MATTHEW W. BRANN, District Judge.
To satisfy Dustin Bogart's federal income tax deficiency, the United States of America foreclosed upon and sold property owned by Dustin and his wife, Marcy Bogart, in Northumberland County, Pennsylvania.
The Bogarts allege that June Bogart (Dustin's mother) and Marcy had cognizable interests in the subject property. Consequently, since the tax liability was owed exclusively by Dustin, the Bogarts argue that June and Marcy are entitled to a share of the property's sales proceeds.
The Bogarts allege that June had an interest in the subject property as a result of a loan advanced by June to the trust that held the property. In support of this claim, the Bogarts submit two exhibits: an affidavit signed by June and a promissory note signed by Marcy on behalf of the trust.
In the affidavit, June states that she provided "$35,000.00 in gold, silver and cash . . . [in order] to obtain a 33 1/3% interest" in the property, and that she "was provided evidence of [that] interest . . . by certificate of capital units . . . ."
As an initial matter, this Court finds this evidence insufficient to support June's claim to an interest in the subject property. Both the affidavit and the promissory note indicate that June should have received a "certificate" reflecting her interest in the subject property. That "certificate," however, was not submitted with the Bogarts' papers, and this Court has not be able to locate it in the record before it. Further, even if this Court accepts the promissory note itself as the "certificate," that document was not recorded until 2016, long after the federal tax liens were recorded in 2005 and 2010.
The Third Circuit remanded this case to this Court to determine whether or not Marcy was entitled to a portion of the sales proceeds. The Government argues that Marcy has waived her right to assert an interest in those proceeds.
Throughout most of this litigation, the Bogarts have maintained that the subject property could not be seized and sold to satisfy Dustin's delinquent tax debts because the property did not belong to either of them, but instead belonged to an unincorporated business trust organization. Marcy did not change her position on this issue—i.e., did not argue that she was a co-owner of the property entitled to a portion of its sales proceeds—until after this Court determined that the business trust was the nominee and alter ego of the Bogarts, after this Court determined that the trust's property was therefore Dustin's property, and after this Court consequently ordered that property to be sold.
For the reasons discussed above, this Court will again deny the Bogarts' motion to reconsider its December 2, 2015 Order distributing the proceeds from the sale of the subject property.
An appropriate Order follows.