RICHARD P. CONABOY, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's appeal from the Commissioner's denial of Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"). (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff filed this action on June 3, 2016, after the Appeals Council denied review of the Decision issued by Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Sykle Merchan on July 24, 2014—the second Decision issued in this matter. (Doc.1; R. 1-5, 109-30.) With this action, Plaintiff identifies three errors: 1) the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff "was able to `communicate in English' without vocational limitation and failing to include such limitations in the hypothetical questions to the vocational expert"; 2) the ALJ erred in accepting the vocational expert's testimony as consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") when two of the jobs identified had greater demands than allowed by Plaintiff's RFC and all jobs identified had greater language requirements than Plaintiff could meet; and 3) the ALJ erred in not properly evaluating the testimony of the medical expert witness who testified at the hearing and in accepting the hearing of the post-hearing consultative examiner. (Doc. 17 at 14-15.) After careful review of the record and the parties' filings, the Court concludes this appeal is properly denied.
Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on February 10, 2010. (Doc. 17 at 5.) She alleged disability beginning on May 28, 2008. (R. 109.) Following an initial denial on July 6, 2010, Plaintiff requested reconsideration which was also denied. (Doc. 17 at 5.) Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an ALJ on September 10, 2010. (Id.) ALJ Allyn Brooks held a hearing on August 2, 2011, and issued his unfavorable decision on August 16, 2011. (Id.) Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council remanded the case for a new hearing with its November 14, 2012, Order. (Doc. 17 at 6.)
On January 14, 2014, ALJ Merchan held another hearing. (Id.) She issued the decision denying Plaintiff's claim on July 24, 2014, after concluding that Plaintiff was capable of performing jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy despite limitations related to her severe impairments of degenerative disc disease, cervical radiculopathy, major depressive disorder, panic disorder, and disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. (R. 112-30.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the hearing decision on April 11, 2016, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Acting Commissioner. (R. 1-5.)
As noted above, Plaintiff filed her action in this Court on June 3, 2016. (Doc. 1.) Defendant filed her Answer and the administrative transcript on August 8, 2016. (Docs. 9, 10.) After Plaintiff filed her supporting brief (Doc. 17) on December 19, 2016, Defendant timely filed her opposing brief (Doc. 18), and Plaintiff timely filed a reply brief (Doc. 19). Therefore, this matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
Plaintiff was born on May 3, 1973, and was thirty-six years old on the date the application was filed and forty-one years old at the time of the 2014 ALJ Decsion. (R. 129; Doc. 18 at 4.) Plaintiff, who came to the United States in 2006 as a refugee, said that she had ten years of education in Uzbekistan "where the education system only goes to 10 years." (Doc. 17 at 7 & n.2; Doc. 18 at 4.) Her interpreter at the second hearing interjected that she had graduated and Plaintiff answered in the affirmative when she was asked if she had finished high school. (R. 18.) Plaintiff had past relevant work as a hand packager. (R. 129.) In her brief, Defendant notes that
(Doc. 18 at 4.)
Plaintiff provides a brief summary of medical evidence which we set out here to provide context.
(Doc. 17 at 11-12 (footnotes omitted).)
Defendant provides a summary of evidence relevant to the issues raised in Plaintiff's appeal.
(Doc. 18 at 5-8.)
At the January 2014 hearing held in Evanston, Illinois, Plaintiff personally appeared as did her attorney, Richard Victor, Vocactional Expert ("VE") Craig Johnston, interpreter Lydia Wexler; medical expert, Scott Kale, M.D., testified by phone.
The ALJ asked Plaintiff if she could read and write in English and Plaintiff responded "no, not really." (R. 19.) Plaintiff confirmed that she could write her last name and address in English but she needed help to write a short note like a school absence excuse—her oldest son would help her and she would just sign her name. (R. 19-20.) She said she could read in English "[i]f it's a very, very simple word, the sentence" and her son helped her read things like the hearing notice. (R. 20.) Plaintiff testified that she had a driver's license and had taken the test in Russian. (R. 21.) When asked if she went to her youngest child's parent-teacher conferences to talk to his teachers, Plaintiff responded that she did not because she doesn't know the language so she feels uncomfortable. (R. 37.)
Regarding employment, Plaintiff said she last worked in 2008 at Tyson Foods as a meat packer—she worked for about a year before she was injured in a fall on the job and her doctors told here she could not work anymore. (R. 23-24.) Plaintiff's attorney clarified that a worker's compensation claim was filed—it was ultimately settled. (R. 25-26.) The ALJ asked Plaintiff how she communicated with her coworkers and supervisor when she worked at Tyson; Plaintiff said that she had some Russian-speaking coworkers who helped with communication with the supervisor so she spoke with him "through a translator." (R. 38.)
Following Dr. Kale's testimony outlined above, including his diagnosis of somatoform disorder, Plaintiff's attorney stated that he had no questions for Dr. Kale. (R. 42.) VE Johnston then testified, indicating that his testimony would be consistent with the DOT or, if it was not consistent, he would advise the ALJ of that fact. (R. 42-43.) ALJ Merchan asked VE Johnston to consider an individual of Plaintiff's "age, education, and work experience who is able to do work at the sedentary exertional level, limited to no ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; no more than occasional as to the remaining postural activities of climbing ramps or stairs, balancing, stooping, crawling, crouching, or kneeling; no work above shoulder level; and no work in cold environments." (R. 44.) The VE testified that Plaintiff's past work would not be available to such an individual but other jobs would be, including production assembler, parts inspector, and sorter. (R. 45.) The VE estimated that the number of jobs available would be reduced by fifty percent if the individual could not lift more than five pounds though this was not mentioned in the DOT. (R. 45-46.) The VE further testified that adding no more than frequent reaching, handling, or fingering would not affect the jobs because that was the typical requirement for the jobs, and adding additional restrictions of no more than simple, routine, repetitive tasks would not affect the jobs because he had cited only unskilled jobs. (R. 46.) VE Johnston stated that all jobs would be eliminated if the individual were off work more than three days per month. (Id.)
Plaintiff's attorney then questioned VE Johnston about a sit/stand option and the amount of time an individual would be expected to be on task. (R. 47.) The VE responded that the jobs would allow a sit/stand option and the individual would have to be on task at least eighty-five percent of the time. (Id.) Plaintiff's attorney confirmed that he had no further questions. (Id.)
Before the hearing ended, ALJ Merchan determined that another consultative examination by a mental health professional was warranted because she had reservations about Dr. Kale's testimony— he did not practice in the mental health area and there was no other mental health treatment. (R. 47.) Other than clarifying that Pennsylvania would be the best location for the consultative exam, Plaintiff's attorney had no further questions. (R. 47-50.)
In her July 24, 2014, Decision, ALJ Merchan made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
(R. 112-130.)
Other relevant portions of the Decision will be discussed in the Discussion section of this Memorandum.
The Commissioner is required to use a five-step analysis to determine whether a claimant is disabled.
If the impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment, the ALJ makes a finding about the claimant's residual functional capacity based on all the relevant medical evidence and other evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 416.920(e). The residual functional capacity assessment is then used at the fourth and fifth steps of the evaluation process. Id.
The disability determination involves shifting burdens of proof. The initial burden rests with the claimant to demonstrate that he or she is unable to engage in his or her past relevant work. If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show that jobs exist in the national economy that a person with the claimant's abilities, age, education, and work experience can perform. Mason v. Shalala, 993 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
As set out above, the instant decision was decided at step five of the sequential evaluation process when the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform jobs which existed in significant numbers in the national economy. (R. 129-30.)
This Court's review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence means "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals further explained this standard in Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1983).
Kent, 710 F.2d at 114.
This guidance makes clear it is necessary for the Secretary to analyze all evidence. If she has not done so and has not sufficiently explained the weight given to all probative exhibits, "to say that [the] decision is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court's duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached are rational." Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). In Cotter, the Circuit Court clarified that the ALJ must not only state the evidence considered which supports the result but also indicate what evidence was rejected: "Since it is apparent that the ALJ cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason, an explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative evidence has been rejected is required so that a reviewing court can determine whether the reasons for rejection were improper." Cotter, 642 F.2d at 706-07. However, the ALJ need not undertake an exhaustive discussion of all the evidence. See, e.g., Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). "There is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record." Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App'x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004). "[W]here [a reviewing court] can determine that there is substantial evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision, . . . the Cotter doctrine is not implicated." Hernandez v. Comm'f of Soc. Sec., 89 Fed. Appx. 771, 774 (3d Cir. 2004) (not precedential).
A reviewing court may not set aside the Commissioner's final decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the court would have reached different factual conclusions. Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 360 (citing Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . ."). "However, even if the Secretary's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, [a court] may review whether the Secretary, in making his findings, applied the correct legal standards to the facts presented." Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation omitted). Where the ALJ's decision is explained in sufficient detail to allow meaningful judicial review and the decision is supported by substantial evidence, a claimed error may be deemed harmless. Albury v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 116 F. App'x 328, 330 (3d Cir. 2004) (not precedential) (citing Burnett v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[O]ur primary concern has always been the ability to conduct meaningful judicial review."); see also Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005) (a remand is not required where it would not affect the outcome of the case.). An ALJ's decision can only be reviewed by a court based on the evidence that was before the ALJ at the time he or she made his or her decision. Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff argues that remand is required for the following reasons: 1) the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff "was able to `communicate in English' without vocational limitation and failing to include such limitations in the hypothetical questions to the vocational expert"; 2) the ALJ erred in accepting the vocational expert's testimony as consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") when two of the jobs identified had greater demands than allowed by Plaintiff's RFC and all jobs identified had greater language requirements than Plaintiff could meet; and 3) the ALJ erred in not properly evaluating the testimony of the medical expert witness who testified at the hearing and in accepting the hearing of the post-hearing consultative examiner. (Doc. 17 at 14-15.)
With Plaintiff's first two claimed errors, she argues that the ALJ did not properly assess her ability to communicate in English in several ways. (Doc. 17 at 14-15.) Defendant maintains that the ALJ did not err on the bases alleged. (Doc. 18 at 11-23.) The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not shown that remand is required on the bases argued in her briefs.
Relevant to Plaintiff's first argument that literacy in the English language is relevant to the ALJ's determination in this case, she points to 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b).
20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(5). Section 416.964(b)(6) addresses "[i]nformation about education":
20 C.F.R. 404.964(b)(6).
Here Plaintiff asserts the jobs identified by the VE have a General Education Development ("GED") level of 1 which Plaintiff does not meet and, therefore, specific vocational testimony was required. (Doc. 17 at 24-26.) In general, "GED measures those aspects of education (formal and informal) which are required of the worker for satisfactory job performance" and it is broken into three categories: reading development, mathematical development, and language development. Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 616 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). Language Development is defined at Level 1 as follows:
DOT, Appendix, 1991 WL 688702 (G.P.O.).
SSR 00-4p addresses conflicts regarding occupational information provided by a VE and other vocational information.
SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2. As explained in Zirnsak,
777 F.3d at 617.
In Zirnsak, the Court found that the ALJ had specifically asked about consistency between the VE's testimony and information in the "DOT and other relevant vocational sources," the VE did not note inconsistencies in GED reasoning level 3 and a limitation to "simple and repetitive tasks involving routine work processes and settings" argued by the plaintiff on appeal, and "[i]mportantly, neither [the plaintiff] nor her attorney challenged the VE on these points or otherwise identified any apparent inconsistency between the VE's testimony and the DOT." 777 F.3d at 617. The analysis continued:
777 F.3d at 617.
Assuming arugendo that Plaintiff's English language ability was a vocational factor at step 5 of the sequential evaluation process which was not directly addressed by the ALJ or VE and Plaintiff's English language abilities were less than those set out in GED language level 1, the question would remain whether the case must be remanded for further consideration of whether Plaintiff's English language ability would prevent her from doing the sorter job identified by the VE.
As noted above, Plaintiff argues that remand is required for specific evidence from a VE identifying jobs in the DOT for a person such as Plaintiff, with minimal English language skills, because all of the DOT jobs require at least a GED of 1. (Doc. 17 at 25.) This argument is based on the premise that the demands of GED language development level 1 "are far beyond the level of Plaintiff, no matter what was used to measure her ability to communicate in English." (Doc. 19 at 7-8.) Plaintiff further asserts that a VE's testimony that a particular job does not require the language skill specified by the DOT would be a variation from the DOT which the ALJ must weigh pursuant to SSR 00-4p. (Doc. 17 at 25-26.) The second aspect of Plaintiff's argument infers that there is always "an apparent unresolved conflict" for which an ALJ must always "elicit a reasonable explanation." SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2.
Before proceeding with further discussion of Plaintiff's claimed error, the Court considers Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff's ability to communicate in English is irrelevant to the outcome of the case pursuant to Grid Rules pertaining to sedentary work (Doc. 18 at 15-16 & n.5). Defendant relies on the following Grid Rule:
(Doc. 18 at 16 (quoting 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 202.00(i)).) The Court is not persuaded by Defendant's argument that the language issue is irrelevant: the terms of the provision itself apply to a "full range of sedentary work" which is not consistent with Plaintiff's RFC (R. 44-46, 114-15); the ALJ did not rely on the Grid Rules; and he is precluded from doing so pursuant to Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 266-71 (3d Cir. 2000), because Plaintiff has both exertional and nonexertional impairments and limitations.
Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff's argument that the job of sorter was inconsistent with her alleged inability to speak English is without merit in part because "GED levels are merely advisory in nature and serve only as a reference for the ALJ and VE." (Doc. 18 at 20.) Based on Zirnsak's analysis of the claimed step five error regarding a GED level, 777 F.3d at 617-19, the Court cannot conclude that GED considerations are categorically insignificant when analyzing an ALJ's reliance on a VE's testimony.
The Court concludes that, rather than the bright-line rule suggested by Plaintiff, the Zirnsak case-specific approach (following cases which "focused on whether a failure to inquire about or reconcile a conflict caused any harm to the claimant when determining whether remand is necessary," 777 F.3d at 618) is appropriate here and is consistent with the emphasis in this Circuit that the presence of inconsistencies does not mandate remand, so long as "substantial evidence exists in other portions of the record that can form an appropriate basis to support the result." 777 F.3d at 617 (quoting Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 557).
Here the ALJ recognized the "general rule, occupational evidence provided by a VE should be consistent with the occupational evidence presented in the DOT," 777 F.3d at 617 (citing SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2), inquiring of the VE about the consistency between his testimony and the DOT. (R. 43.) The VE responded affirmatively and the ALJ did not ask about the inconsistency regarding language level now alleged. Although Plaintiff's attorney was given a specific opportunity to question the VE and raised questions about hypotheticals posed by the ALJ and positions identified by the VE (R. 47), neither Plaintiff nor her attorney challenged the VE or the ALJ about any language-related matters, and Plaintiff's attorney did not seek to elicit information about Plaintiff's language abilities beyond questions asked by the ALJ. (R. 18-20.)
Looking now to more specific factors addressed in Zirnsak, we first consider whether Plaintiff "seriously argue[s] that she is incapable of performing the jobs . . . recommended by the VE." 777 F.3d at 619. Plaintiff does not argue that she is incapable of performing the sorter job identified by the VE. In her reply brief she notes that "[i]t may be that a VE, if asked, would provide reasons why the plaintiff could do some or all of the jobs cited even with a lower then [sic] GED 1 level." (Doc. 19 at 9.) Plaintiff does not follow this observation with any assertion that such testimony would or could be substantively refuted, but states only that this is an administrative matter. (Id. at 9-10.)
Beyond the lack of evidence and lack of assertion to the contrary, the record supports that Plaintiff had sufficient language skills to perform the position. A fair inference can be drawn from the hearing testimony that the VE took Plaintiff's English language ability into account when he provided exemplary position recommendations: the VE confirmed that he had heard the testimony presented at the hearing, he was familiar with the vocational terms and definitions in the regulations, and he was familiar with the jobs existing in the region and the national economy (R. 43); the regulations specify that the term "education" includes how well the claimant is able to communicate in English, and the claimant's ability to communicate in English is considered when it is evaluated what work a claimant can do, 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b), (b)(5); with each hypothetical question from the ALJ, VE Johnston was asked to consider a person of Plaintiff's "age, education, and work experience" (R. 44-46). Thus, when deciding what work Plaintiff could do (including the exemplary sorter position), the VE would have considered Plaintiff's ability to communicate in English including the use of an interpreter at the hearing (see R. 10), Plaintiff's testimony about her English language abilities and difficulties (R. 18-20), the fact that her ten years of formal education (high school) had been in Uzbekistan (R. 18), and the fact that she had only two months of formal English classes when she arrived in the United States (R. 19). Because the ALJ made no findings at the hearing regarding Plaintiff's ability to communicate in English and nothing in the hypotheticals altered the broad application of the general regulatory framework with which the VE expressed familiarity, the VE's testimony that Plaintiff had the ability to perform the sorter position was not influenced by the ALJ's later conclusions in her Decision that Plaintiff "seems to be literate in the English language" (R. 110), and "is able to communicate in English" (R. 129). Another aspect of the record that supports the conclusion that Plaintiff could perform the sorter position is Plaintiff's testimony that she took the citizenship exam in English and "studied well" to do so (R. 18). Though Plaintiff highlights the limited vocabulary associated with the exam (Doc. 18 at 20-21), the testimony is significant beyond the accomplishment—an ability to learn task-specific language shows a practical ability to apply language skills and intelligence in a specific context such as the sorter position. Medical record notations that Plaintiff "does speak some English" (R. 444) is further evidence supporting an ability to perform the sorter position.
The second factor considered in Zirnsak was wether the plaintiff's counsel had identified any inconsistencies at the hearing. 777 F.3d at 619. As discussed above, Plaintiff's counsel did not identify any inconsistencies regarding language ability or raise the matter inferentially.
The final Zirnsak factor was whether the jobs identified by the VE were exemplary. Id. VE Johnston identified the positions as "examples of occupations that would be available." (R. 44.)
The foregoing analysis indicates that the facts of this case (considered in the context of relevant caselaw and regulations) warrant the conclusion that substantial evidence exists in the record to support the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff could perform the sorter position and Plaintiff was not harmed by the ALJ's failure to address the alleged inconsistency at the hearing. Therefore, remand for reconsideration of this issue is not required. See, e.g., Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 557.
Plaintiff also asserts that remand is warranted because the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the opinion of Dr. Kale, a testifying medical expert, that Plaintiff suffered from somatoform disorder and in accepting the opinion of Dr. LaJeunesse, a consultative examiner, who did not diagnose the disorder. (Doc. 17 at 26.) Defendant responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of these opinions. (Doc. 18 at 23.) The Court concludes Plaintiff has not shown remand is warranted on the basis alleged.
In general, greater deference is due an examining source than a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(1). Section 416.927(c)(3) provides the following:
Id.
ALJ Merchan analyzed the relevant portion of Dr. Kale's hearing testimony as follows:
(R. 114.) This summary indicates that ALJ Merchan did not give weight to Dr. Kale's somatoform disorder diagnosis for two specific reasons: because "the record included no documentation of diagnosis of a somatoform disorder, or somatoform depression, to indicate even a medically determinable impairment" and Dr. LaJeunesse did not diagnose a somatoform disorder. (R. 114.)
Plaintiff's argument on this issue clearly shows that she is displeased with ALJ Merchan's analysis, but she does not support her argument with any citation to authority aside from the proposition that "some mental health condition may be diagnosed by a doctor who is not a specialist in mental health, but in another specialty[.]" (Doc. 17 at 31 & n. 21 (citing Cramer v. Colvin, Civ. A. No. 3:13-CV-2665, 2014 WL 6982672 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2014); Heinz v. Heckler, 581 F.Supp. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1987)).) Following this averment, Plaintiff asserts that "a diagnosis of somatoform disorder should be made by someone who either has the qualifications to diagnose both physical and mental health problems, such as Dr. Kale, or a mental health professional who has, at the very least, been asked to assume that the patient does not have physical conditions that would account for her pain."
Plaintiff does not attempt to specifically show how ALJ Merchan ran afoul of the regulatory provision cited above. Plaintiff cannot show that Dr. Kale's opinion is entitled to greater deference than that of the consultative examiner because Dr. Kale did not examine the patient and based his opinion on his review of medical evidence. Plaintiff cannot show that his opinion is entitled to greater deference on the basis of supporting evidence because there is none in the record and the only reason he provides for the diagnosis is that Plaintiff's complaints of pain were out of proportion with identified abnormalities. (R. 41.) Interestingly, although Plaintiff urges reliance on Dr. Kale's opinion regarding somatoform disorder, she takes issue with his assessment of Plaintiff's physical impairments: "Dr. Kale testified that there was no basis for the plaintiff's physical complaints. This ignores the MRI's that show disc herniations. He relied, it appears, on the back [sic] of positive electrodoagnostic [sic] tests. He was not asked about the well known level of false negatives in such studies." (Doc. 17 at 27.) Plaintiff's comments regarding problems with Dr. Kale's evaluation of the evidence supporting complaints of pain inferentially undermines reliance on his somatoform disorder diagnosis — if Plaintiff's physical complaints were attributed to diagnosed conditions, i.e, found to be better supported, Dr. Kale's reliance on lack of support for physical complaints as the basis for the somatoform diagnosis would be undermined or invalidated.
With no evidence in the record of somatoform disorder aside from a testifying, non-examining source, and no diagnosis of such a condition from any of Plaintiff's treating or examining sources, the Court cannot conclude that ALJ Merchan erred on the basis alleged.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court concludes Plaintiff's appeal of the Acting Commissioner's decision is properly denied. An appropriate Order is filed simultaneously with this Memorandum.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).