ELIZABETH T. HEY, Magistrate Judge.
Presently, the court considers dueling motions regarding the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Jason Dodd, the Controller for the defendant Irex entities ("Irex") and their designated deponent. Based on the deposition testimony, Brand "renews its request for an Order compelling [Irex] to produce financial documents sufficient to identify what profit [Irex] earn[ed] on any job for a Brand customer or how the money flowed between Irex entitites." Doc. 256 at 1. Irex responds that the documentation provided is the information kept in the ordinary course of business that establishes the revenue and profit earned by Irex from Brand customers. Doc. 258 at 2-4. In its motion, Irex complains that Brand violated the discovery orders in this case and asks the court to mark the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Mr. Dodd completed. Doc. 255. Brand responds that Irex's accusations regarding the deposition are baseless. Doc. 259. For the reasons that follow, both motions will be denied.
In order to understand Brand's many complaints about the deposition, I need to review some history of the discovery disputes that have plagued this case. On October 20, 2017, I held oral argument on two motions to compel (Docs. 220 and 222) filed by Brand. As discussed at the hearing, in Brand's fourth request for production of documents numbered 1, 14, and 15, Brand was looking for the profit made by Irex from any former Brand customer in order to prove its damages.
At the hearing Irex's counsel represented to the court that through use of the Earned Revenue and Margin Reports (Bates Nos. IREX 0273536-39) and the Recognized Revenue Margin Reports (Bates Nos. IREX0273552-55) anyone could track the flow of money through the Irex entities.
After questioning Mr. Dodd regarding these reports for the relevant years, Brand argues that "Defendants' representations to the Court were not true or accurate in any way." Doc. 256 at 2. Specifically, Brand argues that Mr. Dodd testified that, "unless one has a working knowledge of the operations of the Irex organization, one cannot interpret all of the information contained in the financial reports."
Brand complains that it cannot identify the customer from the Earned Revenue and Margin Reports. Brand also argues that the financial documents "do not identify all of Defendants' customers who may have worked on jobs for Brand customers . . . and do not tell which job corresponds to a particular customer, how much Defendants earned on any particular job, or what Irex entities billed for services for such jobs." Doc. 256 at 3.
Irex complains that Brand's motion in this respect is nothing more than an untimely motion for reconsideration of this court's October 24, 2017 Order (Doc. 236). Doc. 258 at 2. I disagree to some extent with the characterization. Had the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of the Controller of Irex revealed that defense counsel had actually misrepresented the financial documentation provided, the court would have no problem revisiting the issue in light of new evidence. However, the original requests for production that resulted in the production of the financial documentation at issue sought financial statements, income tax filings, operating budgets, revenues generated, profits generated, Earned Revenue & Martin Reports, Recognized Revenue by Region/Area/Mrkt Reports, transactions between or among the relevant Irex entities, and transfers of assets between or among the relevant Irex entities. Plaintiff's Fourth Request for Production of Documents, Nos. 6-8, 10-15. Mr. Dodd's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition does not undermine the validity of the documents produced. He testified that he would have to consult the accounting program to cross reference the jobs to the customers, so it does not appear that a document with such cross referencing is kept in the ordinary course of business. The fact that Brand is not happy with the form of the production does not undermine its validity.
Irex has produced the documentation to show what amounts it has made from former Brand customers based on documents it keeps in the ordinary course of business. I will not require it to manipulate its software to create reports it does not use in the ordinary course of business.
In its motion, Irex argues that Brand went far afield in questioning Mr. Dodd during his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, and asks the court to mark the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Mr. Dodd completed. Doc. 255. Again, some history of the discovery disputes in the case are necessary before delving into the arguments. According to earlier filings, on May 19, 2017, Brand served each of the six Irex Corporate Defendants with Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notices containing 56 separate topics. Docs. 197-1 at 2; 197-3. On August 9, 2017, Irex filed a motion for a protective order, asking the court to quash a number of topics listed in the deposition notices. After considering the motion, response, and the deposition notices, I granted Irex's motion, in part, limiting inquiry into certain areas temporally, and other based on relevancy. I precluded inquiry into other topics that I found were completely irrelevant. Doc. 207. Irex now argues that during Mr. Dodd's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, Brand inquired into areas previously determined to be off limits and thereby wasted Mr. Dodd's time.
Before proceeding to address Irex's specific arguments, I note that Irex appears to begin with a false premise. According to Irex, Mr. Dodd was available for over 7½ hours for the deposition at Brand's counsel's office and was on the record for 5 hours and 55 minutes. Doc. 255 at 5 n.2. Irex offered to compromise regarding Brand's request to continue the deposition by offering to make Mr. Dodd available for another 1 hour and 5 minutes, presumably on the assumption that his deposition was limited to 7 hours. On the contrary, as explained in my Order of August 30, 2017, "[i]f Irex identifies the same individual for multiple corporate defendants, he . . . shall be deposed for a maximum of . . . 7 hours . . . for each defendant for which he . . . has been designated." Doc. 207 at 6 n.2. Thus, Brand is entitled to depose Mr. Dodd for 7 hours for each of the entities for which he was designated, rather than 7 hours total.
With respect to Topics 1-3, 9-10, and 12, which I previously noted "focus on the relationship between, ownership of, corporate structure of, transactions between/among, transfers of assets between/among, and shared services between/among nine Irex entities," I believe the confusion regarding permissible inquiry in these areas arises from the sequence of events prior to Mr. Dodd's deposition. When ruling on Irex's motion for a protective order, I limited inquiry to an explanation of the corporate structure of the Irex entities. Doc. 207 at 3. Thus, I found inquiry into the "inner-workings of, transactions between, and transfers between the Irex entities" to be overbroad and irrelevant.
Subsequently, I held argument on Brand's motion to compel responses to its fourth request for production of documents.
During the argument on the motions to compel, Irex's counsel explained that Irex had produced contract-specific financial statements to respond to such concerns.
To clarify the court's ruling in light of the representations made at the oral argument in October that Brand would be able to question Mr. Dodd about the financial information provided by Irex, Brand may question Mr. Dodd about the corporate structure of Irex in order to follow the "money trail." In order to understand the financial documentation and the internal billing, it is necessary for Brand to understand the structure of Irex to understand what Irex-related entities could or were internally billing the Irex entity that contracted with a former Brand customer.
By order of August 30, 2017, I precluded inquiry into Irex's trade secrets, the steps taken to protect such trade secrets, and the economic value of such trade secrets. Doc. 207 at 2. During the questioning of Mr. Dodd, Brand's counsel asked if he was familiar with recent litigation involving Advanced Industrial Services that Brand's counsel identified as "a trade secrets noncompete lawsuit." Dodd. Dep. at 155:1-3. Although Brand argues that it was merely testing Irex's claims that its subsidiaries are "independent and distinct from one another," Doc. 259 at 4, I find this line of questioning impermissible.
In my August 30 Order, I precluded inquiry into Irex's "internal accounting and bookkeeping functions and procedures as irrelevant." Doc. 207 at 2. Of necessity, Mr. Dodd's deposition included reference to the software program Irex uses, as it was used to produce the financial and accounting documents in discovery. For example, as Brand introduced a financial document, counsel asked how the document was generated, with the response that it was the accounting program. Dodd Dep. at 25:6-7; 27:9-11; 164:2-5. When Brand asked about the cross-referencing information by customer and project as discussed in the first section of this Memorandum, Mr. Dodd explained that he would have to "[i]nquire in our ERP," which he explained was the accounting software. Dodd Dep. at 200:4-201:5; 224:14-225:14. This questioning did not violate my order, and Irex's suggestion that it did, Doc. 255 at 4, is unreasonable. Once Brand's counsel determined that the reports were generated by the accounting software, she moved on to another topic. When the issue of cross-referencing the relevant reports was discussed, there was a bit more discussion about the program and its archives, but nothing more than cursory questioning.
Irex identifies a number of topics into which Brand inquired that were not listed in the deposition notice. Doc. 255 at 4. Brand responds that it is permitted to inquire beyond the noticed 30(b)(6) topics. Doc. 259 at 5. Brand relies on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) defines the scope of discovery "unless otherwise ordered by the court." I do not read Rule 30(b)(6) as carving out a special limitation on the scope of discovery defined in Rule 26(b)(1). Moreover, it is my view that Rule 26(b) does not permit such a special limitation. Indeed the language of Rule 26(b) provides that the only way to change the scope of discovery set forth in Rule 26(b)(1) is by order of the court "in accordance with these rules."
194 F.R.D. at 500.
Finally, Irex complains that Brand wasted Mr. Dodd's time by repeating questions, going off the record to locate exhibits, and have internal discussions, and asks that the Court mark the deposition complete. Doc. 255 at 5. Irex's request is denied. The deposition transcript reveals no unusual delay, and to the extent more time was spent than necessary, both counsel share responsibility.
Considering the discovery deadline quickly approaching, and the deadline extensions previously granted by this court, I recommend that counsel for both sides narrow their focus in completing the depositions.
An appropriate Order follows.
Dodd Dep. 229:10-17.