MEMORANDUM

WILLIAM W. CALDWELL, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Defendant, Earl Lafayette Hall, III, has been charged with numerous counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341; money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); and aggravated identity theft. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). He has filed a motion to suppress statements he made to agents of the United States Department of Labor, asserting they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that, in any event, the statements were involuntary.

In moving to suppress, Defendant does not request a hearing. He specifically bases his motion on the audio disc of the seven-minute interrogation that led to his statements. He argues the audio disc will reveal the violations and that the court should grant his motion after a review of the disc. We will therefore hold no hearing on the motion. See United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2010)(an evidentiary hearing is required on a motion to suppress if, in part, "there are disputed issues of material fact").1

II. Discussion

Before conducting a custodial interrogation, Miranda requires that the police inform a suspect that he has the right (1) to remain silent, (2) to have an attorney present during the interrogation, and (3) to "cease the interrogation if at any point the suspect indicates that he wishes to remain silent or that he wants an attorney." United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1084 (3d Cir. 1989). The suspect must also be informed that the police intend to use his statements to secure a conviction. Id.

Miranda allows a suspect to waive these rights. The waiver "must be the product of `a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.'" United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 348, 362 (3d Cir. 2012)(quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 385, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2262, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010)). "A court will inquire first, whether `the relinquishment of the right [was] voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice,' and second, whether the waiver was made `with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.'" Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)). "Factors relevant to determining whether a statement is voluntary include: whether the police engaged in coercive activity; the length, location, and continuity of the interrogation; the age, education, physical and mental condition of the defendant; and whether Miranda rights were given. United States v. Kellam, No. 14-CR-323, 2015 WL 6560637, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2015)(citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1754, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)).

Invocation of the right to remain silent or the right to counsel must be made unambiguously. See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at 370, 381-82, 130 S.Ct. at 2260-61; United States v. Washington, No. 11-CR-0042, 2012 WL 4051194, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2012).

Defendant does not dispute that the agents read him his Miranda rights. Additionally, he said he understood his rights when asked by one of the agents, (Doc. 26-1, transcript, ECF p. 1), and then volunteered a second time that he understood his rights. (Id., ECF p. 3). Defendant argues that the agents violated his right to remain silent when they continued to question him even though he had made "an unequivocal statement that he did not wish to speak to the agents." (Doc. 27, Def.'s Br. at p. 4). Defendant relies on the following interaction after he was informed of his rights as set forth in the transcript:

We reject the argument that Defendant invoked his right to remain silent. A fuller reading of the transcript shows (supported by the audio disc) that Defendant did not stop speaking after saying "No, I do not" but instead spoke continuously, expressing his puzzlement over why he and the agents were there, and then eventually agreeing to answer the agents' questions.

(Id., ECF pp. 1-2)

(Id., ECF p. 3)

(Id. ECF p. 4).

This is not an unambiguous invocation of Defendant's right to remain silent. Indeed, it is an agreement to speak with the agents and without an attorney present. Thus, Defendant's remarks are not inadmissible on the basis that he invoked his right to remain silent. We add that it is immaterial that Defendant talked to the agents because he wanted to hear what they had to say. Cf. Whiteford, supra, 678 F.3d at 362 (ruling that Miranda waiver was not invalid because of the psychological pressure the defendant felt from the agents' failure to inform him of the charges against him and observing that the court was unaware of any authority "that a defendant must know of the charges against him to validate a Miranda waiver").

Even if a defendant does not invoke his Miranda rights, his statements are still inadmissible unless the government proves that he voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights. Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at 382, 130 S.Ct. at 2260. Defendant asserts his statements were involuntary because he "told the officers that he did not want to talk to them, he requested counsel at several points, and even told the officers that he was talking to them under `duress.'" (Doc. 27, Def.'s Br. at p. 6). As part of this argument, Defendant requests that we listen to the audio disc.

We disagree with Defendant that his statements were involuntary, and we believe that the government has met any burden it has in regard to proving that Defendant's statements were voluntary. Our review of the transcript and audio disc convinces us that Defendant agreed to talk with the agents and never unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. He did say he was acting under "duress," but duress was not apparent during the interrogation, which lasted only seven minutes, and ended when Defendant stated he "need[ed] to speak to an attorney . . . ." (Doc. 26-1. ECF p. 8).

Defendant also argues that the agents violated his right to have an attorney present during questioning when they continued to interrogate him after he invoked his right to an attorney. Defendant bases this argument on his statement while he was being questioned that "I'm gonna speak to a lawyer. Can I, can I have, what's going on here." (Doc. 26-1, ECF p. 6).

As shown above, Defendant waived his right to remain silent and to an attorney and began speaking with the agents. In these circumstances, a belated request for counsel must be unambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). If the suspect's reference to an attorney is ambiguous, there is no need to end the questioning. Id., 114 S.Ct. at 2355. Here, Defendant's reference to a lawyer, that "I'm gonna speak to a lawyer," was ambiguous as it indicated a future intent to speak to a lawyer, see State v. Hatten, 927 N.E.2d 632, 645 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010); Juarez v. Commonwealth, 2008 WL 2167887, at *4 (Ky. 2008)(nonprecedential), not a request for the immediate assistance of a lawyer.

We will issue an appropriate order.