OPINION

JOHN J. THOMAS, Bankruptcy Judge.

Section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code directs the Court to confirm a plan if a number of requirements are met. At issue in the above cases are two of those requirements. First, the plan must comply with the provisions of Chapter 13 and other applicable provisions of the statute, and second, the plan must be proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) and (3).

The Chapter 13 Trustee, Charles J. DeHart, III, has challenged language utilized in the proposed plans filed by Debtors, Mark and Megan Stone ("Stone") and Nicole Travis ("Travis"). While the cases are distinct, they are being advanced by the same counsel, involve overlapping issues, and will be disposed of in this one Opinion.

In Re Nicole Travis, 5-17-bk-00482-JJT

Nevertheless, there are discrete issues in the Travis case that I address at the outset. The Trustee has questioned two items on the Debtor's computation of disposable income, Official Bankruptcy Form 122C. The first item is at line 23 where the Debtor deducts a cell phone expense of $153.14, and the second is a $70.38 deduction at line 26 which represents a monthly expense for items for the Debtor's grandmother in a nursing home.

Attached to Official Bankruptcy Form 122C is a summary by her cell phone provider establishing that her monthly average cell phone bill is $153.14. The Debtor, a nurse by trade, testified as to how access to a cell phone is a practical benefit in her job but is not reimbursable by the employer. She also confirms this is a personal phone. Since it is a personal phone, the Trustee argues that personal cell phone expense is an element of the "National and Local Standards" required to be utilized by § 1325(b)(2)1 and is not a separate deduction. The Trustee is correct. In 2014, the Internal Revenue Service altered the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) to include cell phone expense as part of its housing and utility allowance category of Local Standards. That is not to say that other necessary expenses cannot be identified as additional deductions. Regrettably, an allocation of this cell phone expense between business and personal use was not offered on this record. Though the Debtor has not offered such evidence, I am satisfied to aportion the work portion of the expense at 50%. While the use of a cell phone is not a requirement for employment, I do find it to be a requirement for this Debtor to perform quality nursing services.

I turn now to the dispute involving line item 26 in the amount of $70.38 monthly as an expense for her nursing home-bound grandmother. The disposition depends wholly on whether that expense is necessary. In testimony, the Debtor set out that her grandmother raised her, and the Debtor feels an obligation to make her comfortable in the nursing home. While blind, the grandmother retains her faculties. The funds spent by the Debtor are primarily for food items preferred by the grandmother and replacement clothing and shoes. The nursing home otherwise supplies all nutritional items deemed necessary.

I am satisfied that the food items are a welcome treat for the grandmother, but they do not represent a necessary expense of the Debtor. On the other hand, the nursing home does not supply clothing, and it is unreasonable to expect that the same clothing and shoes would be suitable over the passing years considering the vicissitudes of one's physical condition in the nursing home. I will allow 50% of the identified expense.

I now turn to what appears to be an issue of greater concern to the Trustee. Paragraph 8.A of the plan is typically utilized by debtors in our District to specify special provisions not otherwise included in the standard plan of our District. In this case, Debtor's counsel has included a number of provisions designed to either restate the law or bind the parties. Paragraph 8.A is set forth in a footnote in its entirety.2

I have no problem if Debtor's counsel restates controlling law for the benefit of plan recipients. In such a case, citation to proper authority should be utilized. The Court cannot confirm a plan unless it complies with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). I am troubled that many of these special provisions added by the Debtor are not consistent with the Code. Some of these concerns were addressed by counsel at the confirmation hearing when he agreed to delete a portion of the offensive provisions.

There are issues that remain unresolved.

Proofs of claim

The plan at ¶ 8.A.(1) purports to control when a claim is deemed "allowed." Section 502(a) of the Bankruptcy Code addresses that issue and should not be contradicted by what appears to be an inconsistent statement.

Payments during Applicable Commitment Period

Paragraph 8.A.(2) advances this plan as a "multiplier" plan and not a "temporal" plan . . . meaning that the Debtor is obligated only to make a certain dollar amount of payments rather then commit all disposable income over a fixed period of time. I am not aware of whether there is any controlling law in our jurisdiction on this issue. I did have the opportunity to discuss this issue some time ago in In re Vidal, 418 B.R. 135 (Bankr. M.D.Pa. 2009). I commented on the then-existing split of authority on the subject and concluded that "[i]t makes sense for those courts that interpret projected disposable income as a forward looking concept to view the applicable commitment period as a mandatory minimum ensuring that excess income be invested in the plan [temporal]. Conversely, for those courts that see projected disposable income as fixed at historical levels, the applicable commitment period would logically be viewed as a multiplier by which total contribution to the plan could be measured." In re Vidal, 418 B.R. at 137. In that case, I concluded that I saw projected disposable income as fixed at historical levels and, thus, concluded that the commitment period served as a multiplier. Since that holding, the United States Supreme Court has held that the projected disposable income is forward looking. Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 177 L. Ed. 2d 23 (2010). Such being the case, I am inclined to find that the applicable commitment period is temporal in nature, and the language in Debtor's plan is unacceptable because the Debtor could be compelled to remain in Chapter 13 for the entire commitment period.

Adequate Assurance under § 366.

Debtor's plan attempts to modify the terms of § 366 and constitutes a provision inconsistent with the requirements of § 1325(a)(1).

Consent to Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction

In this section, the plan appears to compel bankruptcy jurisdiction regardless of the legitimacy of that jurisdiction. Post confirmation jurisdiction is extremely limited and cannot be enlarged by the terms of a plan. In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 161 (3rd Cir. 2004).

If it was the Debtor's intent to secure a waiver of a party's right to seek a final dispositive order from an Article III Court in a related matter, then I would be hard pressed to find a waiver prior to the initiation of litigation.

Miscellaneous Provision under ¶ 8.A.(8)

This paragraph discusses the impact of discharge and distribution of plan payments. It is literally incomprehensible. It generally links critical bankruptcy events with the termination of the automatic stay without disclosing that, since property vests in the Debtor on confirmation pursuant to ¶ 6 of her plan, the automatic stay of an act against property of the estate at the time of filing terminates on confirmation. 11 USC § 362(c)(1).

It is for all these reasons that the Trustee's objection to the plan must be sustained.

In Re Mark and Megan Stone, 5-17-bk-01661-JJT The Stone matter involves an issue that overlaps Travis. More specifically, language dealing with adequate assurance under § 366 is virtually identical with that present in the Travis plan, and, similarly, I find the language objectionable.

The Stone plan also addresses the disposition of proceeds from a lawsuit under the Fair Debt Collections Act, valued by the Debtors in their schedules at $1001. Debtors' plan at ¶ 8.A.(1)b. specifies that virtually all aspects of that litigation, including settlement and legal fees, are no longer subject to Court approval upon confirmation.

The Debtors have exempted this lawsuit and specifically articulated that 100% of its value was claimed exempt. (Doc. #1 at page 24.) No one has timely objected, and, therefore, the exemption is deemed allowed. Schwab v. Reilly, 560 U.S. 770, 793, 130 S.Ct. 2652, 2668, 177 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2010). Moreover, this lawsuit vests in Debtors on confirmation. Plan at ¶ 8.A.(1)b. The Trustee's argument that funds received over the numerical amount of $1001 (identified as the estimated value of the lawsuit) should somehow be paid into the estate, is difficult to fathom. First, the Debtors appear to have ample exemption available to them under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). Second, if the Trustee was skeptical of the value of the claim, he should have objected to the exemption claiming 100% of the lawsuit. Once that exemption deadline passed, it really is too late to question whether its benefit should flow to the creditors. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4003(b).

Generally, the Stone plan contains similar language found objectionable in Travis. Where such is the case, my conclusions in Travis would be applicable in Stone.

It is for all these reasons that confirmation must be denied in both cases.

My Order(s) will follow.