OPINION

{Nature of Proceeding: Objection (#57) to Debtor's Third Amended Plan (#54)}

JOHN J. THOMAS, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Debtor, Melanie Kohli, seeks confirmation of her Third Amended Chapter 13 Plan. A creditor, Joel Mortimer, has objected. Mortimer is the former spouse of the Debtor. While the Objector makes vague reference to the "bad faith" of the plan, the thrust of the Objection and the hearing thereon focuses on the Objector's contention that all of Debtor's projected disposable income is not committed to the proposed plan in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B).

Debtor's plan proposes to pay into the plan a total of $43,451.36. (Doc. #54.) Her 122C-2 statement, an official form completed by the Debtor to identify her disposable income, suggests that she has disposable income of $679.82 per month. (Doc. #41.) Because Debtor exceeds the median family income, this commitment must continue for 60 months. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4). The Debtor, therefore, calculates that, absent exceptional circumstances, she must fund the plan by paying to the Trustee the minimum sum of $40,789.20.

The Debtor did not dispute the statutory requirement that disposable income, as defined by the Bankruptcy Code and based on historical income and expenses, be dedicated to the plan. Having said that, it was somewhat surprising that Debtor's testimony at the confirmation hearing centered around Schedule I and J which deal with income and expenses post petition. Focusing on post-petition income and expenses would certainly be relevant if the Debtor was seeking to propose a plan that paid less than the calculated disposable income based on historical figures as presented by Official Form 122C-2. Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 177 L.Ed. 2d 23 (2010). If that is not the case, the issue before me is, simply, whether disposable income based on prepetition income and expense has been calculated properly. If the plan contribution is less than what I so calculate, I am compelled to sustain the Objection.

The Objector has argued that the Debtor has added a $1,131.63 mortgage payment to her list of allowable expenses on Official Form 122C-2. (Doc. #41 at page 5.) By signing this form, the Debtor has declared under penalty of perjury that she owes this debt secured by property she owns. In her response to the Objection, Debtor acknowledges that the secured property is owned by her non-filing spouse and not her. (Doc. #60.) The Objector also raised the issue that there was actually no car loan or lease accounting for the vehicle expense of $471 identified at Item 13 on Official Form 122C-2. Debtor, at hearing, later acknowledged that the automobile was purchased outright by taking a loan on her 401k pension plan. Both of these expense deductions must be disallowed.

At hearing, the Debtor made no effort to amend or even explain the figures used in Official Form 122C-2. Rather, the Debtor appears to abandon her effort to demonstrate disposable income by reference to Official Forms 122C-1 and 122C-2, (average income and expenses over the 6 months prior to filing). At the hearing, the Debtor referenced her Amended Schedules I and J, presumably arguing that her current income and expenses have reduced her disposable income to a point where the current proposed plan is sufficient to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1). A review of Schedules I and J calculate that the net income over expense amounts to $370.95 per month. (Doc. 58 at page 7.)

The Supreme Court case of Hamilton v. Lanning is instructive as to the methodology the bankruptcy courts should implement in order to ascertain projected disposable income. It is fairly clear that the Court embraces a mechanism that begins with the past average disposable income and expenses (Official Forms 122C-1 and 122C-2) and, in exceptional cases, make appropriate adjustments based on significant changes that are anticipated regarding the debtor's financial condition. Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 130 S. Ct. at 2471. In contrast to Lanning, Debtor's entire presentation at the hearing was that this Court should ignore "disposable income" as defined in § 1325(b)(2) and decide projected disposable income solely on the basis of Schedule I and J. That methodology is not acceptable. The Debtor must begin with disposable income as set forth in Official Form 122-C1, and then explain to the Court how changes in circumstance requires an appropriate adjustment to those discrete line items in Official Form 122-C1. The process actually utilized in this case implies that Schedules I and J should replace Official Forms 122C-1 and 122C-2 and ignores the rigid standards adopted by Congress in § 1325 (b).1

Had the Debtor conceded that she cannot fund a plan requiring the payment of disposable income because of a change in income and/or expenses, then I would have considered evidence relative to those future-looking Schedules I and J. Since the Debtor has not made that concession, my disposition is simply based on whether disposable income has been calculated correctly. It has not been because of the improper inclusion of the spouse's mortgage expense and the nonexisting car loan and, therefore, confirmation is denied.

My Order will follow.