JAMES M. MUNLEY, District Judge.
Before the court is Defendant Mark Cook's motion for a bill of particulars. Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for disposition.
On December 20, 2016, the United States charged Defendant Mark Cook in a superseding indictment with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c); several counts of sex trafficking and attempted sex trafficking by force, fraud and coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and (b)(1); possession with the intent to distribute various controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and attempted witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1).
The defendant filed his first request for bill of particulars on October 26, 2017. (Doc. 91). On October 31, 2017, a grand jury returned a second superseding indictment against the defendant, which added an additional count of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion. (Doc. 97). We addressed the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars with reference to the second superseding indictment, and denied the defendant's motion. (Docs. 140, 141). On July 24, `, a grand jury returned a third superseding indictment against the defendant. (Doc. 176). The third superseding indictment added three victims and a new overt act to the conspiracy count, three new sex trafficking counts, a new charge of transporting an individual in interstate commerce for the purposes of prostitution, a new charge of persuading an individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution, a new charge of conspiracy to distribute heroin, molly, and cocaine, and a new charge of possession with the intent to distribute heroin and cocaine. (Doc. 179).
On August 7, 2018, the defendant filed the instant motion for a bill of particulars. (Doc. 185).
The defendant contends that the indictment does not describe with any particularity what the defendant is accused of doing, and thus renders it difficult to present a constitutionally required effective defense. He therefore seeks a bill of particulars which: (1) names the alleged victims; (2) lists the time and place of the acts consisting of the crimes alleged in the indictment; and (3) names the specific person against whom the defendant or his co-conspirators used force, fraud, threats, and/or coercion as alleged in the indictment.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(f) provides that "[t]he court may direct the government to file a bill of particulars." "The purpose of a bill of particulars is `to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges brought against him, to adequately prepare his defense, to avoid surprise during the trial and to protect him against a second prosecution for an inadequately described offense.'"
The law is clear that a bill of particulars is not designed as a discovery device: "[a] bill of particulars, like discovery, is not intended to provide the defendant with the fruits of the government's investigation . . . Rather, it is intended to give the defendant only that minimum amount of information necessary to permit the defendant to conduct his own investigation."
The Third Circuit has discussed that the need for a bill of particulars weakens even further in situations where the defendant "has access through discovery to the documents and witness statements relied upon by the government in constructing its case . . ."
After a careful review, we will deny the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars. We find that the 27-page third superseding indictment sufficiently makes the defendant aware of the charges against him. The third superseding indictment is detailed and provides information as to the basis for each count.
Many of the issues raised by the defendant are issues that we addressed when we denied the defendant's first motion for a bill of particulars. Specifically, the defendant once again seeks the names of his alleged co-conspirators and victims. As we noted in our previous memorandum, although the indictment does not name the defendant's alleged co-conspirators and victims, we find it sufficient that the indictment sets forth the government's theory as to the defendant's involvement in the conspiracy with specificity in other areas. The third superseding indictment lists 42 "overt acts" committed in furtherance of the sex trafficking conspiracy. The overt acts alleged include: the dates of specific hotel and motel room rentals; a time frame for which the defendant and/or his coconspirators provided heroin, cocaine, and "molly" to females that worked for the defendant as prostitutes; and, the date the defendant had advertisements posted on backpage.com in the "Scranton escorts" and "Scranton adult entertainment" sections of the website, showing women in provocative poses. (
Further, each of the sex trafficking by force and coercion and attempted sex trafficking counts, including the three new counts that were added in the third superseding indictment, contain date ranges within which the defendant is alleged to have recruited and enticed victims to engage in commercial sex acts. The two new counts involving interstate prostitution also specify the dates for which such activity is alleged to have taken place and the states to which the victims traveled to engage in these acts.
We find that from the indictment, the defendant knows "`fully, directly and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity . . . all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.'"
In light of the provided discovery and 27-page third superseding indictment, we conclude that a bill of particulars is not warranted in this matter. With this information, the defendant should be able to avoid surprise and prepare for trial.
For these reasons, we will deny the defendant's motion for a bill of particulars. An appropriate order follows.