JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR., District Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Jerome Caldwell commenced this putative civil rights action on or about January 15, 2019, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during a physical altercation with an Allentown Police Officer. Specifically, Caldwell states that on August 31, 2018, Defendant Police Officer Andrew J. Beky
The following facts are drawn from Caldwell's Complaint and are accepted as true, with all inferences drawn in Caldwell's favor. See Lundy v. Monroe Cty. Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 3:17-CV-2255, 2017 WL 9362911, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2017) ("In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2219033 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2018).
Caldwell avers that on August 31, 2018, Officer Beky "slam[med] [Caldwell's] face on the hood of the [police] car causing injuries to [his] face[,] for[e]head[,] and eyes." Compl. at 6.
With respect to the legal authority upon which his claims are brought, the Complaint states that Caldwell's treatment at the hands of Officer Beky and his resulting injuries constitute a "violation of the 8th Amendment of [sic] cruel a[nd] unusual punishment." Compl. at 6. Caldwell also claims that Officer Beky "willfully knowingly intentionally abuse[d] his authority," "torture[d]" him, and used "excessive force." Id.
Caldwell commenced this action on January 15, 2019, with the filing of the Complaint and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See ECF Nos. 1, 2. The Complaint initially named four Domino's Pizza employees as Defendants. In an Order dated January 23, 2019, the Court granted Caldwell's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his claims as to the four Domino's employees.
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on April 2, 2019. See ECF No. 13. Having observed no docket activity for over two months thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated June 6, 2019, directing Caldwell to "mail to the Clerk of the Court a brief in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss within fourteen days after he receives this order," and advising him that "his failure to respond to the Motion to Dismiss may result in the motion being granted as uncontested and this case being dismissed without further notice." ECF No. 14 (emphasis in original). The Court never received any filing from Caldwell in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
In rendering a decision on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court must "accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."
The Defendants' motion to dismiss rests exclusively on the contention that Caldwell cannot bring a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. According to the Defendants, the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments attaches only after an individual is convicted of a crime. Because the alleged events forming the basis of his claim took place before Caldwell was convicted of a crime, the argument goes, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution—the only legal authority explicitly identified in the Complaint—cannot form the basis of his claim, and the Complaint must be dismissed. See Defs.' Mem. at 4.
As an initial matter, the Defendants correctly identify the scope of rights conferred by the Eighth Amendment as applying only to post-conviction detainees: "[t]he Eighth `was designed to protect those convicted of crimes . . . .' Thus, the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply until `after sentence and conviction.'"
As the Court has previously noted, "[w]hen a plaintiff files pro se, [the court has] `a special obligation to construe his complaint liberally.'" Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 694 (3d Cir. 1992)); see Caldwell v. Luzerne Cty. Corr. Facility Mgmt. Employees, 732 F.Supp.2d 458, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (same). In the spirit of liberal construction and based on the underlying factual allegations, the Court easily identifies an attempt by Caldwell to plead an excessive force claim. Indeed, Caldwell states that Officer Beky "willfully knowingly intentionally abuse[d] his authority," "torture[d]" him, and used "excessive force." Compl. at 6. "[W]here, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right `to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.'" Boyden v. Twp. of Upper Darby, 5 F.Supp.3d 731, 736 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 394). Having identified an attempt to plead a Fourth Amendment claim,
Excessive force claims in an arrest context are analyzed under an "objective reasonableness" standard, such that "to state a claim for excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable." Boyden, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 737 (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2005)). Put another way, this Court's inquiry "is whether the force used to effect that seizure was excessive, and thus unreasonable. The reasonableness assessment `requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.'" Boyden, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 737 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
Here, the specific factual allegations in Caldwell's Complaint can be distilled to the following: (1) Officer Beky "slam[med] [his] face on the hood of the [police] car causing injuries to [his] face[,] for[e]head[,] and eyes," Compl. at 6; (2) the alleged violative conduct took place after Officer Beky responded to a Domino's pizza delivery driver's telephone call to police claiming that Caldwell had not paid for his pizza, id.; and (3) Officer Beky "did not believe" Caldwell's explanation that he had already paid for the pizza by credit card over the telephone. Id. Apart from these allegations, the Complaint is limited to conclusory assertions regarding the harm Caldwell claims to have suffered and his desire to "hold[] the City and the County responsible." Id.
The few specific factual allegations identified above are, without more, insufficient to support a plausible inference that Officer Beky acted unreasonably in his interactions with Caldwell. Notably absent from the Complaint are any allegations as to Caldwell's conduct during his interaction with Officer Beky. Without any allegations as to the circumstances of the encounter beyond Officer Beky's alleged misconduct, the Court is unable to plausibly infer that Officer Beky's actions were objectively unreasonable. That is, the Court cannot "balanc[e] . . . the nature and quality of the intrusion on [Caldwell's] Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake" in a manner that would lead to a plausible inference that Beky acted unreasonably—there is simply nothing against which to balance Beky's alleged conduct. Boyden, 5 F. Supp. 3d at 737 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Compare Broadwater v. Fow, 945 F.Supp.2d 574, 584 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that the complaint stated a claim for excessive force where the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that he was pepper sprayed while restrained by a seatbelt and handcuffs in a patrol car, then removed from the car and struck in the face and tasered, despite never displaying any actions evincing an attempt to escape the patrol car). In light of Caldwell's failure to sufficiently plead a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, this claim must be dismissed. Moreover, because Caldwell's Fourth Amendment claim is the only identifiable claim beyond the Complaint's erroneous reference to the Eighth Amendment, the Complaint in its entirety must be dismissed.
Although the Complaint in its current form requires dismissal, it is well recognized that "[i]n the Third Circuit, a court must grant leave to amend before dismissing a civil rights complaint that is merely deficient." Caldwell, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 468 (citing Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007), Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 428 (3d Cir. 2001), and Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)). Additionally, it would seem Caldwell has preemptively sought leave to amend his Complaint, as he explicitly "reserve[s] all right [sic] to amend this Complaint." Compl. at 6. Because it is possible that amending the Complaint to add additional factual context might yield a viable Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, this claim is dismissed without prejudice. Caldwell is granted leave to amend his Complaint to re-plead this claim. He is, however, advised that the "amended complaint must be complete in all respects. It must be a new pleading which stands by itself without reference to the original complaint." Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Moreover, as with Caldwell's initial Complaint, the amended complaint "may not contain conclusory allegations[; r]ather, it must establish the existence of specific actions by the defendants which have resulted in constitutional deprivations." Id. (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)). "The amended complaint must also be `simple, concise, and direct' as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Young, 809 F. Supp. at 1198 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1)).
If he wishes to amend his complaint in this fashion, Caldwell shall file his Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this decision.
Caldwell's Eighth Amendment claim, however, is dismissed with prejudice. It is clear that any attempt to re-plead this claim would be futile. Synthes, Inc. v. Marotta, 281 F.R.D. 217, 224 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (explaining that a district court may deny leave to amend a complaint where such amendment would be futile).
For the reasons discussed above, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted, in accordance with this decision. Caldwell is granted leave to amend his Complaint to re-plead his Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. His Amended Complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days of the issuance of this decision.
