NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, District Judge.
On April 25, 2017, Plaintiff Mary E. Price ("Plaintiff"), the parent of minor child T.R., and the aunt and legal guardian of minor child J.H., commenced this action, in her own right and on behalf of T.R. and J.H., against Defendants Commonwealth Charter Academy — Cyber ("Defendant CCA" or "CCA"), Bureau of Special Education ("Defendant BSE"), and Ruth Furman ("Defendant Furman") (collectively, "Defendants"). [ECF 1]. In her initial complaint (the "Initial Complaint"), Plaintiff asserted claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the "IDEA"),
Pending before this Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant CCA pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which seeks the dismissal of the claims asserted against it in the Amended Complaint. [ECF 21].
This Court will recite only those portions of the procedural and factual histories necessary to address the instant motion. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this civil action on behalf of herself, minor J.H., and minor T.R., by filing an application to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") and the Initial Complaint. [ECF 1]. By Order dated May 1, 2017, the IFP application was granted and the Clerk of Court was directed to docket the Initial Complaint. [ECF 2]. Defendants were served with the summons and a copy of the complaint by the United States Marshal Service. [ECF 13]. Thereafter, Plaintiff was granted permission to amend the Initial Complaint. [ECF 15].
On July 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint, in which she asserts the same claims against Defendants that had been presented in the Initial Complaint, but only on her own behalf, and not on behalf of J.H. and T.R. [ECF 17]. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant CCA failed to comply with, implement, and/or enforce the administrative due process decisions (the "Decisions") issued on September 17, 2016, by an independent Pennsylvania special education hearing officer who had held evidentiary hearings and addressed the sufficiency of J.H.'s and T.R.'s education under the IDEA. (See Am. Compl. at Introduction). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant CCA's failure to comply with and implement the Decisions constituted "discrimination" under Title II of the ADA and Section 504, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at ¶ 92).
Defendant CCA filed the underlying motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), in which it seeks dismissal of all of the claims asserted against it in the Amended Complaint on various grounds, including, inter alia, lack of standing and failure to state a claim. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must accept, as true, all relevant and pertinent factual allegations in the Amended Complaint and construe those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). The salient allegations, as found in the Amended Complaint and attached exhibits,
As noted, the instant motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, "a court . . . must take three steps." Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016). First, a court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the court must identify allegations that are merely legal conclusions "because they . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. While a complaint need not assert detailed factual allegations, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Third, a court should assume the veracity of all well-pleaded factual allegations and "then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Connelly, 809 F.3d at 787 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
A court may determine that a complaint's factual allegations are plausible if the court is able "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not `show[n]'—`that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)) (alterations in original). In other words, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to `nudge [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Although the plausibility standard `does not impose a probability requirement,' it does require a pleading to show `more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786 (citations omitted). Reviewing the plausibility of the complaint is a "context-specific" inquiry and requires a court to "draw on its experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64.
Though pro se filings "must be held to less stringent standards," such filings must contain "sufficient factual matter[,] accepted as true[,] to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)).
"In general, when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), a court may only consider the contents of the pleadings." Cooper v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 374 F. App'x 250, 253 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002)). However, "[d]ocuments that the defendant attaches to the motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the claim. . . ." Id. (quoting Pryor, 288 F.3d at 560).
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant CCA presents four arguments; to wit: (1) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983; (2) Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a claim under either Title II of the ADA or § 504; (3) Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish a plausible prima facie case of discrimination under either Title II or § 504; and (4) Plaintiff's IDEA claim is barred by the statute of limitations and, alternatively, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Each of these arguments will be addressed in turn.
Plaintiff purports to assert a claim against Defendant CCA under § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation. (See Am. Compl. at Introduction, ¶ 92). Defendant CCA moves to dismiss this claim on the ground that Plaintiff has not pled facts to show that Defendant CCA retaliated against her for exercising constitutionally protected speech.
Defendant CCA moves to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA and § 504 claims on the basis that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert her own individual claims under these particular statutes which are premised on alleged discrimination directed toward minors T.R. and/or J.H. In response, Plaintiff contends that she has "associational standing" to assert her claims under both the ADA and § 504. Plaintiff is, however, mistaken.
Courts have widely accepted that under the statutory language of both the ADA and § 504, non-disabled individuals have standing to bring claims when they are injured because of their association with a disabled person. See Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405-09 (3d Cir. 2005); Doe v. Cty. of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 447 (3d Cir. 2001); McCullum v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 768 F.3d 1135, 1142 (11th Cir. 2014). Associational standing under these statutes has been extended to parents/guardians of disabled children. See, e.g., Doe, 242 F.3d at 446-47; K.K. v. North Allegheny Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 2780582, at *12 (W.D. Pa. June 27, 2017). A parent may assert an associational discrimination claim against a school if the school discriminates against the parent/guardian because of his or her association with a disabled child. See Doe, 242 F.3d at 446-47; K.K., 2017 WL 2780582, at *12. Generally, to invoke associational standing, a plaintiff must allege facts to show: (1) a logical and significant association with an individual with disabilities; (2) that a public entity knew of that association; (3) that the public entity discriminated against the plaintiff because of that association; and (4) the plaintiff suffered a direct injury as a result of the discrimination. K.K., 2017 WL 2780582, at *12 (citing Schneider v. Cnty. of Will, State of Ill., 190 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1091-92 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2002)). "[T]he threshold for associational standing under both [§ 504] and the ADA is the same: non-disabled persons have standing to seek relief under either statute only if they allege that they were personally excluded, personally denied benefits, or personally discriminated against because of their association with a disabled person." McCullum, 768 F.3d at 1143.
Apart from citing to case law providing for associational standing, Plaintiff offers no argument for how she meets any of its requirements. Furthermore, the Amended Complaint includes no factual allegations from which one could reasonably infer that Defendant CCA excluded, denied benefits to, or discriminated against Plaintiff (as opposed to T.R. and/or J.H.) because of her association with T.R. and/or J.H or because of their disability. As a result, Plaintiff lacks associational standing to assert her own individual claims under either the ADA or § 504. Cf., R.S. by R.D.S. v. Butler Cty., Pa., 700 F. App'x 105, 109-10 (3d Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of parents' individual claims under § 504 and the ADA because parents had not alleged facts showing injury personal to parents); see also McCullum, 768 F.3d at 1144-1145 (same). Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.
Finally, Defendant CCA moves for the dismissal of Plaintiff's IDEA claims based on the alternative grounds that (1) the claims are time barred by the relevant statute of limitations, and (2) even assuming that the claims are timely, Plaintiff fails to aver facts sufficient to state a claim under the IDEA. Plaintiff does not address either argument. As discussed below, because Plaintiff failed to file this action before the expiration of the ninety-day limitation period prescribed by the IDEA, her IDEA claims are time barred as a matter of law, and must be dismissed.
The IDEA requires institutions that receive federal education funding to provide all children with disabilities with a "free appropriate public education" (a "FAPE"). 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); § 1412(a)(1)(A); Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S.Ct. 988, 993 (2017); D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012). Under the IDEA, any aggrieved party may "present a complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). The party may elect to have the complaint investigated by the state educational agency, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.661, or avail itself of an "impartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f).
Any party aggrieved by the outcome of the due process hearing "shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented . . . in a district court of the United States, without regard to the amount in controversy." Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). This action must be initiated within ninety days from the date of the hearing officer's decision. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B). The ninety-day time limitation begins to run on the date the administrative law judge or other hearing officer issues a decision. See Wall Twp. Bd. of Educ. v. C.M., 534 F.Supp.2d 487, 492 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2008). While affirmative defenses, such as the statute of limitations, generally will not form the basis of a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), see In re Tower Air Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 242 (3d Cir. 2005), the defense can be raised at this stage if it is clear from the face of the complaint that the applicable statute of limitations has run. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2012) (defendant may raise statute of limitations defense by way of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the time bar is apparent on the face of the complaint itself).
Although Plaintiff has not identified her precise theory of relief under the IDEA, the Amended Complaint seeks (1) to enforce Defendant CCA's compliance and implementation of the Decisions and (2) to require Defendant CCA to pay for certain school-related expenses Plaintiff incurred on behalf of J.H. and T.R. The only provision of the IDEA that conceivably creates a right of action for Plaintiff to seek these types of relief is 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), which provides, in its entirety:
Id. Although Plaintiff was the prevailing party at the administrative level, she qualifies as an "aggrieved party" for the purposes of § 1415(i)(2)(A) because she is seeking to enforce a favorable administrative decision. See D.E. v. Central Dauphin Sch. Dist, 765 F.3d 260, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that guardians seeking to enforce a favorable decision obtained at the administrative level are "aggrieved" for the purposes of the IDEA and may properly pursue those claims pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(A)).
However, a careful review of the Amended Complaint reveals that this action was not filed within the ninety-day period following the issuances of the administrative due process decisions underlying the claim. Specifically, in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff avers that the Decisions were issued on September 17, 2016, and that as early as September 19, 2016, Plaintiff attempted to enforce the Decisions. (See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 17). Plaintiff waited until April 25, 2017, more than seven months after the issuance of the Decisions, to file a civil action on behalf of the minors and herself. Because it is clear from the face of the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff's IDEA claim was filed more than ninety days after the hearing officer issued the Decisions that are the subject of her IDEA claim, any claim she purports to assert under § 1415(i)(2)(A) is time barred and, therefore, dismissed.
In the underlying motion, Defendant CCA also moves for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III), arguing that Plaintiff filed this action solely to harass Defendant CCA and to "needlessly increase the cost of litigation by raising issues that have already been decided." (See Def. CCA's Mot. [ECF 21-1] at p. 13). Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant CCA's arguments in support of this request.
The IDEA provides, in pertinent part, that:
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). Here, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and apparently filed this civil action under a belief, valid or not, that the minors had been deprived of their proper educational services and that the terms of the Decisions were not fully honored. Plaintiff was successful at the administrative due process hearings, and pursued further remedies. Though Plaintiff was unsuccessful here, this Court cannot conclude, on the present record, that Plaintiff filed this action for an improper purpose, or that Plaintiff's pursuit of this litigation was frivolous or without foundation. Accordingly, this Court declines to award attorneys' fees to Defendant CCA.
For the reasons stated herein, Defendant CCA's motion to dismiss is granted, and its request for an award of attorneys' fees is denied. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion follows.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), courts apply the same standards governing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCollough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Because this Court will grant Defendant CCA's motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court need not, and will not, address the adequacy of the Amended Complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B).