REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARTIN C. CARLSON, Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

In the instant case we are called upon to review a decision by a Social Security Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") that denied disability benefits to the plaintiff, Michelle Walls. At the time of her disability application, Ms. Walls was in her mid-40s, and claimed that she was wholly disabled due to the combined effects of severe anxiety, depression and lumbar disc disease.

Following a hearing before an ALJ, the ALJ denied Walls' application for disability benefits, finding in part that Walls' statements regarding the disabling effects of her impairments were not fully credible, and further concluding that the opinion rendered by a licensed clinical social worker who had been treating Walls, and found her to be disabled due to her emotional impairments, was entitled to little weight. In reaching these conclusions the ALJ discounted evidence of these emotional impairments and stated categorically that: "There is no evidence of suicide attempts . . . during the relevant time." (Tr. 17.)

This statement appears to be factually incorrect. Indeed, Walls testified at length before the ALJ that she had attempted suicide on several occasions since 2013. (Tr. 46.) Moreover, Walls' statements regarding these suicide attempts were corroborated, in part, by Candace Rutherford, the licensed clinical social worker who had been counseling Walls for many years. Based upon her years of clinical experience with Walls, Ms. Rutherford stated on February 25, 2014 that when Walls "is faced with conflict and/or potential change she can become suicidal and highly emotional." (Tr. 502.)

Ms. Walls has now appealed this adverse disability determination. While Walls generally argues on appeal that the ALJ erred in making credibility determinations and in affording only limited weight to the opinion of her treating licensed clinical social worker, she also specifically contends that:

For the reasons set forth below, we agree that the dissonance between what the ALJ was told in terms of prior suicidal attempts and ideation by Walls, and what the ALJ stated concerning the complete lack of evidence of suicide attempts cannot be reconciled on the current administrative record. We further find that the question of Walls' alleged suicidal tendencies is a material issue in this case, where Walls' disability claim rests in large measure on emotional impairments. Therefore, in the context of a disability claim that is premised upon depression, anxiety and emotional impairments, the ALJ's misstatements concerning whether there was any evidence of suicidal thoughts or actions by Walls cannot be discounted as a harmless error. Thus, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this case be remanded for further consideration of this issue.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

On August 7, 2013, Michelle Walls applied for Social Security disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging an onset of disability beginning on March 28, 2013. (Tr. 10.) In her disability application Walls alleged that she was unable to work due to the combined effects of an array of physical and emotional impairments including: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, endometriosis, ossification in the bilateral acetabular labrums, generalized anxiety disorder and dysthymia, or persistent depression. (Tr. 12.)

On February 20, 2015, an ALJ conducted a hearing on Walls' disability application. (Tr. 26-70.) Walls testified at this hearing, and provided the ALJ with the following extensive account of her past suicide attempts:

Walls' account of her suicidal thoughts and actions was corroborated, in part, by her long-time counsellor, Candace Rutherford. On February 24, 2014, Ms. Rutherford, a licensed clinical social worker, submitted a disability report to the ALJ which confirmed these suicidal impulses on Walls' part, stating that when Walls "is faced with conflict and/or potential change she can become suicidal and highly emotional." (Tr. 502.)

On July 17, 2015, the ALJ issued a decision denying Walls' application for Social Security benefits. (Tr. 10-20.) In this decision, the ALJ first found that Walls met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act at the time of her application in 2013. (Tr. 12.) At Step 2 of the five-step sequential analysis process that applies to Social Security disability claims, the ALJ concluded that Walls had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, endometriosis, ossification in the bilateral acetabular labrums, generalized anxiety disorder and dysthymia, or persistent depression. (Tr. 12.) At Steps 3 and 4 of this sequential analysis, the ALJ concluded that none of Walls' impairments met a listing which would define her as per se disabled, (Tr. 13), and that she had no past relevant work history, (Tr. 18), but that she retained the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of sedentary work. On the basis of these findings, the ALJ concluded that Walls was not disabled and denied her disability application. (Tr. 14-20.) In reaching these conclusions the ALJ addressed Walls' emotional impairments, but did so in a fashion which was plainly at odds with the testimony that the ALJ had heard at the administrative hearing, stating categorically in its decision that: "There is no evidence of suicide attempts . . . during the relevant time." (Tr. 17.)

This assertion simply cannot be reconciled with the testimony that the ALJ heard from Ms. Walls, who described several suicide attempts, or the report of Walls' long-time counsellor that Walls became suicidal when stressed. Moreover, the ALJ's categorical denial of the fact that these suicide attempts occurred, a fact which was supported by testimonial and clinical evidence, leaves us at a loss to determine whether the ALJ forgot, ignored or otherwise discounted this evidence in reaching a decision.

It is against the backdrop of this inexplicable conflict between the facts as found by the ALJ and the evidence actually presented to the ALJ that Walls brings this appeal. (Doc. 1.) On appeal, Walls generally argued that the ALJ erred in making credibility determinations; and in affording only limited weight to the opinion of her treating licensed counsellor and social worker, but also specifically contended that:

For the reasons set forth below, we agree that the unexplained inconsistency between what the ALJ was told in terms of prior suicide attempts by Walls, and what the ALJ stated concerning the complete lack of evidence of suicide attempts, compels a remand of this case. We reach this conclusion because we find that the question of Walls' alleged suicidal tendencies is a material issue in this case, where Walls' disability claim rests in large measure on emotional impairments, and we conclude that it cannot be said that the ALJ's misstatements concerning whether there was any evidence of suicidal thoughts or actions by Walls constitute mere harmless error. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this case be remanded for further consideration of this issue.

III. Discussion

A. A Remand is Necessary Here to Address a Material Factual Dissonance in the ALJ's Decision

Resolution of the instant Social Security appeal involves an informed consideration of the respective roles of two adjudicators-the ALJ and this court. At the outset, it is the responsibility of the ALJ in the first instance to determine whether a claimant has met the statutory prerequisites for entitlement to benefits. To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a claimant must demonstrate an inability to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §416.905(a). To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(B); 20 C.F.R. §416.905(a).

In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a). Under this process, the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity ("RFC"). 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a)(4).

Between steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant's RFC. RFC is defined as "that which an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s)." Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§416.920(e), 416.945(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of the claimant's medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe impairments identified by an ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 20 C.F.R. §416.945(a)(2).

At steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a)(3)(H)(i) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(5) by reference); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993); 20 C.F.R. §416.912.

Once this burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at step 5 to show that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could perform that are consistent with the claimant's age, education, work experience and RFC. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064; 20 C.F.R. §416.912(f).

Once the ALJ has made a disability determination, it is then the responsibility of this court to independently review that finding. In undertaking this task, this court applies a specific, well-settled and carefully articulated standard of review. In an action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for disability benefits, Congress has specifically provided that the "findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, when reviewing the Commissioner's final decision denying a claimant's application for benefits, this Court's review is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); 42 U.S.C. §1383(c)(3); Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F.Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).

But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). "In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole." Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether a plaintiff is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's finding that she is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) ("[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.") (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) ("The Secretary's determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts."); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F.Supp.2d at 536 ("[T]he court has plenary review of all legal issues . . . .").

The ALJ's disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination. Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by "a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-707. In addition, "[t]he ALJ must indicate in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding." Schaudeck v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).

On this score, one other fundamental truth has been repeatedly underscored by the courts: "Although the ALJ may weigh the credibility of the evidence, she must give some indication of the evidence which she rejects and her reason(s) for discounting such evidence. In the absence of such an indication, the reviewing court cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored." Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In short: "When a conflict in the evidence exists, the ALJ may choose whom to credit but `cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.' The ALJ must consider all the evidence and give some reason for discounting the evidence she rejects." Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993)). Thus, it is well-settled that, at a minimum, a remand is necessary when an ALJ's opinion ignores or fails to address material evidence supporting a disability claim. See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 312 (3d Cir. 2000). This principle applies with particular force when an ALJ has "ignored competent medical evidence regarding psychological disability in favor of his own contrary conclusion." Wallace v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (3d Cir. 1983).

Applying these legal benchmarks, it is generally conceded that an unexplained failure by an ALJ to fully acknowledge or address evidence of suicidal impulses by a disability claimant compels a remand. See, e.g., Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 622 (10th Cir. 2006); Roat v. Barnhart, 717 F.Supp.2d 241, 267 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). As one court has aptly observed in this regard: "Due to the ALJ's simultaneous silence as to a suicide attempt and reliance on progress notes containing a claimant's denials of suicidal ideations close in time to the suicide attempt, the Court is unable to conclude that the ALJ considered Plaintiff's medical condition as a whole or applied the appropriate legal standards." Lewis v. Colvin, No. 14-14495-CIV, 2016 WL 4810585, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2016).

So it is in the instant case. On February 20, 2015, Michelle Walls testified before the ALJ that she had engaged in several suicide attempts. Indeed, according to Walls, the only "reason why I stopped was because of my twins, my kids." (Tr. 47.) Walls' suicidal impulses were corroborated by her long-time counsellor, Ms. Rutherford, who also stated in February of 2014 that: when Walls "is faced with conflict and/or potential change she can become suicidal and highly emotional." (Tr. 502.) Despite having heard this evidence, the ALJ's decision denying Walls' disability application inexplicably asserted that: "There is no evidence of suicide attempts . . . during the relevant time." (Tr. 17.) Given the evidence before the ALJ, this categorical factual assertion was plainly in error, and we find this error to be material and not subject to any form of harmless error analysis. See Pool v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-02061-WHO, 2016 WL 4363405, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016) (concluding that suicide attempt was material evidence for purposes of Sentence Six remand of Social Security Appeal for consideration of new evidence.) Therefore we recommend a remand of this case for further consideration and reconciliation of this material disparity between the evidence presented to the ALJ and the facts as found by the ALJ.

Yet, while case law calls for a remand and further proceedings by the ALJ in this case assessing this claim in light of this evidence, nothing in our opinion should be construed as suggesting what the outcome of that final and full analysis should be. Rather, that final assessment of the evidence must await a thorough consideration and development of the record on remand by an ALJ. Therefore, nothing in this Report and Recommendation should be deemed as expressing an opinion on what the ultimate outcome of any reassessment of this evidence should be. Rather, that task should remain the duty and province of the ALJ on remand. Further, because we find this basis for remand, we need not address Ms. Walls' remaining arguments in this appeal. To the extent that any other error may exist, it can be remedied on remand following a new administrative hearing.

IV. Recommendation

Accordingly, for the forgoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this case be REMANDED for further consideration of the evidence by the Commissioner in accordance with this Report and Recommendation. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff and the case marked closed.

The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Failure to file timely Objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.