WILLIAM W. CALDWELL, District Judge.
We are considering Defendant D'Ambrosio's Second Motion in Limine. (Doc. 200). Defendants have been charged with prostitution and drug-related offenses in a seven-count superseding indictment. (Doc. 23). Pertinent to the instant motion, Defendants were charged with: (1) sex trafficking of children, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); (2) transportation for prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421; (3) transportation of minors for prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423; (4) conspiracy to transport for prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; and (5) conspiracy to transport minors for prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The jury was selected on April 4, 2016, and trial is scheduled to commence on April 7, 2016. On April 5, 2016, Defendant D'Ambrosio filed his Second Motion in Limine (Doc. 200), and his co-defendants joined the motion.
At issue is the proposed testimony of Dr. Sharon Cooper, a Government expert witness. The discovery material the Government provided indicated that Dr. Cooper would provide background testimony about "the culture of pimping, the nature of enterprises associated with sex trafficking, victim vulnerabilities, the health care problems of victims which are directly related to the actions of the traffickers, the barriers to exiting what is referred to as `the life' of `the game,' and multiple aspects of offender dynamics." (Doc. 201 at 2; Doc. 202 at 5). Defendants argue, inter alia, that Dr. Cooper's testimony is irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401; they argue that "societal and criminal justice implications of prostitution [are] not probative of whether [Defendants] engaged in a criminal conspiracy to traffic women or commit other sex trafficking offenses. . . ." (Doc. 201 at 4-5).
Conversely, the Government argues that the pimp-prostitute dynamic is complex. (Doc. 202 at 6). The juvenile victims in this case will testify that in return for promises of autonomy and wealth, they joined the "team" and engaged in sex acts with strangers. (
We disagree with the rationale in
Here, Dr. Cooper's testimony does not relate to the elements of the prostitution-related offenses with which Defendants are charged. In Count One of the superseding indictment, Defendants are charged with the sex trafficking of children. (Doc. 23 at 1). This requires the Government to prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Defendants knowingly transported a person or benefitted from participation in a venture which transported a person; (2) Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded that the person had not attained the age of eighteen; (3) defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that the person would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act (i.e., any sex act on account of which anything of value is given or received); and (4) Defendants' conduct affected interstate commerce.
The analysis for the remaining prostitution charges is the same. In Counts Two and Four, Defendants are charged with transportation for prostitution and conspiracy to do the same. (Doc. 23 at 3, 5). Transportation for prostitution requires the Government to prove (1) Defendants knowingly transported an individual in interstate commerce, and (2) Defendants intended that the individual would engage in prostitution. (Doc. 194 at 19). In Counts Three and Five, Defendants are charged with transportation of minors for prostitution and conspiracy to do the same. This requires one additional element that the Government must prove — that the individual transported was less than eighteen years old. Again, we see no way in which Dr. Cooper's testimony makes it more probable that
That leaves us with the question of whether Dr. Cooper's testimony bears upon the evaluation of the probative value to be given to other evidence in the case. The Government argues that it does; they insist that Dr. Cooper's testimony will help the jurors understand why the victims took the actions they did. Thus, it bears upon the credibility of the victims. While we agree with the Government that Dr. Cooper's testimony will support the victims' credibility, such testimony is not permitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 608. It provides that a party cannot introduce evidence to support a witness's credibility unless and until it has been attacked. FED. R. EVID. 608. Only then may a party offer opinion evidence to rehabilitate the witness.
For the reasons discussed above, we find that Dr. Cooper's testimony is not relevant, and we will grant Defendants' motion to exclude her testimony.