A. Richard Caputo, United States District Judge.
Presently before the Court are Defendants Canton Borough and Douglas Seeley's ("Canton Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80.); Defendants Towanda Borough, John Storzyk, and James L. Hart's ("Towanda Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 82.); and Defendants Frank Noonan, Jeffrey Miller ("Colonel Miller"), John Yencha ("Corporal Yencha"), Robert Hutchinson, Jeffrey Creeden, John Kern, Brian Fedor, Benjamin Biggus, Thomas Blair ("Trooper Blair") and James Dughi's ("Trooper Dughi") (collectively "Commonwealth Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 91.). In his Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 37.), Plaintiff David Ward
Because Mr. Ward fails to present sufficient evidence to support his claims against the Canton Defendants, their motion for summary judgment will be granted. Based on Mr. Ward's agreement that he cannot advance a Monell claim or a request for punitive damages against the Towanda Defendants, their motion for summary judgment will be granted on those claims. Because Mr. Ward has failed to allege any involvement of Commonwealth Defendants Noonan, Hutchinson, Creeden, Kern, Fedor and Biggus, their motion for summary judgment will be granted. Due to a failure of Mr. Ward to present sufficient evidence on claims against Colonel Miller and Corporal Yencha for failure to train, supervise, investigate or discipline, their motion for summary judgment will be granted. The motion for summary judgment filed by Troopers Dughi and Blair on Mr. Ward's malicious prosecution, due process and failure to train, supervise, or discipline claims will be granted because Mr. Ward has failed to advance such claims. Trooper Blair's motion for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's unlawful arrest claim will be granted as he is entitled to qualified immunity. Because there are disputed issues of fact with regard
On May 24, 2009, a DUI checkpoint was set up, operated and maintained by the Canton Borough Police Department, the Towanda Borough Police Department, and the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") on State Route Fourteen in Canton Borough, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 93, Commw. Defs.' Statement of Material and Undisputed Facts, "Commw. Defs. SMF," ¶ 1.; Doc. 109, Pl.'s Counter-statement to Commw. Defs' Undisputed Material Facts, "Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs" ¶ 1.)
Canton Borough has an approximate population of 1900 residents and ranked third in Bradford County, Pennsylvania in alcohol related crashes from 1998 to 2001 and again in 2003. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 45; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 45.) Between 1998 and 2003, the Canton Borough Police Department made fifty-one DUI arrests. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 46; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 46.) The number remained relatively constant between the years 2004 to 2006, with twenty-five total arrests for DUI. (Id.) The Bradford County DUI Task force began conducting sobriety checkpoints on Route Fourteen in Canton Borough to prevent drunk driving. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 56; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 56.)
In May 2009, the DUI checkpoint was sponsored by Canton Borough, which is a municipal entity, organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and located in Canton, Bradford County, Pennsylvania. (Canton Defs. SMF, ¶¶ 2, 7; Pl.'s CSMF-Canton Defs., ¶¶ 2, 7.) Officers were instructed to observe drivers for signs of intoxication and were provided with a script to guide their interactions with motorists. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 50; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 50.) The PSP regulations permitted officers to ask the driver to produce a license, registration and proof of financial responsibility, purportedly serving the additional purpose of checking drivers for signs of intoxication. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶¶ 47, 52-53; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶¶ 47, 52-53; Doc. 94-10, 110-23.) All officers at the checkpoint were in uniform. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 54; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs, ¶ 54.) Every vehicle was stopped at the checkpoint and the stops were brief. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶¶ 48-49; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶¶ 48-49.)
Just after midnight on May 24, 2009, a 2005 Chevrolet Equinox, driven by Jocelyn Ward ("Mrs. Ward"), was stopped by Troopers Dughi and Blair while going through the checkpoint. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 8; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 5.) The vehicle was occupied by Mrs. Ward; Mr. Ward; and three backseat passengers: Chloe Ward, Eric Tenny, and Ryan Weider. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 9; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 9.) When the window was rolled down, Trooper Dughi could detect the smell of alcohol emanating from inside the vehicle. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 10; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 10.) Trooper Dughi introduced himself to Mrs. Ward, told her what he was doing there and asked for her driver's license, insurance card, and vehicle registration. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 11; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 11.) Mrs. Ward told Trooper Dughi she did not have a driver's license with her. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 13; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 13.) Mr. Ward told Trooper Dughi, "I've been f-king drinking." (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 14; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 14.) Mr. Ward had consumed eight to ten drinks that evening over an approximate four hour time period. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 15; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 15.) Trooper Blair was positioned at the rear of the vehicle and described Mr. Ward's language as very loud and yelling toward Trooper Dughi. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 16; Pl.'s
Trooper Dughi came to the passenger side of the vehicle, opened the door and ordered Mr. Ward out, to which Mr. Ward
Mr. Ward was drive stunned
Trooper Dughi believed Mr. Ward had committed the offense of disorderly conduct and believed he had probable cause to arrest Mr. Ward. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 30.) Mr. Ward was arrested at the checkpoint for disorderly conduct, additionally charged with resisting arrest, transported to the state police barracks, arraigned by phone and released to his wife. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶¶ 31-33; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶¶ 31-33.) After a preliminary hearing, charges of Disorderly Conduct and Resisting Arrest were bound over to court. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 34; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 34.)
Corporal Yencha was the supervisor of the PSP troopers working at the DUI checkpoint on May 24, 2009. (Pl's CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 59.) As such, Corporal Yencha, upon his return to the checkpoint and upon learning of the incident with Mr. Ward, filed an "Early Intervention Use of Force Tracking Worksheet." (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶¶ 60-61; Pl's CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶¶ 60-61.) Corporal Yencha was not Trooper Dughi's regularly assigned supervisor and did not have the responsibility for determining or issuing discipline. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶¶ 59-60; Pl's CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶¶ 59-60.)
As a result of the May 24, 2009 incident, Mr. Ward filed suit and raises claims regarding probable cause for his arrest, the manner in which he was removed from the vehicle when arrested, the use of a Taser during his arrest, and the manner in which he was restrained during his arrest. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 34; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 34; Second Am. Compl.) Mr. Ward alleges he suffered physical injury as a result of the use of force, including the use of a Taser, during his arrest. (Commw. Defs. SMF, ¶ 34; Pl.'s CSMF-Commw. Defs., ¶ 36; Second Am. Compl., ¶ 66.)
Relevant to the current motions, Mr. Ward filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 37.) on December 28, 2011. On December 8, 2014, Canton Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 80.), a statement of facts (Doc. 83.), and a supporting brief (Doc. 85.). On December 8, 2014, Towanda Defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 82.), a statement of facts (Doc. 84.) and a supporting brief (Doc. 86.). On December 8, 2014, Commonwealth Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 91.), a statement of facts (Doc. 93.), and a brief in support (Doc. 96.). On January 28, 2015, Mr. Ward filed an answer to the Canton defendants' statement of facts (Doc. 107.)
Defendants seek summary judgment on most of Mr. Ward's claims. More specifically, Commonwealth Defendants challenge claims contained in Count I of the Second Amended Complaint. Commonwealth Defendants have not filed for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's claims of unlawful arrest and excessive force against Trooper Dughi. The Towanda Defendants seek summary judgment on Count II of the Second Amended Complaint but failed to seek summary judgment on Mr. Ward's claims for unlawful arrest against Officer Strozyk and Hart. The Canton Defendants seek summary judgment on Count III of the Second Amended Complaint. The motions are addressed more fully below.
Summary judgment will be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir.2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.1995)). A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Edelman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 68, 70 (3d Cir.1996). Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue of material fact is genuine if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the initial burden of proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010). The moving party may present its own evidence or, where the non-moving party has the burden of proof, simply point out to the court that "the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.2007). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the burden
"To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial." Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm'n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). "While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla." Id. (quoting Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir.2005)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Mr. Ward has alleged violations of his constitutional rights and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 states, "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... or any other person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, will be liable to the party injured." Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes." City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 749 n. 9, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). To prevail in an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir.2000); Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1993). "Action under color of state law `requires that one liable under § 1983 have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'" Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir.2011) (quoting Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir.1998)).
The Second Amended Complaint states that the defendants' actions violated Mr. Ward's due process rights in Counts I, II, and III. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment "has both substantive and procedural components." Evans v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 645 F.3d 650, 658 (3d Cir.2011). Despite allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Ward states his excessive force claim is being brought under the Fourth Amendment not the Fourteenth. (Doc. 112, 22.) Mr. Ward has failed to articulate any allegation regarding the violation of his due process rights other than
At the outset, prior to engaging in an analysis of Mr. Ward's claims under the applicable summary judgment law, it is prudent to address the claims that do not require analysis. Count I of the Second Amended Complaint names several Commonwealth Defendants. In Mr. Ward's brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, he states the following: "[b]ased upon the discovery in this case, it is admitted that the Defendants Noonan, Hutchinson, Creeden, Kern, Fedor, and Biggus had no personal involvement in the attack on Mr. Ward." (Doc. 112, 10.) Because "[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs" for liability to attach, See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.1988), it follows that the above Defendants cannot be liable to Mr. Ward. Therefore, summary judgment will be granted on behalf of Commonwealth Defendants Noonan, Hutchinson, Creeden, Kern, Fedor and Biggus.
The Commonwealth Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Mr. Ward's claims against Colonel Miller and Corporal Yencha. They have also moved for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's claims of malicious prosecution; due process; and failure to supervise, train or discipline against Troopers Dughi and Blair. They have moved for summary judgment on all other claims against Trooper Blair. The Commonwealth Defendants have not moved for summary judgment on excessive force or unlawful arrest against Trooper Dughi. Therefore, those claim remains and all other claims are addressed below.
Mr. Ward names Defendants Miller and Yencha as having been "deliberately indifferent to the following patterns, practices, and customs and the need for more or different training, supervision, investigation or discipline ..." (Second Am. Compl., ¶ 81.) To establish individual liability in a § 1983 case, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had "personal involvement in the alleged wrongs." Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Where a supervisor did not directly participate in violating a plaintiff's rights, he may still be liable under § 1983 where he "directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in his `subordinates' violations." A.M. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.2004).
Where "the policy in question concerns a failure to train or supervise municipal employees, liability under section 1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to "deliberate indifference" to the rights of persons with whom those employees will come into contact." Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir.1999) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989))). Failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference when: "(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by
A supervisor may also be liable under § 1983 "if he or she implements a policy or practice that creates an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation on the part of the subordinate and the supervisor's failure to change the policy or employ corrective practices is a cause of this unconstitutional conduct." Brown, 269 F.3d at 216. A supervisor cannot be held liable, however, on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.
In Brown, the Third Circuit set out the factors for a finding of supervisory liability as follows:
269 F.3d at 216 (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1116 (3d Cir.1989)). The court further reiterated that "it is not enough for a plaintiff to argue that the constitutionally cognizable injury would not have occurred if the superior had done more than he or she did." Brown, 269 F.3d at 216 (quoting Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118). But instead "must identify specific acts or omissions of the supervisor that evidence deliberate indifference and persuade the court that there is a "relationship between the `identified deficiency' and the `ultimate injury.'" Id.
Mr. Ward lists seven areas in which he contends that Defendants Miller and Yencha "encouraged, tolerated, ratified, [or] ... been deliberately indifferent to ... patterns, practices and customs and the need for more or different training, supervision, investigation or discipline." (Second Am. Compl., ¶ 81.) Mr. Ward alleges "Defendants Miller and Yencha failed to properly sanction or discipline officers, who are aware of and conceal and/or aid and abet violations of constitutional rights of citizens by other police officers, thereby causing and encouraging the police, including the Defendant officers in this case to violate the rights of citizens such as Mr. Ward." (Id. at ¶ 81(g).)
Turning to Colonel Miller, Mr. Ward, while acknowledging that Colonel Miller resigned before May 24, 2009, states "he was ultimately responsible for the training of the Defendant Dughi." (Doc. 112, 11.) In support of his claim, Mr. Ward states that Colonel Miller "[i]n his capacity... was aware Trooper Dughi would come in contact and confront individuals who, because they had been drinking, would be loud and boisterous and a decision would have to be made as to whether a crime was committed or not and the degree of force that should be used if crime was committed. He was also aware that the wrong choice by a trooper would cause a deprivation of constitutional rights." (Id. at 11-12.) Mr. Ward then states that Trooper Dughi was not properly
Mr. Ward provides no other argument regarding the supervisory or disciplinary role of Colonel Miller, which is logical because Colonel Miller was not the acting PSP Commissioner on May 24, 2009, nor any time afterwards. Colonel Miller is entitled to summary judgment on all claims.
Mr. Ward argues because Corporal Yencha was the PSP supervisor for the troopers on scene on May 24, 2009, "he set the scene for Trooper Dughi's encounter with Mr. Ward." (Doc. 112, 13.) Mr. Ward contends Corporal Yencha "was responsible for defining expected performance by promulgating rules and monitoring adherence to performance standards and individual discipline." (Id.) Mr. Ward cites his expert report
Mr. Ward states that "[h]ad a proper investigation been conducted, the situation would have warranted disciplinary measures because of the constitutional rights violation engaged in by the Defendant Dughi and injuries inflicted to Mr. Ward ... the Corporal is liable in his role as a supervisor." (Doc. 112, 14.) Corporal Yencha was not Trooper Dughi's regularly
Mr. Ward has not advanced a claim for failure to train, supervise, or discipline against Trooper Blair, therefore, Trooper Blair is entitled to summary judgment with regard to any claim for failure to train, supervise, or discipline.
Mr. Ward has not presented evidence with regard to a failure to train, supervise, or discipline claim against Trooper Dughi. It cannot be disputed that Trooper Dughi is one of the individuals whom Mr. Ward alleges violated his constitutional rights, therefore, any claim against Trooper Dughi for failure to train, supervise or discipline, defies logic. Trooper Dughi is entitled to summary judgment on a failure to train, supervise, or discipline claim, as a matter of law.
Mr. Ward contends that Trooper Dughi maliciously prosecuted him in Count I. Mr. Ward alleges that the there was a "violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution." (Second Am. Compl.) The Commonwealth Defendants move for summary judgment on this claim, arguing that there is no evidence of record to show that Trooper Dughi acted with malice. (Doc. 95, 29.) Mr. Ward counters that there is evidence of record which could lead a reasonable jury to find Trooper Dughi acted with malice. (Doc. 112, 19.) Mr. Ward additionally argues that he brought a Pennsylvania state law claim for the common law tort of malicious prosecution. (Doc. 112, 20-21.) Mr. Ward, however, failed to plead a claim under Pennsylvania law against Trooper Dughi and cannot now add a claim that was not alleged in the Second Amended Complaint.
477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir.2007). "If Plaintiffs have not proffered evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to all five prongs, their malicious prosecution claim must fail as a matter of law." Domenech v. City of Philadelphia, 2009 WL 1109316, at *9 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 23, 2009) aff'd, 373 Fed. Appx. 254 (3d Cir.2010).
Trooper Dughi was the affiant who filed charges against Mr. Ward of Disorderly Conduct, 18 Pa. C.S.A § 5503(A)(1), graded as misdemeanor of the third degree, and Resisting Arrest, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5104, graded as misdemeanor of the second degree. (Doc. 94, Commw. Defs. SMF-Ex I.) After a jury trial, Mr. Ward was acquitted of all charges. (Second Am. Compl., ¶ 56.; Doc. 43, Commw. Defs. Ans., ¶ 56.) The first two prongs are not in dispute.
Turning to the third prong, the Commonwealth Defendants have not advanced any argument with regard to whether or not Trooper Dughi had probable cause to arrest Mr. Ward. Trooper Dughi needed probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct because a resisting arrest charge could not have provided probable cause ab intitio. "[A] valid charge of resisting arrest requires an underlying lawful arrest, which, in turn, requires that the arresting officer possess probable cause." Com. v. Hock, 556 Pa. 409, 415, 728 A.2d 943, 946 (1999). There must have been an underlying basis for arrest that Mr. Ward would be allegedly resisting, i.e., probable cause for an arrest for disorderly conduct. Mr. Ward was charged with violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1) according to the Magisterial District Court Docket Transcript. (Commw. Defs. SMF-Ex. I.) However, as stated Commonwealth Defendants do not address probable cause and because Mr. Ward's claim against Trooper Dughi for unlawful arrest remains, the jury will be tasked with determining whether or not probable cause existed.
Commonwealth Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Mr. Ward has failed to provide evidentiary support that Trooper Dughi acted maliciously. (Doc. 95, 30.) The Third Circuit has stated that "malice can mean ill-will or the use of a prosecution for an extraneous purpose or a lack of belief in the guilt of the accused." Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1503 (3d Cir.1993). Additionally, malice can be shown "either [by] stat[ing] a deliberate falsehood or act[ing] with a reckless disregard for the truth. Proof of negligence or innocent mistake is insufficient." Id. at 1501 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)). Malice may be inferred from the absence of probable cause. Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1502 (citations omitted).
Mr. Ward's asserts that "the evidence of record clearly supports a finding that Trooper Dughi acted with malice." (Doc.
Mr. Ward argues that because his expert determined that Trooper Dughi lacked probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct, "a jury could infer malice therefrom." Id.
When a malicious prosecution claim is brought under the Fourth Amendment, "the plaintiff [must have] suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding." Johnson, 477 F.3d at 81-82. This fifth element distinguishes Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims from Pennsylvania common law malicious prosecution. See Collins v. Jones, 2015 WL 790055 * 4 n. 10 (E.D.Pa. February 24, 2015). "Pretrial custody and some onerous types of pretrial, non-custodial restrictions constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure." DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir.2005) (no seizure resulted where plaintiffs were issued only a summons and did not have to post bail). In Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir.1998), the plaintiff was seized when he was required to post $ 10,000 bond, attend all court hearings, contact pretrial services weekly and was prohibited from traveling outside of a two state area. In Johnson, a seizure was found where the plaintiff was detained for approximately two days prior to making bail, and was also required to return in six weeks for a hearing. 477 F.3d 75.
Mr. Ward sets forth that "deprivation of liberty is not an element for the state law cause of action" and that "he can recover based upon the state law cause of action." (Doc. 112, 25.) However, as discussed above, Mr. Ward fails to plead a claim under Pennsylvania law as he states in the Second Amended Complaint that his claims are pursuant to the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Mr. Ward fails to set forth any evidentiary support demonstrating that he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes thus leading to the conclusion that Trooper Dughi is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Ward's malicious prosecution claim.
Commonwealth Defendants argue against the malicious prosecution claim contending that Trooper Dughi's actions were not the proximate cause of Mr. Ward's injuries. (Doc. 95, 32-35.) Commonwealth Defendants argue that Mr. Ward's arraignment and preliminary hearing break the causal chain with regard to malicious prosecution. Because it was determined above that Mr. Ward has not come forward with evidence of a seizure as required,
Mr. Ward has not presented evidence with regard to a malicious prosecution claim against Trooper Blair. The evidence is clear that Trooper Dughi initiated the criminal proceedings against Mr. Ward and therefore, Trooper Blair is entitled to summary judgment on a malicious prosecution claim as a matter of law.
Commonwealth Defendants seek summary judgment on behalf of Trooper Blair on all Mr. Ward's claims because "[e]ven though Trooper Blair was present at Ward's arrest, Ward clearly stated during his deposition that Trooper Blair did not injure him." (Doc. 95, 41.) Commonwealth Defendants argue that tort principles of damages are applicable to actions brought pursuant to § 1983 and therefore, because Mr. Ward stated Trooper Blair did not cause him injury, he cannot be liable to him for damages. (Id.) Mr. Ward responds to Commonwealth defendants' motion stating that Trooper Blair was on his right hand side, with a hold on his right arm. (Doc. 112, 27; Doc. 105-7, 49-50, 59.) Mr. Ward testified that he suffered injury to his right biceps tendon. (Doc. 105-1, 38.) Despite Mr. Ward's statement that Trooper Blair did not cause injury to him, there remains a question of fact with regard to whether Trooper Blair played a role in causing injury to Mr. Ward. Therefore, Trooper Blair is not entitled to summary judgment based on a lack of duty to Mr. Ward.
Commonwealth Defendants alternatively argue Trooper Blair should be entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Ward's unlawful or false arrest claim based on qualified immunity. (Doc. 95, 42.) "The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from arresting a citizen except upon probable cause." Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.1995)) (citation omitted). I agree Trooper Blair is entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Ward's unlawful and false arrest claim. However, I will explore whether probable cause existed for Mr. Ward's arrest.
A defendant official may be entitled to qualified immunity or a good faith, affirmative defense. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The defense has both an objective and a subjective aspect, with the objective aspect involving a "presumptive knowledge of and respect for `basic, unquestioned constitutional rights.'" Id. at 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1001, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975)). "Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct." Taylor v. Barkes, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2042, 2044, 192 L.Ed.2d 78 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012)).
"Where a police officer makes an arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an officer will be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in a civil rights suit for unlawful arrest provided it was objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed." Rogers, 120 F.3d at 455. The inquiry has two parts: first, did the officer's conduct violate clearly established law? Secondly, did the officer "nevertheless reasonably believe that his conduct was lawful in light of the information he possessed at the time?" Berg, 219 F.3d at 272.
The Commonwealth Defendants argue that it was objectively reasonable for Trooper Blair to assist Trooper Dughi in the arrest based on his observations.
Under Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated: "whether a defendant's words or acts rise to the level of disorderly conduct hinges upon whether they cause or unjustifiably risk a public disturbance." Com. v. Hock, 556 Pa. 409, 415-16, 728 A.2d 943, 946 (1999) (holding that the statement "F___ you, you a___ h___" when made to a police officer did not constitute fighting words). Additionally, "[w]hen the regulated conduct consists of speech, ... the statute must `be carefully drawn or authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression.'" Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir.2003)) (citations omitted). "Speech that does not receive First Amendment protection, in turn, `include[s] the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or `fighting' words.'" Gilles, 427 F.3d at 204 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942)). Fighting words are "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, 62 S.Ct. at 769.
In Gilles, the district court's determination that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity was affirmed where the plaintiff singled out an individual with comments that the court deemed "especially abusive and constituted fighting words." 427 F.3d at 205. Reasoning that where a police officer is confronted by words "akin to a racial slur" and "with little time to parse" the speech, it was not unreasonable to believe the plaintiff engaged in disorderly conduct." Id. at 206. In Tate v. West Norriton Twp., 545 F.Supp.2d 480
In the current case, it is undisputed that Mr. Ward remained in the vehicle while statements were made. Additionally, the vehicle was pulled off to the side of the roadway. The statements by Mr. Ward "I've been f___ing drinking", `this is f___ing bulls —', and "I'll shut my mouth", do not rise to the level of fighting words. Such phrases, although certainly can be considered offensive, do not by themselves inflict injury nor can it be said they will bring about an immediate breach of peace. Therefore, the use of such words does not lead to probable cause to arrest for disorderly conduct. However, that does not end the inquiry with regard to Trooper Blair. Even if Mr. Ward has presented evidence that there was a violation of his constitutional rights, Trooper Blair can still be entitled to qualified immunity if his actions were objectively reasonable in light of what was available to him at the time.
In Rogers, a police officer was told by a probation officer, who was no longer supervising the plaintiff, that another county may have a detainer or warrant for the plaintiff. 120 F.3d 446. No such warrant existed but the officer took steps and made contacts to bring the plaintiff into custody. Id. at 451. When the plaintiff filed suit under § 1983 and the officer raised a qualified immunity defense based on the statements made to him, the court stated that: "[t]he relevant question is whether it was objectively reasonable for [the officer] to believe, on the basis of the statements, that probable cause existed for the arrest." Id. at 455. The court determined that, "in the absence of any statement confirming the existence of probable cause or a warrant itself," the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because reliance on the statement under the circumstances was not reasonable. Id. In Dull v. W. Manchester Twp. Police Dep't, an officer who misinterpreted another officer's statement to take the plaintiff to the station as an instruction to arrest, opposed to the intended desire to take her to the station for questioning, was deemed to be entitled to qualified immunity. 604 F.Supp.2d 739 (M.D.Pa.2009). Finding the officer could have reasonably believed he was being instructed to detain the plaintiff, the officer's actions were objectively reasonable, allowing for qualified immunity on unlawful arrest and unlawful imprisonment claims. Id. at 752. The court reasoned that "guileless misunderstandings that result from spur-of-the-moment decision-making are not the type of pernicious constitutional violations that vitiate qualified immunity." Id. at 753.
In the current case, Trooper Blair's reliance on Trooper Dughi's statement to Mr. Ward that he was under arrest was objectively reasonable to invoke qualified immunity. Despite the fact that Trooper Dughi did not have probable cause for the underlying arrest, it was not unreasonable for Trooper Blair to rely on the statement of a fellow trooper declaring an arrest. The entire matter spanned a very short period of time. Although Mr. Ward presented evidence that he asked Trooper Dughi what he was being arrested for but did not receive a response (Doc. 105-7, Pl's-CSMF-Commw. Defs., Ex.G, 24.), no evidence has been presented that Trooper Blair knew Trooper Dughi did not have probable cause for arrest. Therefore, it
Dull, 604 F.Supp.2d at 752, n. 8. This case falls within the ambit of the above language. Therefore, Trooper Blair is entitled to qualified immunity on Mr. Ward's unlawful or false arrest claim.
Towanda Borough and Defendant Officers John Strozyk and James Hart move for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's claims against them. However, Officers Strozyk and Hart fail to address Mr. Ward's claim of unlawful arrest made against them and their motion for summary judgment is devoid of mention of the claim. Mr. Ward's Second Amended Complaint states "That the Defendants Strozyk and Hart participated in the arrest of Mr. Ward, since their actions restricted his freedom of movement, forcing him to remain at the scene while the Defendant Dughi illegally arrested Mr. Ward." (Second Am. Compl., ¶ 87.) Therefore, Mr. Ward's claim for unlawful or false arrest against Officers Strozyk and Hart remains.
Officers Strozyk and Hart move for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's claims against for use of excessive force. (Doc. 82; Second Am. Compl., Count II.) Officers Strozyk and Hart argue that Mr. Ward "admitted that Stroyzk's efforts in holding his head was an assistive measure so as to prevent Ward from hitting the ground." (Doc. 86, 7-8.) They further argue that the "record is entirely silent as to any unreasonable use of force by Officer Hart", additionally citing to Mr. Ward's testimony that Officer Hart helped Mr. Ward to the ground. (Id.) Mr. Ward responds that defendants' claim ignores evidence that Officers Strozyk and Hart grabbed Mr. Ward's arms and pulled them behind him to be handcuffed. (Doc. 106, 7.)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, will not be violated...." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A" claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment requires a plaintiff to show that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable," Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir.1999)), and "[t]he use of excessive force is itself an unlawful `seizure' under the Fourth Amendment," Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); Carswell v. Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 240 (3d Cir.2004)). "In deciding whether challenged conduct constitutes excessive force, a court must determine the objective `reasonableness' of the challenged conduct, considering the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.'" Couden, 446 F.3d at 496-97 (quoting Carswell, 381 F.3d at 240). "Other factors include the duration of the [officer's] action, whether the action takes place in the context of effecting an
"[R]easonableness under the Fourth Amendment should frequently remain a question for the jury." Geist v. Ammary, 40 F.Supp.3d 467, 476 (E.D.Pa. 2014) appeal dismissed, 617 Fed.Appx. 182 (3d Cir.2015) (quoting Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 290 (3d Cir.1999)). "Summary judgment may be possible, however, if the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances after all factual disputes have been resolved in favor of the plaintiff" and "[t]he use of a Taser during an arrest, ... may be reasonable." Id.
"Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is `reasonable'... requires ... careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case," Brown v. Cwynar, 484 Fed. Appx. 676, 679-80 (3d Cir.2012) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865.) Therefore, the factual scenario underlying the claim must be evaluated. In an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit held in Patrick v. Moorman, 536 Fed.Appx. 255 (3d Cir.2013), that the use of a taser against a fleeing alleged bank robber was reasonable and in line with the controlling policy of the department. Id. at 259. Again, in an unpublished opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment finding that the officer was reasonable in employing a taser when dispatched to the scene for assistance with a reported scuffle with an officer; the officer arrived to find the plaintiff scuffling with an officer; the officer had been told the plaintiff had been tased prior but continued to resist; and he observed the plaintiff, lying on the ground, refusing to release his hands. Brown, 484 Fed.Appx. at 680. The court determined the amount of force was proportional to the threat, stating that "information supplied [the officer] a reasonable basis to conclude that [the plaintiff] would continue to resist arrest and to act belligerently towards the police were he not subdued" and the reasonableness was bolstered by the fact that the officer had warned the plaintiff that he would be tased if he did not comply. Id. In Geist v. Ammary, the court found that summary judgment was not appropriate where an officer tased a juvenile. 40 F.Supp.3d at 478. There were conflicts in the accounts of the officer and the plaintiff with regard to the overall surrounding circumstances, the plaintiff's behavior, whether any or what types of warnings were given to the plaintiff, what happened after the tasing and the placement of plaintiff's bag on her body. Id. at 481-82. The court declined to allow qualified immunity because "[s]everal facts material to the determination of reasonableness remain in dispute." Id. at 485.
Defendants Strozyk and Hart argue there is no evidence of record to show that they exerted any force against Mr.
(Second Am. Compl., ¶ 66.) Mr. Ward argues that the officers' argument "ignores the evidence that both Strozyk and Hart grabbed the Wards [sic] arms and pulled them up behind him and handcuffed him at the same time that he was being actively tasered by Trooper Dughi." (Doc. 106, 7.)
The question to be answered is whether the actions taken by Officers Strozyk and Hart were reasonable based on the totality of circumstances. There is no dispute that Officers Strozyk and Hart did not deploy the Taser on Mr. Ward. To limit the inquiry to just the application of the Taser, however, would be to take too narrow a view of the incident. Mr. Ward alleges he was injured during the course of the arrest and therefore, where he has presented evidence that the Officers possibly used excessive force in securing him, those claims will survive summary judgment. It is clear that the officers did participate in securing Mr. Ward and also in bringing him to the ground after he was Tased while standing. Mr. Ward testified he was not resisting arrest contrary to what has been stated by the officers involved. (Doc. 105-3, Ex. A, Ward Deposition, 227.) He additionally testified that he was unable to comply with commands because, at first, he was seat-belted and then was drive-stunned with one leg outside the car, causing him to hang on to the car door.(Id. at 228.) After the first Taser deployment, Mr. Ward was brought to the ground and was then Tased when he was lying face down. Trooper Dughi testified he became rigid after the first Taser deployment and also when lying face down and Tased again. (Doc. 105-3, Ex. K, Dughi Deposition, 156-58; 176.)
There were four officers surrounding Mr. Ward and there is no allegation that the officers had any suspicion that he was armed. Defendants testified he was not compliant (Doc. 105-3, Ex. K, Dughi Deposition, 176; Ex. G, Blair Deposition, 22-23; Ex. F, Hart Deposition, 42-44), however, there is no factual citation that Mr. Ward, at any point, was attempting to counter officers attempts to take him into custody with force. Officer Hart did state that Mr. Ward was struggling with the officers and attempting to shake them off. (Hart Deposition, 42-44) but did not reference any specific actions by Mr. Ward in an effort to resist. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Mr. Ward and based on the nature of the alleged crime, the amount of officers present, and Mr. Ward's contention that he was not resisting arrest, questions of fact remain whether the force used to take Mr. Ward into custody was reasonable, and therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate. Officers Strozyk and Hart are not entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Ward's excessive force claim.
Officers Strozyk and Hart move for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's claims that they are liable to him
Officers Strozyk and Hart argue that they did not have a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene stating "Plaintiff has adduced no evidence that Strozyk or Hart had a reasonable opportunity to intervene prior to Dughi's use of the Taser." (Doc. 86, 9-10.) On behalf of Officer Hart, it is argued that there has been no evidence that Officer Hart confronted a "situation that warranted his involvement." (Id. at 10.) Mr. Ward responds that Officer Hart was present from the time Mr. Ward was being removed from the vehicle and stepped aside when the Taser was being deployed. (Doc. 106, 9-10.)
Despite their presence, Mr. Ward has not come forward with any evidence of record to demonstrate that Officers Strozyk and Hart had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and stop Trooper Dughi from using the Taser.
Officers Strozyk and Hart move for summary judgment on the claims against them arguing they are entitled to qualified immunity. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are immune from suit for damages where their conduct did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, 129 S.Ct. 808 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Qualified immunity protects government officials whether they have made a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact. Id. To determine whether qualified immunity applies, a court must examine "whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right" and "whether the right at issue was `clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." Id. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808 (internal citations omitted). A court may exercise its discretion in choosing which prong to address first, considering
Based on disputed issues as to whether the force used to arrest Mr. Ward was reasonable and the denial of Officer Strozyk and Hart's motion for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's claim for excessive force, I cannot determine that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Because the privilege is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," Pearson, 555 U.S. at 237, 129 S.Ct. 808, courts should address the issue of qualified immunity "at the earliest possible stages of litigation," Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 242 n. 7 (3d Cir.2008). But "[a] decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical facts relevant to the immunity analysis." Curley, 298 F.3d at 278. Because there is a disputed issue of fact material to the qualified immunity determination, Officers Strozyk and Hart's motion will be denied on Mr. Ward's excessive force claim.
Because I will grant Officers Strozyk and Hart's motion for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's failure to intervene claim, a determination regarding qualified immunity is unnecessary.
Towanda Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's request for relief in the form of punitive damages as well as the Monell claim alleged against Towanda Borough. (Doc. 82, ¶¶ 6-7.) Mr. Ward concurs that summary judgment is appropriate with regard to the Monell claim and therefore, the motion for summary judgment filed by Towanda Defendants is granted.
Mr. Ward additionally concedes that he is precluded from seeking punitive damages from Towanda and Canton Boroughs. (Doc. 108, 9; Doc. 106, 15.) The Third Circuit has stated "a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," Smith v. Borough of Dunmore, 633 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.2011)(citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981)). Because Mr. Ward cannot be granted punitive damages, summary judgment is proper on behalf of the Canton Borough and the Towanda Borough on the respective requests for such relief in Counts II and III.
Mr. Ward states that he is not seeking punitive damages against any of the Towanda Defendants. (Doc. 106, 15.) Punitive damage are available "in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). Because Mr. Ward has not presented evidence of conduct by Officers Strozyk and Hart necessary for a punitive damages award, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Mr. Ward alleges that Chief Seeley is liable to him for failing to intervene during the May 24, 2009 incident. (Second Am. Compl., ¶ 101.) However, Mr. Ward concedes that the record does not support a claim against Chief Seeley for failing to intervene because it is not disputed that he was in the bingo hall throughout the time Mr. Ward was in contact with Troopers Dughi and Blair and Officers Strozyk and Hart. (Doc. 108, 7.) Therefore, summary judgment will be granted on behalf of
In Mr. Ward's reply brief, despite acknowledging Chief Seeley was not involved in the stop of the Ward vehicle, he alleges Chief Seeley unconstitutionally failed to supervise by delegating his supervisory role to Lance Larcom
Mr. Ward fails to expand on any alleged unconstitutionality of the DUI checkpoint in his Second Amended Complaint. However, he argues at length that the DUI checkpoint was an unconstitutional seizure in both his brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed by the Canton Defendants (Doc. 108, 7-13.) and also in his brief in opposition to the motion filed by the Commonwealth Defendants (Doc. 112, 18-20.). Mr. Ward alleges that because the DUI checkpoint was requested by Canton Borough and Chief Seeley and was a "sham" checkpoint, Chief Seeley is liable to Mr. Ward. (Doc. 108, 8.) For the reasons that follow, defendants' motions for summary judgment will be granted on Mr. Ward's claim that the DUI checkpoint amounted to an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Construing Mr. Ward's allegation that "Defendants in this case violated the following clearly established and well settled constitutional rights of Plaintiff David Ward: a.) Freedom from unreasonable seizure of his person" to be a Fourth Amendment challenge to the DUI checkpoint, such a claim fails to withstand summary judgment. Mr. Ward's contention appears to be that because he asserts the DUI checkpoint was unconstitutional and because Chief Seeley and the Commonwealth Defendants participated in the set up or manning of the checkpoint in some way, they are liable to him for an unconstitutional seizure.
Mr. Ward argues that Chief Seeley, along with Canton Borough
(Doc. 108, 7.) Mr Ward asserts Chief Seeley "is the policy maker responsible for both establishing the location and time of the DUI checkpoint, and for continuing to
Mr. Ward has not presented evidence, other than his assertions, that the statistics do not support the checkpoint, however, resolution of whether the checkpoint amounted to an unconstitutional seizure will ultimately determine the liability of Chief Seeley and Canton Borough. In Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2488, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), the Supreme Court stated, in evaluating checkpoints, there is to be a "balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped." The Court went on to hold that a checkpoint that stopped one hundred and twenty six vehicles for an average of twenty five seconds and resulted in two arrests for drunk drivers, was not an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 448, 455, 110 S.Ct. at 2484, 2487-88.
Mr. Ward alleges that the checkpoint "did not meet the
Blouse, 531 Pa. at 172, 611 A.2d at 1180 (citing Tarbert, 517 Pa. at 293, 535 A.2d at 1043). The court further stated "[s]ubstantial compliance with the guidelines is all that is required to reduce the intrusiveness of the search to a constitutionally acceptable level." Id. Despite Mr. Ward's statement that the checkpoint resulted in an unreasonable seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, he has failed to expand on how the checkpoint did not meet the criteria set forth by the United States Supreme Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Mr. Ward places great emphasis on the fact that Sergeant Lance Larcom answered affirmatively when asked "So that the chief determinant then of having the checkpoint at this location is not the number of arrests for DUI, but because that's
In Mr. Ward's brief in opposition to the Commonwealth defendants' motion for summary judgment, he argues that summary judgment is not appropriate for the Commonwealth Defendants because "there exists questions of fact which must be decided by a jury." (Doc. 112, 16.) First, Mr. Ward states Chief Osman
Additionally, the PSP guidelines provide for the selection and location of a checkpoint. The guidelines list the following as factors for consideration:
(Doc. 94-10, 3.) In fact, Corporal Andrascik stated the guidelines were modified to comport with Commonwealth v. Tarbert. (Doc. 94-10, 16.) Mr. Ward has not come forward with evidence of record demonstrating any lack of compliance with the above guidelines.
Mr. Ward argues the singular determinant for the location of the checkpoint was based on the ability to pull people over rather than statistics. (Doc. 108, 9-10.) The Commonwealth Defendants have cited to several documents of record in which they provide support for the operation of the checkpoint at the location selected, including reference to statistical data. (Doc. 94-10, 125-33.) Mr. Ward has not successfully countered these documents but instead contends that the "there was a lack of justification" in the statistics provided and the "facts make it totally clear that decision to have a DUI checkpoint at the Bingo Hall in Canton is not based on the required facts of having high probability of encountering intoxicated drivers or being an area where [sic] with a high number of DUI-related motor vehicle accidents." (Doc. 108, 10-11.) Mr. Ward may disagree with the reasons why Canton Borough, the DUI TaskForce and the PSP chose to hold the checkpoint at the time and place that they did, but based on the evidentiary record, the checkpoint was a reasonable seizure and therefore, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Ward has not articulated any basis for liability on a claim for a Fourth Amendment unconstitutional seizure as against the Commonwealth Defendants.
Canton Borough has moved for summary judgment on Mr. Ward's Monell claim. Canton Borough argues that Mr. Ward cannot establish a claim for excessive force, however, Mr. Ward alleges that "Canton Borough had a custom or policy of holding DUI checkpoints in an area which did not meet the criteria set forth" in the applicable Pennsylvania case law. (Doc. 108, 7.) Mr. Ward alleges that Canton Borough is liable and that "[o]ur case meets all of the requirements for establishing municipal liability as initially set by the Supreme Court in
The Supreme Court determined in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), that a municipality or other local government may be subject to liability under § 1983. But local governments "are responsible only for their own illegal acts"; they cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for
Mr. Ward alleges that Canton Borough "had a custom or policy of holding DUI checkpoints in an area which did not meet the criteria set forth in Commonwealth v. Blouse and Commonwealth v. Tarbert." (Doc. 108, 7.) However, Mr. Ward does not cite to any facts of record to demonstrate such. Even assuming arguendo, that the checkpoint was constitutionally infirm, there is no evidence of record that Canton Borough, through Chief Seeley, was aware that holding the checkpoint in the location selected was unlawful. Mr. Ward must do more than rest on the allegations of the complaint, he must produce factual evidence that advances his claims. He has not done so. Mr. Ward instead cites the statistics relied on by Canton Borough and the Commonwealth Defendants as well as the fact that the officers who worked the checkpoint would be paid overtime, among other facts of record. (Doc. 108, 10.) However, Mr. Ward does not point to any differences in the factual record. Even when viewed in a light most favorable to him, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simply stating the checkpoint was a sham is not sufficient. Additionally, as discussed above, based on the record, the checkpoint was not an unconstitutional seizure, therefore Canton Borough is entitled to summary judgment on the Monell claim.
Even if Mr. Ward had demonstrated that Canton Borough had an unlawful policy or custom, "he must `demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged." Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)) (per curiam). If the "policy or custom does not facially violate federal law, causation can be established only by `demonstat[ing] that the municipal action was taken with `deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences.'" Id. Mr. Ward has not presented evidence that the decision to request a checkpoint and the selection of the location for the DUI checkpoint was made with deliberate indifference to known or obvious consequences by Canton Borough, nor that the checkpoint location selection was the moving force behind any alleged injury.
Because Mr. Ward agrees that he cannot advance a claim against Chief Seeley for failing to intervene and because I have determined that Chief Seeley and Canton
As stated above, Mr. Ward concedes that punitive damages could not be sought from Canton Borough and therefore, summary judgment will be granted on the claim for relief.
Mr. Ward states that he is not seeking punitive damages against any of the Canton Defendants. (Doc. 108, 13.) Punitive damage are available "in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 56, 103 S.Ct. at 1640. Because Mr. Ward has not presented evidence of the conduct of Chief Seeley necessary for an award of punitive damages, summary judgment will be granted.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
An appropriate order follows.
M.D. Pa. Local R. 56.1. "The purpose of this rule is obvious: it enables the court to identify contested facts expeditiously and prevents factual disputes from becoming obscured by a lengthy record." Pinegar v. Shinseki, 2009 WL 1324125 (M.D.Pa. May 12, 2009). The opposing statements have been reviewed, and where Mr. Ward does properly challenge the facts put forth by Defendants, such disagreement is noted. Where Plaintiff fails to properly contest the defendants' facts, I set forth what has been admitted by Plaintiff by virtue of failing to comply with Local Rule 56.1.
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5503. There is no evidence of record to indicate that the charge was not filed under 5503(a)(1) and review of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas Docket Sheet indicates a charge under 5503(a)(1).
