MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT D. MARIANI, District Judge.

Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's following motions in limine:

The Court will address each request in turn. Before doing so, however, the Court notes at the outset that it exercises its discretion to rule in limine on evidentiary issues "in appropriate cases." In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). While motions in limine may serve as a useful pretrial tool that enables a more in-depth briefing than would be available at trial, a court may defer ruling on such motions "if the context of trial would provide clarity." Frintner v. TruePosition, 892 F.Supp.2d 699, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 260).

"[M]otions in limine often present issues for which final decision is best reserved for a specific trial situation." Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 518 n.10 (3d Cir 1997). Thus, certain motions, "especially ones that encompass broad classes of evidence, should generally be deferred until trial to allow for the resolution of questions of foundation, relevancy, and potential prejudice in proper context." Leonard v. Stemetech Health Scis., Inc., 981 F.Supp.2d 273, 276 (D. Del. 2013). Specifically, "pretrial Rule 403 exclusions should rarely be granted. . . . [A] court cannot fairly ascertain the potential relevance of evidence for Rule 403 purposes until it has a full record relevant to the putatively objectionable evidence." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 859 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis original). Finally, it is important to note that "in limine rulings are not binding on the trial judge, and the judge may always change his mind during the course of a trial." Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L. Ed. 2d 826 (2000).

With these principles in mind, the Court now turns to Plaintiffs motions.

1. Motion to Preclude Irrelevant Personal Matters of Plaintiff, Jonathan Botey (Doc. 189)

Plaintiff requests that the Court preclude the following information, which he deems to be "irrelevant personal matters of Plaintiff':

(Doc. 190, at 5-6).

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and . . . the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, federal statute, Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury." Fed. R. Evid. 403.

It is not at all clear how the information Plaintiff seeks to preclude is irrelevant. Plaintiff claims that the "only use of such evidence is to distract the jury into questions concerning Plaintiff's general state of health at the time of the subject collision." (Doc. 190, at 5) (emphasis added). Plaintiff's assertion is wrong. As discussed in this Court's Opinion addressing Plaintiff's Motion to Preclude portions of Dr. Schretlen's report and testimony, Plaintiff has placed the cause of his current physical and cognitive difficulties at issue. The evidence Plaintiff seeks to preclude is probative to a determination of Plaintiff's physical and cognitive abilities both before and after the accident, and to a jury's determination of what harm, if any, resulted from the accident. In addition to causation, the medical history is also relevant to Plaintiff's claims of damages, and in particular, Plaintiffs claims of lost wages, diminished earning capacity, and medical costs.

Plaintiff's motion will therefore be denied.

2. Motion to Preclude Irrelevant Personal Matters of Maria Isabelle Lopez-Lake (Doc. 183)

Plaintiff also moves to preclude testimony by Maria Isabelle Lopez-Lake, his mother, "that she had a subjective belief that she was experiencing memory issues in 2014" and that she was diagnosed with colitis and mild depression. (Doc. 184, at 4, 6).

With respect to Lopez-Lake's memory issues, such evidence will be permissible in cross-examination solely for the purpose of aiding the jury in determining the witness' credibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 601 advisory committee's note ("Interest in the outcome of litigation and mental capacity are, of course, highly relevant to credibility and require no special treatment to render them admissible along with other matters bearing upon the perception, memory, and narration of witnesses."). However, assuming that Plaintiff is correct that none of Defendants' experts opine that Botey's cognitive issues are the cause of a genetic disorder (Doc. 184, at 5), and because Defendants did not file a brief in opposition to this motion, the Court will preclude any reference to Lopez-Lake's memory issues as genetic and therefore the cause, or part of the cause, of Botey's asserted memory problems.

With respect to Lopez-Lake's colitis and mild depression, once again no evidence has been currently placed before this Court to demonstrate how these conditions are relevant, or related, to Botey's claims. This information will thus be precluded.

Plaintiffs motion will therefore be granted in part and denied in part as explained above. However, should Defendants, at trial, produce evidence or appropriate testimony demonstrating a nexus between any of Lopez-Lake's medical conditions and Botey's medical conditions, the Court will review such evidence and consider revising this ruling. See Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000) (in limine rulings are not binding on the trial judge, and the judge may always change his mind during the course of a trial.").

3. Motion to Preclude Testimony of Trooper Joseph H. Nalepa Regarding Accident Reconstruction and the Cause of the Subject Accident (Doc. 179)

Plaintiff requests that Trooper Nalepa be precluded from testifying as to how the accident at issue occurred or who he believes was at fault and/or caused the accident. Plaintiff argues this is appropriate because Nalepa did not witness the accident and lacks the requisite training, experience, and specialized knowledge to provide testimony as to how the accident happened or to act as an accident reconstructionist. (Doc. 180, at 3-5).

Although Defendants did not file a brief in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion, the Court first notes that Defendants' Pre-Trial Memorandum indicates that Nalepa will be called as a lay witness, not necessarily as an expert. (See Doc. 258, at 3-6).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, the opinion testimony of a witness who is not testifying as an expert is limited to one that is (1) "rationally based on the witness's perception", (2) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue", and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702", which governs testimony by an expert witness. Fed. R. Evid. 701.

The Third Circuit recently explained the contours of Rule 701 as follows:

U.S. v. Fulton, 837 F.3d 281, 291-292 (3d Cir. 2016).

Having not heard any evidence in this action, including the testimony of Trooper Nalepa or his qualifications, the Court is not currently in a posture to fully rule on Plaintiffs motion. To the extent that Trooper Nalepa is offered only as a lay witness, he may testify about what he saw on the day of the accident, the full scope of his investigation, and provide appropriate lay witness opinions which are rationally based on his perception and personal knowledge of the accident. However, should Nalepa not be offered as an expert witness, he may be precluded from offering testimony as to his conclusions regarding fault of the parties due to the lack of proper expert qualifications to offer such an opinion as well the risk that such testimony would "amount[ ] to little more than choosing up sides" or "merely tell[ ] the jury what result to reach." Fulton, 837 F.3d at 291. See also, Duhon v. Marceaux, 33 F.App'x 703 (5th Cir. 2002) ("It is undisputed that [the police officer] was not qualified to testify as an expert in accident reconstruction and that he did not witness the accident. As a general rule, police officers' lay opinions as to the cause of an automobile accident formed by viewing subsequent evidence at the scene are excluded under Rule 701. See 38 A.L.R.2d 13 § 22; Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, Inc., 550 F.Supp. 1220, 1223 (E.D.Pa. 1982), aff'd without op., 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1982)(officer's lay opinion testimony was admissible only to the extent that it pertained to the point of impact).").

Accordingly, all specific objections to Nalepa's testimony are deferred until the time of trial.

4. Motion to Preclude Defendants from Introducing Evidence or Making Comments or Argument Regarding any Adverse Effect of the Accident on Defendants and/or a verdict Against the Defendants (Doc. 187)

Plaintiffs motion in limine rests on his anticipation that "the Defendants may seek to introduce evidence, argument, or comments" on the following:

(Doc. 188, at 3) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs contentions as to what Defendants may try to argue are speculative, at best, and Plaintiff cites no specific case law that addresses the law as it relates to any of the aforementioned concerns.1 In turn, Defendants did not file a brief in opposition, so the Court is further left to speculate as to whether they even intend to attempt to introduce evidence or reference any of Plaintiff's areas of concern.

Thus, Plaintiff's motion is premature and will be denied without prejudice. If Plaintiff believes at the appropriate time of trial that Defendants are attempting to introduce evidence or make comments or arguments in violation of the Rules of Evidence, Plaintiff shall timely object and set forth the specific basis for such objection.

5. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motions (Docs. 189, 183, 179, 187) will be decided as set forth in this Memorandum Opinion. A separate Order follows.