Goldberg, District Judge.
The question before me is whether a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") pertaining to a $125 million antitrust resolution constitutes a binding settlement agreement.
This dispute arises from several antitrust claims, brought pursuant to
In an opinion issued April 20, 2018, I determined that the MOU contained the essential terms of a settlement and constituted a binding, enforceable, and unambiguous contract.
1. Beginning in May 2006, over sixteen lawsuits (including putative class actions) alleging antitrust violations were filed against the Cephalon Parties and other generic drug manufacturers relating to the branded drug Provigil®. (Stipulation of Facts ("SOF") ¶ 1.)
2. Pursuant to an August 8, 2006 case management order, these antitrust lawsuits were collectively captioned
3. In May 2015, Cephalon, Inc. and Teva Pharmaceuticals Ltd. settled the FTC action. (
4. The FTC settlement required Cephalon, Inc. to deposit $1.2 billion, less amounts already paid out in related case settlements, into an FTC-administered account.
5. Jay Lefkowitz, Esq. from the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis LLP, represented Cephalon in settlement negotiations relating to the Provigil® antitrust claims. (Notes of Testimony ("N.T.") 4/23/18, 123:18-24.) Greg Skidmore, Esq. from Kirkland & Ellis, also worked on the Provigil matter, including settlement, on behalf of Cephalon. (N.T. 4/24/18 108:18-109:25.)
6. UnitedHealth Group ("UHG") is a holding company with two subsidiary business units: (a) United Healthcare Services, Inc. ("United Healthcare"), which provides health insurance services to third parties, and (b) OptumInsight ("Optum"), which provides information and technology-enabled health related services. (N.T. 4/25/18, 34:3-18; N.T. 4/27/18, 33:8-13.)
7. During the relevant time period, Marianne Short, Esq. was general counsel of UHG and the most senior lawyer in the organization. (N.T. 4/27/18, 65:11-15.) Matthew Shors, Esq. was UHG's head of litigation and reported to Short. (N.T. 4/27/18, 33:2-4.) Heather Redmond, Esq. was a deputy general counsel for intellectual property and litigation at UHG and reported to Shors. (Redmond Dep. 9:21-23; N.T. 4/27/18, 29:22-25.)
8. During the relevant time period, Chris Zaetta, Esq. was head of litigation for United Healthcare. (N.T. 4/27/18, 4:6-11.) Andrea Boado, Esq. was Deputy General Counsel and oversaw a group of lawyers who provided legal support for UHS's commercial pharmacy business. (N.T. 4/26/18, 9:18-25, 47:3-5.) Both Zaetta and Boado reported to Thad Johnson, Esq. who was United Healthcare's General Counsel. (N.T. 4/26/18, 44:24-45:4; 33:17-20.) Jeremy Johnson, Esq. was a senior associate general counsel who reported to Zaetta. (N.T. 4/26/18, 91:1-92:11.) Laurie Wolfe, Esq. was a senior associate general counsel reporting to Boado. (Wolfe Dep. 16:19-21:6.)
9. During the relevant time period, Matthew Klein, Esq. was the head of litigation for Optum. (N.T. 4/25/18, 28:5-7.) Elizabeth (Betsy) Schmiesing, Esq. was a litigation manager tasked with overseeing a team of lawyers. (Klein Dep. 20:5-10.) Klein supervised four lawyers, including Schmiesing. Schmiesing had an additional five lawyers that reported directly to her. (Klein Dep. 19:11-16.)
10. Optum handled "national recovery matters" for the entire UnitedHealth Group. (N.T. 4/25/18, 29:1-4, 38:9-14.) National recovery matters are those that mostly involve claims against medical device manufacturers or pharmaceutical companies to recover some fraction of the costs or the "spend" for the device or drug, and generally take the form of either a mass tort action or an antitrust pricing-type case. (N.T. 4/25/18, 29:5-17.) Schmiesing was the individual at Optum responsible for handling the national recovery cases for UnitedHealth Group. (N.T. 4/25/18, 39:3-7.)
11. The Provigil® matter was one such national recovery case and fell within Schmiesing's responsibilities. (N.T. 4/25/18, 39:8-15.)
12. To summarize, the in-house counsel for United involved with the Provigil matter include the following:
NAME UNITED BRANCH POSITION Marianne Short UHG General counsel Matthew Shors UHG Head of litigation Heather Redmond UHG Deputy general counsel for intellectual property & litigation Thad Johnson United Healthcare General counsel Andrea Boado United Healthcare Deputy general counsel Chris Zaetta United Healthcare Head of litigation Jeremy Johnson United Healthcare Senior associate general counsel Laurie Wolfe United Healthcare Senior associate general counsel Matt Klein Optum Head of litigation Betsy Schmiesing Optum Litigation manager
13. On April 20, 2012, Schmiesing signed an engagement letter, on behalf of United, retaining Robert Rhoad, Esq. of Crowell & Moring LLP ("Crowell") and Mark Sandmann, Esq. of Gibson & Sharps ("Gibson") "in resolving potential claims United has against Cephalon, Inc. ("Cephalon") in the pending matter captioned as
14. The "Scope" provision of the engagement letter stated:
(Trial Exhibit ("TX") 2.) Schmiesing understood this provision to mean that she was authorizing Crowell and Gibson to conduct settlement negotiations on behalf of United. (N.T. 4/25/18, 33:23-34:2.) Rhoad likewise understood that he had been retained to negotiate a settlement on behalf of United in the Provigil matter. (N.T. 4/25/18, 173:12-16.)
15. At the time of the execution of this letter and thereafter, Rhoad understood that Schmiesing was his main point of contact at United for the Provigil matter. (N.T. 4/24/18, 171:5-172:2.) From 2012 to March 2016, Schmiesing remained the primary point of contact for the Provigil matter. (N.T. 4/25/18 41:5-10.)
16. In September 2015, Sandmann left Gibson and joined the Hill Hill Carter firm ("Hill Hill"), but continued to represent United in the Provigil matter. At that
17. This was not the first time Sandmann, Slate, and Rhoad (collectively "outside counsel" or "United outside counsel") had represented United. Rhoad had represented United in approximately ten to twenty cost recovery matters between 1999 and 2015, and had previously worked with Schmiesing. (N.T. 4/24/18, 16:16-169:3, 172:3-10.) Likewise, Sandmann represented United between 2012 and 2015 in at least six settlements related to defective hip implants, and Schmiesing was his primary contact. (Sandmann Dep. 20:10-21:19, 27:5-27:10.) Finally, Slate represented United on approximately a half dozen health care cost recovery matters before September 2015. (Slate Dep. 35:8-35:21.)
18. A punitive class action was brought by the end-payors of Provigil ("end-payor plaintiffs") in
19. Following the FTC settlement, the end payors were the only group that had not yet settled with the Cephalon Parties. (N.T. 133:15-20.)
20. Members of the putative class continued to be represented by attorney John Macoretta, Esq. for purposes of continuing settlement talks with the Cephalon Parties. (N.T. 4/24/18, 35:24-36:3.)
21. On June 4, 2014, the Cephalon Parties' lead attorney, Jay Lefkowitz, received an email from Richard Cohen, Esq. of the Lowey Dannenberg ("Lowey") firm. Cohen indicated that he represented a number of end payors that did not want to participate in the class settlement — including "Aetna, Humana, the Blue Cross Association and others" — and inquired whether Lefkowitz would be interested in settling. (TX 4; N.T. 4/23/18, 128:16-23.)
22. The two spoke and Lefkowitz explained that he was only interested in settling if he was going to get "global peace" with all of the end payors through a single lump sum payment. (N.T. 4/23/18, 133:4-134:2.)
23. Cohen provided some insight as to why the individual health plans elected to settle separately from the class. He explained that class actions are designed for constituents whose claims are not large enough to make sense to litigate individually. By contrast, the larger health plans have claims that are quite significant, giving them multiple incentives to negotiate, sue, and settle apart from a class. These incentives include lower attorneys' fees, the ability to get a "quick pay" of settlement funds without seeking court approval, and more independence to negotiate their claims. (N.T. 4/24/18, 32:10-35:11.)
24. On June 29, 2015, Cohen sent Lefkowitz another email with a spreadsheet showing "clients' respective covered lives." He indicated that he expected to add to the list "as more health insurers retain us." (TX 8.)
25. Lefkowitz had no concerns about Cohen negotiating on behalf of a group of health insurers. In his experience, "[i]t's very commonplace to rely on lead negotiators who are speaking on behalf of a broad group of people, which could include their own clients and others who are similarly aligned ... it's perfectly normal in my practice to have a negotiation with one person." (N.T. 4/23/18, 148:1-12.) Skidmore, Lefkowitz's colleague, confirmed that "it's not uncommon when you have that many different parties that all want to reach a kind of global settlement to appoint
26. Shortly after the FTC settlement, Schmiesing reached out to Rhoads and requested an update on Provigil® and how the FTC settlement would impact United. (TX 18, at p. 3.)
27. Rhoad's co-counsel, Sandmann, emailed back indicating that outside counsel were collectively discussing the possibility of United and other health plans entering into a tolling agreement with Cephalon and that they were working on determining the "proper course of action." (TX 18, at p. 2.)
28. On July 8, 2015, Rhoad e-mailed Schmiesing to note that things were "progressing rapidly in the Provigil recovery matter" and that immediate action would be necessary. (TX 12.)
29. Around the same time, Cohen (the lead negotiator for the health plans) reached out to an attorney named Mark Fischer, Esq., knowing that Fischer's firm had a relationship with United. At Cohen's request, Fischer contacted United regarding representation in the Provigil case and was told, by someone at United, that Sandmann was going to represent United in that matter. Based on that information, Cohen called Sandmann to explain what Cohen's group was trying to accomplish in terms of settlement and determine whether United would want to be part of that effort. Sandmann, responding on behalf of United, said that he wanted to be involved. (N.T. 4/24/18, 40:14-41:19.)
30. According to Gerald Lawrence, Esq., Cohen's partner, Sandmann and Rhoad specifically told him that they had been retained by United to represent United in this matter and that United had authorized them to join the negotiating group headed up by Cohen in order to make global settlement demands of the Cephalon Defendants. (Lawrence Dep. 34:3-36:1.)
31. Subsequent to this conversation, Cohen wrote to Lefkowitz, stating that "we have brought into our fold the lawyers representing the most of the rest of the major health insurers. So we will be able to come to the table with UnitedHealthcare, Massachusetts Minnesota and North Carolina Blue Cross, Assurant and several others." (TX 13 (emphasis added).) In Cohen's July 20, 2015 e-mail to Skidmore, he indicated that "we've made peace with the Macoretta class action group, so we expect to be able to negotiate for virtually all endpayers." (TX 14.)
32. It was significant to Lefkowitz that United was part of this group because he knew United was the major end payor. Lefkowitz understood the e-mails to mean that Cohen was going to be able to negotiate on behalf of United and others, not that Cohen was counsel for United. Notably, he remarked that if he thought that United was not involved, he may not have settled. (N.T. 4/23/18, 134:20-137:7, 158:18-159:12.)
33. In the meantime, Cohen and Skidmore began negotiating a tolling agreement to preserve the claims of the end payors pending the settlement discussions. The agreement provided Schedules A, B, and C to capture the majority of U.S. insured covered lives (i.e., the majority of people and their dependents enrolled in a health insurance program) and end payor purchases of Provigil over the relevant period. (TX 14.)
34. The tolling agreement listed United as a Schedule B plaintiff. (TX 17.) On July 21, 2015, Sandmann and Rhoad executed the tolling agreement on behalf of Schedule B plaintiffs. (TX 17.) The agreement
35. Rhoad testified that the tolling agreement was explained to Schmiesing before it was signed and that she gave him authority to execute it. Schmiesing corroborated this statement and confirmed that she authorized the tolling agreement. (N.T. 4/25/18, 179:11-180:9;
36. On July 22, 2015, Sandmann forwarded the tolling agreement, executed by Sandmann and Rhoad on United's behalf, to Schmiesing. In the accompanying email, Sandmann informed Schmiesing that,
(TX 18.)
37. Schmiesing understood from this e-mail that United was one of the members of the group that would be making a unified demand on the Cephalon Parties to settle Provigil. (N.T. 4/25/18, 51:21-25.) In response to this e-mail, Schmiesing never provided Sandmann or Rhoad direction as to a minimum share that United would need to receive as part of this global group. (N.T. 4/25/18, 52:11-15.) Nor did Schmiesing ever ask Sandmann for any information about the nature of the coordination with the Lowey firm in connection with the settlement negotiations. (N.T. 4/25/18, 67:21-25.)
38. Skidmore signed the tolling agreement on behalf of the Cephalon Parties on August 10, 2015. (TX 25.)
39. The following chart summarizes the attorneys involved with negotiation of the settlement and MOU:
NAME FIRM/COMPANY CLIENT Jay Lefkowitz Kirkland & Ellis Cephalon Parties Greg Skidmore Kirkland & Ellis Cephalon Parties John Macoretta Spector, Roseman, Kodroff & Putative End Payor Class Willis, P.C. Members Richard Cohen Lowey Firm Lead negotiator for Third-Party Payors (later known as "SHPs") Gerald Lawrence Lowey Firm Lead negotiator for Third-Party Payors (later known as "SHPs") Robert Rhoad Crowell & Moring, LLP United ("outside counsel") Mark Sandmann Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, United ("outside counsel") Cole & Black, P.C. Pamela Slate Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, United ("outside counsel") Cole & Black, P.C.
40. Upon returning the fully-executed tolling agreement to Cohen, Skidmore asked Cohen's partner Lawrence for Provigil purchase data. (TX 24.) Skidmore testified that the reason for this request was:
(N.T. 4/24/18, 122:21-123:3.)
41. This type of information is not publicly available and had to be obtained from the health plans themselves. (N.T. 4/23/18, 138:15-21, 153:3-12.)
42. On August 26, 2015, Sandmann e-mailed Schmiesing and Connie Redden, a non-attorney member of United's legal department, requesting United's purchase data for Provigil and its generic from June 1, 2006 to September 30, 2015, because they were "starting negotiations with the Defendants in the Provigil antitrust matter." (TX 27.) Schmiesing understood the purpose of this request was to facilitate settlement negotiations. (N.T. 4/25/18, 61:10-13.) The following day, Redden provided this data to Sandmann. (TX 29.) Sandmann, in turn, forwarded the information to the Lowey firm. (Sandmann Dep. 81:6-16.)
43. On September 17, 2015, Lawrence sent Lefkowitz a chart containing the purchase data for most of the health plans in the global negotiating group, including United. (TX 30;
44. Lefkowitz indicated that receipt of this data confirmed for him that Cohen was, in fact, negotiating on behalf of the whole group of health plans, including United, because he would not have otherwise been able to obtain this confidential data. (N.T. 4/23/18, 138:15-139:15, 154:11-155:3.) Skidmore drew the same conclusion. (N.T. 4/24/18, 114:21-116:8.)
45. United's outside counsel Rhoad and Sandmann then signed an amended tolling agreement, dated September 30, 2015, relating to United's Provigil claims. (TX 32; SOF ¶ 7.) Schmiesing did not dispute that outside counsel were authorized to sign that agreement. (N.T. 4/25/18, 68:8-19.) A second amended tolling agreement was subsequently signed by counsel for the Cephalon Parties and the health plans, extending the tolling period through November 30, 2015. (TX 43; SOF ¶ 8.)
46. The Cephalon Parties' lawyers concluded from the attorney signatures on these tolling agreements that Cohen had been authorized by United's representatives to negotiate on its behalf. (N.T. 4/23/18, 144:12-15; N.T. 4/24/18, 114:21-115:17.)
47. Over the ensuing weeks, settlement discussions occurred both between Lefkowitz and Cohen, and between Cohen and the various health plans.
48. During the entire period of these negotiations, neither Lefkowitz nor Skidmore had any direct communications with in-house lawyers or outside counsel for United regarding the Provigil matter. (N.T. 4/23/18, 170:4-9; N.T. 4/24/18, 146:12-25.) Nonetheless, Cohen explained that he made numerous phone calls to counsel for each of the groups of health plans to keep them apprised of discussions between himself and Lefkowitz. Cohen
49. Sandmann, Slate, and Rhoad all extensively participated in these discussions. (N.T. 4/24/18, 59:17-60:18, 191:13-21.) None of United's outside counsel ever suggested that they had limited authority to negotiate on United's behalf or indicated that United required a minimum share of any settlement. (N.T. 4/24/18, 60:24-61:3; Lawrence Dep. 36:3-38:8, 652-25.) It was Cohen's understanding and impression throughout the Provigil settlement negotiations that outside counsel had full authority to negotiate a settlement for United. (N.T. 4/24/18 61:4-11.)
50. The Cephalon Parties understood (a) that Cohen had full authority from counsel for the various health plans to make demands on their behalf, and (b) that Cohen was having multiple conversations with the health plans' attorneys and with Macoretta on behalf of the class. (N.T. 4/23/18, 148:23-149:16; N.T. 4/24/18, 78:12-17, 113:24-115:8, 118:25-119:21.)
51. Sometime in the first half of October, Lefkowitz signaled to Cohen what number it would take for them to reach an agreement. (N.T. 4/23/18, 157:12-23.)
52. On October 22, 2015, Lefkowitz and Cohen had a five to six-minute telephone conversation during which they agreed to "global peace" via a settlement for $125 million, which included all of the health plans and the Macoretta group. (N.T. 4/23/18, 157:12-158:7; N.T. 4/24/18, 63:10-64:5.) In that conversation, Cohen affirmatively represented that the $125 million would allow for full releases by all of the indirect purchasers, both from the Macoretta group and from the third-party health plans. (N.T. 4/23/18, 159:13-24.)
53. Cohen believed that the oral agreement reached on October 22, 2015 was a binding settlement agreement. (N.T. 4/24/18, 64:6-19.) Cohen further stated that the $125 million settlement he reached with Lefkowitz was approximately $10 million higher than what he and the lawyers for the other health plans had agreed they would be willing to take. (N.T. 4/24/18, 79:3-12.)
54. Sandmann, Slate, and Rhoad all assented to the settlement terms reached on October 22, 2015. (N.T. 4/24/18, 192:17-23.)
55. The trial testimony was somewhat inconsistent as to whether United authorized outside counsel to commit to the $125 million settlement. Rhoad "distinctly recall[ed]" he, Sandmann, and Slate having a conversation with Schmiesing, on or around October 22, 2015, wherein they told Schmiesing that negotiations were at a point where they were about to agree to settlement terms. According to Rhoad, they outlined those terms for her, and Schmiesing orally committed to the terms and authorized outside counsel to commit to those terms. (N.T. 4/24/18, 192:24-194:17.) Schmiesing, on the other hand, could not recall having any phone call with Rhoad between August 28, 2015 and December 1, 2015, in which she told him he could approve United's participation in a settlement of Provigil claims. (N.T. 4/25/18, 189:9-190:3.)
56. The day after the Cohen/Lefkowitz phone conversation, Macoretta and Lefkowitz telephoned the Court to advise that the parties had reached a settlement. (N.T. 4/27/18, 95:12-18.)
57. Almost immediately after the October 22, 2015 telephone call, the Cephalon Parties began drafting a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") to memorialize the settlement. On October 23, 2015, Lefkowitz sent a draft of the MOU to Cohen and Macoretta. (TX 36.)
58. Two key provisions of the draft remained consistent throughout the drafting process. First, the introduction stated, "[t]his memorandum of understanding (MOU) memorializes the principal terms of a settlement agreement reached on October 22, 2015 by and between the following persons and entities (collectively, "The Parties") and to be incorporated into a comprehensive written settlement agreement that will be presented to the Court for approval." (
59. After that draft was sent to Cohen, and because there were numerous settling entities, it took the health plans (the "settling health plans" or "SHPs") a couple of weeks to get back to the Cephalon Parties with their edits. The parties then negotiated the exact language of the MOU over the ensuing six weeks. (N.T. 4/24/18, 127:16-129:6.)
60. During that time, the lawyers for the individual SHPs — including the lawyers for United — had ample opportunity to both review and mark up the draft MOUs. (N.T. 4/24/18, 69:6-70:2; Lawrence Dep. 70:25-71:11; Slate Dep. 371:17-372:2; Sandmann Dep. 182:7-182:20; TX 38; TX 39.) In fact, Slate was "deeply involved" in the drafting process and exchanged many drafts of the MOU back and forth with the Lowey firm. (Lawrence Dep. 71:20-72:20.)
61. On December 2, 2015, Lawrence e-mailed Skidmore requesting a third tolling agreement. (TX 68.) Skidmore declined to execute the third tolling agreement because the Cephalon Parties did not want any further delay in the signing of the MOU. (N.T. 4/24/18, 128:7-20.)
62. On December 1, 2015, Schmiesing emailed outside counsel to request an update on the status of Provigil. (TX 61.) Sandmann and Slate responded that they were close to a proposed agreement on settlement, which prompted Schmiesing to request a phone conference to discuss specifics because she was "a little uncomfortable with [Slate] stating that we're close to a settlement when [she] [hadn't] heard any numbers." (TX 61.)
63. Schmiesing also asked whether there had been any discussions about the amount of the settlement because they would "need to get approval of the amount in discussion." (TX 59.) Slate responded, "Yes, we will be recommending the settlement with a quick-pay of $77 million for our group out of a total $125 million for our group and the class (which includes both health plans and consumers) combined, and with a true-up process as in a typical SHP deal.... All of this is highly confidential (a term of the draft MOU/agreement), of course." (TX 59.)
65. Slate, Sandmann, and Rhoad testified that on December 8, 2015, prior to signing the MOU, they had a phone call with Schmiesing wherein they walked through what they believed were the essential terms of the settlement. (Slate Dep. 173:8-13; Sandmann Dep. 112:14-113:9.) They explained their view of the MOU and that it did not obligate United to anything at that point. (Slate Dep. 209:23-211:12.) They further indicated that they were about to sign the MOU, but United would still have options in deciding whether to go forward with the ultimate SHP settlement agreement because there was a provision allowing United to "opt-out." (Slate Dep. 212:14-214:11; N.T. 4/24/18, 197:12-198:12.)
66. According to outside counsel, Schmiesing told them it was fine for them to go ahead and sign the MOU. (Slate Dep. 214:12-16; Sandmann Dep. 113:10-15.) Sandmann testified that there was no ambiguity about Schmiesing's grant of authority to sign the MOU. (Sandmann Dep. 113:10-114:3.) Rhoad corroborated Sandmann's testimony and stated that before he signed the MOU on behalf of United and the other Schedule C Plaintiffs, he fully explained the terms of the MOU to Schmiesing and that she orally provided authority to sign on United's behalf. (N.T. 4/24/18, 195:8-196:25.)
67. Schmiesing contradicted this testimony and categorically denied giving outside counsel authority to execute the MOU on United's behalf. She maintained that she could not recall any conversation at all with outside counsel in December 2015. (N.T. 4/25/18, 175:10-19.) Several facts undermine her position:
68. Given the foregoing facts, together with consistent testimony from outside counsel regarding the December 7, 2015 phone call, I credit the testimony of Sandmann, Slate, and Rhoad that Schmiesing authorized them to sign the MOU.
69. On December 9, 2015, Cohen sent Lekfowitz and Skidmore "the MOU signed by all plaintiff side counsel." (TX 83.) United was listed as a Schedule C SHP, and outside counsel Rhoad and Sandmann signed on behalf of the Schedule C "Settling Health Plans." (TX 83.) Outside counsel for United represented to Cohen that they had the informed consent from United's in-house lawyers to sign the MOU on United's behalf. (N.T. 4/24/18, 72:23-73:1; Lawrence Dep. 69:2-23.)
70. The following day, December 10, 2015, Skidmore signed the MOU on behalf of the Cephalon parties, made a .pdf copy of the executed document, and emailed it to Cohen under the file name "Provigil MOU Final Executed.pdf." (TX 84; 4/24/18, 131:17-20.)
71. At the time the MOU was executed, Lefkowitz and Skidmore understood that Sandmann and Rhoad were authorized to bind United to the MOU. (N.T. 4/23/18, 162:17-163:2; N.T. 4/24/18, 129:17-130:5.)
72. Similar to the original draft MOU, the introduction to the fully-executed MOU stated:
(TX 84 at Introduction.)
73. The MOU then provides that "Plaintiffs will release all claims against the Cephalon [Parties] and covenant not to sue the Cephalon [Parties] on any claims relating in any way to the claims asserted in the lawsuit filed by the End-Payor Plaintiffs and related actions." (
74. In exchange for these releases, the Cephalon Parties were to request from the FTC Settlement Fund certain amounts for each group of plaintiffs. With respect to the SHPs, the Cephalon Parties agreed to request disbursement from the Settlement Fund in the amount of $77 million into "an account designated by Plaintiffs' Counsel." (
75. The MOU then states that "[t]he settlement is binding and enforceable, and, unless otherwise agreed to in writing, the terms, including the Settlement Payment, will not change regardless of any
76. Unlike the Tolling Agreement, the MOU did not contain a "Consent and Authority" provision, or any similar provision, warranting that each person executing the MOU in a representative capacity on behalf of a party is fully empowered and authorized by such party to execute the MOU on its behalf. (TX 84.)
77. On December 22, 2015, Skidmore sent Lawrence initial drafts of the two settlement documents contemplated in the MOU: the End-Payor Class Settlement Agreement and the SHP Settlement Agreement. (N.T. 4/24/18, 131:23-132:12; TX 95.) Both draft documents contained a "WHEREAS" clause indicating that "parties have entered into a binding Memorandum of Understanding that contemplates the entry of this Settlement Agreement which will remain in force and effect only until this Settlement Agreement becomes effective, at which point the Memorandum of Understanding will be superseded by this Settlement Agreement." (TX 95.) This clause was included in all drafts of the SHP Settlement Agreement, including the latest one circulated on April 4, 2016. (TX 211, TX 215.) Sandmann, Slate, and Rhoad were aware of the inclusion of this clause, but never questioned it. (N.T. 4/24/18, 68:6-69:5; Slate Dep. 297:22-300:8.)
78. Skidmore understood that Cohen and Lawrence forwarded the draft SHP and Class Agreements to the other lawyers in their group. (N.T. 4/24/18, 134:12-135:14.)
79. On November 19, 2015, lawyers from two other law firms, Boies Schiller ("Boies") and Zelle — current counsel in this enforcement of settlement dispute — held a meeting with United in-house counsel at United's headquarters in Minnesota. United's attendees at this meeting included Redmond, Schmiesing, Klein, Jeremy Johnson, Boado, and Zaetta. (N.T. 4/25/18, 68:24-69:12.)
80. The point of this meeting was for the Boies and Zelle lawyers to "pitch" United on pursing affirmative, contingency-fee antitrust litigation with respect to Provigil in lieu of pursuing settlement. (N.T. 4/26/18, 93:2-14.)
81. Shortly after this pitch meeting, Zaetta asked Jeremy Johnson to work up a potential affirmative litigation case in connection with Provigil. (N.T. 4/26/18, 93:20-24; TX 58.) Johnson explained that this was a new tact with respect to the Provigil cases since, prior to that time, Schmiesing and Optum had been working on negotiating settlements. (N.T. 4/26/18, 96:24-97:11, 96:10-97:10; N.T. 4/27/18, 5:14-19.)
82. Following the pitch meeting, Schmiesing emailed Johnson, Zaetta, and Klein, on November 18, 2015, stating, "[j]ust want to give you a heads up that we have already retained another firm on Provigil...." She then identified Crowell and Hill Hill as the firms United "regularly use[s]" for the national recovery work. (TX 52.)
83. Outside counsel was not aware at that time that United was working with the Boies and Zelle firms to develop a litigation strategy for Provigil. (Slate Dep. 241:4-13.)
84. Following execution of the MOU, outside counsel sent Schmiesing an extensive memorandum, dated December 9, 2015, entitled "Provigil Proposed Settlement."
85. The December 9
(
86. In the memorandum, Slate, Sandmann, and Rhoad recommended that "United accept a settlement containing the essential terms" set forth in the memorandum "subject, of course, to the drafting of an acceptable written agreement." (
87. On December 18, 2015, Schmiesing forwarded this memorandum to her colleagues at United, including Redmond, Boado, Zaetta, Jeremy Johnson, and Klein, with the subject "Provigil proposed settlement." (TX 88.) Schmiesing indicated that the Cephalon Parties had "agreed to settle the Settling Health Plan group (SHP) and indirect purchaser class (IP Class) claims for a total of $125 million. United is a member of the SHP group." (TX 88.) She went on to note that the SHP group would receive approximately $77 million in a quick pay and there would be a "true-up" payment after the class funds were distributed. She commented that although outside counsel acknowledged that a larger recovery might be achieved through litigation, they were recommending settlement because of the risks associated with litigation. (
88. Schmiesing testified that, at this time, the Provigil matter was proceeding on "two tracks" within United. On one track, United was considering affirmative litigation through the Boies and Zelle firms, while, on the other, United was considering settlement through outside counsel. (N.T. 4/25/18, 95:10-23.) Schmiesing was not directly involved in discussions about affirmative litigation. (
89. On December 21, 2015, Andrea Boado called Schmiesing regarding the Provigil matter. (N.T. 4/26/18, 17:19-18:5; TX 70.) Boado's contemporaneous notes of the call refer to the fact that the "Settling HP [Health Plan] Group" will get the "SHP Quick Pay," and that it "[s]eems we've reached a settlement [agreement]," but could still decide not to settle. (TX 70.) Boado understood that there were proposed settlement terms that were put forth for United to evaluate. (N.T. 4/26/18, 2:5-15.)
91. On January 5, 2016, United in-house lawyers Schmiesing, Boado, Jeremy Johnson, and Redmond had a conference call with outside counsel Sandmann, Rhoad, and Slate. (TX 96; TX 97; N.T. 4/26/18, 30:11-31:7.) Zaetta was not on the call. (
92. Sandmann first sent Schmiesing a copy of the executed MOU on January 14, 2016 via an email with the file name "Provigil MOU Final Executed.pdf." (TX 109.) The cover email stated, "[h]ere is the MOU that contains the proposed terms discussed in our memorandum." (TX 109.) Although Schmiesing understood that the principal terms of the settlement were memorialized in this MOU, she did not click on the link to open the MOU and read it. (N.T. 4/25/18, 129:9-22.) In fact, Schmiesing testified that she never read the MOU until sometime after March 25, 2016. (N.T. 129:17-130:11.) At the time she first received the MOU, Schmiesing believed that it was only a proposed settlement which allowed United to walk away from it, but not the Cephalon Parties. (N.T. 4/25/18, 132:21-3.) She thought that when Sandmann and Rhoad signed the MOU on United's behalf, United gained rights and obligations under this MOU to enforce the settlement against the Cephalon Parties. (N.T. 4/25/18, 133:14-134:20.)
93. On January 15, 2016, and without any comment, Schmiesing forwarded the MOU to several of her colleagues inside United, including Boado, Jeremy Johnson, and Redmond. (TX 110; N.T. 4/25/18, 128:18-129:5.)
94. Upon receipt, Johnson read the MOU within a day or two. (N.T. 4/26/18, 104:2-106:13.) He noted that the MOU expressly stated that it "memorializes the principal terms of the settlement agreement reached on October 22
95. Boado did not read the MOU upon receipt, but rather reviewed it at a "high level" and relied on what outside counsel had conveyed to her about the MOU. (N.T. 4/26/18, 45:11-46:24, 51:15-53:15.) She did not believe it was her responsibility, as a business lawyer, to thoroughly read the document. (N.T. 4/26/18, 58:19-59:4.)
96. Similarly, Redmond indicated that she opened up the MOU and reviewed it for the framework of the proposed settlement and the financial aspects, but did not review the entire document from start to finish. (Redmond Dep. 44:20-45:25; 93:6-9.) She considered the MOU to be a framework of possible settlement terms that the parties were negotiating, and did not believe it was a binding settlement agreement. (Redmond Dep. 47:6-11, 96:16-18.)
97. On January 22, 2016, Jeremy Johnson, together with Andrea Boado and Laurie Wolfe, prepared a report for United Healthcare General Counsel, Thad Johnson. (TX 111, 112, 113, 114.) This report stated, in part:
(TX 114.) Boado did not tell Thad Johnson that a week earlier she had received an executed MOU. (N.T. 4/26/18, 45:11-24.)
98. On January 28, 2016, Jeremy Johnson emailed Wolfe and Boado in preparation for Boado's meeting with Zaetta and Thad Johnson the following Monday. (N.T. 4/26/18, 107:13-108:18.) Without mentioning the MOU, Jeremy Johnson stated "Crowell negotiated a tentative $125 mm settlement agreement with defendants on behalf of a group of indirect purchasers (including UHC). UHS would likely receive $11 mm-$16.5 mm under that settlement." (TX 117.) Johnson acknowledged that he pulled his summary more from the December 9
99. At the end of January 2016, Schmiesing reached out to Sandmann to inquire whether the tolling agreement between the Cephalon Parties and the end payors had been extended. (TX 119.) Sandmann responded, in part, "need to confirm with Jerry Lawrence at Lowey that the [Defendants] are treating the agreement as still in effect during the sign off period for the MOU ..." (TX 119.)
100. Thereafter, Slate and Sandmann contacted Lawrence and asked whether "[i]f this [the MOU] all blew up somehow, are we still tolled?" (TX 118.) Lawrence responded that, "if it blew up, we'd [the plaintiffs] be suing to enforce the settlement." (TX 118.) Sandmann then repeated the question regarding whether the claims were still tolled in light of the expiration of the tolling agreement. (TX 118.) Lawrence stated that "the antitrust claims aren't tolled, but we now have claims to enforce the settlement — same if we tried to bring the antitrust claim they could enforce the settlement." (TX 118.) In follow up, Sandmann remarked, "is what I am hearing is that if one of the SHP clients decides not [to] participate and wants to sue (and does), the limitations period has not been tolled since November 30, 2014." (TX 118.) Lawrence simply responded, "yes." (TX 118.)
101. Lawrence explained that he understood these questions to reflect Sandmann and Slate's concern that perhaps the Cephalon parties were trying to back out of the settlement. (Lawrence Dep. 229:6-20.) He testified that this email did not set off any red flags for him because he was "confident that [United] agreed to a settlement on October 22
102. Schmiesing then spoke with Sandmann sometime on January 29, 2016, but could not remember the call with any level of specificity. (N.T. 4/25/18, 136:18-138:4.) Thereafter, she wrote to Jeremy Johnson, Boado, Wolfe, and Redmond stating, "Hi — I spoke with Mark. Even if we decide not to sign off on the MOU, we are OK because there will be an opt out period associated with the approval of the settlement class. Also, the class claims are tolled from the filing of class complaint until the time of denial of certification, so there is still time left on the clock — approximately three years." (TX 120.)
103. Upon reading this email from Schmiesing, Boado sent a separate email to Jeremy Johnson, and Wolfe inquiring, "[i]s she merely addressing the settlement issue or is she confusing/conflating the settlement opt out with our query re the DP opt out ..." (TX 121.) Johnson responded that,
(TX 121.) Johnson understood that the SHP settlement did not require court approval, but did not think that it affected United's opt-out rights. (N.T. 4/26/18, 8-12, 127:10-23.)
104. Johnson also told Boado that "on a related note, settlements often also have
105. On February 15, 2016, Redmond sent the executed MOU, with the same filename — "Provigil MOU Final Executed.pdf." — to Matthew Shors, the corporate head of litigation for UnitedHealth Group. (N.T. 4/27/18, 33:31-4; TX 133.) At this point, multiple high-level inhouse lawyers at United — Matthew Shors, Jeremy Johnson, Elizabeth Schmiesing, Andrea Boado, and Laurie Wolfe — had a copy of the MOU. From January through late March of 2016, no counsel from United expressed any surprise that there was an executed MOU in the Provigil matter or questioned whether outside counsel had authority to sign the MOU. (N.T. 4/24/18, 203:16-205:3; N.T. 4/25/18, 173:1-22; N.T. 4/26/18, 106:14-107:3, 138:22-140:3.)
106. On March 25, 2016, Chris Zaetta, head of litigation at United Healthcare, was on a conference call when something alerted him to the potential existence of a document involving Provigil. (N.T. 4/27/18, 17:18-18:9.) At Zaetta's request, Boado forwarded Jeremy Johnson's January 29, 2016 email referring to the MOU. (TX 145; N.T. 4/27/18, 18:10-19:23.) It was at this point that Zaetta first learned that there was an MOU. (N.T. 4/27/18, 20:1-4.)
107. After seeing the reference to the MOU, Zaetta wrote to Schmiesing asking if there was "a deadline for opting out?" (TX 147.) Schmiesing responded, "I assume you mean a deadline for opting out of the proposed settlement, right? I'm not aware of one, but I will follow up and let you know." (TX 147.) This prompted Zaetta to ask, "Is there a settlement agreement?" (TX 147.) Schmiesing then forwarded him Sandmann's email of January 14, 2016, which attached a copy of the executed MOU. Schmiesing's cover email stated, "Here's the proposed settlement." (TX 149.) Zaetta then realized that everyone on his inhouse team working on the Provigil matter knew about the executed MOU except him. (N.T. 4/27/18, 22:4-7.)
108. As soon as he received the MOU, he read it and concluded that there was a problem. (N.T. 4/27/18, 22:8-15.) In his view, what he was reading in the MOU was very inconsistent with what he had understood to be the state of affairs, i.e. that United could opt out of the settlement. (N.T. 4/27/18, 23:3-7.)
109. Zaetta emailed Schmiesing stating, "[i]t's not clear to me that we can actually opt out from the settlement based on this MOU? What is your view on that?" (TX 156.) Schmiesing remarked that there was no final agreement yet. She went on to state that, "[w]e are definitely not bound to the settlement at this point — we would just need to tell the firm [Hill Hill] that we're not signing on and we would then not be listed as a settling TPA. If they are not able to get this approved as a class settlement, we would not need to opt out, but if there is a class settlement, it will include an opt out procedure." (TX 156.) At this point, Schmiesing had still not read the MOU. (N.T. 4/25/18, 142:21-145:16.)
110. Zaetta responded, "My view is that we're probably going to have a fight on our hands if a settlement class is certified and we decide to opt out." (TX 156.) When Zaetta indicated that he did not understand the purpose of the MOU if
(TX 162.) In other words, Schmiesing took the position that somehow United had a choice not to be part of the MOU. (N.T. 4/25/18, 151:2-6.) Zaetta wrote back and asked, "[d]oesn't the fact that we're a signatory to the MOU make us a party to it." (TX 165.) Schmiesing answered, "It has not yet been finalized. Crowell and Hill Hill understand that we have not agreed to the settlement." (TX 165.) At trial, Schmiesing acknowledged that this email did not deny granting authority to outside counsel to sign the MOU for United. (N.T. 4/25/18, 152:11-16.)
111. Zaetta wanted to get outside counsel on the phone so he could have them address his concerns about how the MOU should be read, particularly in light of its "binding and enforceable" language. (N.T. 4/27/18, 24:22-25:9.)
112. In preparation for this meeting, Boado forwarded several emails relating to the settlement to Zaetta, including one from Schmiesing to Johnson, Boado, Wolfe, and Redmond describing the opt-out theory. (TX 155.) Zaetta responded simply, "I'm not sure I agree with the below." (TX 155.)
113. Boado also sent to Thad Johnson and Zaetta a "rough chronology of salient meetings and messages" that she had relating to Provigil. (TX 160.) The basic point of this timeline was to show when people became aware of the MOU. (Wolfe Dep. 37:16-40:14.)
114. On March 26, 2016, Zaetta emailed Jeremy Johnson asking, "I don't get this. We signed this mou. Why aren't we barred from opting out?" (TX 179.) Johnson replied the next day, "[m]ost importantly, the MOU contemplates final settlement agreements that must be court approved. The parties need the court to approve a settlement class, provide notification and opt out opportunity to the members of the approved settlement class, which is the typical procedure." (TX 178.) When Johnson sent that email, he was aware that the MOU contemplated two separate settlement agreements, only one of which needed court approval, the other of which did not. Nonetheless, he did not note this in his email. (N.T. 4/26/18, 132:11-134:12.)
115. On March 28, 2016, Zaetta had a conference call with outside counsel — Sandmann, Slate, and Rhoad — as well as in-house lawyers Boado and Schmiesing. (N.T. 4/27/18, 28:15-17; TX 168.) The call primarily focused on the terms of the MOU, whether United was bound, and outside counsel's explanation as to how United could opt out of the Provigil settlement. (N.T. 4/24/18, 205:25-206:10; N.T. 4/25/18, 153:3-19; Sandmann Dep. 127:7-129:9.) At no point did Schmiesing or anyone else on the call indicate that outside counsel did not have the authority to sign the MOU on United's behalf. (N.T. 4/24/18, 209:13-22; N.T. 4/26/18, 139:16-23; Slate Dep. 271:2-14; Sandmann Dep. 206:2-17.)
116. Zaetta was not satisfied with outside counsel's "opt-out" explanation. (N.T. 4/27/18, 25:18-20.) Following the call, he wrote back to Jeremy Johnson with respect to Johnson's previously-provided opt
117. Following the March 28
118. Zaetta forwarded outside counsel's email to Boado and stated, "Huh?" (TX 174.) In a later email responding to outside counsel's explanation, Zaetta offered the following:
119. In yet another attempt to explain the opt-out theory, Slate, Rhoad, and Sandmann sent another email, dated March 29, 2016, to Zaetta and Boado, reasoning that United would only be a SHP if it enters into the separate SHP Settlement Agreement. If it does not, it remains part of the End Payor Class and would have the right to opt out. Because the MOU did not exclude any SHPs from the class definitions, outside counsel further reasoned that the SHPs in the MOU remain class members unless and until they sign off on the SHP settlement agreement. (TX 180.) Slate testified that the arguments laid out in this email were the best arguments
120. At this point, outside counsel understood very clearly that United wanted the option of getting out of the Provigil settlement. (Slate Dep. 281:7-13.) At no point did outside counsel convey to Zaetta that he did not need to worry about the terms of the MOU because United was not a signatory party to it. (Sandmann Dep. 210:9-210:25.)
121. Although the analysis set forth in this March 29
122. In response to Zaetta, Schmiesing suggested another phone call and stated, "[w]e have not agreed to the settlement, and these attorneys know that." (TX 182.) Schmiesing explained that she was not referring to outside counsel's authority to sign the MOU, but rather outside counsel's authority to finally settle the claims. (N.T. 4/25/18, 159:1-4.) On the same day, Schmiesing also forwarded the e-mail chain to Matt Klein — Optum's head of litigation — commenting, "FYI. Not sure what can be done here, but these two groups are talking past each other. I'm trying to help bridge the gap, but I'm not in the best position to do so. Any thoughts?" (TX 186.) Klein requested a copy of the MOU. (TX 186.) Schmiesing immediately forwarded it to him, which was the first time Klein had seen the MOU. (Klein Dep. 57:11-13, 59:9-13.)
123. On the same day — subsequent to Zaetta's phone call with outside counsel and their follow up email to him — Schmiesing wrote to outside counsel: "I'm sorry I didn't adequately prepare you for the call yesterday. I think Chris wants to understand how we are not bound by the MOU when we are already listed as a SHP, and the document appears to be executed. Can that be explained? What action can/will defendants take if United determines not to go through with the settlement?" (TX 181.) She did not, at this time, mention anything to outside counsel about the fact that they purportedly signed the MOU without obtaining her authority. (N.T. 4/25/18, 159:18-160:12.) Nor did she ever tell Zaetta that she did not give outside counsel authority to sign the MOU. (N.T. 4/25/18, 171:6-25.) Nonetheless, Schmiesing testified that at some unspecified point, she confronted outside counsel about their alleged unauthorized signature of the MOU. (N.T. 4/25/18, 157:6-12, 159:18-25, 170:20-171:4, 248:3-249:9.)
124. In the late afternoon of March 29, 2016, Sandmann sent to Zaetta all the draft documents that could be relevant to continued discussions. (TX. 193.) Zaetta promptly instructed, "[p]lease do not conduct any further negotiation on these documents. I would like to have a call on Thursday." (TX 193.)
125. On March 30, 2016, Schmiesing chimed in on this exchange, stating:
(TX 195.) Schmiesing then separately told Zaetta that she did not authorize outside counsel to sign the MOU. (N.T. 4/25/18, 169:3-15, 251:1-15; N.T. 4/27/18, 58:21-59:60:9.)
126. On March 31, 2016, Klein reached out to Schmiesing and asked, "Have we told Crowell/Sandmann that they need to get us out of the settlement?" (TX 202.) Schmiesing replied, "I've told them what the issue is. I don't think there has been a final decision on the litigation yet. They know that we are contemplating it and that we need to be able to exit the agreement, though." (TX 202.) Klein then asked, "Is Crowell/Sandmann telling us that we aren't going to be able to get out?" to which Schmiesing replied, "No. They do not agree that the MOU commits us, and do not see an issue. Chris et al. [readacted] disagree with their analysis." (TX 202.)
127. Zaetta then contacted UHG head of litigation Matt Shors, stating:
(TX 204.) Without any indication that he had already received a copy of the executed MOU over a month earlier, Mr. Shors cursorily responded, "Yikes." (TX 204.) Zaetta did not know that Shors had previously seen the MOU (
128. In the meantime, outside counsel and Zaetta arranged another phone call for March 31, 2016. Sandmann, Slate, and
129. The call took place on March 31
130. On April 5, 2016, Zaetta telephoned the Cephalon Parties' counsel, Skidmore, to let them know that United would not be participating in the settlement. (TX 217.) According, to Zaetta's email to other United counsel of the same date, Skidmore asserted that lawyers "purporting to represent [United] signed a binding MOU on [United's] behalf" and wanted to know how United thought it was not bound. Zaetta responded that "the lawyers did not have authority to bind us." (TX 217.)
131. Skidmore testified that he was "incredulous" because "we had been negotiating this for months and months." (N.T. 4/24/18, 137:6-14.) Skidmore's belief had always been that Sandmann and Rhoad had authority from United to enter into this settlement. (N.T. 4/24/18, 136:11-21.) Skidmore contacted Lefkowitz, who testified that he was "flabbergasted," "shocked," and "incredulous" because he had engaged in months of settlement and "relied on lawyers who signed a legally-binding document that said they were representing one of the parties to the document." (N.T. 4/23/18, 164:12-24.)
132. On June 21, 2016, Skidmore received a letter from United's new counsel, Boies Schiller, stating, in part:
(TX 221.)
133. Shortly thereafter, in July 2016, United sued the Cephalon Parties, Mylan Laboratories, Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., and Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
134. On August 19, 2016, the Cephalon Parties filed a "Motion to Enforce" the MOU as a settlement agreement. The present litigation was commenced by the Cephalon Parties against United on September 9, 2016, alleging a breach of contract claim and seeking an order compelling United's specific performance under the MOU.
On April 18, 2018, prior to the trial, I informed the parties that Minnesota law would govern the authority issue at trial and advised that I would provide a more detailed legal analysis of any reasoning underlying this ruling in my post-trial opinion. Although the Cephalon Parties and United agree that Pennsylvania law applies to any contract and ratification issues, the parties dispute which law applies to the question of outside counsel had authority to bind United to the MOU. The Cephalon Parties assert that Minnesota law applies to the authority issues, while United contends that Pennsylvania law applies.
When a federal court is sitting in diversity, the choice of law rules of the forum state — in this case, Pennsylvania — apply.
Pennsylvania's choice of law analysis consists of two steps. First, the Court must determine whether an actual conflict exists between the laws of two or more states.
Second, if an actual conflict exists, the court must determine whether the conflict is "true" or "false."
I must first determine whether an actual conflict exists between the agency laws of Minnesota and Pennsylvania, i.e. one in which the application of each state's substantive law produces contrary results. I find that because Minnesota and Pennsylvania law differ on whether an agent may bind a principal in settlement under the doctrine of apparent authority, a conflict does exist.
Under Minnesota law, settlement of a client's claim is not subsumed within the ordinary agency of an attorney for his clients, and as such, an attorney must be specially authorized to settle a claim.
By contrast, under Pennsylvania law, it is well-settled that only express authority can bind a client to a settlement agreement.
Given this actual conflict and the fact that both states maintain an interest in protecting their citizens, I must now determine which state law governs.
Under Pennsylvania choice-of-law rules, the applicable law is that of the place with the most significant relationship to the parties and the transaction.
After determining the nexus or focal point of the relevant transaction or relationship, the court must also consider the relative interests and policies of each jurisdiction. Among the factors a court may consider are: (a) "the needs of the interstate and international systems;" (b) "the relevant policies of the forum;" (c) "the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue;" (d) "the protection of justified expectations;" (e) "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law;" (f) "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result;" and (g) "the ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied." Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 6(2) (1971);
United argues that Pennsylvania has the closest relationship, citing several allegedly relevant contacts. First, United notes that the underlying lawsuit (the Provigil antitrust claims) arose from anticompetitive agreements entered into between Pennsylvania-based Cephalon and four different generic companies, two of whom have their principal places of business in Pennsylvania. Second, United points out that Pennsylvania was the "forum state" of the litigation allegedly settled. Third, United notes that the lawyers who negotiated the alleged settlement were (a) the Cephalon lawyers in New York; (b) the End Payor Class lawyers in Pennsylvania; and (c) lawyers from the Lowey firm, one of whom was based in New York and the other in Pennsylvania. Finally, United states that the settlement discussions involving the MOU took place primarily in Pennsylvania, and the MOU was to be performed primarily in Pennsylvania because the funds United was to receive in consideration for the release were to be paid from a settlement fund overseen in the Eastern District Pennsylvania. According to United, Minnesota bears no connection to the MOU.
United's argument is misplaced because the issues currently before me do not involve any inquiry into the alleged anticompetitive agreements, but rather focus on: (a) whether United's outside counsel had express or apparent authority to settle the case and (b) whether United ratified its attorneys' actions. As noted above, the parties agree that the ratification issue is governed by Pennsylvania law, meaning that I only need to consider contacts relevant to the authority issue.
The authority issue here centers only around United's relationship with its outside settlement counsel. Focusing on that relationship, all of the relevant contacts are in Minnesota: the place where United retained outside counsel, the location of in-house counsel Besty Schmeising, the starting point for most of the communications between United and its counsel, actions taken by United in-house attorneys to vest their outside counsel with apparent authority, and the place where decision-making regarding settlement would have occurred. Indeed, there is no evidence that United's outside counsel ever set foot in Pennsylvania in connection with the Provigil antitrust litigation.
United alternatively contends that Pennsylvania has the strongest interest in this action, asserting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made clear its policy interest in ensuring settlements are not enforced against clients who did not knowingly authorize them or consent to them. It further urges that Pennsylvania has a strong interest in applying its settlement authorization rules to claimed settlement agreements purporting to resolve litigation filed in Pennsylvania and received by Pennsylvania courts. Finally, United suggests that, under the doctrine of apparent authority, a court must consider whether the adversary — in this case, the Cephalon Parties — relied upon United's counsel's representation that they had authority to bind United to the MOU. As the Cephalon Parties are Pennsylvania citizens, United posits that Pennsylvania would have an interest in protecting them and ensuring that their interests are met.
In short, the "center of gravity" with respect to the agency issues rests squarely in Minnesota. Accordingly, I will apply Minnesota law to the questions of authority.
Under both Minnesota and Pennsylvania law, "[s]ettlement of disputes without litigation is highly favored, ... and such settlements will not lightly be set aside by the courts."
The central question before me is whether United is bound by the MOU and, in turn, to the settlement. United claims that it did not give outside counsel authority to settle and, therefore, it is not bound to any settlement agreement. The Cephalon Parties respond that the MOU is enforceable against United on several bases. First, they contend that United gave its outside counsel authority to settle, both by (a) expressly granting such authority and (b) cloaking outside counsel with apparent authority. Second, they posit that United ratified outside counsel's signatures on the MOU. I address each argument individually.
The traditional sources of authority are express actual authority, implied actual authority, and apparent authority.
Here, the Cephalon Parties contend that United (1) gave express actual authority to its outside counsel to settle and (2) cloaked its attorneys with apparent authority to settle.
As a general principal, Minnesota Statute § 481.08 (1990) allows "an attorney [to] bind a client, at any stage of an action or proceeding by agreement ... made in writing and signed by such attorney." This principal, however, does not apply to the settlement of an action.
Consistent with the foregoing principles, any actual authorization to settle a claim must be express, not implied.
Here, although I credit the testimony of Sandmann, Slate, and Rhoad that Schmiesing explicitly authorized them to sign the MOU on United's behalf, such authorization did not amount to express authority to settle the case. For the following reasons, I find that the evidence shows that United never granted outside counsel express authority to settle United's Provigil claims.
Subsequently, on December 8, 2017, when outside counsel had a phone call with Schmiesing regarding the MOU, Slate explained her view that the MOU did not obligate United to anything at that point. Outside counsel went on to reason that even if they signed the MOU on United's behalf, United would still have options in deciding whether to go forward with the ultimate SHP settlement agreement because of the opt-out provision. (FOF ¶ 65.)
Following the execution of the MOU, outside counsel sent Schmiesing the December 9, 2015 memorandum that discussed a "Provigil Proposed Settlement." At the conclusion of their summary of the settlement negotiations, outside counsel recommended that "United accept a settlement containing the essential terms set forth above subject, of course, to the drafting of an acceptable written agreement." (FOF ¶ 84.) Later, when Zaetta confronted outside counsel with the MOU, Slate agreed that outside counsel did not ask for authority to settle the case and did not have it. (FOF ¶ 129.)
Considering this testimony collectively, I conclude that although Schmiesing gave outside counsel authority to enter into the MOU on United's behalf, that authorization was based on a misunderstanding that the MOU was a non-binding settlement agreement. In short, express authority to settle was not provided.
In an effort to counter the evidence that outside counsel had no express authority to settle, the Cephalon Parties offer two arguments, neither of which I find availing.
First, the Cephalon Parties rely on basic principles of contract and agency to urge that "[a]n agent's authorized signature on a contract has the same effect as the principal's own signature." (Pls.' Br., at p. 14 (citing
Second, the Cephalon Parties posit that it is irrelevant that Schmiesing believed the MOU was "non-binding" and did not effectuate a settlement because, under basic principles of contract law, "[a]bsent fraud or misrepresentation, a person who signs a contract may not avoid it on the ground that he did not read it or thought its terms to be different." (Pls.' Br. 16 (citing
The lack of express authority does not, however, absolve United of its obligations under the MOU. Although Minnesota law requires any actual settlement authority to be express, rather than implied, Minnesota Courts have recognized that a party may be bound to settlement under the doctrine of apparent authority. "Apparent or ostensible authority is not actual authority; rather it is authority which the principal holds the agent out as possessing or knowingly permits the agent to assume."
In the settlement context, "where a client has created the appearance that his attorney has authority to settle a case and the attorney exceeds his authority in some way, if the adversary relies on the settlement to its detriment, the client may be estopped to deny his attorney's authority."
Repeatedly, federal courts in Minnesota have upheld the enforceability of a settlement agreement where the attorney, although perhaps not expressly authorized to settle, was cloaked with apparent authority. For example, in
In
Applying the apparent authority rule in the context of settlement, the court found "significant evidence" supporting a finding of authority to settle prior to the time that the plaintiff discharged his attorneys.
Considered collectively, this evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that United knowingly and affirmatively cloaked outside counsel with the apparent authority to settle its Provigil claims and that the Cephalon Parties reasonably believed that United had bestowed such authority. United — a major health insurance company with a deep and experienced bench of in-house lawyers — decided to hire outside counsel to conduct all settlement negotiations on its behalf on the Provigil litigation. In doing so, United placed complete authority in outside counsel to act on its behalf in these negotiations without providing outside counsel any parameters. Thereafter, with full knowledge that extensive settlement negotiations were ongoing among the various parties to the Provigil claims, United made repeated outward gestures suggesting that outside counsel had authority to participate in these negotiations and ultimately settle by execution of the MOU.
As noted above, "the scope of apparent authority is determined not only by what the principal knows and acquiesces in, but also by what the principal should, in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, know his agent is doing."
In an attempt to avoid the ramifications of these facts, United posits several arguments. I address each individually.
United's argument, however, misstates the relevant jurisprudence. The cases it cites pertain to express authority in relation to implied authority. United posits that the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a lawyer cannot have "implied authority" to settle a case, but in so arguing United seems to conflate the distinct doctrines of implied and apparent authority. As explained by the Minnesota Supreme Court:
None of the cases cited by United repudiate the doctrine of apparent authority or state that apparent authority cannot suffice to create a binding settlement.
The evidence of record belies this argument. United created the appearance that its counsel had full authority to settle. This conclusion is strongly supported by the facts that United: permitted outside counsel to sign tolling agreements for purposes of engaging in settlement discussions; explicitly authorized outside counsel to participate in settlement negotiations; authorized outside counsel to make a settlement demand on the Cephalon Parties;
United identifies no evidence which would have led any reasonable party to understand that outside counsel only had authority to negotiate a settlement and not enter into a settlement. Indeed, the terms "binding and enforceable" signed onto by United's outside counsel are far more consistent with a binding settlement. The mere fact that outside counsel's express authority may have been less extensive than that with which they were actually cloaked does not change the fact that United created the appearance that outside counsel could enter into, and did in fact bind United to, a full settlement agreement.
This argument is also meritless and United provides no support for the proposition that there must be direct communication between the third party and either the client or the agent in order for there to be apparent authority.
The evidence before me reflects that it was a common practice in national recovery matters for United to have a lead negotiator. (FOF ¶ 25.) Lawrence testified that Sandmann and Rhoad specifically told him that United had authorized them to join the negotiating group and make global settlement demands. (FOF ¶ 30.) Schmiesing was well aware of this arrangement, knew that United was one of the members of the group making a unified demand on the Cephalon Parties, and explicitly authorized outside counsel to engage in these settlement negotiations. (FOF ¶ 37.) As all outward appearances reflected that outside counsel had authority to settle on behalf of United, the Cephalon Parties did not need to take extra steps to confirm outside counsel's authority. United's expectation that the Cephalon Parties' lawyers had to actually bypass the outside counsel they had been dealing with and call Schmiesing to confirm authority is unrealistic. Rather, the burden fell on United to reach out to the Cephalon Parties and disabuse them of any notion that outside counsel could in fact enter into a settlement on United's behalf.
This argument fails for two reasons. As a primary matter, the language from
Restatement (Second) Agency § 8 (emphasis added). Consequently, this language does not support United's position that detrimental reliance is needed.
But even if Minnesota law would deem detrimental reliance an element of apparent authority to settle, the trial evidence clearly establishes the existence of such reliance. The cases discussing reliance have required no more than a minimal showing that the adverse party altered their course in a particular case.
Here, the Cephalon Parties clearly established that they altered their course based upon the belief that settlement had been reached. Lefkowitz explained that, at the outset of settlement negotiations, the Cephalon Parties were only interested in settling if he was going to get "global peace" with all of the end payors through a single lump sum payment. (FOF ¶ 22.) It was particularly significant to Lefkowitz that United was part of this group because United was the largest end payor. Lefkowitz specifically testified that if he had known that a major player such as United was not involved, he may not have settled. (FOF ¶ 32.)
In the October 22, 2015 phone call, Lefkowitz and Cohen agreed to "global peace" for $125 million, which would allow for full releases by all of the indirect purchasers,
Based on this evidence, it is abundantly clear that the Cephalon Parties "altered their preparations for trial" and spent months under a well-founded belief that they had fully settled all of their Provigil claims with the end-payor group of Plaintiffs. As such, I find that the Cephalon Parties relied, to their detriment, on United's entry into the MOU settlement agreement.
In sum, United knew or should have known that outside counsel was acting on its behalf, that the Cephalon Parties reasonably believed that outside counsel were being permitted by United to act on its behalf, and that United made affirmative gestures to confirm outside counsel's apparent authority to settle the case. While United may now claim that it never intended that outside counsel settle its claims, it remains bound because, under the apparent authority doctrine, "where one of two innocent parties must suffer from the wrongful act of another, the loss should fall upon the one who, by his conduct, created the circumstances which enabled the third party to perpetrate the wrong and cause the loss."
Finally, I find that United ratified the MOU by failing to repudiate counsel's authority to settle in a timely fashion.
If there is a dispute regarding an attorney's authority to settle a case, a court may find express authority "where the client delayed in asserting the lack of authority, or where it is clear that the real motive for challenging a settlement involved a change of heart."
"[I]in order to find ratification from failure to repudiate the agent's unauthorized actions, it is necessary that the principal have full knowledge of the material facts and circumstances attending the transaction to be ratified."
Here, even if United was justified in its reliance on outside counsel's description of the MOU as a proposed settlement, the evidence reflects that from at least January 14, 2016, United had full knowledge of the MOU's terms, yet failed to repudiate it until the end of March 2016. Several pieces of evidence support this conclusion.
First, it is undisputed that between mid-January 2016 and the end of March 2016, at least four United in-house lawyers received a copy of the executed, six-page MOU — which unambiguously contained binding material terms. Schmiesing received a copy of the executed MOU on January 14, 2016. The file name of the document was "Provigil MOU Final Executed.pdf," thereby putting Schmiesing on notice that it was some type of final executed agreement. Yet, Schmiesing testified that she never read the MOU between the time that she received it on January 14, 2016 and sometime after March 25, 2016, choosing to simply rely on what outside counsel told her. (FOF ¶ 92.)
On January 15, 2016, Schmiesing forwarded the MOU to her colleagues Boado, Johnson, and Redmond, all of whom are attorneys. (FOF ¶ 93.) Boado testified that she did not read the MOU in any detail. Rather, she simply reviewed it at a "high level," also relying heavily on what outside counsel had conveyed, because she did not believe it was her responsibility to thoroughly read the document. (FOF ¶ 95.) Similarly, Redmond stated that although she opened up the MOU and reviewed it for the framework of the proposed settlement and financial aspects, she did not review the entire document from start to finish. (FOF ¶ 96.) Finally, Jeremy Johnson testified that he read the MOU, saw the language indicating that it was "binding and enforceable," read the introduction that stated that the MOU memorialized the principal terms of the settlement agreement, and noted that Rhoad and Sandmann had signed the MOU on behalf of United. Yet, at no point did Johnson question outside counsel's authority to execute that document or suggest to any other lawyer at United that the MOU was actually binding and enforceable. Johnson admitted that he relied "heavily" on the "outside lawyers who ha[d] been involved in the process" and that he read the MOU "in that context" believing that "they knew more about the MOU than [he] did." (FOF ¶ 94.)
In short, four of United's in-house lawyers received the MOU in mid-January 2016, but chose either to not read it at all or to rely almost exclusively on outside counsel's interpretation. A sophisticated company ably represented by a team of in-house lawyers cannot remain willfully blind to a contractual obligation and then claim that their ignorance precludes ratification.
The circumstances during the pertinent time period exacerbate United's failure to read the MOU. Simultaneous with the signing of the MOU and the ongoing efforts by the Cephalon Parties and Lowey firm to finalize settlement documents, United was engaged in an active inquiry as
I conclude that United ratified the contract by delaying any dispute of outside counsel's authority until after it decided to pursue affirmative litigation. The MOU was a brief, six-page, double-spaced document containing unambiguous language expressly indicating in plain language that the settlement was binding and enforceable. Once United's in-house lawyers had the MOU in hand, United had full knowledge of the material facts and circumstances regarding the transaction to be ratified. United's failure to promptly repudiate the settlement after receiving clear recitation of its terms constitutes a ratification of the MOU and renders it binding.
United offers a series of contrary arguments: (a) it claims that the Cephalon Parties failed to prove United manifested its "assent to be bound" to a settlement; (b) it argues that outside counsel's faulty description of the import of the MOU precluded United's silence from being ratification; (c) it asserts that the Third Circuit's decision in
United first argues that ratification requires evidence of the principal's "consent to be a party to the previous transaction" and it consists of "an externally observable manifestation of assent to be bound by the prior act of another person." (Def.'s Br. 24-25.) It contends that absent any evidence of United's specific intent and consent to be bound by the MOU, the Cephalon Parties cannot prove ratification.
The Cephalon Parties do not need to prove United's specific intent to consent. An affirmance that results in ratification "may consist of a manifestation of consent to be a party to the previous transaction, or a manifestation that such consent has been given." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 83, cmt. b (emphasis added). "Such manifestation is effective when made, although not communicated to the other party or to others, unless the other party changes his position believing that there has been no ratification."
The Restatement further provides that affirmance of a transaction can be inferred from a failure to repudiate it:
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 94, cmt. a (1958).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected an argument similar to United's in
Here, outside counsel signed the MOU with the express knowledge of their client. As of mid-January 2016, at least four in-house lawyers knew that the MOU had been signed on United's behalf. Yet, not one lawyer for United made any effort to challenge outside counsel's authority to sign that MOU. Nor did any of these lawyers choose to carefully read the MOU, opting instead to tacitly accept, over a period of several months, its consequences as explained to them by outside counsel. Under such circumstances, United's silence is not susceptible to any interpretation other than ratification.
United next contends that silence can create an inference of "assent to be bound" only if the evidence shows that the matter was presented to the principal in a manner calculated to call for dissent. It urges that the MOU was not presented to United in such a manner because outside counsel repeatedly told United that the MOU merely contained the "proposed terms" of a "proposed settlement." United goes on to contend that "[Oven that the outside lawyers were much closer to the settlement discussions, United's in-house lawyers accepted these explanations and focused on whether the `proposed settlement' was desirable, or whether United should litigate its claims." (
United's argument disregards fundamental principles of mistake under contract law. "Generally if a mistake is not mutual, but unilateral, and is not due to the fault of the party not mistaken, but to the negligence of the one who acted under the mistake, it affords no basis for relief."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically addressed the situation at issue here, where the principal's alleged lack of knowledge of facts was based on his or her own negligence or willful disregard. In
I find that United's failure to repudiate the MOU for months reflected their intent to be bound by the MOU. Schmiesing authorized outside counsel to sign the MOU. The knowing and intentional decision to not read the contract in order to fully ascertain the scope of the terms to which United had agreed, and to instead rely almost exclusively on advice from outside counsel regarding the MOU's terms, is a unilateral mistake that does not now allow United to escape the consequences of its decision. To hold otherwise would allow parties to rescind settlement agreements simply by willfully avoiding any understanding of the terms of their agreements.
United's assertion that the MOU was not presented in a manner calculated to
United's third effort to avoid ratification rests on the theory that the case of
Moreover, in reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, the Third Circuit clearly stated that it "expressed no opinion the ultimate success" of the ratification argument.
Here, I am not bound by the same standard. The parties proceeded through a five-day bench trial during which numerous witnesses and documents were offered into evidence. As the fact-finder, I am specifically tasked with resolving issues of material fact. Having done so, I find that although United may have reasonably believed the MOU was only a proposed settlement at the time it was signed, that belief was unfounded once the in-house lawyers had the MOU in their possession, giving them all the material facts necessary to know there was a settlement that they needed to repudiate.
United's final argument asserts that to be effective, "ratification must be made by persons having the power to perform the act which is the subject of ratification." (Def.'s Br. 30 (quoting
United's argument is misplaced on two levels. Primarily, the evidence of United's settlement process and who precisely had authority to approve a settlement was vague at best. Zaetta testified generally that he, Thad Johnson, and Marianne Short would have had to be involved. (N.T. 4/27/18, 62:13-63:10.) Schmiesing also offered some testimony about how a settlement would have to work its way up the chain within UHG and Optum and would need approval "from folks like Mr. Zaetta." (N.T. 4/25/18, 187:15-188:2.) Matthew Klein remarked that that there was "a process for review and approval of third-party liability or national recovery cases" and Provigil never went through that process. (Klein Dep. 32:20-33:3.) Jeremy Johnson testified that the settlement process was "not a decision that could have been made at the level that Betsy — or Ms. Schmiesing and I were at." (N.T. 4/26/18, 159:3-9.) United's trial counsel represented in court that Chris Zaetta and Thad Johnson would have had to approve a settlement. (N.T. 4/23/18, 78:17-79:12.) Absent any clear evidence offered by United of what its settlement process was, I cannot determine the merit of United's defense that no one with authority ratified the contract.
In any event, I find no substantive merit to United's argument. In
Here, even assuming that Schmiesing, Jeremy Johnson, and Boado did not have authority to approve a settlement, and that higher-level attorneys would have to approve a settlement, I find that the failure of these higher-level attorneys to inquire into the relevant facts constituted ratification. The undisputed testimony also reveals that many of the "higher-level" attorneys were aware that some settlement offer existed. On January 22, 2016, Jeremy Johnson, Boado, and Wolfe prepared a report for United Healthcare General Counsel Thad Johnson explaining that outside counsel had in hand a settlement offer from the Cephalon Parties, yet Thad Johnson never inquired further into the status of these settlement talks. (FOF ¶ 97.) On February 15, 2016, Matthew Shors, the corporate head of litigation for the entire UnitedHealth Group, actually received a copy of the executed MOU, yet did not think to raise any questions about its "binding and enforceable" language. (FOF ¶ 105.) Indeed, even when Zaetta raised questions to Shors about the MOU at the end of March 2016, Shors did not even acknowledge having ever received it. (FOF ¶ 127.)
In light of the foregoing, I conclude that by failing to contest the authority of its outside counsel to sign the MOU or otherwise express opposition to the MOU for at least two and half months after it was well aware of the document, United ratified the MOU. The ratification renders the MOU binding on United.
Having fully considered the trial testimony, exhibits, deposition transcripts, and attorney argument, I conclude that United is bound to the MOU signed on its behalf. Aside from the fact that United clearly cloaked its outside counsel with apparent authority to reach a settlement agreement, it also ratified the MOU by failing to repudiate it despite having all of the relevant facts in its possession. Therefore, I will enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs the Cephalon Parties and against Defendant United on the entirety of the Complaint.
An appropriate Order follows.
The remaining cases relied upon by United are inapposite.
Nonetheless, "[a]llocation of the burden of proof will be significant, in theory at least, only in the rare case when, assuming the evidence is weighed by the preponderance of evidence standard, the conflicting evidence is in equipoise in the mind of the fact finder."
The same holds true for the other cases cited by the Cephalon Parties. In
The cases cited by United are distinguishable. In
United also cites to