SYLVIA H. RAMBO, District Judge.
In this Section 1983 civil rights action, Plaintiff brings claims for false arrest, excessive force, battery, and false imprisonment against the City of York, Pennsylvania, as well as three police officers, Vincent Monte, Nicholas Figge, and Terry Seitz. Presently before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, the court will deny Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
In considering the instant motions, the court relied on the uncontested facts or, where the facts were disputed, viewed the facts and deduced all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Plaintiff, Willashia Williams ("Plaintiff" or "Williams"), is an African-American woman who was eighteen years old and a resident of the City of York ("York") at the time of the incident. Vincent Monte ("Officer Monte") and Terry Seitz ("Officer Seitz") were patrol officers, and Nicholas Figge ("Sergeant Figge") was a sergeant, with the York City Police Department ("YCPD"). Other than the date of the incident at issue, March 12, 2013, and certain events that occurred prior to Defendants' interaction with Plaintiff, there is little agreement regarding what occurred that night.
The parties do agree on the following: At approximately 8:35 p.m. on March 12, 2013, Officer Lowe reported via the police radio that there were shots fired and that the suspects' fled in a white vehicle, but stated that he and other officers could not pursue the vehicle, because they were on foot. Sergeant Figge, however, was driving near the scene when the suspects' vehicle pulled in front of him. Office Lowe reported, and Sergeant Figge confirmed, that there were three occupants in the vehicle. The suspects fled at a high rate of speed while Sergeant Figge and Officer Jay pursued them through multiple streets in York. The vehicle subsequently crashed into a parked car outside of the officers' view. Officer Jay was the first to arrive at the crash site and saw one of the passengers flee on foot to the south of the accident. The driver and other passenger had already left the accident scene. Sergeant Figge arrived on scene moments after Officer Jay, but left soon after to pursue the driver and additional passenger. (Figge Dep., p. 12.) Officer Jay stayed at the accident scene to complete the accident investigation report during which he found a spent .38 caliber shell casing inside the vehicle. (Jay Dep., pp. 6, 10-12; Doc. 84-9, p. 2 of 7.)
After the accident, dispatch reported that the driver fled northbound on foot. Officer Jay assumed that both the driver and second passenger fled northbound but did not see either person flee in that direction. (Jay Dep., p. 17.) Shortly after leaving to pursue the driver and second passenger, Sergeant Figge observed two people running away from the accident area in the eastbound direction on Princess Street.
Thirty-one seconds after Officer Monte parked his vehicle, Plaintiff and Scott begin having a conversation with officers.
While walking to Officer Seitz's vehicle, Plaintiff tripped on an officer's foot. Officer Monte subsequently sees Plaintiff "on the ground kicking and screaming."
Sergeant Figge ordered Officer Seitz to cite Plaintiff with disorderly conduct. Plaintiff was then placed in Officer Seitz's vehicle and transported to City Hall. Officer Seitz had no further conversations with Sergeant Figge or any other officers at the scene. Scott was also transported to City Hall by Officer Monte.
The remaining details of the story, as highlighted by these examples, are matters of significant debate. Plaintiff alleges that prior to running down Princess Street, she and Scott were at a park in York with two of their friends. A police officer told them to evacuate the area because there had been a shooting. To get home more quickly, Plaintiff and Scott decided to run back to their house, running up Princess Street towards Pine Street. At this point, Sergeant Figge saw Plaintiff and Scott running and yelled for them to stop. Plaintiff submits that when Officer Seitz arrested her, he threw her to the ground. She alleges that the officers were "really forceful and rough with [her], like [she] was a man." (Williams Dep., pp. 56-57.) Defendants aver that Plaintiff was kicking, flailing around, being disorderly, and yelling while she was being handcuffed. She reportedly refused orders to place her hands behind her back, was being uncooperative, and swearing at officers. At City Hall, Plaintiff avers that her wrist was hurting and asked to have the handcuffs removed. An officer purportedly approached her, twisted her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened if she did not give him her arm, he would break it. Plaintiff alleges that after the handcuffs were removed, her wrist was swollen making it difficult to sign the citation issued to her. Further, as a result of the excessive forced used against her, Plaintiff alleges that she sustained a fractured wrist and bruised ribs. In contrast, Defendants claim Plaintiff was extremely noisy, loudly pounding her free arm on a metal wall. The competing versions of the evening are each supported by evidence of record.
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on March 11, 2015, and subsequently amended her complaint with leave of court on May 6, 2016. (Docs. 1, 33.) In her amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for false arrest, excessive force, battery, and false imprisonment against Monte, Figge, and Seitz, as well as Monell claims for false arrest and excessive force against York. Following a long and arduous discovery period, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment along with a supporting brief and statement of facts. (Docs. 81-84.) Defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment and statement of facts, followed by a brief in support. (Docs. 85-87.) Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition. (Docs. 89-91, 94, 96, 98, 108, 111-112.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 sets forth the standard and procedures for the grant of summary judgment. Rule 56(a) provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law, and is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the same. Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. "Once the moving party points to evidence demonstrating no issue of material fact exists, the nonmoving party has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor." Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat'l Ass'n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). The non-moving party may not simply sit back and rest on the allegations in its complaint; instead, it must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotations omitted); see also Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001). Summary judgment should be granted where a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. "Such affirmative evidence — regardless of whether it is direct or circumstantial — must amount to more than a scintilla, but may amount to less (in the evaluation of the court) than a preponderance." Saldana, 260 F.3d at 232 (quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460-61 (3d Cir. 1989)).
In her motion, Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be granted in her favor because Sergeant Figge lacked reasonable suspicion to detain her, and Sergeant Figge and Officer Seitz lacked probable cause for her arrest. (Doc. 82, pp. 8-15.) Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion submitting that Sergeant Figge had reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiff for several reasons, including that she was running from police in a high crime area
Defendants, in support of their summary judgment motion, set forth a myriad of arguments challenging all of Plaintiff's claims. (See Doc. 87.) In opposition, Plaintiff defends her claims by submitting that Defendants have failed to establish their entitlement to qualified immunity and summary judgment.
As an initial matter, Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It does not, by itself, create substantive rights, but instead "provides remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere." City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To establish a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff must show a deprivation of a "right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . by a person acting under color of state law." Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 2252 (3d Cir. 1995)).
A plaintiff is not guaranteed recovery by satisfying Section 1983's requirements. Rather, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity, i.e. "immunity from suit," if, while performing "discretionary functions," their conduct did not violate a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable person would have known." Crouse v. S. Lebanon Twp., 668 F.Supp.2d 664, 671 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)).
A two-part inquiry is required to determine whether police officers are entitled to qualified immunity. First, the court determines whether the defendant violated the plaintiff's constitutional right. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). If the defendant did not violate the plaintiff's constitutional right, the court must grant summary judgment in the defendant's favor. Crouse, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). If the plaintiff satisfies the first step, the court must then determine "whether the right at issue was `clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. A right is "clearly established" when the circumstances are "`sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). Because of the difficult constitutional issues typically involved in cases examining qualified immunity, the court is not required to conduct this two-part inquiry sequentially. Crouse, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 671. Nonetheless, "analysis of the merits for purposes of summary judgment merges with analysis of the deprivation of federal rights for purposes of qualified immunity." Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, the court will first address whether Plaintiff's rights were violated, and then determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whether a seizure is reasonable "depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself." Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)). The court must assess, "on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
Brief investigative stops, or Terry stops, are seizures subject to the Fourth Amendment and are permitted if an officer can "point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In determining the reasonableness of a Terry stop, courts must ask if "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that criminal activity may be afoot." Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 205 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22) (internal quotations omitted). However, a seizure does not occur every time a police officer approaches an individual to ask a few questions. Id. When a reasonable person would no longer feel free to leave, the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the intrusion to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)).
To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts "must look at the `totality of the circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a `particularized and objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). Numerous factors are relevant in evaluating the totality of the circumstances, including:
United States v. Fogle, 515 F.Supp.2d 474, 484-85 (D.N.J. 2007) (citations omitted). Concurrently, the court must allow "officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. Courts should "give considerable deference to police officers' determinations of reasonable suspicion." United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2006)). Furthermore, courts are reluctant to "`second-guess' investigative decisions made by officers in hot pursuit of criminal suspects." United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002).
The parties do not dispute that Sergeant Figge's actions — holding his firearm out the window of his unmarked police vehicle while ordering Plaintiff and Scott to get on the ground — constitute an investigative detention. (See Docs. 82, 87, 90, 96.) Notwithstanding such agreement, the court concludes that Sergeant Figge's initial contact with Plaintiff constituted a seizure, which required reasonable suspicion. Thus, the court will address whether Sergeant Figge had the required reasonable suspicion to seize Plaintiff.
Minutes prior to his interaction with Plaintiff, Sergeant Figge pursued a suspects' vehicle with three occupants that fled the scene of a shots fired call. That vehicle crashed into parked cars and the three passengers fled on foot. Sergeant Figge left the accident scene to locate the driver and second passenger, at which point he saw Plaintiff and Scott running eastbound on Princess Street. Plaintiff contends that there is no evidence of her fleeing from the police, rather, she and Scott were "merely running as Sergeant Figge's eyes alighted on them." (Doc. 82, p. 11.) Without more, Plaintiff argues Sergeant Figge lacked reasonable suspicion to seize Plaintiff. (Id. at 8-11; see also Doc. 96, pp. 9-12 of 39.) While flight itself is "not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, . . . it is certainly suggestive of such." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Figge observed Plaintiff running in geographical
To maintain her claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must show that Sergeant Figge and Officer Seitz lacked probable cause to arrest her. See Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F.Supp.2d 581, 592 (M.D. Pa. 2008). "Probable cause exists when the totality of facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent officer to believe that the party charged has committed an offense." Id. (quoting Garcia v. Cty. of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 265 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)). The "`constitutional validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed any crime,' but whether the police had probable cause to believe that the individual committed those crimes at the time of his or her arrest." Crouse, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 672 (quoting Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005)).
The appropriateness of Plaintiff's arrest depends upon the nature of the crime in question. Id. (citing Wright, 409 F.3d at 602). Plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 5503(a), which provides:
In Pennsylvania, disorderly conduct is "not intended as a catchall for every act which annoys or disturbs people," rather, it is meant to prevent "`recklessly creating a risk' of public alarm, annoyance or inconvenience." Commonwealth v. Vetter, 149 A.3d 71, 77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)); see also Commonwealth v. DeLuca, 597 A.2d 1121, 1123 (Pa. 1991). Furthermore, "[t]he cardinal feature of the crime of disorderly conduct is public unruliness which can or does lead to tumult and disorder." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. 1999)).
The court finds that there are not sufficient facts to determine whether Sergeant Figge and Officer Seitz had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for disorderly conduct. Taking the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, at a minimum, Plaintiff was loud and upset with Defendants. Whether Plaintiff's behavior rose to the level of disorderly conduct is best left for a jury.
Defendants further argue that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff for the more serious crimes of criminal escape or harassment since "an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking." D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 584 n.2 (`) (citing Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-55 (2004)). A person commits criminal escape if "he unlawfully removes himself from official detention or fails to return to official detention following temporary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited purpose." 18 Pa. C.S. § 5121(a). Defendants contend that Plaintiff fled an investigative detention when she failed to stop immediately upon Sergeant Figge's command. Once again, there is a factual dispute regarding exactly when Plaintiff stopped at Sergeant Figge's command such that the court cannot determine if there was sufficient probable cause for criminal escape. Lastly, the contention that Plaintiff could have been charged with harassment
The Fourth Amendment grants the right to be free from excessive force during a lawful arrest. Dull v. W. Manchester Twp. Police Dep't, 604 F.Supp.2d 739, 749 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776-78 (3d Cir. 2004)). "To state a claim for excessive force as an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that a `seizure' occurred and that it was unreasonable." Kopec, 361 F.3d at 776 (quoting Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 515 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1999)). Here, Defendants do not contend that Plaintiff's detention and arrest did not constitute a "seizure;" therefore, the court must only determine whether the force used by the officers was reasonable.
Reasonableness is determined by the totality of the circumstances, i.e. whether "the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivations." Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). An officer's good or bad faith motivations are immaterial if the use of force is considered objectively reasonable. Id. (citing Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d at 515; Abraham, 183 F.3d at 289). In determining reasonableness, the court may consider the severity of the crime at issue, whether the individual poses an immediate threat to officers or the public or is considered violent or dangerous, whether the individual is resisting or attempting to evade arrest, the number of persons officers are detaining at one time, the duration of the action, and the possibility that the person may be armed. Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997)). Reasonableness should "frequently remain a question for the jury," but a defendant can "still win on summary judgment if the district court concludes, after resolving all factual disputes in the favor of the plaintiff, that the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances." Id. (quoting Abraham, 183 F.3d at 290).
The undisputed facts establish that Officer Seitz handcuffed Plaintiff at the time of her arrest and an officer placed his knee on Plaintiff's back.
Based on the court's findings that Plaintiff has established prima facie claims for false arrest and excessive force, the court must determine whether Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, and Officer Seitz are entitled to qualified immunity. The court must ascertain whether the officers violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Wright, 409 F.3d at 599-600. "[A]ll but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" are protected by qualified immunity. Dull, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 752 (quoting Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 215 (3d Cir. 2004)). Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court must determine whether Defendants should have known that their actions contravened statutory or constitutional guarantees. Id. (citing Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2000)). Granting immunity is appropriate unless the unlawfulness of the conduct is "apparent based upon the law as it existed at the time of defendant's actions." Id. (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Notwithstanding, if the qualified immunity analysis requires the resolution of disputed facts, the court must postpone consideration of immunity until a jury resolves those factual issues. Id. (Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006)).
The court holds that a finding of qualified immunity for Plaintiff's false arrest claim as to Sergeant Figge and Officer Seitz is inappropriate at this time in light of the genuine issues of material fact. According to Plaintiff's account of the incident, the facts do not support a finding that a reasonable police officer would believe he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity will be denied with respect to Plaintiff's false arrest claim.
The court further finds that the disputed issues of fact prevent application of qualified immunity to Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, and Officer Seitz for Plaintiff's excessive force claim. The court cannot determine the reasonableness of the officers' actions without ascertaining whether Officer Seitz threw Plaintiff to the ground, and whether Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, or Officer Seitz twisted her arm, threw her against a wall, and handcuffed her wrists too tightly at City Hall. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity will be denied with respect to Plaintiff's excessive force claim.
Local government entities cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for their employees' acts using the theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). However, York can be held liable if Plaintiff can "identify a municipal `policy' or `custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury." Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Once a policy or custom is identified, Plaintiff must show that "through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the alleged injury." Must v. W. Hills Police Dep't, 126 Fed. App'x 539, 544 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Berg v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2000)). A custom is a practice that is "so permanent and well-settled as to virtually constitute law," while a policy is established by showing that a "decisionmaker possessing final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action `issues an official proclamation, policy or edict.'" Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)).
The failure to adequately train employees may establish Section 1983 liability if the plaintiff provides "evidence of a pattern of constitutional violations." Must, 126 Fed. App'x at 544. This failure must "amount to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with whom the police come in contact." Horton v. City of Harrisburg, No. 06-cv-2338, 2009 WL 2225386, *4 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 2009) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 943 F.2d 1017, 1028 (3d Cir. 1991). Deliberate indifference requires that "(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights." Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999). "A need for training or other corrective action to avoid imminent deprivations of a constitutional right must be so apparent that any reasonable policymaker or supervisor would have taken appropriate preventive measures." Horton, 2009 WL 2225386 at *4 (quoting Strauss v. Walsh, No. 01-cv-3625, 2002 WL 32341791, *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2002)); Garcia v. Cty. of Bucks, 155 F.Supp.2d 259, 268 (E.D. Pa. 2001). Plaintiff's recovery also requires that the failure to train claim be "closely related to the ultimate [constitutional] injury." Id. (quoting Woloszyn v. Cty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 325 (3d Cir. 2005)).
Here, York argues that Plaintiff cannot present evidence that it violated her rights or that there is evidence of any prior constitutional violations or a pattern of such violations relating to use of excessive force. (Doc. 87, pp. 28-30.) In opposition, Plaintiff submits the deposition testimony of Training Coordinator Troy Bankert, Chief of Police Wesley Kahley, Operations Commander Timothy Utley, and Internal Affairs Inspector Dana Ward. Plaintiff argues that the lack of training on what exceeds reasonable use of force, the lack of legal input when creating use of force policies, the lack of long-term oversight, ignorance of complaints of civil rights violations, and the absence of meaningful discipline shows the failure to train and supervise, thus creating a custom of approving of the use of excessive force. (Doc. 96, pp. 29-35.) Once again, the parties disagree regarding the substance and value of this evidence. As such, in reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court finds that reasonable jurors could conclude that York's failure to train its officers establishes deliberate indifference under Section 1983. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's state law claims for battery and false imprisonment are barred by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act ("PTCSA"). The PTCSA grants immunity from liability to municipalities for any damages resulting from an injury to a person caused by the municipality, its employees, or another person with limited exceptions not applicable in this matter. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8542. This immunity "extends to an employee who is liable [in his individual capacity] for civil damages caused by acts which are within the scope of his office or duties." Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994). However, this immunity does not protect conduct that "amounts to actual fraud, crime, actual malice or willful misconduct." Kokinda, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 594. Willful misconduct is "synonymous with the term intentional tort." Allen v. District Attorney's Office of Phila., 644 F.Supp.2d 600, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citations omitted). Because battery and false imprisonment are intentional torts and the court lacks sufficient facts to determine whether Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, and Officer Seitz acted in a manner constituting willful misconduct, the court will not grant Defendants immunity pursuant to the PSTCA at this time.
In Pennsylvania, battery requires "proof that the defendant acted with the intent to cause harmful or offensive bodily contact with the person of the plaintiff and that such contact actually followed." Dull, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (citations omitted). Police officers are permitted to commit battery when using a reasonable amount of force when effectuating an arrest. Id. (citations omitted). However, use of excessive force dissolves this privilege. Id. Because Plaintiff has satisfied her prima facie burden as to her excessive force claim, she has also satisfied that burden regarding battery. Accordingly, Defendants motion will be denied as to this claim and Plaintiff's claim against Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, and Officer Seitz for battery will proceed to a jury.
"False arrest and false imprisonment are essentially the same claim." Kokinda, 557 F. Supp. at 593 (quoting Olender v. Twp. of Bensalem, 32 F.Supp.2d 775, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1999)). In Pennsylvania, a claim of false imprisonment requires "(1) the detention of another person, and (2) the unlawfulness of such detention." Id. (quoting Renk, 641 A.2d at 293). The lack of probable cause for an arrest provides an arrestee with a Section 1983 claim for false imprisonment based on a detention pursuant to that arrest." Crouse, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 673 (quoting Groman, 47 F.3d at 636). Because there is a dispute of facts concerning the existence of probable cause, Defendants motion will be denied as to this claim and Plaintiff's claim against Sergeant Figge and Officer Seitz for false imprisonment will proceed to a jury.
For the reasons stated herein, the court will deny Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. An appropriate order will issue.
