MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION, District Judge.

I. Background

Plaintiff, Michael Silva, an inmate formerly confined in the State Correctional Institution, Coal Township ("SCI-Coal Township"), Pennsylvania, filed the above captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. (See Doc. 1, complaint). The named Defendants are twenty-nine employees of SCI-Coal Township.

On August 7, 2015, Defendant Kaskie filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, (Doc. 30) and subsequently, on August 21, 2015, Defendant Kaskie filed a brief in support of her motion. (Doc. 32). On September 2, 2015, the remaining Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, (Doc. 33), and a brief in support on November 9, 2015. (Doc. 45). Both dispositive motions argue, inter alia, Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing the instant action.

By Order dated October 9, 2015, Plaintiff was granted an enlargement of time until December 30, 2015, within which file a brief in opposition to Defendants' dispositive motions. (Doc. 41). By Order dated January 6, 2016, Plaintiff was granted a second enlargement of time, until February 1, 2016, within which to file a brief in opposition to Defendants' motions. (Doc. 48).

On January 19, 2016, this Court's January 6, 2016 Order was returned to the Court as undeliverable, stating that Silva had been released from SCI-Coal Township. (Doc. 49). The Court then forwarded its January 6, 2016 Order to Silva's current location, Central Receiving and Assignment Facility, West Trenton, New Jersey. On February 8, 2016, this Court's January 6, 2016 Order was again returned with the notation that service was "attempted" but "not known" and "unable to forward". (Doc. 50). A search of the Department of Corrections' inmate locator, http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/, revealed that Silva was released from the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' unopposed motions will be granted and the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's action for failure to prosecute.

II. Discussion

Generally, a dispositive motion may not be granted merely because it is unopposed. However, when a plaintiff fails to prosecute or comply with a court order, the court may dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962). In Link, the Supreme Court stated:

Id. at 629-30.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991), that a district court should not dismiss a civil rights complaint brought by a former prisoner for failure to comply with a local rule requiring a response to a dispositive motion without examining the merits of the complaint. However, in reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals did not vitiate the Supreme Court's decision in Link, Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the inherent power of the district court to impose the sanction of dismissal for failing to comply with a court order. Instead, the Court of Appeals specifically stated:

Stackhouse, 951 F.2d at 30 (emphasis added); see also Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Poulis did not provide a magic formula whereby the decision to dismiss or not to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint becomes a mechanical calculation. ... [N]ot all of the Poulis factors1 need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint. ... Instead, the decision must be made in the context of the district court's extended contact with the litigant. Ultimately, the decision to dismiss constitutes an exercise of the district court judge's discretion and must be given great deference by [the Court of Appeals].").

In the instant case, Silva has twice been granted enlargements of time to comply with Local Rule 7.6 and file an all-inclusive brief in opposition. (See Docs. 41, 48). Moreover, as is apparent from the history of litigation in this case, Plaintiff clearly has the ability to file documents and communicate with this court.

Five months have passed since Silva's opposition to Defendant Kaskie's motion to dismiss was due, and three months have passed since Silva's opposition to the remaining Defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment was due. Plaintiff has not filed any brief in opposition or sought an additional extension of time in which to do so.

Additionally, a pro se plaintiff has the affirmative obligation to keep the court informed of his address. Should such address change in the course of this litigation, the plaintiff shall immediately inform the court of such change, in writing. If the court is unable to communicate with the plaintiff because he has failed to notify the court of his address, the plaintiff will be deemed to have abandoned the lawsuit.

Silva's last communication with this Court was the filing of his second motion for enlargement of time on December 22, 2015. (See Doc. 47). Silva has not communicated with the court since the filing of this motion. The record clearly indicates that he has been released from the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Silva has abandoned this suit. As a result, the Court concludes that Silva's dilatoriness outweighs any of the other considerations set forth in Poulis. See supra note 1, at 4.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court will deem the pending motions to dismiss and for summary judgment to be unopposed, grant the motions, dismiss the complaint in this action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute and for failure to comply with a court order, and direct that this case be closed. An appropriate order shall issue.