JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR., District Judge.
On July 1, 2013, Plaintiff Desiree Moye applied for supplemental security income and alleged she is disabled. After an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Social Security Administration denied her application, Moye filed a request for review in this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 3. United States Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R), in which he recommends that this Court affirm the ALJ's denial of benefits. For the reasons discussed below, this Court adopts the R&R in part, grants Moye's request for review, and reverses the decision of the Social Security Administration.
This Court adopts Magistrate Judge Rice's statement of the procedural and factual history from the R&R.
When objections to a report and recommendation have been filed, "the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989); Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1984). "District Courts, however, are not required to make any separate findings or conclusions when reviewing a Magistrate Judge's recommendation de novo under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)." Hill v. Barnacle, 655 F. App'x 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2016). The "court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations" contained in the report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
This Court reviews any findings of fact made by an ALJ under the deferential "substantial evidence" standard. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schaudeck v. Comm'r, 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999). A district court must affirm an ALJ as long as substantial evidence supports her conclusions. Craigie v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 56, 57 (3d Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). It is "more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence." Id. A district court reviews the record as a whole to determine whether substantial evidence supports a factual finding. Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 431.
Analyzing a claim for disability benefits requires an ALJ to make certain credibility determinations and district courts defer to an ALJ's assessment of credibility. See Diaz v. Comm'r, 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2009) ("In determining whether there is substantial evidence to support an administrative law judge's decision, we owe deference to his evaluation of the evidence [and] assessment of the credibility of witnesses. . . ."). However, the ALJ must specifically identify and explain what evidence she found not credible and why she found it not credible. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Stewart v. Sec'y of Health, Education and Welfare, 714 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1983)). An ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or for an incorrect reason. Ray v. Astrue, 649 F.Supp.2d 391, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993)). The Social Security Administration has promulgated a five-step process for evaluating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1999). First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, then the Commissioner considers in the second step whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" that significantly limits his physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. If the claimant suffers a severe impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based on the medical evidence, the impairment meets the criteria of an impairment listed in the "listing of impairments," 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 (1999), which result in a presumption of disability, or whether the claimant retains the capacity to work. If the impairment does not meet the criteria for a listed impairment, then the Commissioner assesses in the fourth step whether, despite the severe impairment, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. If the claimant cannot perform his past work, then the final step is to determine whether the claimant can perform other work that exists in the national economy. The claimant bears the burden of proof for steps one, two, and four of this test. Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2000). The Commissioner bears the burden of proof for the last step. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
The dispositive issues in this case involve the fourth step and the assessment of Moye's residual functional capacity (RFC). Moye objects to the R&R's conclusion that the ALJ appropriately analyzed the opinion of Dr. Ira Rubenfeld, the consultative examiner. Objs. 3-4, ECF No. 16. Moye argues that the ALJ did not explain which portions of Dr. Rubenfeld's opinions she accepted versus which she rejected in reaching the conclusion that Moye can perform light work. Id. This Court finds that this objection entitles Moye to relief, so it does not address her other objections to the R&R.
The question of whether Moye is disabled hinges on the interpretation of Dr. Rubenfeld's conclusions. After his examination of Moye, Dr. Rubenfeld concluded that she can occasionally lift and carry ten pounds, but never any greater weight. Rubenfeld Report, Ex. 5F, R. 347-348, ECF No. 7-7. He also found that Moye can sit for six hours at a time, stand for one hour, and walk for one hour in an eight-hour workday. Id. She can occasionally use her hands for reaching, handling, fingering, feeling, pushing and pulling, and can occasionally use her feet to operate foot controls. Id. These activities are consistent with the regulatory definition of sedentary work:
20 C.F.R. § 416.967(a). Under the grid rules,
The ALJ gave Dr. Rubenfeld's report "some weight to the extent that it shows the claimant is not disabled and likely able to perform light work," but apparently rejected Dr. Rubenfeld's report to the extent that his findings suggest that Moye has the residual functional capacity to perform only sedentary work. ALJ Op. 6, ECF No. 7-2.
20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).
After she concluded that Moye has the residual functional capacity to perform light work, the ALJ determined that Moye has no past relevant work, falls into the "closely approaching advanced age" category, has a limited education, and can communicate in English. ALJ Op. 7. Based on these factors, the ALJ applied Rule 202.10 of the grid rules and determined that Moye is not disabled. Id; see 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2. Thus, whether Moye is disabled hinges on whether she can perform light work or only sedentary work, and whether Moye is entitled to relief depends upon whether the ALJ's conclusion that Moye can perform light work and not just sedentary work is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ's decision in this case resembles an ALJ's decision that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned in Doak v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1986). In Doak, the ALJ reviewed a record that consisted of the claimant's testimony, three medical reports, and a vocational expert's testimony. Id. One of the physicians stated that the claimant was totally disabled and could perform no work, a second opined that the claimant could perform sedentary work, and the third offered no opinion, but recognized the claimant's significant physical limitations. Id. at 29. Regardless, the ALJ concluded that the claimant could perform light work. Id. at 28. The Third Circuit concluded that the record did not contain substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that the claimant could perform light work because none of the physicians' reports in evidence "suggested that the activity Doak could perform was consistent with the definition of light work set forth in the regulations, and therefore the ALJ's conclusion that he could is not supported by substantial evidence."
Similarly, in Patton v. Berryhill, Judge Nealon of the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that the record did not contain substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that the claimant could perform light work. No. 3:16-CV-2533, 2017 WL 4867396, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2017). In Patton, the only medical opinion of record limited the claimant to sedentary work and lifting and carrying ten pounds at most. Id. at *4. However, the ALJ concluded that the claimant could perform light work and lift or carry up to twenty pounds, based on the evidence in the record that the claimant was recovering well from her back surgery. Id. Judge Nealon found that this conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence because he could not determine how the ALJ could conclude that the claimant could lift twenty pounds as required for light work where the only medical opinion limited her to ten pounds:
Id. at *4.
As was the case in Doak, the record in this case similarly includes a physician's opinion that describes the claimant's limitations as consistent with the ability to perform sedentary work, as well as another physician's opinion describing even more severe limitations.
Although this evidence shows that Moye retained some level of normal day-to-day function, none of these findings contradict Dr. Rubenfeld's conclusions that Moye could only occasionally carry up to ten pounds, could sit for six hours at a time, stand for one hour, and walk for one hour in an eight-hour workday. Moreover, Dr. Rubenfeld's conclusions are well-supported: he examined Moye and found significant limitations. The flexion of her lumbar spine was limited to 30 degrees out of 90. Rubenfeld Report, Ex. 5F, R. 344, ECF No. 7-7. Her shoulder range of motion was limited to 75 degrees out of 150 for forward elevation and 75 degrees out of 150 for abduction. R. 343. Dr. Rubenfeld found that right upright and both supine straight leg raising maneuver produced discomfort in the calf, and the left upright straight leg raising maneuver was positive. R. 341. Therefore, to the extent that the ALJ relied on this evidence in rejecting Dr. Rubenfeld's conclusions about Moye's limitations with respect to lifting, standing, and walking, the ALJ rejected Dr. Rubenfeld's conclusions for an incorrect reason.
Nor do the findings the ALJ cites establish on their own that Moye can occasionally lift twenty pounds, frequently lift and carry up to ten pounds, and walk and stand to the extent necessary to be capable of light work. To the extent that the ALJ concluded that Dr. Rubenfeld's findings suggested that Moye could perform the actions required to be capable of light work, she substituted her own medical judgment for Dr. Rubenfeld's. The medical evidence does not support the ALJ's conclusion that Moye had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, and the ALJ does not satisfactorily explain Dr. Rubenfeld's contradictory opinion that Moye was limited to sedentary work. Thus, similar to Doak and Patton, the ALJ's assessment of residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial evidence.
A district court reviewing a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security may affirm, modify, or reverse the decision, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court should order the award of benefits without a remand "only when the administrative record of the case has been fully developed and when substantial evidence on the record as a whole indicates that the claimant is disabled and entitled to benefits." See Zied v. Astrue, 347 Fed. App'x 862, 865 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Gilliland v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 1986)). This is the case here. The administrative record has been fully developed and indicates that Moye is disabled.
For the reasons discussed above, the decision of the Social Security Administration is reversed. This Court awards benefits to Plaintiff dating back to the onset of Moye's disability and remands back to the Social Security Administration for calculation and payment of the benefits due. A separate order follows.
This Court does not address this disagreement because this is not a case of the ALJ drawing a conclusion that contravenes medical opinions but that is otherwise supported by medical evidence — instead, in this case the ALJ drew a conclusion, namely that Moye can lift twenty pounds as required for light work, which does not follow from the evidence.