance. Id at 385. We held that a judge could not grant such a continuance after the expiration of the seventy day period was brought to it's attention by a motion to dismiss. Id at 383, 386. In Carasquillo, there was no decision or reflection whatsoever on the part of the district judge concerning the continuance until after the expiration of the seventy day period. Id at 385. The reasons the court gave for the continuance were wholly an after thought. In that case CHEIF JUDGE ALBERT LEE STEPHENS JR Said: "I submit that the federal courts (should) accept, as a finding in writing a transcript of a proceeding wherein a (667 f.2d 387) judge, from the bench, has expressed his reasons, his findings, and made a record of them that is later typed up."
The purpose of the requirement that reason be stated is to ensure careful consideration of the relevant factors by the trial court and to provide a reviewable record on appeal. Both purposes are served if the text of the order, taken together with more detailed subsequent statements, adequately explains the factual basis for the continuance under the relevant criteria. United States v. Rush, 738 f.2d 497, 507 (1st cir 1984) cert denied, 470 U.S. 1004, 84 L. Ed 2d 378, 105 S.Ct. (1985)(citing, Brooks, 697 f.2d 520-22). Other court of appeals have addressed the problem of open-ended continuances in United States v. Pollock, 726 f.2d 1456 (9th cir. 1984) "The United States courts of appeals for the ninth circuit rejected open ended continuances, holding that "an ends of justice extension under section 3161(h) is proper only if ordered for a specific period of time and justified on the record with reference to the factors enumerated in section 3161(h)(8)(B)." 17 Id at 1461. accord United States v. Jordan, 915 f.2d 563, 585 (9th cir 1990) ("ends of justice" continuance must be specifically limited in time and supported by finding justified by the record.
(982 f.2d 882) Since open ended continuances cannot, however, be unreasonably long, we must decide whether the delays that results from the district courts open ended continuance and it's subsequent extension are reasonable under the particular circumstances of this case. Inasmuch as the government has a statutory obligation to ensure that the purposes of The Speedy Trial Act are carried out. see United States v. Lattany, United States Court Of Appeals for The Third Circuit. 982 f.2d 866, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 33697 No. 91-1826. When this continuance was made on June 12, and July 22 of 2014 the court granted it without a date of when the continuance would conclude instead the judge stated on record the trial date would be set in the future and allowed the continuance to go on for 9 months. The court later said in Carasquillo, 667 f.2d 382, 1981 U.S. App Lexis 15099 "Although it is intended that continuances under 3161(h)(8) should be given only in unusual cases, it is anticipated that the provision will be neccessary in protracted and complicated federal prosecutions, that is antitrust case, and complicated organized crime criminal conspiracy cases. However the committee has rejected a blanket exception for these cases and opted for a case-by-case approach. Each time such a continuance is granted in a complicated case the judge will have to weigh the right of society and the defendant to a speedy trial against the "ends of justice".
Subsection 3161(h)(8) has been redrafted to reflect the committee's clear intention that the determination of whether or not to grant an exclusion is to be via a balancing test. Before establishing a special, more lenient set of limits, a court would have to determine that the "ends of justice" outweigh the defendants and society's interest in Speedy Trial. Also, the section as amended by the committee sets out, in the statutory language, the specific factors which a judge should consider when weighing these interests. This is designed to give the courts the maximum degree of guidance in interpreting this critical provision.
As it was said in United States v. Lattany, before excluding a period of time under an "ends of justice" continuance pursuant to (h)(8)(A), the district court must consider certain factors in determining whether such a continuance should be granted including:
(i): whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such a proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice. (982 f.2d 872)(ii): whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preperation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section. . . .
(iv) whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or complex as to fall within this clause would deny the defendant or the governments continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the attorney for the government the reasonable time necessary for effective preperation taking into account the excercise due diligence. Id 3161(h)(8)(B)(i)(ii)-(iv).
However, as a general matter the committee intends that, except for the above situations, this provision should be rarely used. Furthermore, even the above situations (667 f.2d 388 Carasquillo,) should be handled on a case by case basis with the court stating. . . . The reasons why it believes that granting the continuance strikes the proper balance by the ends of justice on the one hand and the interest of society in a speedy trial and the interest of the defendant in a speedy trial on the other. Id at 39-41. The delicacy and infrequent use of this balancing strongly suggest that congress contemplated that only the trial judge would make this determination. We cannot excuse a court practice that fails to comply with the language of the act or to further it's policies even though it's objective is to keep a judge free of scheduling conflicts that result from overcrowded trial dockets. The House Committee on the judiciary stated the section 3161(h)(8).
Provides that no continuance shall be granted for reasons of general court congestion, or lack of diligent preperation, or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the attorney for the government. By approving this provision, the committee intends to make it clear that the continuance provision should not be invoked for reasons other than those which would meet the ends the justice. The committee can forsee instances in which institutional delays caused by any of the factors could result in what subsection 3161(h)(8)(B) (1) terms a "miscarriage of justice". However, the nature of the concept of speedy trial is one who recognizes that institutional delays occasioned by poor administration and management can work to the detriment of the accused. Placing prohibition on the granting of continuances for these reasons serves as an incentive to the courts and the government to effectively utilize manpower and resources so that defendants may be tried within the time limits provided by the bill.
Then Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist indicated that the act is a "peremptory instruction to prosecutors, defense counsel and judges alike that criminal cases must be tried within a particular period of time." Id at 20 (1974). U.S. Code Cong. § Ad News 7414. Congress realized that good faith delay may undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system as much as deliberate abuse. It intended the firm time limits in the act to shake the system "by the scruff of it's neck." Id. As the House Committee on the judiciary stated: federal judges must put their houses in order by beginning a thorough examination and evaluation of their problems to determine what is necessary to solve them." Id (1974) U.S. Code Cong § Ad news 7413. Congress solution is clear; both the courts and the parties should move to trial expeditiously, and any delay must be justified on the record and only under carefully limited circumstances. We believe that the procedures employed in this case tend to encourage the very delay that congress sought to avoid.
The 5th Amendment "Due Process of Law" and the Sixth, said that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a Speedy Trial, by an impartial jury." Sullivan v. Lousianna, Pg <405> 508 U.S. 275, 277-278, 124 L.Ed 182, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (1993). It is well established that "Congress did not intend any particular type of dismissal to serve as the presumptive for a Speedy Trial violation. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 334, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 101 L.Ed 2d 297 (1988);
The Act does however, set out factors that a district court must consider in choosing between the two remedies: In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice the court shall consider among others, each of the following factors "the seriousness of the offense" "the facts and circumstances of the case in which led to the dismissal'' and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). In addition to these statutory factors, The Supreme Court has indicated that prejudice to the defendant should also be considered. Wilson, 11 f.3d at 352 (quot Taylor, 487 US at 334. Defendant now discusses the factors.
Although Wilson was indicted for a serious offense, before the court can consider this factor as tipping in favor of dismissal without prejudice "the seriousness the crime must be weighed against . . . the seriousness of the delay." Stayton; 791 f.2d at 21. (internal citation omitted) because "where the crime charge is serious the sanction for dismissal with prejudice should ordinarily be imposed only for serious delay." United States v. Simmons, 786 f.2d 479, 489 (2nd cir. 1986). From May 29, 2014 arraignment until now defendants have been incarcerated for 23 Months and denied the fundamental "Due Process" right to a fast and Speedy Trial, On June 12, 2014 two continuance motions were filed by Wilson's brother defense counsel Coley Reynolds the first was to file pretrial motions in which he never did so. (see dkt history). The second was an ends of justice continuance under section(h)(8) in which the court granted without articulating it's reason orally or in writing for granting such a continuance like the case being complex or unusal, why failing to do so may result in a miscarriage of justice, or when the continuance would conclude instead the motion simply stated "In The Future." This delay took place from June 12, 2014-April 9, 2015 when defendants stood side by side in a joint Rule 11 Inadequate Plea Colloquy hearing resulting from deception, vindictiveness, misrepresentation, and coercion done by. USA Astolfi, Defense Attornies Russell Soloway & Coley Reynolds. (see dkt #95, 113, 119 85-88 to support these claim.) The delay was extremely prejudicial being the court never stated it's reasons for granting such continuance and the measures taken by attorney's in result of this delay. Prejudice is proven if "there is reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In other words now quoting Gambrino, 59 f.3d at 36 "Justice delayed is justice denied."
In United States v. Stayton, the court ordered dismissal with pre-judice based in the "dominating consideration" of "the sheer length of the 23 month delay between voir dire and trial, concluding that "the enormity of the delay was sufficient alone to tip the second factor in favor of dismissal of an indictment with prejudice." 791 f.2d at 22. The longer the delay, the greater the presumptive or actual prejudice to the defendant, in terms of his ability to prepare for trial or restrictions on his liberty. Taylor, 485 US at 340. Wilson's attorney Russell Soloway had no interest in mounting a defense for trial instead his intention was to engage in the prosecution's deception. Stating that Wilson had to abandon his 4th Amendment right by pleading guilty in order for his brother to reap the same benefit of the "non existing package agreement" using dishonesty to deliberately cause Wilson to abandon his "Due Process" right to a fast and speedy trial. (see June 16, 2015 transcripts Pg 19 #14-20). Although the Speedy Trial Act was violated well before the April 9, 2015 guilty plea hearing "we press on our analysis to discern the full extent of the unexcused trial delay, and because the continuance was defective, the clock continued to run abated until now." (quoting United States v. Barnes, 159 f.3d 4; 1998 US App. Lexis 27961 No.97-2251 Pg 12.) The delay caused by the continuance without oral and written explanation failing to state why it meets the ends of justice and when it would conclude should not be faulted to the defendants. The Supreme Court has construed subsection(F) as setting a two-teired approach to determining the extent of excludable delay caused by the submission and disposition of pretrial motions. see Henderson, 476 US at 329-30. By contrast, when "motions that require no hearing" are involved, time is tolled only until the "prompt disposition" of the motion, which ordinarily cannot exceed the 30-day "under advisement" period. Henderson, 476 U.S at 329; See Santiago-Becerril, 130 f.3d at 17; 5 Rep No 96-212, 96th Cong 1st Sess at 34 (1979). The court granted the continuances under section(h)(8) filed by both attorney's but failed to state it's complexities causing defendant to believe the continuance was basic and frivolous. Furthermore in result of the actions taken by the US Attorney and defense attorney's cause Wilson to later file a pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea submitted June 22, 2015 causing the motion to go under advisement and cause additional delay. Since then Wilson has been appointed two attorney's Caroline Cinqanto and Susan Lin which has submitted an amended motion and U.S.A Astolfi has written a letter to the court on Jan 29, 2016 acknowledging his misconduct (see exhibit A.) The court still has not ruled on the guilty plea withdrawal motion making a unnecessary delay even after knowing this misconduct has taken place. This lengthy post-violation delay has caused the defendants pre-judice being that the defendants has been incarcerated this entire time behind the misconduct that has taken place. The court concluded in Bert, 801 f.3d 125; 2015 U.S App. Lexis 16072 Docket. No. 14-2428,
It is well established that a criminal defendant has "no obligation to take affirmative steps to insure that he will be tried in a timely manner. United States v. Tunnessen, 763 f.2d 74, 79 (2nd cir 1985). It is a court and government that bear the affirmative obligation of insuring the speedy prosecution of criminal charges. United States v. Vasquez, 918 f.2d 329, 336 (2nd cir 1990). The sheer length of the delay at issue here was presumptively prejudicial, See Doggett, 505 U.S at 652 n. 1, particularly because defendants remained incarcerated throughout the time that the docket sat idle.
The court said in Bert, "Amazingly the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy Trial Act, the district court summarily concluded the fact that the government will have to reindict has served as a deterrent, particularly here is no bad faith or intentional conduct or pattern on the part of the government, and defendants crime is serious. Special App'x at 33. Again the district courts findings are inadequate to satisfy the "more substantive scrutiny'' Taylor, 487 at 337. It is beyond question that "dismissal without prejudice is a toothless sanction" Taylor, 487 US at 342. But is equally doubtless that the sanction of dismissal with prejudice has more bite. see Id. "It is self evident that dismissal with prejudice always sends a stronger message than dismissal without prejudice, and is more likely to induce statutory changes in procedures, reducing pretrial delays." Although the less severe sanction "imposes some cost on the prosecution and the court Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 499, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 164 L.Ed 2d 749 (2006). The burden on the courts and the prosecutors of re-indicting a defendant is, at minimum, not substantially more onerous than the routine business of ensuring vigilant compliance. Accordingly, "the knowledge that a violation could potentially result in dismissal with prejudice gives the prosecution a powerful for incentive to be careful about compliance. Zedner, 547 US at 499. Furthermore, under a regime that limited the more severe sanction exclusively to cases of intentional misconduct, criminal defendants would have littleincentive to alert the court to administrative oversights that held no conceivable promise of precluding reprosecution. see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.ct 2182, 33 L.Ed 2d 101 (1972).
"There is a societal interest in providing a Speedy Trial which exists seperate from, and at times in opposition to the interest of the accused." Barker, 407 U.S at 519. The Acts demand that justice be swiftly administered serves the public interest by, among other things, avoiding extended pretrial delays, which may "impair the deterrent effect of punishment." Zedner, 547 U.S at 502, or risk the lost of evidence. Giambrone, 920 f.2d at 181. "whenever (a prosecution for whatever reasons falls short of meeting the act's requirements, the administration of justice is adversely affected. Ramirez, 973 f.2d at 39. "certainly, the public is the loser when a criminal trial is not prosecuted expeditiously, as suggested by the aphorism "Justice delayed is justice denied." Gambino, 59 f.3d at 360.
The court cannot adequately address this final factor of the statutory analysis without shifting the spotlight back to the governemt. Even though prosecutors do not bear the burden of monitoring the courts compliance with the Act in absence of an announced rule, district courts do look to prosectuors for assistance as an officer of the court Ramirez, 973 f.2d at 39. As a nation, we demand a great deal from our United States district courts and judges who are called to serve on them. District Courts in this circuit and across the country shoulder heavy and complex caseloads. Given the Myriad of Administrative demands that accompany these tasks, and in light of the government's affirmative obligation to insure speedy prosecution of criminal charges." Vasquez, 918 f.2d at 336, we agree emphatically that "it is wise for prosectuors to be alert to the (Speedy Trial Act) calculations in order to aid the court in it's enforcement" of the Act Ramirez, 973 f.2d at 39. Once a motion has been under advisement the government mtist not simply wash its hands of any further involvement and be assured the benefit of dismissal without prejudice in the event that the Speedy Trial Act is violated due to the courts adminstrative neglect. Although the government is not required to monitor and notify the court of impending and expired speedy trial deadlines, any such action on the part of the government is properly taken into consideration when evaluating "the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal." 18 U.S.C § 3162 (a)(2) and may weigh in favor of dismissal without prejudice. Given the extended administrative neglect by the court and the government in allowing the case to stagnate for nearly 2 years While Wilson remained incarcerated, Wilson cannot be held accountable for the delay resulting before the deceptive and induced pleas and resulted after the misconduct taken to get the pleas, making Wilson's position extremely prejudicial denying his 5th Amendment "Due Process" right. Lastly again Bert, 801 f.3d 125 2015 US. App. Lexis 16072 Dock No. 14-2428-cr. The court went on to say "As the district recogn.i2edthe defendant was charged with a serious crime, Regardless the speedy trial violation was grave, unjustified by what we assume was administrative neglect, and presumptively prejudicial to the incarcerated defendant. Barring re-prosecution in this case will have more positive and substantial impact on the administration of justice. In the words of the late great Martin Luther King Jr. "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."
That being said Wilson moves this court for an order to dismiss indictment with prejudice.
Any statements made herein are subject to the penalties of perjury.
Re:
Dear Mr. Wilson:
At the request of Susan Lin, Esquire, I enclosed a copy of Assistant United States Attorney Salvatore L. Astolfi's January 29, 2016 letter to the Honorable Legrome D. Davis.
Dear Judge Davis:
As you know, Marquis Wilson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the above referenced matter. Upon reviewing the Third Circuit's decision in
Thank you in advance for your consideration of this request.
RE: U.S. v. Wilson Cr. No #14-209-1
Dear Judge Davis,
I respectfully send this letter in regards to the recent court order (That Reads Hybrid Representation) recieved on March 31, 2016 dkt #128. Sir forsurely it is not my intent in any shape form and/or fashion to upset the court and/or circumvent the rules, policy, and/or standards set by you in any proceeding pertaining to this matter, before this court and that is the violation of my 5th Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law, "Right to a Prompt and Speedily Trial. The mixed origin and/or composition of my motion is rather simple, you have appointed me 3 attorneys in 24 months by the grace of god and not one professional and paid counsel has attempted to put the government's case up to advesary test and/or challenge of any sort to substantiate a show of the defendants will to prove his innocence. There is a few legal rules to meaningfully constrain this prosecutor who has illegally used my own attorney along with my brother/co-defendants attorney to coerce us into an illegal plea agreement. Had I not pursued to expose this injustice by Pro-Se Litigation the court may and/or may not have been aware of the constitutional violations that has been committed by the US Attorney and counsel. I know very little about the law, but I have learned at the very least I have the fundamental right to the basic legal representation. Judge Davis, in 24 months and 3 attorneys later, not one of these attorneys filed a single motion or has established a strategy that resembles a defense for trial. Each attorney has appeared for legal visit and know very little about the facts of this case. How could the defense of one's life be labeled "Hybrid Representation" when thats the only representation that has been made available with and/or without counsel. It fustrates me as a human being that these "esoteric byzantine" procedures prevent my claims from being heard. Thank you Judge Davis for simply listening,"! understand you have a job to do and you make decisions based on law and not because you want to but because you have to. I say that to say I am not sending you Pro-Se motions because I want to but because I have to, because my attorneys have failed in their duty to put an adversary challenge to the government's case on my behalf.
COMES NOW, Marquis Wilson, Defendant, by and through his attorney, Russell M. Soloway, Esquire, and requests this Court continue the trial, and in support thereof avers as follows:
1. Trial in the above matter is scheduled for July 28, 2014.
2. Undersigned counsel received initial discovery on June 30, 2014. Additional discovery was produced by the government on July 2, 2014.
3. Undersigned counsel has yet to be able to review the aforementioned discovery, discuss the discovery with his client, and engage in discussion with the assigned A.U.S.A. Salvatore L. Astolfi in regards to a non-trial disposition.
4. Undersigned counsel's current case load prevent's him from adequately preparing Wilson's defense prior to the current trial setting.
5. Counsel for the government, A.U.S.A. Salvatore L. Astolfi, Esquire is unopposed to this request for a continuance.
6. Pursuant to the _______________ the ends of justice are best served by granting Wilson's request. Specifically, defense counsel must have time to adequately review discovery and prepare a defense for his client, Wilson is not opposed to the delay, the Government is not opposed to the delay and the delay is necessary to allow the parties to either negotiate a non-trial resolution of this matter or prepare for trial. In light of the foregoing, the ends of justice served by granting Wilson's request outweigh the best interest of the public to a speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested this Honorable Court GRANT Moore's request to continue the trial.
AND NOW, this ___ day of ____, 2014, upon consideration of Marquis Wilson's First Motion to Continue Trial, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that said Motion is Granted. The trial in this matter currently scheduled for July 28, 2014 is rescheduled to __________, for the following reasons.
Pursuant to ____________ ends of justice are best served by granting Wilson's request. Specifically, this matter cannot proceed to trial and, therefore, must be continued because, notwithstanding the diligence of counsel the time needed to prepare for trial is such that the failure to grant the continuance would likely result in a miscarriage ofjustice, Wilson is not opposed to the delay, the Government is not opposed to the delay and the delay is necessary to allow the parties to either negotiate a non-trial resolution of this matter or prepare for trial. In light of the foregoing, foe ends of justice served by granting Wilson's request outweigh the best interest of the public and Wilson in a speedy trial.
AND NOW, this 21st day of July, 2014, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Continue the Trial (Doc. No. 72), it is ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED. In accordance with _____________ the Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and, therefore, orders this case continued. A new trial date is to be set in the future.
AND NOW, this 26th day of February 2016, upon consideration of Defendant's Pro Se Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Remove Counsel (Doc. No. 119) and Attorney Coley Reynolds's Motion to Withdraw as Attorney (Doc. No. 121), it is hereby ORDERED that Mr Reynolds's motion is GRANTED and Defendant's motion is GRANTED IN PART. Mr. Reynolds is removed as counsel for Defendant. New counsel will be appointed at a later date.
AND NOW, this 17th day of June, 2014, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion to Continue the Trial (Doc. No. 57), it is ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED. In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8), the Court finds that the ends of justice served by granting this continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and, therefore, orders this case continued. A new trial date is to be set in the future.
prior to me being able to have the document in my hand from Mr. Astolfi and deliver it to him, Mr. Astolfi approached me and said, you know what, he had talked to his supervisors. He had miscalculated the guidelines or the way that, frankly, it's a tricky, tricky way that the 924(c) counts are used or what he was able to do under Department of Justice guidance.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. SOLOWAY; And he said it's actually going to be the 17 years. I went back, I told him about the mistake, I told him that it was the 17 years. Initially he said, you know what, I take it back, now I don't want to plea. And then we kind of went through all of the explanations, all the motions again. He still was reluctant to plea.
THE COURT: Especially since the two defendants are brothers.
MR. SOLOWAY: Right.
THE COURT: Right?
MR. SOLOWAY: Right. Well, so they were separated.
