REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARTIN C. CARLSON, Magistrate Judge.

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case

The plaintiff, Corey Bracey, is a state prisoner, who commenced this case by filing a civil complaint on December 1, 2014, (Doc. 1.), which he subsequently amended on December 12, 2014. (Doc. 5.) In this amended complaint, Bracey recited that he had been involved in a physical altercation with prison staff at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Huntingdon on November 17, 2012, an affray which resulted in exposure of one prison staff member, Defendant Adam Park, to Bracey's blood. (Id.)

Because of this blood exposure, prison staff sought Bracey's consent to obtain a blood sample from the plaintiff for testing to determine if staff had been exposed to HIV or hepatitis. (Id.) Bracey refused to provide a blood sample, and prison officials, acting through their counsel Defendant Travis Anderson, went to state court to secure an order authorizing them to obtain and disclose this information, a procedure which is expressly authorized by statute. 35 Pa.C.S. §§7601-7611. Following a hearing conducted before Judge Stewart Kurtz of the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County, Bracey was compelled to provide a blood sample for this testing purpose. (Id.) Bracey appealed this ruling in state court, but to no avail. The decision of the state judge was upheld when Bracey's appeal was dismissed as moot.

This legal procedure used to gain important medical information relating to inmate and correctional officer safety and well-being now forms the basis of Bracey's amended complaint in federal court, a complaint which was filed some two years after-the-fact, and which seeks injunctive and declaratory relief along with compensatory and punitive damages. (Id.) In this amended complaint, Bracey sues the correctional staff member exposed to his blood in November 2012, Adam Park, and the attorney who successfully litigated the state case, Travis Anderson, alleging abuse of process by both of these defendants. These officials have been served, and have now filed a motion to dismiss Bracey's complaint. (Doc. 21.) This motion has been briefed by both parties, (Docs. 22 and 29.),1 and is, therefore, ripe for resolution.

For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the amended complaint be dismissed and this action be closed.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss — Standard of Review

The corrections defendants have moved to dismiss this amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court "need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss." Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally a court need not "assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged." Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do." Id. at 555. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:

Id. at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the court of appeals has also observed: "The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the `plausibility' standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege `enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings `allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing `more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.' Id. A complaint which pleads facts `merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, [ ] `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement of relief."'" Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1861, 182 L. Ed. 2d 644 (U.S. 2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: "First, the court must `tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, `because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Id. at 1950. Finally, `where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.' Id." Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:

In our view, these pleading standards apply to all aspects of the court's threshold analysis of a complaint's legal sufficiency. Thus, we will apply this analysis both when assessing the adequacy of the factual assertions set forth in the amended complaint, and when examining whether a complaint properly invokes the jurisdiction of this court.

B. This Amended Complaint Fails to State A Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted

Applying these legal benchmarks in this case, dismissal of this amended complaint is warranted because the amended complaint fails on a number of scores to meet the substantive standards required by law, in that it does not set forth a "short and plain" statement of a cognizable violation of some right guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Some of the flaws in this particular pro se amended complaint are discussed separately below.

1. To the Extent That Bracey Seeks to Re-litigate Claims That Were Previously Tried in State Court, the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Applies and Bars Re-litigation of These Matters

At the outset, to the extent that Bracey's amended complaint seeks to re-litigate a matter which has previously been conclusively resolved by the state courts in 2012, the res judicata, collateral estoppel and issue preclusion doctrines apply and compel dismissal of any of the previously litigated claims that are made by the plaintiff in this amended complaint relating to rulings in his prior state case by the state courts. Collateral estoppel, res judicata and issue preclusion are doctrines which play a vital role in litigation. It has long been recognized that "[t]he doctrine[] of . . . collateral estoppel, now. . termed . . . issue preclusion, `shar[es] the common goals of judicial economy, predictability, and freedom from harassment. . . .' Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir.1988). Generally speaking, the . . . doctrine of issue preclusion, `precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been put in issue and directly determined adversely to the party against whom the estoppel is asserted.' Melikian v. Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274, 277 (3d Cir.1986)." Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., Inc. 889 F.2d 41, 44 (3d. Cir.1989)(citations omitted).

The parameters of this doctrine, which precludes relitigation of certain issues, have been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the following terms:

Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174-5 (3d Cir. 2007). Stated succinctly, principles of collateral estoppel compel a later court to honor the an earlier decision of a matter that was actually litigated. Dici v. Commonwealth of Pa., 91 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 1997). This doctrine, which involves an assessment of the overlap between issues presented in separate lawsuits, raises essentially legal questions which are often amenable to resolution by courts as a matter of law. See, e.g., Peloro v. United States, supra; Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc, supra; Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198-205 (3d Cir. 1999); Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-9 (3d Cir. 1995)(summary judgment, offensive issue preclusion).

Here, we find that, with respect to the claims made by Bracey in the instant complaint concerning rulings in his prior state case by the state courts under state law, the legal requisites for issue preclusion are fully satisfied, since: "`(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.'" Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir.1992)); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, n. 5(1979). Therefore, these claims should be dismissed.

2. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Prevents Bracey from Re-litigating these Claims Which He Lost in State Court

In addition, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here and bars further consideration of this matter, which arises out of a previously litigated state case. Given these state court proceedings, this complaint fails because we lack subject matter jurisdiction over the issues raised by the plaintiff, which necessarily invite a federal court to review, re-examine and reject state court rulings in a state case.

This we cannot do. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has spoken to this issue and has announced a rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which compels federal district courts to decline invitations to conduct what amounts to appellate review of state trial court decisions. As described by the Third Circuit:

Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). Because federal district courts are not empowered by law to sit as reviewing courts, reexamining state court decisions, "[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction in some circumstances to review a state court adjudication." Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, LLP, 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Cases construing this jurisdictional limit on the power of federal courts have quite appropriately:

Id.

However, even within these narrowly drawn confines, it has been consistently recognized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal judges from considering civil rights lawsuits which seek to re-examine state domestic relations court rulings that are presented "by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced." Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F. App'x 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2007). In such instances, the federal courts have typically deferred to the state court decisions, and rebuffed efforts to use federal civil rights laws to review, or reverse, those state court rulings. See, e.g., Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143 (3d. Cir. 2004); Kwasnik 228 F. App'x 238, 242; Smith v. Department of Human Services, 198 F. App'x 227 (3d Cir. 2006); Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Section, 659 F.Supp.2d 672, 690 (W.D. Pa. 2009) aff'd sub nom. Van Tassel v. Lawrence County Domestic Relations Sections, 390 F. App'x 201 (3d Cir. 2010)(Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates as a jurisdictional bar to plaintiff's claims if the injuries of which she complains were caused by a state court judgment or ruling which was entered against her); Buchanan v. Gay, 491 F.Supp.2d 483, 487 (D. Del. 2007); Rose v. County of York, No. 05-5820, 2007 WL 136682 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2007); Logan v. Lillie, 965 F.Supp. 695, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1997) aff'd, 142 F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1998); Behr v. Snider, 900 F.Supp. 719, 721 (E.D. Pa. 1995).

Given this settled legal authority, applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the field, the plaintiff's claims, which necessarily invite a federal court to review, re-examine and reject state court rulings that are presented "by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced," simply may not be pursued in this federal forum and should be dismissed. Kwasnik v. Leblon, 228 F. App'x 238, 242 (3d Cir. 2007).

3. This Court Should Abstain From Ruling Upon Claims for Injunctive Relief in This State Case

Further, we note that the plaintiff also appears to request an injunction enjoining the state court in some way. (Doc. 5.) To the extent that the complaint invites this court to enjoin state cases, this pro se pleading runs afoul of a settled tenet of federal law, the Younger abstention doctrine.

The Younger abstention doctrine is inspired by basic considerations of comity that are fundamental to our federal system of government. As defined by the courts: "Younger abstention is a legal doctrine granting federal courts discretion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over a claim when resolution of that claim would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (`[W]e have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.')." Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 130 (3d Cir. 2009).

This doctrine, which is informed by principles of comity, is also guided by these same principles in its application. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed:

Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d at 131.

Once these three legal requirements for Younger abstention are met, the decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, applying these standards, federal courts frequently abstain from hearing matters which necessarily interfere with on-going state cases. Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2004); Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).

In this case, the plaintiff's pro se complaint reveals that all of the legal prerequisites for Younger abstention are present here. First, it is evident that there were state proceedings in this case. Second, it is also apparent that those proceedings afforded the plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in this lawsuit in these state cases. See Sullivan v. Linebaugh, 362 F. App'x 248, 249-50 (3d Cir. 2010). Finally, it is clear that the state proceedings implicate important state interests. See, e.g., Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2004); Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).

Since the legal requirements for Younger abstention are fully met here, the decision to abstain rests in the sound discretion of this Court. Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319, 325 (3d Cir. 2004). However, given the important state interests in the adjudication of these matters relating to correctional staff and state inmate health and safety, and recognizing that the state courts are prepared to fully address the merits of these matters, we believe that the proper exercise of this discretion weighs in favor of abstention and dismissal of this federal case at the present time. Lui v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 369 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2004); Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2002).

4. The Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity From Damages

Furthermore, in his complaint Bracey sues a correctional officer and an attorney for relying upon a legal process prescribed by state law to obtain a blood sample from the plaintiff in order to ensure staff health and safety. Even if Bracey's amended complaint had stated some sort of colorable constitutional claim, we conclude that the defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity from these claims for damages. In order to establish a civil rights claim Bracey must show the deprivation of a right secured by the United States Constitution or the laws of the United States. Satisfying these elements alone, however, does not guarantee that Bracey is entitled to recover damages from these public officials. Government officials performing "discretionary functions," are insulated from suit if their conduct did not violate a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). This doctrine, known as qualified immunity, provides officials performing discretionary functions not only defense to liability, but also "immunity from suit." Crouse v. S. Lebanon Twp., 668 F.Supp.2d 664, 671 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (Conner, J.) (citations omitted). Qualified immunity

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

Determinations regarding qualified immunity, and its application in a given case, require a court to undertake two distinct inquiries. First, the court must evaluate whether the defendant violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001), abrogated in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223; Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2007); Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir. 2006). If the defendant did not actually commit a constitutional violation, then the court must find in the defendant's favor. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If the defendant is found to have committed a constitutional violation, the court must undertake a second, related inquiry to assess whether the constitutional right in question was "clearly established" at the time the defendant acted. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. The Supreme Court has instructed that a right is clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity if a reasonable state actor under the circumstances would understand that his conduct violates that right. Williams, 455 F.3d at 191 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202).

In order to find that a right is clearly established, "the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity." Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615. The Supreme Court has explained that, at least in some cases, "a general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In some cases, "officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances." Wilson, 455 F.3d at 191 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).

The court is no longer required to conduct these two inquiries sequentially, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239-40, and it may forego difficult constitutional issues and award qualified immunity to a defendant if it is apparent that the defendant did not violate rights that were clearly established at the time the defendant acted. Id. Where a court elects to address the alleged constitutional violations, however, the court's analysis of the merits for purposes of summary judgment merges with analysis of the deprivation of federal rights for purposes of qualified immunity. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2000); Crouse, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 671; see also Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[C]rucial to the resolution of [the] assertion of qualified immunity is a careful examination of the record . . . to establish . . . a detailed factual description of the actions of each individual defendant (viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff).") Because qualified immunity entails a consideration of whether the law was clearly established at the time of a defendant's conduct, this defense, which focuses on the state of the law, presents a question of law for the court, and one which can often be resolved on summary judgment. See Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2010).

In the context of malicious prosecution claims, an essential element to such a claim is that the federal civil rights plaintiff must have actually ultimately prevailed in the underlying state litigation. See Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2009). Here it is undisputed that Bracey did not prevail in his state case. Rather, he lost that case. Therefore, this essential element to a malicious prosecution claim—prior success on the merits of the underlying case—is notably lacking here. Given this undisputed fact, we find that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in this case. Nothing could have alerted these officials that their actions in seeking, and obtaining, a court order authorizing them to take a blood sample from Bracey in order to ensure the safety of a correctional officer who had been exposed to Bracey's bodily fluids would somehow violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Therefore, these officials should be entitled to qualified immunity from damages in this case.2

5. The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Must be Dismissed From The Case

Finally, contrary, to the suggestion contained in his response to this motion to dismiss that he may still maintain a claim for damages from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Bracey's damages claims against this state agency are barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. In this case, dismissal of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, a state agency, from this amended complaint is warranted because this pro se amended complaint runs afoul of basic constitutional and statutory rules limiting lawsuits against state agencies and officials.

First, as a matter of constitutional law, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the . . . States . . . .", U. S. Const. Amend XI. By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment strictly limits the power of federal courts to entertain cases brought by citizens against the state and state agencies. Moreover, a suit brought against an individual acting in his or her official capacity constitutes a suit against the state and, therefore, also is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states, state agencies and state officials who are sued in their official capacity are generally immune from lawsuits in federal courts brought against them by citizens. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Under the Eleventh Amendment, the Commonwealth's immunity exists as a matter of law unless waived by the state, or expressly and unequivocally abrogated by Congress. The constitutional protections afforded to the states under the Eleventh Amendment also expressly apply to the state agencies that are integral parts of Pennsylvania's criminal justice system like the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly observed with respect to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections:

Lavia v. Pennsylvania, Dept. of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000)(emphasis added).

Here, Congress has not expressly abrogated this constitutional immunity with respect to federal civil rights lawsuits against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and the Commonwealth clearly has not waived its immunity. Quite the contrary, the Commonwealth has specifically by statute invoked its Eleventh Amendment immunity in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b). Thus, while Pennsylvania has waived sovereign immunity in limited categories of cases brought against the Commonwealth in state court, See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8522, Section 8521(b) flatly states that: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa.C.S.A. §8521(b).

Moreover as a matter of statutory interpretation, the plaintiff cannot bring a damages action against this state agency or state officials in their official capacity since it is also well-settled that a state, a state agency, or a state official acting in an official capacity is not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983, the principal federal civil rights statute. Will v. Michigan Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In sum, this federal civil rights claim for damages against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is barred both by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and by cases construing the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §1983. Therefore, since the Department of Corrections, as an agency of state government cannot be sued in this fashion in federal court, the Department of Corrections should be dismissed as a defendant from this action.3

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 21.), be GRANTED and the plaintiff's amended complaint be DISMISSED.

The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: