NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, District Judge.
Presently before this Court are: (1) the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6), by Defendants American Airlines, Inc., ("AA"), US Airways, Inc., ("US Airways"), W. Douglas Parker, Robert D. Isom, Jr., Stephen L. Johnson, Bob Ciminelli, Cedric Rockamore, Ariel Morales, Shelly Wattman, Robert Yori, and Manal El-Hajal (collectively, "Defendants"), [ECF 6]; (2) the response in opposition filed by Plaintiffs David Smith, Andre Fields, Kendall Green, Andre Roundtree, Trandom Milsip, Emanuel Taylor, Tyesha Johnson, Kellen Pinckney, and Charles Trower (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), [ECF 11], and; (3) Defendants' reply. [ECF 13]. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants essentially argue that the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-2708, (the "PWCA"), is the exclusive remedy available to Plaintiffs and, therefore, this matter should be dismissed.
For the reasons set forth, this Court agrees, and the motion to dismiss is granted.
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint against Defendants in state court, [ECF 1(4)] ("Sec. Am. Compl."), asserting in Count I a claim for medical monitoring on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals, and state law claims on behalf of only themselves; to wit: negligence (Count II); battery (Count III); public nmsance (Count IV); violation of the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law; fraud (Count VI); civil conspiracy (Count VII); and breach of contract as third-party beneficiaries of the contract between Defendant AA and Deer Park/Nestle (Count VIII). (Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 150-218). On January 13, 2016, Defendants removed the state court action to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA"),
When ruling on Defendants' motions to dismiss, this Court must accept, as true, all relevant and pertinent factual allegations in the second amended complaint, and construe these factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
As stated, in Count I, Plaintiffs assert a claim for medical monitoring on behalf of themselves and "all employees of American Airlines and/or US Airways who were exposed to toxic water as a result of improper handling, use, and refilling of Deer Park Nestle Jugs in the past seven (7) years." (Id. at ¶¶ 143, 150-60). Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants move for dismissal of the second amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs' claims are all premised on work-related injuries and/or damages and, accordingly, the exclusive remedy available to Plaintiffs is to seek compensation pursuant to the PWCA.
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The court must determine "whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a `plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). The complaint must do more than merely allege the plaintiffs entitlement to relief; it must "show such an entitlement with its facts." Id. (citations omitted). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct the complaint has alleged — but it has not `show[n]' — `that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)) (alterations in original). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice." Id. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to `nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
The PWCA provides that "[e]very employer shall be liable for compensation for personal injury to, or for the death of each employe, by an injury in the course of his employment. . . ." 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 431. The PWCA further provides:
Id. at§ 481 (emphasis added). That is, "[e]mployees who are injured at work are limited to the compensation available to them under the PWCA and cannot separately sue their employers for personal injury." Ochs v. Reading Hosp., 2016 WL 1567597, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2016); see also Garlick v. Trans Tech Logistics, Inc., 636 F. App'x 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2015) ("[T]he only remedy an employee may pursue against his employer for a work-related injury is workers' compensation.").
Succinctly, Plaintiffs' claims of injuries stem from events that occurred during the course of their employment and work-related assignments, which are essentially based on allegations of the improper use and handling of Deer Park/Nestle five-gallon water jugs when top-filling blue juice in the lavatory in airplanes, and which are later recycled for drinking water. These allegations fall within the four corners of the PWCA, which is designed to cover injuries to an employee arising in the course of his employment. 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 411(1). These injuries include "occupational diseases," a term which is defined to include such things as poisoning from exposure to numerous listed chemicals and substances, cancers related to exposure to asbestos, and any other disease which a claimant is exposed to by reason of his employment that is related to the industry at issue and where the incidence of such disease is greater in that industry than in the general population. Id at § 27.1. In addition, diseases that do not fall within the definition of the statute may still qualify as "occupational diseases" subject to compensation under the PWCA if the disease is produced or aggravated by distinctive conditions of employment. Al's Radiator Serv. v. W.C.A.B. (Jorden's Radiator Serv.), 630 A.2d 485, 488 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
There are situations, however, where the PWCA does not provide compensation for diseases that would otherwise constitute "occupational diseases." Specifically, the PWCA provides that "whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, . . . it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment." 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 411(2). Relying on this exception and citing to Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2013), Plaintiffs argue that because the potential for occupational diseases in this case, prostate cancer and breast cancer, have latency periods in excess of 300 weeks, these diseases are not "injuries" under the PWCA and, thus, their claims are not subject to the exclusivity provision of the PWCA. [ECF 11 at 30-36].
Plaintiffs' reliance is misplaced. Tooey involved a consolidated appeal of two suits, one brought by the estate of John Tooey, who was employed from 1964 until 1982, as an industrial salesman of asbestos products, and who developed mesothelioma in 2007, and died one year later; the other action was brought by the estate of Spurgeon Landis, who was exposed to asbestos throughout his employment which ended in 1992, and was diagnosed in 2007 with mesothelioma. Tooey, 81 A.3d at 856. The respective estates brought lawsuits against multiple defendants, including the decedents' employers. Id. These defendants argued that the claims were barred by the PWCA's exclusivity provision. Id. The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed, noting that the exclusivity provision of the PWCA applied to injuries occurring more than 300 weeks after the last day of employment, even though such injuries were not compensable under the PWCA. Id. (discussing the unpublished Superior Court decision). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the manifestation of an occupational disease outside the 300-week period prescribed in the PWCA removed the claim from the purview of the act, such that the exclusivity provision did not apply. Id. at 855. After considering both the plain language of the exclusivity provision and the legislative intent in enacting the PWCA,
Plaintiffs argue that Tooey applies in this case where the occupational diseases at issue, prostate cancer and breast cancer, may manifest 300 weeks after the Plaintiffs terminate their employment with Defendant AA. While anything is possible, this argument is highly speculative and without legal support. Unlike in Tooey, Plaintiffs, except for Plaintiff Trower, are asymptomatic and continue to work for Defendant AA. They have, therefore, not yet triggered the exception to the PWCA, an exception that arises 300 weeks after employment and the last occupational exposure. As noted, Plaintiff Trower has been diagnosed with prostate cancer and is still employed with Defendant.
Plaintiffs also cite to Scott v. Duquesne Light Co., No. 2014 WL 10920477 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 12, 2014), McCloskey v. Cemline Corp., No. 2015 WL 7014702 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 17, 2015), and Stellar v. Allied Signal, Inc., 98 F.Supp.3d 790 (E.D. Pa. 2015), to support their argument that Tooey "remove[d] occupational diseases with latency periods of greater than 300 weeks from coverage under the [PWCA]." [ECF 11 at 32-33]. Plaintiffs are again misguided as none of these cases stand for the proposition asserted. In these three cases, the decedents were no longer employed by the defendant-employers, and developed mesothelioma more than 300 weeks after their respective last day of employment. See Scott, 2014 WL 10920477, at *1 (decedent ceased working for defendant in 1985 and was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2007); McClosky, 2015 WL 7014702, at *3 (decedent's "workplace exposure ended by 1995 and he was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2007, a period greater than 300 weeks"); Stellar v. Allied Signal, Inc., 5:14-cv-5083 at [1] ¶¶ 23 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2014) (noting that the decedent's workplace exposure to asbestos ended in 1991 and he was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2012). As such, these cases, like Tooey, provide Plaintiffs with no support for their argument.
Finally, Plaintiffs are asking this Court to expand the holding in Tooey to allow them, as claimants, to avoid the exclusivity clause of the PWCA whenever a claim is premised on the potential development of an occupational disease with a latency period which might cause it to manifest more than 300 weeks after the last date of employment. Based on a fair reading of the PWCA and case law, this Court cannot grant Plaintiffs' request. The precedent is unequivocal. In considering the interplay between the PWCA's exclusivity provision and its definition of "injury," Tooey concluded that the exclusory provision did not apply to occupational diseases that actually manifested more than 300 weeks after the last date of employment. Tooey, 81 A.3d at 865. Because Plaintiffs continue to be employed by Defendant AA, the exception to the exclusivity provision found in Tooey does not apply. This is true for the eight Plaintiffs that do not have any occupational diseases
Based upon this analysis, because Plaintiffs' class action claim for medical monitoring relates to work-related conditions, events, and allegations regarding the drinking of water at the workplace and the improper handling and use of Deer Park/Nestle water jugs to top-fill lavatories in airplanes, this Court finds that this class action claim is subject to the PWCA's exclusivity provision. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs' class action claim for medical monitoring is dismissed.
Plaintiffs' remaining claims are all state law claims brought on behalf of Plaintiffs only, and are not subject to the provisions of the CAFA. In considering whether jurisdiction exists, this Court notes that two Plaintiffs are citizens of Delaware, (Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 20, 24), and Defendant AA is also a citizen of Delaware, [ECF 1 at ¶ 11]. Therefore, this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In addition, because this Court has dismissed the only claim over which it had original jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims, and will dismiss these claims without prejudice. See, e.g., Eberts v. Wert, 1993 WL 304111, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Courts should ordinarily decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims when the federal claims are dismissed.").
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows.
Id. (quoting Alston v. St. Paul Ins. Companies, 612 A.2d 421, 424 (Pa. 1992)). The PWCA, however, is "remedial in nature and intended to benefit the worker, and, therefore, the Act must be liberally construed to effectuate its humanitarian objectives." Id. (quoting Giant Eagle, Inc. v. W.C.A.B. (Givner), 39 A.3d 287, 290 (Pa. 2012)).
Plaintiffs misunderstand the holding in Martin. In Martin, the employer manufactured automotive and truck wet storage batteries, which resulted in extensive employee exposure to lead dust and fumes. Martin, 606 A.2d at 445. Federal regulations required that the employees be tested on a regular basis for the lead content in their blood. Id. at 445-46. The employer tested the plaintiffs blood, and intentionally altered the results of the tests before forwarding the results to the plaintiff. Id. at 446. The plaintiff was subsequently diagnosed with chronic lead toxicity, lead neuropathy, hypertension, gout, and renal insufficiency, the severity of which "would have been substantially reduced if his employer had not perpetrated a delay by failing to accurately report the elevated levels of lead in [the plaintiff's] blood." Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in considering whether the plaintiff's claims were subject to the PWCA's exclusivity clause, noted that there is a difference between employers who tolerate hazardous workplace conditions and those that actively mislead employees already suffering from the hazards. Id. at 448. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the exclusivity clause did not apply to the plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claim under these circumstances. Id. at 447.
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants do not rise to the level of misconduct that occurred in Martin. The Martin exception applies when an "employer conceal[s], alter[s] or intentionally misrepresent[s] information related to the work-related injury which result[s] in aggravation of that injury." Winterberg v. Transp. Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Santiago v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 613 A.2d 1235, 1241 (Pa. Super. 1992)). In other words, the employer must know about the work-related injury, in this case, prostate cancer, and misrepresent information concerning that injury. See, e.g., Ranalli v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2983 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa. Super. 2009) (Martin "exception is where the employer knew its employee had a disease and withheld that information, causing an aggravation of the disease."); Rakoczy v. Hubert C. Jasinski Laboratory, Inc., 2011 WL 5838271 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct. 19, 2011) ("the Martin exception requires that the employer . . . have actual knowledge of the employee's . . . existing injury and to affirmatively conceal the dangerous exposure."). Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants were aware of Plaintiff Trower's prostate cancer, or that they misrepresented information concerning his cancer to him. The Martin exception to the PWCA's exclusivity provision does not apply under the facts alleged.
