Smith, District Judge.
Under Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law ("MVFRL"), an insurance company must provide uninsured and underinsured motorists ("UM" and "UIM", respectively; "UM/UIM", collectively) coverage limits equal to the bodily injury liability limits under an automobile insurance policy unless the named insured submits a written request for lower limits. In the instant case, the named insureds effectively lowered the UM/UIM benefits for their four vehicles under an automobile insurance policy with the defendant by executing a form request for lower UM/UIM coverage in September 2001. The named insureds later dropped their fourth vehicle from the policy, only to add another fourth vehicle a few months later. When they added the new fourth vehicle, the vehicle would have had UM/UIM coverage equal to the bodily injury limits unless the named insureds executed another document requesting lower limits on this vehicle.
In March 2003, the named insureds signed a form provided by the defendant wherein they unequivocally requested lower UM/UIM limits for this fourth vehicle. This form, however, also listed the other three vehicles covered by the policy, and the named insureds did not check any boxes indicating a selection of lower UM/UIM limits for these vehicles. At the top of the form, there is language indicating that the policy will carry UM/UIM limits equal to the bodily injury liability limits unless the first named insured selects a lower limit.
In this action, the daughter of the named insureds was injured in an accident while driving a covered vehicle. The named insureds had reduced the UM/UIM coverage for this vehicle in September 2001, but they did not check any box for lower limits on the form request for lower UM/UIM limits in March 2003. The daughter has brought an action against her parents' insurer seeking, inter alia, UIM coverage equal to the bodily injury liability limits by
Both parties have moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's cause of action seeking a declaratory judgment. After reviewing the record, the court finds that the March 2003 reduction form was intended to reduce the UM/UIM limits for the fourth vehicle (thus bringing it into line with their UM/UIM coverage on their three other vehicles) and did not otherwise operate to increase the UM/UIM limits on the other three vehicles to the bodily injury liability limits. As such, the court will deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grant the insurance company's motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff, Pietra Limandri ("Plaintiff"), commenced this action by filing a complaint against the defendant, Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"), in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County on June 3, 2016. See Notice for Removal of Civil Action from State Court, Ex. A, Compl., Doc. No. 1-1. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in September 2013, she was involved in a motor vehicle accident caused by another motorist unlawfully proceeding through a stop sign. See Compl. at 1. Plaintiff suffered numerous injuries from the accident, "including but not limited to, cervical disc herniation, acute cervical strain and spasms, [a] strained left shoulder, severe migraines, and decreased range of motion in the neck[.]" Id. Due to her injuries, she "underwent an anterior cervical discectomy fusion surgery at C5-6 with graft plating and bone marrow aspiration." Id. at 2.
Plaintiff first attempted to recover damages for those injuries by suing the tortfeasor. See id. at 2. This lawsuit resulted in Plaintiff entering into a settlement with the tortfeasor's insurance carrier for the applicable bodily injury liability limits, i.e. $15,000. See id. At Plaintiff's request, Allstate, which had insured the vehicle Plaintiff was driving at the time of the accident, consented to the settlement with the tortfeasor in October 2015.
The tortfeasor's bodily injury policy limits were allegedly inadequate to compensate Plaintiff for her injuries, so she notified Allstate of her intent to seek UIM coverage under an automobile insurance policy with Allstate. See id. at 3, 5. Plaintiff sought $200,000 (representing a bodily injury limit of $100,000, stacked for two vehicles) from Allstate. See id. at 5. Allstate responded to Plaintiff's UIM benefits claim by notifying her that it believed that she was entitled to a maximum of $30,000 in UIM coverage under the applicable policy. See id. at 6. Then, in September 2015, Allstate offered Plaintiff $10,000 for her UIM claim. See id. Plaintiff provided Allstate with additional documentation showing that her injuries and economic damages well exceed the $10,000 offer, yet Allstate did not increase its offer even
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts three causes of action in the complaint. See id. at 6-13. The first cause of action is a claim for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that the applicable insurance policy provides for UIM coverage equal to the bodily injury coverage under the policy, $100,000 stacked for two vehicles, for a total of $200,000. See id. at 6-9. The second cause of action is a breach of contract claim. See id. at 9-11. The final cause of action is a bad faith claim under Pennsylvania's Bad Faith Statute, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371. See id. at 11-13.
Allstate removed the action from the Court of Common Pleas to this court on June 27, 2016, and it was originally assigned to the Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel, now retired. See Doc. No. 1. After receiving an extension, Allstate filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint on July 27, 2016. See Doc. No. 7. The parties proceeded through discovery, and then filed the instant cross-motions for summary judgment on February 23, 2017.
This matter was reassigned from then-Chief Judge Stengel to the undersigned on July 17, 2018. See Doc. No. 23. The undersigned heard oral argument from counsel for the parties on the cross-motions for summary judgment on August 24, 2018. The cross-motions for summary judgment are ripe for disposition.
A district court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden "of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Once the moving party has met this burden, the non-moving party must counter with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating that "[a] party asserting that a fact ... is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by... citing to particular parts of materials in the record ...; or ... [by] showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence ... of a genuine dispute"). The non-movant must show more than the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" for elements on which the non-movant bears the burden of production. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1982) (indicating that party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not "rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions"); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that "speculation and conclusory allegations" do not satisfy non-moving party's duty to "set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor"). Additionally, the non-moving party "cannot rely on unsupported allegations, but must go beyond pleadings and provide some evidence that would show that there exists a genuine issue for trial." Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, it is not enough to "merely [] restat[e] the allegations" in the complaint; instead, the non-moving party must "point to concrete evidence in the record that supports each and every essential element of his case." Jones v. Beard, 145 F. App'x 743, 745-46 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548). Moreover, arguments made in briefs "are not evidence and cannot by themselves create a factual dispute sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Twp. of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (3d Cir. 1985).
"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). The court must decide "not whether ... the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial'" and the court should grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, when one party's claims are "blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it," the court should not take those claims as true for the "purposes of ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment."
The summary judgment standard is the same even when, as here, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Erbe v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 06-113, 2009 WL 605836, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2009) (citing Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Hinchey, 464 F.Supp.2d 425, 430 (M.D. Pa. 2006)). "When confronted with cross-motions for summary judgment ... `the court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the summary judgment standard.'" Id. (quoting Transguard, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 430).
On September 4, 2013, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident (the "Accident"). See Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pl.'s Facts") at ¶ 3, Doc. No. 16-2; Def. Allstate Ins. Co.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ("Def.'s Resp.") at ¶ 3, Doc. No. 20-1; see also Def. Allstate Ins. Co.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Facts") at ¶ 7 (referencing allegations in complaint), Doc. No. 18; Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Facts ("Pl.'s Resp.") at ¶ 7, Doc. No. 22. Infinity Select Insurance Company ("Infinity") insured the tortfeasor in the Accident, and the tortfeasor's automobile insurance policy had bodily injury liability protection limits of $15,000. See Pl.'s Facts at ¶ 4; Def.'s Resp. at ¶ 4. After filing suit against the tortfeasor, Plaintiff settled with Infinity for the policy limits of $15,000. See Compl. at ¶ 13; Answer at ¶ 13, Doc. No. 7; Pl.'s Facts at ¶ 5; Def.'s Resp. at ¶ 5; Def.'s Facts at ¶ 8; Pl.'s Resp. at ¶ 8. Before settling, Plaintiff requested that Allstate consent to settlement of this third-party action against the tortfeasor and Allstate provided its consent in October 2015. See Pl.'s Facts at ¶ 9; Def.'s Resp. at ¶ 9.
On September 15, 2015, Plaintiff notified Allstate that she intended to make a claim for UM/UIM benefits through the Policy and provided it with medical documentation regarding her injuries and treatment.
At the time of the Accident, Plaintiff asserts that she was driving a 2003 Isuzu Rodeo owned by her mother, Paula Limandri ("Mrs. Limandri"),
Mrs. Limandri testified at her deposition that she and Vincenzo Limandri ("Mr. Limandri") worked with Alex Ramos ("Ramos") in the purchase of their auto insurance.
Ramos testified that when customers, such as the Limandris, desire insurance for a vehicle in addition to vehicles already on a policy, UM and UIM limits cannot be lower than the liability limits unless the customer "signs down" for the lower limit. See Def.'s Facts at ¶ 14; Pl.'s Resp. at ¶ 14. Ramos also testified that when a customer calls to insure an additional vehicle with UM/UIM limits lower than the liability limits, the agent explains that without a written request the vehicle would be added with UM/UIM limits at the higher (liability) limits; the agent sends the customer a sign-down form to request lower limits, without which the higher liability limits would apply to the UM/UIM limits, and the customer is charged a higher premium for that specific car until the executed form is returned.
As an Allstate senior field support representative, Collard testified at her deposition that she reviewed the Policy's history from 1985 forward and, in 1988, when the Limandris moved from Florida to Pennsylvania with one vehicle, the UM/UIM coverage was $15,000/$30,000. See Def.'s Facts at ¶ 17; Pl.'s Resp. at ¶ 17. The 2001 Mazda Protégé on the Policy at the time of the Accident was added to the Limandris' coverage in the June 3, 2001, to December 3, 2001 policy period. See Def.'s Facts at
On September 26, 2001, following the addition of a 1993 Ford Escort as "Vehicle 4" on the Policy, Mr. Limandri executed a sign-down form for lower UM/UIM limits for each of the four vehicles then on the Policy, including the 1999 Plymouth Neon, pursuant to which $15,000/$30,000 UM/ UIM limits were in place for the 1999 Plymouth Neon and, as such, the 2003 Isuzu Rodeo which replaced it (the "September 2001 Form").
The March 2003 Form listed four unidentified vehicles: Vehicle 1; Vehicle 2; Vehicle 3; and Vehicle 4. See Pl.'s Facts at ¶ 35 & Ex. F at ECF p. 6; Def.'s Resp. at ¶ 35; Compl., Ex. D. On the form, there is an "X" mark to elect UM/UIM coverage in the amount of $15,000/$30,000 for Vehicle 4.
On March 8, 2003, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident, and she subsequently brought an UIM claim which Allstate settled with her in the amount of $140,000. See Def.'s Facts at ¶ 25; Pl.'s Resp. at ¶ 25. Allstate's files reflect that Plaintiff's attorney for the March 8, 2003 accident had demanded only $60,000, believed to be the UIM limit ($15,000) on four vehicles (stacked), but Allstate's adjuster discovered that Allstate was charging a premium based on $100,000 in UIM coverage for one of the vehicles on the Policy, the newly added Pontiac Sunfire; therefore, in good faith, the adjuster negotiated the $140,000 settlement based on $145,000 in total possible UIM coverage for the March 8, 2003 accident.
At all times after March 10, 2003, and up to the date of the Accident, the Policy renewals indicated $15,000/$30,000 UIM
The sign-down forms the Limandris executed on September 26, 2001 and March 10, 2003 stated: "The limits selected above will apply to all future renewals, continuations, and changes in your policy unless you contact your Allstate agent or we notify you otherwise." See Def.'s Facts at ¶ 34; Pl.'s Resp. at ¶ 34; Pl.'s Facts at ¶ 33; Def.'s Resp. at ¶ 33. The forms also state as follows:
Pl.'s Facts at ¶ 23; Def.'s Resp. at ¶¶ 23, 33.
As this court is sitting in diversity jurisdiction, the court
Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1373 n.15 (3d Cir. 1996).
Both parties agree that Pennsylvania substantive law applies to this matter. See Br. in Supp. of Def. Allstate Ins. Co.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Br.") at 7 ("The district court, exercising diversity jurisdiction in this declaratory judgment action, applies the substantive law of Pennsylvania."), Doc. No. 15-10; Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Br.") at 10, n.2 ("There is no dispute that Pennsylvania law applies."), Doc. No. 16-1. When interpreting an insurance contract, Pennsylvania courts apply the following rules of contract interpretation:
401 Fourth St., Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Grp., 583 Pa. 445, 879 A.2d 166, 171 (2005). In addition, "[w]hether a particular loss is within the coverage of an insurance policy is ... a question of law and may be decided on a motion for summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 441 Pa.Super. 446, 657 A.2d 1252, 1255 (1995).
As this matter involves the reduction of UM/UIM benefits, the MVFRL applies. The MVFRL, inter alia, establishes the obligations of insurance companies with respect to UM/UIM coverage.
In addition,
Erie Ins. Exchange v. Larrimore, 987 A.2d 732, 740 (Pa. Super. 2009) (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Resseguie, 980 F.2d at 232 (predicting that "the Pennsylvania Supreme court would narrowly and strictly construe the provision of the MVFRL that allows an insured to request lower UIM coverage limits than are mandated by § 1731" (footnote omitted)).
Concerning validly requesting a reduction of UM/UIM coverage,
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Catalini, 18 A.3d 1206, 1209 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Section 1734 does not "dictate[] the particular language that the parties must utilize to accomplish a valid request for the reduction of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage limits." Hartford Ins. Co. v. O'Mara, 907 A.2d 589, 603 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).
In the instant case, the parties' arguments can be summarized as follows: Plaintiff asserts three arguments in support of her claim that the court should grant summary judgment in her favor and declare that the amount of her UIM coverage is $100,000/$300,000 stacked for two vehicles. See Pl.'s Br. at 2. First, Plaintiff contends that the plain language of the March 2003 Form supports her claim for $200,000 of UIM coverage. See id. at 10. In this regard, Plaintiff points out that the March 2003 Form does not expressly designate the amount of UM/UIM coverage for Vehicles 1 through 3, except for the language on the form stating: "If the first named insured has not rejected [UM/UIM Insurance, the UM/UIM] limits will be included in your policy at limits equal to your Bodily Injury Liability ... limits unless the first named insured selects lower limits.". See id. at 13; see also Compl., Ex. D. Plaintiff asserts that the March 2003 Form did not inform the Limandris that the failure to make a specific election (by checking one of the boxes on the form) would result in the prior election remaining in effect. See id. Plaintiff notes that Collard testified during her deposition that a request for lower UM/UIM limits stays in effect until there is a new election on a new form. See id. (citing Collard Dep. at 24, 47-48). Thus, the March 2003 Form superseded any prior elections for UM/ UIM coverage, and "[g]iven the strict requirements for waiving or reducing UM/ UIM Coverage and the policy reasons for the same, it is clear that the Limandris did not effectively reduce their UM/UIM Coverage for vehicles one (1) through three (3)." See id. at 14.
Plaintiff's second argument is that the March 2003 Form is ambiguous and, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, must be interpreted against Allstate. See id. at 15-16. As already mentioned, Plaintiff contends this form, read in isolation, provides that UM/UIM coverage will be equal to the bodily injury liability limits unless the named insured specifically requests lower limits, and it does not state that it will be
For her final argument, Plaintiff argues that the bi-annual renewals and the payments of lower premiums over an approximately ten-year period are irrelevant in this court's determination of the amount of coverage. See id. at 17. She notes that "the presumption that the insured has notice of available UM/UIM Coverage options when provided with the statutorily-mandated notice does not relieve the insurer of providing UM/UIM limits equal to third-party liability coverage absent the insured's written request for lower coverage limits." Id. (citing Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triboski-Gray, 584 F.Supp.2d 687, 693 (M.D. Pa. 2008)). She also asserts that "an insured's actual knowledge of lower coverage provided by the insurer is legally insignificant absent a valid written request of the insured for reduced UM/UIM Coverage." Id. (citing Resseguie, 980 F.2d at 233). She further states that "[a]n insured's payment of premiums for several years with policy providing UM/UIM Coverage less than liability limits does not operate as a waiver of the statutory right to UM/UIM Coverage equal to liability limits, unless the insured executed a valid request for lower UM/ UIM Coverage." Id. at 18 (citing Breuninger v. Pennland Ins. Co., 450 Pa.Super. 149, 675 A.2d 353 (1996)).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Allstate generally argues that Plaintiff is only entitled to $15,000/$30,000 in UM/UIM coverage stacked by two vehicles. See Def.'s Br. at 1.
Regarding the March 2003 Form, Allstate points out that the Limandris had already dropped UM/UIM coverage to $15,000/$30,000 on all their insured vehicles (including the 1999 Plymouth Neon for which the 2003 Isuzu Rodeo involved in the Accident replaced) in September 2001. See id. at 11. The Isuzu Rodeo was therefore
Allstate also contends that Plaintiff cannot simply rely on the fact that the Limandris checked only the "15/30" box for UM/ UIM coverage on Vehicle 4 in the March 2003 Form because there is no evidence that the Limandris ever intended to select the $15,000/$30,000 limit only on Vehicle 4 (the 2001 Pontiac Sunfire) and then have the UM/UIM coverage on the other three vehicles changed to $100,000/$300,000. See id. It points out that Mrs. Limandri testified that she wanted the coverages on all their vehicles to be uniform. See id. It also asserts that the "onus is on the named insured to request changes to underinsured motorist benefits." Id. (citing Guglielmelli, 628 F. App'x at 140); see also Br. of Def., Allstate Ins. Co., in Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 6, Doc. No. 20-3 (citations omitted). It further asserts that
Id. at 13.
As additional support, Allstate references Plaintiff's prior interaction with Allstate regarding two other accidents in which she made UM/UIM claims and asserts that this validates its contention that the Policy provided only a $15,000/$30,000 stacked UM/UIM limit at the time of the Accident. See id. For Plaintiff's March 2003 accident, Plaintiff received the $100,000/ $300,000 UM/UIM limit for one vehicle (the 2001 Sunfire) because Allstate had not yet received the sign-down form for this vehicle and was charging the Limandris a premium based on the $100,000/ $300,000 UM/UIM limit. See id. Once Allstate received the March 2003 Form, it lowered the UM/UIM limit to $15,000/ $30,000 for the Pontiac Sunfire. See id. Allstate also points out that after the March 2003 Form, the Limandris received policy renewals every six months showing that all vehicles had a stacked $15,000/$30,000 UM/UIM limit. See id. In addition, when Plaintiff's Florida attorney contacted Allstate about her 2005 accident, Allstate provided the attorney a certified declarations page showing that her UM/ UIM coverage was $15,000/$30,000. See id.
Allstate relies significantly on the district court and the Third Circuit's decisions in Guglielmelli and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Kimball v. Cigna Ins. Co., 443 Pa.Super. 143, 660 A.2d 1386 (1995) to support their argument that the Limandris needed to affirmatively act to increase their coverage on Vehicles 1 through 3 when they had previously reduced the UM/UIM limits on those vehicles. In particular, Allstate points out that, in deciding matters against the insureds in those cases, the courts focused on the inaction by the insureds to correct a coverage issue if they were seeking greater coverage. See id. at 14. Allstate states that in Guglielmelli, the district court explained that the plaintiff's policy had been renewed nine times over approximately four years with all the renewals showing a reduced limit for UM/UIM coverage. See
Similarly, Allstate argues that the Limandris are like the plaintiff in Kimball because they
Id. (quoting Kimball, 660 A.2d at 1389).
Id. (quoting Kimball, 660 A.2d at 1389).
The court has summarized the parties' contentions in their supporting memoranda at length because the instant case presents an unusual set of factual circumstances dissimilar to the facts of any case
Plaintiff's point of emphasis in this case is the language at the top of the form, which basically repeats the requirements of the MVFRL insofar as it provides that if the first named insured does not select lower UM/UIM limits, the limits will be set at an amount equal to the policy's bodily injury liability limits. Unfortunately, despite this language and the Limandris' lack of marking on the checkboxes next to the UM/UIM limits for Vehicles 1 through 3 being the primary focus of Plaintiffs' arguments, Allstate has (as best the court can discern) devoted no part of its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment or its brief in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment to discussing how the court should interpret this language in relation to the rest of the form.
Despite Allstate not addressing the above language in its briefs, the court agrees with Allstate that Plaintiff is only entitled to $15,000/$30,000 stacked UM/ UIM under the Policy. Mr. Limandri unequivocally signed-down the UM/UIM coverage limits to $15,000/$30,000 on all four of the Limandris' vehicles in September 2001.
The question presented here is whether the Limandris could change the UM/UIM limits for Vehicles 1 through 3 by failing to check any box for a lower limit for those vehicles on the March 2003 Form and then relying on the statement at the top of the form providing that unless the first named insured selects a lower limit, the UM/UIM limits will equal the bodily injury liability limits. Plaintiff would have the court find that their silence combined with the language at the top of the form constitutes an election for UM/UIM coverage commensurate with the bodily injury liability limits. Allstate argues that the Limandris needed to take an affirmative action. The court agrees with Allstate.
It would be an unreasonable interpretation of the March 2003 Form if the court would conclude that the Limandris, by failing to check any of the boxes for an UM/ UIM limit for Vehicles 1 through 3, changed their September 2001 election of UM/UIM limits of $15,000/$30,000 for those vehicles. As Allstate noted, when Mr. Limandri chose the lower UM/UIM limits in September 2001, the form explained that these choices would apply to all future renewals, continuations, and changes in the Policy until they contacted their Allstate agent or Allstate told them otherwise. Leaving the check boxes blank for Vehicles 1 through 3 on the March 2003 Form is not affirmative evidence of a choice to increase UM/UIM coverages, as there is no indication that they purposefully decided not to check off one of the limit boxes to increase their UM/UIM coverage for those three vehicles. In addition, the language at the top of the form about not choosing a lower limit resulting in the higher coverage is inapplicable because the Limandris chose lower limits in September 2001 and the March 2003 Form did not affirmatively indicate that they were changing those limits.
Moreover, the title of the form is "REQUEST FOR LOWER LIMITS OF COVERAGE FOR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE." By March 10, 2003, the date of the execution of the March 2003 Form, the Limandris had already elected to have three of their vehicles with the lowest possible UM/UIM limit (out of the specifically identified limits). The only vehicle with a higher limit was Vehicle 4. A much more plausible interpretation of the
To the extent that there is an ambiguity with ascertaining the parties' intent through the form, the overwhelming record evidence supports the court's conclusion that the Limandris intended to keep the $15,000/$30,000 UM/UIM limits on Vehicles 1 through 3 and reduce the UM/ UIM limits for Vehicle 4. Mrs. Limandri testified that she intended her coverages for all vehicles to be uniform; thus, it is much more probable and plausible that the Limandris intended this March 2003 sign-down to match Vehicle 4 with the reduced UM/UIM limits for their other three vehicles. There is no evidence in the record (other than Plaintiff's interpretation of the March 2003 Form) showing that the Limandris ever expressed any intention of increasing the UM/UIM limits on Vehicles 1 through 3 when they executed the March 2003 Request Form.
In addition, as noted by Plaintiff, there are restrictions with the court considering the applicability of the information provided in the renewals that Allstate provided to the Limandris every six months for ten years and even the fact that they paid premiums based in part on them carrying $15,000/$30,000 UM/UIM limits on their vehicles. Plaintiffs' arguments are based on a request that the court find that the March 2003 Form was not a valid waiver of UM/UIM coverage. Plaintiffs' arguments are misplaced, however, because the March 2003 Form has no effect on the Limandris' reduction in UM/UIM benefits whatsoever. The valid election of reduced UM/UIM coverage limits occurred in September 2001 and, for Vehicles 1 through 3, those limits continued through the March 2003 Form when the Limandris did not affirmatively change them on the form.
Further, from all indications, the Limandris intended to maintain the $15,000/$30,000 in UM/UIM limits on their vehicles. While the court recognizes that Mrs. Limandri stated that she never read the renewal forms, the Limandris received renewal forms every six months for approximately ten years in which the declarations page showed that the UM/ UIM coverage for their vehicles was $15,000/$30,000 and not $100,000/$300,000. The Limandris do not assert that they ever contested these numbers by claiming that they sought higher coverage by complaining to Allstate. In addition, the Limandris paid premiums reflecting the lower UM/UIM coverages for approximately ten years.
The Limandris executed a valid reduction of their UM/UIM coverage for their four covered vehicles in September 2001 when they signed and returned the September 2001 Form. The March 2003 Form did not affirmatively change this reduction in limits, and the record contains no evidence of the Limandris' intent to increase the UM/UIM coverage in the three vehicles. Accordingly, at the time of Plaintiff's accident in 2013, where there were two covered vehicles under the Policy, Plaintiff was entitled to seek no more than the $15,000/$30,000 UM/UIM limits stacked by two vehicles. As such, the court will grant Allstate's motion for summary judgment (insofar as it seeks judgment in Allstate's favor on Plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim) and deny Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on her declaratory judgment claim.
The court will enter a separate order.
Collard indicated that requests to lower coverage limits are effective on the date signed by the insured. See Collard Dep. at 21; see also Pl.'s Facts at ¶ 14; Def.'s Resp. at ¶ 14. Regarding when a request for lower limits is necessary, Collard testified as follows:
Collard Dep. at 38-39.
793 A.2d at 152.
Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Novitsky, 366 F.Supp.3d 638, 646 (M.D. Pa. 2019).
After the plaintiff was injured by an uninsured motorist, she attempted to recover under the UM provisions in her policy, but the insurance company indicated that she was bound to the same limits of coverage as her mother elected when she signed-down. See id. She filed an action against the insurance company, and she won at the trial court. See id. The insurance company filed an appeal to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court reversed the trial court.
In reversing the trial court, the Superior Court pointed out that even though the plaintiff was not a named insured when her mother signed-down the UM limits, she was a named insured when an endorsement amending the policy was received at her household. See id. at 1388-89. This endorsement clearly showed the reduced UM limits. See id. at 1389. Yet, the plaintiff took no action. See id. The Superior Court explained that the plaintiff "could have increased coverage under her mother's policy (with accompanying premium increases) or secured her own separate policy should her mother not be amenable to the increased coverage and additional cost associated therewith." Id. The plaintiff failed to do so. The court also noted that the limits were in effect for two renewal periods without the plaintiff having acted, and the premiums were paid without questioning the insurance company's agent about the coverage. See id. The court explained that "[t]o find that the plaintiff is not bound by her mother's election and remaining silent on the issue of increased coverage, while reaping the benefits of reduced rates, would be to reward inaction. Here, the plaintiff had the means and opportunity to avoid any insurance shortfall, but she took no action to remedy the matter." Id.