A. RICHARD CAPUTO, District Judge.
Presently before me is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) filed by Petitioner Michael Tyrell Holston ("Petitioner"). For the reasons that follow, the petition will be denied.
The facts of this case have been summarized by the Pennsylvania Superior Court as follows:
Commonwealth v. Holston, No. 223 MDA 2014, 2014 WL 10558598, at *1-4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2014) (citation, internal citations, and footnotes omitted).
Following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and two counts of carrying a firearm without a license. See id. at *1. Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder and to concurrent terms of 3-7 years on the firearm convictions. See id.
Petitioner filed post-sentence motions, which were denied by the trial court, and then he filed a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. See id. Holston's judgment of sentence was affirmed by the Superior Court on August 17, 2012. See id.
Petitioner filed a pro se Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition in the trial court on February 1, 2013. See id. Counsel was then appointed to represent Petitioner, and an amended, counseled PCRA petition was filed. See id. The trial court dismissed the PCRA petition on January 14, 2014. See id.
Petitioner appealed the dismissal of the PCRA petition to the Superior Court. See id. In that appeal, Petitioner raised the following three issues: (1) his constitutional rights were violated because the police failed to give him Miranda warnings before obtaining his custodial statement; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of a photograph depicting the victim as he was discovered by the first responding police officer; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. See id. at *4-6. The Superior Court affirmed the trial court's denial of PCRA relief on October 28, 2014. See id. at *6.
On December 21, 2014, Petitioner filed another pro se PCRA petition in the trial court. (See Doc. 6-10, 2). The trial court dismissed that petition on February 23, 2016. (See Doc. 6-2, 11).
Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 1, 2016. (See Doc. 1, generally). Therein, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: (1) his constitutional rights were violated because the police failed to give him Miranda warnings before obtaining his custodial statement; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the improper admission of inflammatory photographs; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the proper issue on appeal, (see id.), i.e., the same issues he raised before the Superior Court on appeal from the denial of his first PCRA action.
Respondent filed an answer to the § 2254 petition on July 27, 2016. (See Doc. 6, generally). On August 12, 2016, Petitioner filed a traverse. (See Doc. 7, generally). The petition for habeas corpus is thus ripe for disposition.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254, mandates that petitioners demonstrate that they have "exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State" before seeking federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). An exhausted claim is one that has been "fairly presented" to the state courts "by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process," and which has been adjudicated on the merits. See Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)); Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 302 (2013). "Fair presentation" of a claim merely requires the petitioner to "present [the] federal claim's factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted." Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). For § 2254(d) purposes, a claim has been adjudicated on the merits "when a state court has made a decision that finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground." Collins v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 545 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 2009)).
When a claim is properly exhausted in the state courts and then raised on federal habeas review, the level of deference afforded to the state-court decision is substantial. Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Gilmore v. Bey, No. 17-681 (U.S. Nov. 8, 2017). The AEDPA "does not `permit federal judges to . . . casually second-guess the decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense attorneys.'" Collins, 742 F.3d at 543 (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 13 (2013)). Accordingly, under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is unavailable for exhausted claims unless the state-court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
This is an intentionally difficult standard to meet. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). Section 2254(d) "preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Id. Therefore, to obtain federal habeas relief on an exhausted claim, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103.
Finally, "[i]f a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petition[er] must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)[] on the record that was before that state court"; "evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)[] review." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 185 (2011) (footnote omitted). "[D]istrict courts cannot conduct evidentiary hearings to supplement the existing state court record under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Otherwise, federal habeas petitioners would be able to circumvent the finality of state court judgments by establishing a new factual record." Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 2011). "This would contravene AEDPA, which requires petitioners to diligently present the facts in state court before proceeding to the federal courthouse." Id.
If a state prisoner has not fairly presented a claim "to the state courts but state law clearly forecloses review, exhaustion is excused, but the doctrine of procedural default may come into play." Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (citations omitted). Generally, if a prisoner has procedurally defaulted on a claim by failing to raise it in state-court proceedings, a federal habeas court will not review the merits of the claim, even one that implicates constitutional concerns. Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 9 (2012) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747-48 (1991) and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84-85 (1977)). A few limited exceptions to this rule exist.
One exception is that "[a] prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law." Id. at 10 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). "Cause for a procedural default exists where something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[,] . . . impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show not merely that there were errors that created a possibility of prejudice, but that they "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." Holland v. Horn, 519 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982)). If cause and prejudice are established, the federal court reviews the claim "de novo because the state court did not consider the claim on the merits." Bey, 856 F.3d at 236 (citation omitted).
Another rare exception that will excuse a procedural default is if the petitioner can show that "failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental `miscarriage of justice.'" Carpenter, 296 F.3d at 146 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750). To satisfy the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception, a petitioner typically will have to show actual innocence. Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Among other protections, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused in a criminal prosecution "to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The applicable federal precedent for ineffective assistance claims is the well-settled two-prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
To establish he was denied the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the movant must show that (1) the performance of trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the performance of counsel unfairly prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. "Both Strickland prongs must be satisfied." George v. Sively, 254 F.3d 438, 443 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1989)).
The first Strickland prong requires a defendant to "establish . . . that counsel's performance was deficient." Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001). Proving a deficiency in conduct "`requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). "In assessing counsel's performance, `every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.'" Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
"Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is to say, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is "whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id.
The second prong of Strickland requires a defendant to show that counsel's performance unfairly prejudiced the defendant, meaning that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is not enough to show that the error had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding, for virtually every act or omission would meet such a test. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Rather, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. The Third Circuit has stated that the "Strickland prejudice standard is not `stringent'—it is, in fact, `less demanding than the preponderance standard.'" Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 282).
When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is brought under § 2254,
Woods v. Etherton, 136 S.Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted).
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas relief for three reasons. First, he argues that his constitutional rights were violated because police interrogated him while he was in custody without first providing Miranda warnings. Second, Petitioner assertsthat his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of an inflammatory photograph of the victim. And, third, appellate counsel was ineffective, says Petitioner, by failing to raise the proper issue on direct appeal. I will address those claims in order.
Petitioner first argues for habeas relief on the basis that his constitutional rights were violated when the police failed to give him Miranda warnings. (See Doc. 1-1, 3). Respondent contends that this claim fails because it was not raised at trial, on direct appeal, or in his original PCRA filings, but was instead pursued by Petitioner for the first time when he appealed the dismissal of his PCRA petition to the Superior Court. (See Doc. 6-1, 4-5). The Superior Court found the Miranda claim waived because Petitioner did not raise it in his original and amended PCRA petitions. See Holston, 2014 WL 10558598, at *4.
Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground One of the petition. Petitioner, as stated, did not raise his Miranda claim at trial, on direct appeal or, or in his original or amended PCRA petition. "The requirement that claims be raised before the PCRA Court to be preserved for appellate review has been found to be independent and adequate, and this Court agrees with that assessment." Robinson v. Smith, No. 17-1023, 2018 WL 3385189, at *8 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2018) (citing Suny v. Pennsylvania, 687 F. App'x 170, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2017) (Superior Court's dismissal of claim due to petitioner's failure to raise it in PCRA Court was based on independent and adequate state ground); Thomas v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't or Corr., 495 F. App'x 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding claim procedurally defaulted due to petitioner's failure to "comply with the clear and unambiguous Pennsylvania rules that require each claim to be separately and explicitly asserted in the PCRA petition")). As such, Petitioner's first claim "is procedurally defaulted and the merits of the claim are unreviewable here." Suny, 687 F. App'x at 176; see also Castillo v. Fisher, No. 14-418, 2018 WL 701857, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2018) ("For similar reasons, Petitioner's objection that his sentencing counsel was ineffective for `failing to file a notice of appeal' must also fail. . . . The issue is waived as it was not one of the issues raised in his PCRA petition.");Smith v. Nish, No. 07-1279, 2008 WL 4616850, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2008) ("All of the issues of trial counsel's ineffectiveness — other than the three raised in the counseled PCRA petition — that Petitioner raises in Ground One were waived in the state courts because they were never presented in the counseled amended PCRA petition."). Moreover, Petitioner has not provided any argument to support an exception to this procedural default. See, e.g., Crocker v. Klem, 450 F. App'x 136, 138-39 (3d Cir. 2011); Tai-Nan v. Wilson, 336 F. App'x 256-262 (3d Cir. 2009). The claim for relief in Ground One of the petition will be denied.
In Ground Two of the petition, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of an inflammatory photograph of the victim. Unlike Ground One, Petitioner presented this claim to both the PCRA court and the Superior Court. See Holston, 2014 WL 10558598, at *4. The Superior Court, though, rejected this claim, explaining:
Id. at *4-5 (record citations omitted).
Where, as here, the state court already has rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a federal court must defer to the state court's decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential standard." Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 123, 131 S.Ct. 733, 740, 178 L. Ed. 2d 649 (2011) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S. Ct. at 788). Reiterating that review of this claim is "doubly deferential," Petitioner fails to show that the Superior Court's decision was an unreasonable application of Strickland or that it was an unreasonable application of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The Superior Court concluded that Petitioner's claim relating to the introduction of the photograph of the victim at trial failed for lack of arguable merit. The adjudication of this claim did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor did it result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). More particularly, counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the photograph because, as detailed by the Superior Court, it was admissible to demonstrate Petitioner's intent and to assist the jury in understanding the circumstances of the execution style murder.
Lastly, Petitioner claims his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the proper issue on direct appeal. Specifically, Petitioner argues that counsel should have made a sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal rather than a weight of the evidence claim and, as a result, Petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Like Ground Two, this issue was raised before the PCRA court and the Superior Court. But, in finding that claim lacked "arguable merit", the Superior Court reasoned:
Holston, 2014 WL 10558598, at *5-6 (record citations omitted).
The Superior Court's resolution of this claim was not unreasonable. There was sufficient evidence for which a jury could conclude that an intoxication defense was not established. As the Superior Court explained, multiple witnesses viewed Petitioner moments before the killing who described Petitioner as not displaying overt signs of intoxication. The Commonwealth also presented evidence that Petitioner attempted to give the murder weapon to a different individual shortly after the shooting. On these facts, the Superior Court reasonably applied Strickland in determining that his counsel's failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions did not amount to constitutionally ineffective assistance. See, e.g., Garrett v. Knight, No. 16-3233, 2018 WL 2150261, at *8 (S.D. Ind. May 10, 2018); McNally v. Pierce, No. 12-1303, 2015 WL 7566667, at *7 (D. Del. Nov. 24, 2015); Jacobs v. Folino, No. 07-925, 2011 WL 1770899, at *12 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2011). Ground Three of the petition will be denied.
For the above stated reasons, the § 2254 petition filed by Petitioner Michael Tyrell Holston will be denied. A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A court may issue a certificate of appealability only when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This showing is satisfied when the petitioner demonstrates "that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1034, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). The instant petition does not warrant habeas relief, and reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability will not be issued because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of his constitutional rights. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000).
An appropriate order follows.
