MEMORANDUM

YVETTE KANE, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff William Milbrand's complaint filed by Defendants William Miner ("Miner"), and Nathan Rhodes ("Rhodes"). (Doc. No. 9.) For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff's complaint arises out of criminal charges that were allegedly improperly filed against him and were ultimately dropped. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 16.) At all times relevant to the complaint, Plaintiff was the duly elected Mayor of the City of Shamokin, Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, and also served as the President of the Shamokin Cemetery Association volunteering to maintain the Shamokin Cemetery. (Id. ¶ 11.) On or about January 31, 2017, the Defendants, police officers with the City of Shamokin Police Department, arrested Plaintiff, placed him in a police car, and drove him to the office of Magisterial Judge John Gembic in the City of Shamokin. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16.) On the same date, Defendant Miner filed a criminal complaint against Plaintiff, without review by the District Attorney of Northumberland County, alleging that Plaintiff desecrated burial lots in the Shamokin Cemetery. (Id.) The criminal complaint, attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff's complaint, charges Plaintiff with fourteen (14) felonies and twenty-eight (28) misdemeanors. (Id.; Doc. No. 1-1 at 2-8.)

Specifically, the complaint charges Plaintiff with violating 18 Pa. C. S. A. § 3307(a)(2), Institutional Vandalism of a Cemetery or Facility, a felony, with regard to 14 individual graves in the Shamokin Cemetery. The statute provides, in relevant part:

18 Pa. C. S. A. § 3307. The complaint also charges Plaintiff with desecration of venerated objects and desecration of historic burial lots, both misdemeanors, in violation of 18 Pa. C. S. A. § 5509, with regard to each of 14 individual graves in the Shamokin Cemetery. That statute provides, in relevant part:

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5509. Ultimately, all criminal charges against Plaintiff were withdrawn by the Northumberland County District Attorney on February 21, 2017. (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff alleges that the criminal complaint filed by Defendant Miner was false and fraudulent, as he maintains that Defendants Miner and Rhodes knew that he had not desecrated any graves at the Shamokin Cemetery, but instead filed criminal charges against him and arrested him in an effort to punish him. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, in his capacity as Mayor of Shamokin, he advised Defendant Miner that he could not authorize or vote for a pension for him based in part on accumulated sick leave and vacation time, as the Auditor General's office had previously cited the City of Shamokin for including sick time and vacation leave as part of pension awards to previously-retired police officers. (Id. ¶ 12.) Further, as to Defendant Rhodes, Plaintiff alleges that he wanted to "cause the Plaintiff harm for a number of reasons," including Plaintiff's vote to lay off Defendant Rhodes in 2004, Defendant Rhodes' wife's relation to Plaintiff's opponent in the upcoming mayoral race in the City of Shamokin, and what Plaintiff describes as a "grudge" held by Defendant Rhodes against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendant knew that he had not taken any action to deface or desecrate any graves at the Shamokin Cemetery, by virtue of Defendant Miner's conversation with Andrew Garancosky, whom Plaintiff alleges told Defendant Miner that he had never observed Plaintiff at the cemetery defacing any graves. (Id. ¶ 19.)

As part of the criminal complaint lodged against Plaintiff and attached as Exhibit A to his complaint, the Affidavit of Probable Cause ("Affidavit"), pursuant to which Plaintiff was arrested, contains the following statements regarding Defendant Miner's conversation with Mr. Garancosky:

(Doc. No. 1-1 at 10-11.)

The Affidavit also represents that the investigation which resulted in the criminal complaint filed against Plaintiff was initiated pursuant to a complaint lodged by Thomas S. Ward. As to Ward, the Affidavit provides:

(Id. at 10.)

The Affidavit further details the steps taken by Defendant Miner to investigate Ward's complaint:

(Id. at 11.)

Plaintiff filed the above-captioned action on April 28, 2017. (Doc. No. 1.) The Defendants were served with the complaint on June 22, 2017, and after requesting an extension of time from the Court, filed the instant motion to dismiss (Doc. 9), with supporting brief (Doc. No. 10), on August 25, 2017. Plaintiff filed his brief in opposition to Defendants' motion on September 15, 2017. (Doc. No. 13.) Accordingly, the motion is ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Phillips v. Cnty. Of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must present facts that, accepted as true, demonstrate a plausible right to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires "only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," a complaint may nevertheless be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for its "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court's inquiry is guided by the standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Under Twombly and Iqbal, pleading requirements have shifted to a "more heightened form of pleading." See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must set out "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Id. The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not `show[n]' — `that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Accordingly, to determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified the following steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint "not entitled" to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any "well-pleaded factual allegations" contained in the complaint "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F2.d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). A court may also consider "any `matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.'" Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d Ed. 2004)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts three constitutional claims2,3 and one state law claim against Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Counts 1 and 2 assert a false arrest claim against Defendants Miner and Rhodes; Count 4 asserts an abuse of process claim against both Defendants; Count 5 asserts a malicious prosecution claim against only Defendant Miner; and Count 3 asserts a state law claim for false light invasion of privacy against both Defendants.

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens can seek redress for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute states, in pertinent part:

Id. "Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights," but is merely a means through which "to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors." Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). To maintain a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

1. Official Capacity Claims

Before addressing the individual claims brought by Plaintiff, the Court addresses Plaintiff's assertion of claims against Defendants in their official, as well as individual, capacities. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against them in their official capacities are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. No. 10 at 11-12.) Defendants correctly note that an official capacity claim brought under Section 1983 is in effect a claim against the governmental entity employing the individual defendant. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1985). Defendants also correctly note that a governmental entity, here the City of Shamokin, can be held liable for an employee's violation of a constitutional right under Section 1983 only if a plaintiff can show a policy or custom created by a policymaker that caused the alleged violation. Monell v. N.Y. City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-92 (1978); Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facil., 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Bd. of the Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). Defendants argue that since Plaintiff's complaint fails to include allegations regarding any policy or custom of the City of Shamokin that caused the alleged constitutional violations, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed. (Doc. No. 10 at 12.)

In response, Plaintiff argues at length that his official capacity claims are cognizable under the so-called "single incident" theory of Monell liability, based on the City of Shamokin's failure to train its police officers to properly determine probable cause. (Doc. No. 12 at 3-7.) Plaintiff is correct that the Supreme Court has stated that the deliberate indifference required for Monell liability may be shown even in the absence of a pattern of violations in very limited situations. City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). However, for the single incident theory to apply, the complaint must contain sufficient allegations establishing that municipality's policymakers must "kn[e]w to a moral certainty" that the specific constitutional deprivation would occur as a result of the municipality's custom or policy. Id. Normally, a pattern of violations puts policymakers on notice that their custom or policy is inadequate, but in single incident cases, the policy's deficiency must be so obvious and the likelihood of constitutional harm so great, that notice to the policymakers may be assumed. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011).

Here, aside from indicating in the caption of his complaint that he is pursuing claims against the Defendants in their official capacities, Plaintiff's complaint is devoid of even a bare reference to the City of Shamokin's policy or custom regarding training of its police officers. In fact, the entire thrust of the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint is not that the City of Shamokin police officers lack adequate training in determining the existence of probable cause, but rather that the two Defendants arrested him and initiated criminal proceedings against him "as a result of maliciousness and solely to punish the Plaintiff." (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) There are simply no allegations in Plaintiff's complaint that support a Monell theory of liability, even one premised on a "single incident." Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss the official capacity claims asserted by Plaintiff.

2. False Arrest

Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest made without probable cause is a constitutional violation that may be redressed under Section 1983. However, in order to make out a false arrest claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that there was an arrest and (2) that the arrest was made in the absence of probable cause. Dowling v. City of Phila., 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). Probable cause to support an arrest does not "require the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). Rather, probable cause exists when the "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.'" Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). In making a probable cause determination, a police officer is authorized to weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations, even if those decisions later prove incorrect. Eckman v. Lancaster City, 742 F.Supp.2d 638, 650 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff'd, 505 F. App'x 93 (3d Cir. 2013) and aff'd, 529 F. App'x 185 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Wright v. City of Phila, 409 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2005)).

Where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating that (1) the officer "knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood in applying for a warrant," and (2) that "such statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.'" Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Mitchell v. Obenski, 134 F. App'x 548, 551 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1997)) (noting that the fact that a magisterial district judge signed the warrant entitles the officers to a "presumption of reasonableness that can only be overcome by `allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth,' which must be accompanied by specific proof"). Omissions are made with reckless disregard "if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that any reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know." Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An officer is not required to "relate the entire history of events leading up to a warrant application with every potentially evocative detail." Id. at 787. In determining the alleged materiality of an assertion or omission, the court must "excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the `corrected' warrant affidavit would establish probable cause." Wilson, 212 F.3d at 789.

In light of the fact that Plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a magisterial district judge, supported by an Affidavit of Probable Cause drafted by Defendant Miner, the officers' actions here are entitled to a "presumption of reasonableness that can only be overcome by `allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth,' which must be accompanied by specific proof." Mitchell, 134 F. App'x at 551 (quotation omitted). As Defendants point out, and as previously described, the Affidavit prepared by Defendant Miner contains detailed evidence of a complaint from a citizen, Thomas Ward, Jr., regarding the condition of the graves in the cemetery, including photographs. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 10.) The Affidavit details Defendant Miner's investigation into the complaint, which included visiting the cemetery, reviewing the cemetery plan and developing information regarding gravesites that were either buried or disturbed by the construction of the cell phone tower. (Id.) The Affidavit details Defendant Miner's interview of Mr. Garancoski, who was the former caretaker of the Shamokin Cemetery. (Id.) As detailed more fully above, Garancoski stated that he observed graves that were disturbed in connection with the cell tower construction, and reviewed cemetery maps with Defendant Miner, pointing out areas of construction and graves he felt had been disturbed. (Id. at 11.) According to the Affidavit, Defendant Miner's investigation also included meeting with the contractor who did the cell tower work, who indicated that he met with the Plaintiff at the site and that Plaintiff advised him where to dig in the cemetery, assuring him that no grave sites were located in that area. (Id.) Defendant Miner then plotted out which grave sites were affected by the construction, and ultimately identified fourteen graves that were affected. (Id.) In light of Plaintiff's position as President of the Shamokin Cemetery and reported involvement in directing the cell tower work in the cemetery, the Criminal Complaint prepared by Defendant Miner charged Plaintiff with a felony and misdemeanor counts relative to each of the fourteen graves because of his role in "authoriz[ing], allow[ing], and direct[ing]" the various gravesites to be covered by dirt in connection with the construction of a cell phone tower. (Id. at 2-8.)

As noted above, Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's complaint allege in conclusory fashion that the Criminal Complaint and Affidavit pursuant to which Plaintiff was arrested were "false and fraudulent and not based on facts" because Defendants "knew that the Plaintiff took no action whatsoever to, in any way, deface or desecrate any graves." (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 16-17.) The only specific fact alleged in support of Plaintiff's claim that the Affidavit contained false statements is the complaint's allegation that that Mr. Garancosky told Defendant Miner that "he had never seen the Plaintiff at the cemetery." (Id.¶ 19.) However, it is unclear to the Court how this allegation, even if true, demonstrates that any of the facts contained in the Affidavit were false, as the Affidavit and Criminal Complaint make no reference to Plaintiff's presence in the cemetery, and instead speak to Plaintiff in his capacity as President of the Shamokin Cemetery "authoriz[ing], allow[ing], and direct[ing]" the work that allegedly constituted desecration of the grave sites. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2-8.) Plaintiff's complaint simply fails to allege that any specific facts contained in the Affidavit were false, or that the Affidavit omitted any exculpatory information. Accordingly, under the legal standard articulated above for probable cause challenges to an arrest executed pursuant to a warrant, Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts from which a reasonable factfinder could infer the absence of probable cause.

Having found the complaint to be lacking in allegations from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that Plaintiff's arrest and criminal prosecution were initiated in the absence of probable cause, the Court will grant the Defendants' motion to dismiss as it relates to Count 1 and 2's false arrest claim. However, as it is unclear at this procedural stage whether amendment of this claim would be futile, the Court will permit Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to correct the identified pleading deficiencies.

3. Malicious Prosecution

In Count 5 of his complaint, Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against Defendant Miner. In order to state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege facts satisfying each of the following elements:

Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007).

In light of the Court's finding supra that Plaintiff's complaint lacks allegations from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that Plaintiff's arrest and criminal prosecution were initiated in the absence of probable cause, the Court must find that Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for malicious prosecution, and will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss Count 5 claim against Defendant Miner. However, as it is unclear at this procedural stage whether amendment of this claim will be futile, the Court will permit Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to correct the identified pleading deficiencies.

4. Abuse of Process

With regard to the abuse of process claim asserted by Plaintiff in Count 4 of his complaint, the Court agrees with Defendants that such a claim is subject to dismissal, as it is clear from Plaintiff's complaint that he fails to state a cognizable claim for abuse of process against the Defendants. In contrast to false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, an abuse of process claim "lies where `prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for a purpose other than that intended by law.'" Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 n. 17 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation and quotation omitted).

With regard to abuse of process, Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following: "Defendants filed charges against the Plaintiff for a purpose other than [sic] what the criminal process is designed;" "Defendants brought charges against the Plaintiff in order to benefit themselves and to prejudice the Plaintiff;" "Defendants initiated criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff in retaliation . . . or for another improper purpose;" and "[t]he legal process used by the Defendants was not legitimate." (Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 32, 35-37.)

According to these allegations, Defendants Miner and Rhodes initiated criminal proceedings against him for an improper or illegitimate purpose. Such allegations are fundamentally inconsistent with an abuse of process claim, which, at bottom, is premised on an allegation that legal proceedings initiated legitimately were thereafter used for an improper purpose. See Rose, 871 F.2d at 350 n.17. The allegations of Plaintiff's complaint, while potentially pertinent to a claim for false arrest or malicious prosecution, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for abuse of process. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss as it relates to Count 4's abuse of process claim with prejudice.

B. State Law False Light Claim

In light of the Court's resolution of Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Plaintiff's complaint, there is currently no viable federal claim before the Court supporting the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim. See Plasko v. City of Pottsville, 852 F.Supp. 1258, 1267 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("[c]ourts should ordinarily decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claim when the federal claims are dismissed") (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law false light claim asserted by Plaintiff in Count 3, and will dismiss it without prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to reassert the claim in an amended complaint pursuant to the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss. Count 4 will be dismissed with prejudice. Counts 1, 2, 3 and 5 will be dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint with regard to those counts. Plaintiff will be granted thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum and corresponding Order to file an amended complaint that corrects the pleading deficiencies identified herein. An Order consistent with this Memorandum follows.