MEMORANDUM RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO STRIKE

MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, District Judge.

This case concerns the scope of a property insurance policy and whether the insurer, Allstate Vehicle & Property Insurance Company, breached its obligations to the insured, William Koepke, Sr. ("Plaintiff"), by its handling of Plaintiff's claim for benefits. Plaintiff alleges two claims against Allstate: (1) breach of contract; and (2) bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371. Allstate now moves for dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6),1 citing Plaintiff's failure to join an indispensable party, and further moves to strike under Federal Rule 12(f) Plaintiff's demand for compensatory and consequential damages.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff alleges that on August 29, 2015 he suffered damage to his property caused by a peril insured under the property insurance policy (the "Policy") in effect between himself and Allstate. ECF No. 1, Notice of Removal, Ex. A ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiff further avers that he promptly notified Allstate of the loss and otherwise complied with the terms and conditions of the Policy, but that Allstate has refused to pay the benefits owed under the Policy. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff initiated this suit in the Court of Common Pleas on July 26, 2016, stating claims for breach of contract and statutory bad faith, and seeking damages in excess of $50,000. Id. ¶¶ 8-16. Allstate then filed a Notice of Removal on August 25, 2016 (ECF No. 1). On August 31, 2016, Allstate filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to strike (ECF No. 3), to which Plaintiff responded on September 19, 2016 (ECF No. 4). Allstate replied on October 1, 2016 (ECF No. 6).

II. Discussion

a. Leave to Amend

Allstate argues that Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party: Plaintiff's wife, Catherine Koepke. In Plaintiff's response, he "concedes that [Mrs. Koepke] is an indispensable party to this litigation" and seeks leave to amend the complaint to join his wife as a party. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5. Allstate does not challenge Plaintiff's request for leave to amend. See Def.'s Reply. Therefore, we grant Plaintiff's request for leave to amend.

b. Motion to Strike

Allstate further argues that this Court should strike Plaintiff's claim for compensatory and consequential damages from his statutory bad faith claim under Section 8371.2 Because compensatory damages are not available under that Section, we grant the motion to strike and permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint such that he asserts these damages under his breach of contract claim.

Rule 12(f) allows a court to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). "The purpose of a motion to strike is to clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters." McInerney v. Moyer Lumber & Hardware, Inc., 244 F.Supp.2d 393, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Whether a motion to strike should be granted is within the sound discretion of the district court. See Davis v. Corr. Med. Servs., 436 F. App'x 52, 53 (3d Cir. 2011) ("[A] district court's decision to grant a motion to strike a pleading will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."). Notwithstanding the trial court's latitude in making this determination, "such motions are `not favored and usually will be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues in the case.'" Synthes, Inc. v. Emerge Med., Inc., No. 11-1566, 2012 WL 4473228, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2012) (quoting River Road Devel. Corp. v. Carlson Corp., No. 89-7037, 1990 WL 69085, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1990)).

Here, Allstate moves to strike Plaintiff's request for compensatory and consequential damages from Count II because, it argues, those damages are not recoverable in a statutory bad faith claim under Section 8371. Def.'s Mot. at 8. Although Allstate correctly cites The Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies, Inc., 567 Pa. 386 (2001) for the rule that Section 8371 does not provide for compensatory damages,3 that holding does not end the inquiry. Rather, the Court in Birth Center explained that Section 8371 "does not alter [the insured's] common law contract rights," including its right to seek compensatory damages. Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., Inc., 567 Pa. 386, 402 (2001). Indeed, the court was clear that "[t]he statute does not prohibit the award of compensatory damages" because it neither "reference[s] the common law, . . . [nor] explicitly reject[s] it, and [because] application of the statute is not inconsistent with the common law." Id. at 402-03.

Therefore, in order for Plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages, he must do so on the basis of his breach of contract claim.4 Plaintiff acknowledges this fact in his Response by asserting that his claim for these damages arises under Allstate's alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is a facet of the breach of contract claim.5 See Pl.'s Opp'n at 6-8. Plaintiff's analysis hits a snag, however, due to the drafting of his complaint, in which he specifically asserts compensatory damages under Section 8371: "Defendant has acted in bad faith in violation of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371, for which Defendant is liable for . . . such other compensatory and/or consequential damages as are permitted by law." Notice of Removal, Ex. A ¶ 16.

Two cases from this Circuit addressing such a situation are instructive. In Simmons v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 788 F.Supp.2d 404 (W.D. Pa. 2011), the court denied defendant's motion to strike plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages from the ad damnum clause of plaintiff's Section 8371 claim despite acknowledging that such damages were not available under that statute. The court explained that although "[p]laintiff did not use the express term `compensatory damages' in his prayer for relief under [his breach of contract claim] . . . . [r]eading the two counts together, there [was] no redundant demand for compensatory damages." Simmons v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 788 F.Supp.2d 404, 410-11 (W.D. Pa. 2011). A court in this district took a different approach to a similar scenario—the court dismissed compensatory damages claims pleaded under Section 8371, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend its contractual claim to include compensatory damages. See Cummings v. Allstate Ins. Co., 832 F.Supp.2d 469 (E.D. Pa. 2011). The plaintiff in Cummings, like Plaintiff in this case, had brought a breach of contract claim which did not include a request for compensatory damages, and a statutory bad faith claim which did. Id. at 471.

The disposition of Cummings is appropriate in the instant case for two reasons. First, Plaintiff's request for compensatory damages is set forth explicitly in Count II, indicating his intent to seek compensatory damages under Section 8371, in contrast to the complaint in Simmons in which the prayer for compensatory damages was included within an ad damnum clause. Second, this Court is granting Plaintiff's leave to amend to join Catherine Koepke, meaning that Plaintiff will bear no significant additional burden in amending his claim for compensatory damages, as well. These two factors counsel in favor of taking the approach of the Cummings court.

Accordingly, we will grant Allstate's motion to strike Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in Count II and permit Plaintiff to submit an Amended Complaint reflecting his claim for compensatory damages under Count I's breach of contract.

III. Conclusion

The Court denies as moot Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party and grants Defendant's motion to strike. Plaintiff has fourteen (14) days in which to submit an Amended Complaint.